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Neurosensitivity: Implications for cognition and creativity. 
David Bridges 
Sensory-processing sensitivity, or neurosensitivity, is a biologically-based personality 
dimension with implications for personality, creativity and cognition. This thesis focuses on 
sensitivity and its cognitive implications using recent state-of-the-art sensitivity and creativity 
assessments with an aim to identify objective cognitive tests of sensitivity that can 
supplement self-report measures, whilst providing insight into the brain basis for creativity. 
In Chapter 1, we review literature on creativity and sensitivity. Chapter 2 presents new 
evidence that positive-affect-related dimensions of sensitivity benefit creativity independently 
and/or interactively with Big-Five openness. Factor analysis in Chapter 3 provides important 
evidence that multiple dimensions of sensitivity are distinct from Big-Five personality traits. 
Chapter 4 and 5 explore sensitivity-related attention components in relation to endogenous 
and exogenous attention tasks, revealing that positive-affect-related sensitivity is 
characterized by differences in exogenous inhibition-of-return, and defocused, disinhibited 
attention states that facilitate creative potential. Chapter 6 shows sensitivity has positive 
implications for learning and memory processes, demonstrating that neurosensitivity affects 
neuroplasticity favourably. Chapter 7 explores how individual differences in unconscious 
cognitive mechanisms of latent inhibition (LI) may underlie higher creative potential and 
achievement in sensitive, open creators, as theory and evidence suggest low LI in high 
sensitivity and creative achievement. No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that 
LI differs in sensitivity, or underlies the sensitive creator. All findings are interpreted in light 
of a new sensitivity framework that is consistent with cognitive disinhibition and hemispheric 
asymmetry hypotheses of creativity and models of the creative process suggesting an 
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People differ widely in creative ability (Runco, 2014; Sawyer, 2012). Individual 
differences in cognition, affect, and personality have been explored extensively as factors in 
creativity, but pinpointing the exact factors has remained elusive (Sawyer, 2012). A creative 
personality exists (Feist, 1998, 2010), and openness to experience is the strongest predictor of 
creativitiy from the Big-Five traits, but controversies remain (Feist, 2010; Kaufman et al., 
2016; Runco, 2014; Sawyer, 2012). Sensitivity is a biologically-based temperamant 
dimension (Evans & Rothbart, 2007; Pluess, 2015a) that has been associated with creativity 
anecdotally but rarely investigated and with mixed results (Brodsky & Brodsky, 1981; 
Martindale, 1999; Martindale, Anderson, Moore, & West, 1996; Necka & Hlawacz, 2013; 
Shamay-Tsoory, Adler, Aharon-Peretz, Perry, & Mayseless, 2011). Critically, recent state-of-
the-art sensitivity and creativity assessments have not been used, especially those reflecting 
recent advances in defining sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997; Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008; 
Pluess, 2015a) nor has the relationship between creativity and cognitive processes that should 
reflect sensitive neural processing been investigated. This thesis addresses these major gaps 
in understanding individual differences in creativity, focusing on sensitivity and its 
implications for cognitive processes supporting creative potential and achievement. 
Neurobiological Theories of Creative Cognition 
Neurobiological theories of creativity combine fields of neurobiology, neurogenetics and 
cognitive neuroscience to explain individual differences in creative ability (Kaufman, Kornilov, 
Bristol, Tan, & Grigorenko, 2010). A complication for any theory of creativity involves it’s 
operationalization, as prior definitions of “creativity” are both ambiguous, and elusive with an 
abundance of definitions in the past literature offering little consistency (Plucker, Beghetto, & 
Dow, 2004; Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Simonton, 2012a). However, the general consensus, or 
“standard definition” defines creativity as something demanding both originality and 




something to be novel, whereas effectiveness determines the usefulness of an idea or product. 
Neither term alone is sufficient for creativity to emerge. For example, original ideas can stem 
from psychopathology, or randomness, but may lack value. On the other hand, effective or 
useful ideas lacking originality are not new, and so already exist.  
Relevant to enquiries of individual differences are the models that attempt to explain 
how novelty and effectiveness emerge as a function of product, place, process and person (for a 
review of the Four P's of creativity, see Kozbelt, Beghetto, & Runco, 2010). Products and place 
examine creative products and places they flourish, whereas process and person advance the idea 
that creative ability emerges from basic human cognition, recognizing that individual differences 
explain all variation in creative ability (Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995). In this project, we take the 
person and process approach taken from a neurobiological perspective to examine how individual 
differences in biologically-based temperaments shape personality and creative cognition. 
In early seminal work, Colin Martindale developed new perspectives that explain 
individual differences in creativity have a neurobiological basis, combining primary process 
cognition (Kris, 1952), associative hierarchies (Mednick, 1962), and defocused attention 
(Mendelsohn, 1976), which themselves are thought to be cognitive “building blocks” in the 
overall creative process (Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999). Martindale 
(1999) theorized that creative inspirations are the result of a combined mental state in which 
attention is defocused, thought is associative and a large number of mental representations are 
simultaneously activated, occuring together in a state of cognitive disinhibition with 
comparatively more right than left hemisphere activation. Specifically, highly creative people 
have lower cognitive inhibition due to frontal lobe de-activation, with greater disinhibition in 
the right hemisphere, but only when engaged in the creative process. In his synthesis, 
Martindale combined two major theories of creativity under one model; the cognitive 




disinhibition allows usually-inhibited, seemingly irrelevant information to enter conscious 
awareness, thus facilitating the formulation of novel associations (Carson, 2014a) that are 
detected with right-hemisphere lateralized attention mechanisms. Today, both mechanisms 
are thought to reflect two separate stages of the creative process (Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 
2010). 
Martindale’s work is of particular interest because of the role of that cortical arousal 
plays in creative cognition. In a series of experiments, Martindale found that highly creative 
people were over-sensitive and more physiologically reactive than people low in creativity 
(for a review, see Martindale, 1999). Sensitivity is considered as an enduring biologically-
based personality or temperament trait anecdotally linked to higher creativity (Aron & Aron, 
1997) and may reflect individual differences in universal cognitive functions of attention 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007), and cognition more generally through the mechanism of sensory-
processing sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997), or neurosensitivity (Pluess, 2015a). The 
relationship between creativity and cognitive processes that should reflect sensitive neural 
processing have not been investigated prior to this project, thus we address these major gaps 
in understanding individual differences in creativity by focusing on sensitivity and its 












The Sensitive Creator 
Early Observations and Experiments on Creativity and Sensitivity 
The sensitive temperament has been associated with creativity mainly based on 
anecdotal observations, “every sensitive person is unusually creative“ (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 
2011, p. 104), in qualitative research characterizing eminent creators (Martindale, 1989; 
Runco, 1998) or groups (Brodsky & Brodsky, 1981), and in a few early experimental studies 
(for a review, see Martindale, 1999). Inspired by the stereotype of the highly sensitive creator 
and the anecdotal accounts of extreme sensitivity in eminent creators (Martindale, 1989), 
Martindale and colleagues investigated the hypothesis that creative people have exceptionally 
sensitive temperaments, and findings suggest that creativity is associated with higher 
sensitivity to sensory stimulation (Martindale, 1999).  
Martindale and Armstrong (1974a) performed an electroencephalogram (EEG) study 
in which subjects were required to either enhance or suppress their own alpha waves in the 
presence of an auditory tone. Alpha activity is oscillation of the EEG at a frequency between 
8 – 12 Hz observed when a person is minimally aroused; relaxed but awake. Greater alpha 
activity is thought to indicate the low arousal state associated with internally oriented 
attention required for associative ideation (cf. Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Fink & Benedek, 
2014; Martindale & Armstrong, 1974a). Participants were separated into high and low 
creativity groups based on their composite fluency performance measured using the alternate 
uses task (AUT; Christensen, Guilford, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1960) and remote associates 
task (RAT; Mednick, 1962; Mednick & Mednick, 1967). RAT is a reliable 
divergent/convergent creative thinking task positively correlated with ratings of creativity 
(Mednick, 1962) and insightful problem solving (Schooler & Melcher, 1995). The AUT has 
been labelled a pure measure of creativity since it does not correlate with IQ (Martindale, 




fluency factors correlated with IQ (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Silvia, 2008). Interestingly, 
when compared with low creative groups, high creative groups showed higher alpha blockade 
(i.e., less alpha) during habituation to tones over time, but also a greater ability to suppress 
alpha when required. This suggested that high creative groups were more sensitive to 
auditory stimulation (i.e., lower alpha suggesting greater attention to auditory stimuli), but 
also showed greater effortful control of attentional orienting. In another study, participants 
were delivered a series of electric shocks and asked to rate the shock intensity. Scores on both 
AUT and RAT were positively correlated with ratings of shock intensity, suggesting that 
creative groups have a greater sensitivity to sensory stimulation (Martindale, 1977). Another 
study by Martindale et al. (1996) found that high versus low creative groups were more 
physiologically responsive and slower to habituate to stimulation over time. In this study, 
participants fitted with headphones and habituated to 60db bursts of white noise for durations 
of 2.5 seconds. In the test phase, participants were exposed to the white noise at random 
intervals between 25-50 seconds and, to keep attention focused on the task, were asked to 
verbally report their preference (from displeasure to pleasure) for noises. 
Electrophysiological skin conductance response potentials indexed sensitivity of the attention 
orienting response to the white noise, and creativity was measured using the RAT and AUT 
fluency scores (for a review of orienting reflex, see Barry, MacDonald, De Blasio, & Steiner, 
2013; Bradley, 2009). The main result was that positive amplitude in skin conductance, 
reflecting an alerting response, increased across trials in high creatives (HC), but decreased 
for low creatives (LC). Furthermore, gamma EEG band responses, reflecting an attentional 
orienting and habituation response, showed that LC habituated after 3 trials, whereas HC did 
not habituate at all, an effect mainly related to RAT performance. In addition to 
demonstrating higher sensitivity and slower habituations in creative groups, the study also 




fast habituation. Indeed, the slow habituation and high alerting response over time suggests 
that creative groups process more novelty in the mundane and are perhaps less inhibited than 
low creative groups, as would be explained by cognitive disinhibition hypothesis of creativity 
(Martindale, 1999) and also the related phenomenon of low latent inhibition in high creativity 
(Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; Lubow & Gewirtz, 1995; see Chapter 7).  
Martindale’s pioneering work has provided the first experimental evidence that 
physiological sensitivity and slower habituation of the attention orienting response is linked 
to creative potential. However, there has since been important work to consider for the 
interpretation of Martindale’s findings. For example, fluency measures of DT tasks 
commonly used in Martindale’s studies (e.g., Martindale, 1977; Martindale et al., 1996; 
Martindale & Armstrong, 1974a) show some relation to IQ (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Silvia, 
2008) and AUT performance may simply reflect long term memory-retrieval strategies 
(Batey & Furnham, 2006; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007). This suggests that 
the measures used were not entirely valid indicators of creative potential. However, in further 
support of Martindale’s work, creativity has more recently been associated with a sensitivity 
to emotion, as people who are biologically sensitive to negative affect also tend to score 
higher on DT tasks and produce artistic works judged as more creative than people less 
vulnerable (Akinola & Mendes, 2008).  
The Sensitive Temperament 
This thesis focuses on recent advances in defining the sensitive temperament including 
sensory-processing sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997), environmental sensitivity (Pluess, 2015a; 
Pluess & Belsky, 2009, 2013), and orienting sensitivity of the emotion-attention theory of 
temperament (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). Each theory offers unique but overlapping 
perspectives on the physiological processes underlying the sensitive temperament, and each 




perspectives on the relationship between temperament and personality, please see Appendix A: 
Temperament, Personality and Creativity. 
Sensory-Processing Sensitivity 
Sensory-processing sensitivity (SPS; Aron & Aron, 1997) is a broad trait consisting of 
sensitivity types associated with different outcomes in personality, well-being and creative 
potential (Aron & Aron, 1997; Smolewska, McCabe, & Woody, 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 
2015). Aron and Aron (1997) proposed that most species evolved personality types (bold vs. 
shy) that represent two strategies for dealing with novelty; either exploration, which is 
associated with approach behavior, or quiet vigilance (or inhibition), which is associated with 
withdrawal (or avoidance) behavior. The tendency for explore-approach or inhibit-avoid 
strategy is partly determined by individual differences in SPS (Aron & Aron, 1997). SPS is 
defined as a unidimensional genetically influenced temperament dimension characterized by 
differences in the transmission and processing of sensory information. People with high SPS 
tend to be more inhibited towards novelty, but show greater sensitivity to subtle, low-level 
information and engage in deeper processing strategies, in the sense of Craik and Lockhart 
(1972) levels of processing theory, for planning effective action, all of which is driven by a 
stronger biological or emotional reactivity (Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron, Aron, & Davies, 2005; 
Aron, Aron, & Jagiellowicz, 2012). Conceptually, SPS is related to the Behavioural Inhibition 
System (BIS), a "pause and reflect" inhibitory system sensitive to punishment, non-reward and 
novelty. The BIS is more active in neurotic-introverts, or those prone to anxiety (Carver & 
White, 1994; Gray, 1981), although SPS is partially independent of introversion and 
neuroticism (Aron & Aron, 1997). 
SPS is measured using the highly sensitive person scale (HSPS) developed by Aron 
and Aron (1997). The HSPS consists of 27 items measuring sensitivity to both internal and 




sensitivity of sense organs themselves. Items probe tendencies to notice subtleties in the 
environment, having a rich complex inner life, noticing other people’s moods, and being 
deeply moved by arts, but also tendencies to startle easily, to become bothered, overwhelmed 
and withdraw when over-stimulated. The HSPS has good discriminant validity from 
personality factors suggesting that the HSPS is not contained within the Big-Five. For 
example, the multiple correlation of all Big-Five factors (e.g., Goldberg, 1990) with the full 
HSPS (r = .54) leaves 71% of the HSPS variance unexplained by the Big-Five (Aron & Aron, 
1997), with the caveat that the short form versions of the Big-Five personality scales were 
used. When short form measures are used to assess the discriminant validity, it is possible 
that both measures capture different factors of the same conceptual hierarchy, i.e., one 
general factor and one sub factor. If those two measures of the same construct are not highly 
correlated (i.e., <.85) then discriminant validity is assumed (Evans & Rothbart, 2007; Kline, 
2015). However, the HSPS (Aron & Aron, 1997) and short-form Big-Five inventory 
(Goldberg, 1990) have high reliability and validity and capture the core of each trait 
independent of other traits so if short-form personality inventories do not capture sensitivity 
then core definitions of personality domains may be inadequate.  
Using this scale, Aron and Aron (1997) identified two distinct groups of highly 
sensitive individuals. The smaller group of highly sensitive individuals reported substantially 
troubled childhoods and was more introverted and emotional, whereas the larger group 
scored equally high on sensitivity measures but were more similar to non-highly sensitive 
individuals with regards to childhood trauma, introversion and emotionality. Thus, sensitivity 
does not necessarily lead to proneness towards negative affective states. However, highly 
sensitive individuals are more vulnerable to developing negative affect when coming from 
adverse childhood environments, as research also supports links between sensitivity and 




linked to higher incidence of anxiety (Neal, Edelmann, & Glachan, 2002), higher perceived 
stress (Kjellgren, Bood, Axelsson, Norlander, & Saatcioglu, 2007), more frequent symptoms 
of ill health (Benham, 2006), agoraphobia, and harm avoidance, a temperament variable 
linked to inhibition and shyness (Hofmann & Bitran, 2007). Aron et al. (2005) show that SPS 
leads to shyness when proneness to negative affect (i.e., depression and anxiety) develops 
through adverse parental environments. People who were not highly sensitive were less likely 
to experience negative affect and shyness as a result of adverse parental environments. Liss, 
Timmel, Baxley, and Killingsworth (2005) found that highly sensitive individuals who 
experience a low care (cold and rejecting) parental style were more depressed than non-
highly sensitive people in low care groups. No differences in depression rates were found 
between high and low sensitive people when parental care levels were high. Individuals with 
high SPS may be more prone to depression and anxiety as the result of learned helplessness 
following repeated and unavoidable experiences associated with negative affective states. 
This maladaptive tendency in high SPS individuals was suggested to result from a greater 
awareness and non-acceptance of distress, exacerbated by low efficacy for emotional 
regulation (Brindle, Moulding, Bakker, & Nedeljkovic, 2015). Highly sensitive individuals 
are also more likely to experience symptoms of avoidant personality disorder, in particular 
when combined with pessimistic expectancies, that is, highly sensitive people who expect 
negative outcomes are more likely to withdraw and avoid (Meyer & Carver, 2000). 
The HSPS as a measure of SPS may over-represent sensory discomfort and negative 
affect, under-represent positive affect and may actually reveal multiple dimensions of 
sensitivity or other traits. The items on the HSPS focus more strongly on sensory discomfort 
and negative affect associated with sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2008), and the role of 
heightened emotional reactivity is not assessed fully because positive emotion items of the 




originally that the HSPS is a unidimensional construct, but recent evidence has identified 
multiple subfactors within the HSPS (Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et al., 2006), 
some of which are associated with more positive affect and outcomes (Sobocko & Zelenski, 
2015). Consistent with this, Aron et al. (2012) propose at least four facets of the sensitive 
temperament, although the HSPS was not designed to distinguish these. Nonetheless, factor 
analyses of the HSPS, as reviewed next, are subject to technical limitations, including non-
normal score distributions, gender differences, item correlations with negative affect, and 
self-report biases, and future work will need to provide clearer evidence for multiple 
dimensions of SPS (Aron et al., 2012).  
Multiple Dimensions of the HSPS. Smolewska et al. (2006) used a large sample 
(n=851) to study the psychometric properties of the 27-item HSPS and its relation to 
BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1981) and personality. In contrast to the Aron 
and Aron (1997) unidimensional model of SPS, factor analysis by Smolewska et al. (2006) 
identified three factors in the HSPS: Ease of Excitation (EOE) refers to becoming mentally 
overwhelmed by external and internal demands; Aesthetic Sensitivity (AES) refers to 
aesthetic awareness and Low Sensory Threshold (LST) relates to unpleasant sensory arousal 
to external stimuli. Whilst positive inter-correlations amongst the three factors are consistent 
with a higher-order SPS construct, the three factors seem to measure different facets of 
sensitivity. For example, the three factors are not equally associated with personality traits 
and BIS/BAS measures. In general, EOE and LST showed stronger positive associations with 
neuroticism, whereas AES was more positively associated with openness. The full HSPS and 
subfactors showed positive association with the BIS, but all except the LST factor were also 
positively associated with the BAS-reward responsivity. Also, the HSPS was unrelated to the 




(Aron & Aron, 1997). More recent factor analysis by Sobocko and Zelenski (2015) supports a 
similar three-factor solution with a smaller sample (n=319). 
In Evans and Rothbart (2008) study (n=297), the HSPS was characterized as 
measuring at least two temperament constructs, which differentiate between sensory 
sensitivity and sensory discomfort aspects of SPS. Evans and Rothbart (2008) propose that 
thresholds for sensory discomfort should be measured as a separate construct from the 
cognitive detection mechanisms used for fine grained perception of sensory sensitivity. The 
Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ; Evans & Rothbart, 2007) captures sensory 
sensitivity and sensory discomfort within the respective orthogonal temperament constructs 
of orienting sensitivity and negative affect. Orienting sensitivity is the automatic attention to 
internal and external events, and negative affect relates to negative feeling, over-arousal and 
sensory discomfort. Indeed, Evans and Rothbart (2008) using ATQ data found no evidence 
for correlations between sensory sensitivity and sensory discomfort subfactors (r = .00), as 
well as between the higher-order factors of orienting sensitivity and negative affect (r = .09). 
This suggests orthogonality between the two constructs and therefore does not support the 
Aron and Aron (1997) hypothesis that higher sensory sensitivity is linked with tendencies 
towards over-arousal and negative affect. Using factor analysis, Evans and Rothbart (2008) 
also explored the factor structure of the HSPS and found the HSPS to contain two primary 
factors, the first relating to negative affect (r =.70), and the second relating to orienting 
sensitivity (r =.63). However, the two factors of orienting sensitivity and negative affect 
extracted from the HSPS show a small correlation (r = .25). The authors note that only one 
item (i.e., ‘‘Do you seem to be aware of subtleties in your environment?’’) of the HSPS fits 
the ATQ’s specific definition of perceptual/sensory sensitivity subfactor of the orienting 
sensitivity construct, and so it is possible the orienting sensitivity factor of the HSPS overlaps 




support for multidimensionality of the HSPS (Smolewska et al., 2006), but the correlation 
observed between the HSPS subfactors is challenging to reconcile with the orthogonal 
structure of the ATQ factors of OS and NA (Evans & Rothbart, 2008) as they suggest a 
higher-order, unidimensional factor of sensory-processing sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997). 
Indeed, this would be consistent with evidence that factor analysis of the HSPS does not 
always produce good fits for two- or three-factor solution (e.g., Liss, Mailloux, & Erchull, 
2008), and with suggestions that factor analysis of the HSPS is fraught with technological 
limitations, for example item differences in social desirability and gender bias that could 
explain the emergence of multiple factors (Aron & Aron, 2013). Thus, it is possible that 
differences in orthogonality between OS and NA factors of the ATQ and the HSPS may 
result from qualitative item differences loading on each factor. 
Multidimensional HSPS and the different outcomes by factor. Based on the links 
with sensitivity types, personality and BIS/BAS, different sensitivity types appear to be 
associated with desirable or undesirable traits or outcomes. Smolewska et al. (2006) show 
that the AES facet from the HSPS is associated with positive and desirable aspects of 
personality, such as openness, and the EOE and LST facets are associated with undesirable 
aspects of personality, such as neuroticism and BIS. Furthermore, EOE and LST factors are 
associated with poorer social and communication skills as well as depression (Liss et al., 
2005). These findings may reflect the two distinct groups of highly sensitive individuals 
identified by Aron and Aron (1997) who differed in introversion and neuroticism as a result 
of adverse parental environment. Evidence for differences in happiness and well-being across 
SPS factors identified by Smolewska et al. (2006) was explored in a study by Sobocko and 
Zelenski (2015). 
In addition to replicating the three-factor solution, Sobocko and Zelenski (2015) 




factor models of the HSPS with personality, well-being, and emotion. Findings from the first 
experiment (n=154) indicated that sensitivity types are differentially related to measures of 
positive and negative affect, suggesting the HSPS can capture sensitivity related to both 
positive and negative affect. The full HSPS, and EOE, LST and NA factors showed moderate 
positive correlations with measures of neuroticism and negative affect. They also showed 
negative correlations with extraversion and measures of subjective happiness. In contrast, 
both AES and OS factors show equal and significant positive correlations with measures of 
openness and positive affect. This suggests that AES and OS factors measure something 
different than other sensitivity factors. However, the OS factor was also positively correlated 
with neuroticism, which may be explained by the lack of pure sensory sensitivity items 
comprising that factor, as identified by Evans and Rothbart (2008). For example, the HSPS 
item “When you were a child, did parents or teachers seem to see you as sensitive or shy?” is 
part of the OS factor, according to 2-factor HSPS models (Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Sobocko 
& Zelenski, 2015), although it does not load onto the OS factor (-.01) but instead loads onto 
the NA factor (.36) in Evans and Rothbart (2008) 2-factor model. Also, the HSPS item, “Do 
other people’s mood affect you” is part of the OS factor, according to 2-factor HSPS models 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) but shows equal loading on NA and 
OS factors (.32) in Evans and Rothbart (2008) 2-factor model. Such mixed factor items 
should be excluded from scales that aim to capture OS. Indeed, Sobocko and Zelenski (2015) 
excluded the former (“shy”) item entirely, and both these items are not included in the very 
short HSPS with the 6 best items that directly assess SPS and the more diverse 12-item short 
HSPS (Aron & Aron, 2013). 
Environmental Sensitivity: Two Outcomes of Sensitivity 
A recent conceptualization of the sensitive temperament is the “environmental 




external environmental stimuli (Pluess, 2015a). Based on genetic, physiological, and 
psychological evidence, the central mechanism of environmental sensitivity is proposed to be 
“neurobiological susceptibility” or “neurosensitivity”. Neurosensitivity is determined directly 
and interactively by genetic and environmental factors which result in a central nervous system 
responding more strongly to sensory stimulation in more sensitive individuals (Pluess, 2015a). 
Neurosensitivity may occur due to neuronal hyper-excitability resulting from reduced inhibitory 
control (i.e., disinhibition) and increased synaptic spine density, providing a mechanism whereby 
stimulation accumulates to threshold levels more rapidly in sensitive individuals (Homberg, 
Schubert, Asan, & Aron, 2016). Interestingly, cognitive disinhibition (i.e., reduced inhibition) plays 
an important role in the creative process (Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999).  
Environmental sensitivity captures both negative and positive aspects of sensitivity 
within a single account (Pluess, 2015a), and incorporates ideas about sensory-processing 
sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997), differential susceptibility theory (DST; Belsky & Pluess, 
2009a) and biological sensitivity to context theory (BSCT; Ellis, Boyce, Belsky, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & Van IJzendoorn, 2011). The DST (Belsky & Pluess, 2009a) within the 
environmental sensitivity framework explains the two sides of sensitivity, and sensitivity to 
positive experiences that enhance potential for creativity would be on the positive side; a 
“vantage sensitivity”. The sensitive temperament is associated with disproportionate 
susceptibility to negative life events, i.e., the negative side of sensitivity similar to diathesis 
stress models (Monroe & Simons, 1991), and to positive life events showing positive side or 
“vantage sensitivity” (Pluess, 2015a; Pluess & Bartley, 2015; Pluess & Belsky, 2013). The 
endogenous attributes including temperament, physiology and variation in serotongergic and 
dopaminergic genes (e.g., 5-HTTLPR short alleles and DRD4 7-repeat) that lead to 
vulnerability to stressors (i.e., sensitive temperament) may also allow one to benefit more from 




therefore show "vantage sensitivity" and gain disproportionate benefits of positive enriching 
environments along with resilience to negative experiences (Pluess & Belsky, 2013). Indeed, 
as mentioned above, recent evidence has identified two- or three-factors within the HSPS 
associated with different outcomes in personality, emotion and well-being (Aron & Aron, 
1997; Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015). By a 2-
factor solution, a negative affect (NA) factor is associated with negative aspects of sensitivity, 
such as negative emotion, neuroticism, and sensory discomfort, while a 3-factor solution splits 
NA into ease of excitation (EOE; e.g., “more sensitive to pain”) and low sensory threshold 
(LST; e.g., “overwhelmed by strong sensory input”) (Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et 
al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015). By a 2-factor solution, a second orienting sensitivity 
(OS) factor is associated with positive aspects of sensitivity, such as positive emotion and open 
personality, and a 3-factor solution characterizes largely the same set of items into a third factor 
of aesthetic sensitivity (e.g., “deeply moved by the arts”) so both these factors relate to OS and 
will henceforth be considered as such. Vantage sensitivity may thus relate to measures of 
positive outcomes in sensitivity (i.e., OS and openness), and the addition of resilience, which 
may be associated with such positive outcomes, may be important for creativity. Indeed, the 
openness and sensitivity to experience consciousness, but with a resilience so as not to suffer, 
is one of the paradoxical characteristics of the creative person (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). This 
project proposes and investigates the novel hypothesis that vantage sensitivity includes an 
orienting sensitivity factor as a positive outcome of the sensitive temperament due to positive 
experiences and thus provides a cognitive basis for the role of sensitivity in creative cognition, 
through the mechanisms of attention (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). 
Orienting Sensitivity in the Emotion-Attention Framework 
The emotion-attention framework defines four temperament factors based on emotion 




development of the adult temperament questionnaire (ATQ), which includes NA and OS as 
two of four major temperament factors also observed in the two-factor split of the HSPS 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2008). The ATQ expands the definition of NA beyond sensory 
discomfort (part of the HSPS) to include fear, sadness and frustration. The NA construct is an 
orthogonal construct to sensitivity, which is defined entirely by OS (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 
2008). OS is defined as the sensitivity of automatic reactive attention and includes subfactors 
associated with sensitivity to percepts, associations, and affect. OS is a correlate with 
openness to experience (r = .65), which is surprising given that OS measures awareness of 
low intensity stimuli, and openness is a broad, complex personality construct consisting of 
insightfulness, reflection and imagination (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). Evans and Rothbart 
(2007) explain the relationship with the proposal that orienting sensitivity may be the 
biological substrate for openness, consistent with the general idea that temperament interacts 
with experience to “grow” personality (Goldsmith et al., 1987; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 
2000; Shiner et al., 2012b; Zentner & Bates, 2008). The OS construct is distinct from 
effortful control (EC), essentially executive attention, which includes effortful attention, 
inhibition, and activation control constructs (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008). The two 
attention components of the emotion-attention model load on to separate higher order factors. 
In one higher-order factor, negative affect is negatively correlated with effortful control, and 
another higher-order factor consists of positively correlated affiliativeness, positive 
emotionality, and orienting sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2009). As sensory-processing 
sensitivity of the HSPS (Aron & Aron, 1997) may capture positive and negative affect-related 
of the sensitive temperament (Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & 
Zelenski, 2015), it is possible that sensory-processing sensitivity would overlap with both 
higher-order factors that are related to negative affect and its effortful control, and the 




relative strengths of those higher-order factors in the sensitive temperament would be an 
index of the developmental outcome, in a similar way that relative strengths of BIS/BAS 
define Eysenckian extraversion (Gray, 1981). For example, high sensitivity with negative 
childhood experiences (Aron et al., 2005) and lower resilience through maladaptive 
emotional regulation strategies (Brindle et al., 2015) develops tendencies towards negative 
affect, and high sensitivity in positive enriching environments leads to positive life outcomes, 
such as higher OS, openness and creativity (Lin, Hsu, Chen, & Chang, 2013; Pluess, 2015b; 
Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015). The disproportionate susceptibility to life experience thus 
determines the relative strength of scores on the negative affect and positive emotionality 
dimensions of the ATQ. 
Mechanisms of Creative Potential and Achievement in Sensitivity 
SPS, environmental sensitivity and orienting sensitivity provide unique but overlapping 
explanations of the sensitive temperament. Both SPS and environmental sensitivity explain 
both the negative and positive outcomes of the sensitive temperament, that is, a 
disproportionate susceptibility to negative outcomes following childhood adversity (Aron & 
Aron, 1997; Aron et al., 2005; Pluess, 2015a) but simultaneously the potential for 
disproportionate gain in the presence of positive enriching environments resulting in positive 
outcomes i.e., OS, openness and resilience of vantage sensitivity. The HSPS can capture both 
of the two outcomes as indicated by the two- and three-factor solutions of the HSPS (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), which includes the Evans 
and Rothbart (2007) definition of sensitivity (i.e., orienting sensitivity) as something separate 
from negative affect. Evans and Rothbart’s theory adds unique value as orienting sensitivity is 
an observable, objective cognitive ability of orienting attention. How different factors 
associated with the sensitive temperament are related to creativity has not been explored, 




Sensitivity, Affect and Creativity 
Different sensitivity factors may affect creativity differently because different factors 
of SPS (OS vs. NA, respectively) have been associated with positive and negative affect 
(Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), which have been associated in different ways with creativity 
(Runco, 2014; Sawyer, 2012).  
The broad two-factor temperament theory (Evans & Rothbart, 2009) splits OS and NA 
into different overarching factors, combining OS, positive affect/extraversion, and 
agreeability/affiliativeness into one global factor, and NA and effortful control into a second 
global factor, similar to the meta-traits of stability and plasticity in personality theory 
(DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2002; Digman, 1997). OS is positively associated with 
openness (Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), which 
is the personality trait most associated with higher creativity (Feist, 2010; Kaufman et al., 2016; 
Runco, 2014; Sawyer, 2012). Both OS (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) and openness (Steel, 
Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008) are associated with positive affect. For activating mood states 
(approach vs. avoidance), positive affect is associated with higher creativity, whereas negative 
affect is associated with lower creativity (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008; cf. Kaufmann, 
2003). Thus, consistent with a “positive-mood-promotes-creativity” hypothesis, the sensitive 
temperament factors associated with positive affect (i.e., OS) may promote higher creativity, 
while ones associated with negative affect (i.e., NA, or EOE and LST) may lower creativity.  
Consistent with this, Lin and colleagues (2013) found that ATQ OS correlates 
positively with creativity, as measured by verbal and figural insight problem-solving tasks and 
subscales (fluency, flexibility, originality, and elaboration) of the ATTA (Goff & Torrance, 
2002), an objective test of divergent thinking. However, when OS, 6-factor personality traits, 
and IQ are considered independently in a hierarchical multiple regression, OS accounts for 




suggests OS is related only to the illumination stage of the creative process (Lubart, 2001; 
Wallas, 1926) leading to insight. However, the HSPS and NA were not assessed, nor were 
interactions of sensitivity types and personality, or overall ATTA score, and the tests were 
Asian versions. The evidence that OS promotes creativity, while controlling for negative affect, 
would provide important support that creativity is a positive outcome of the sensitive 
temperament within a positive experiential environment; a vantage sensitivity (Pluess, 2015a, 
2015b). 
Orienting Attention 
The present evidence for a relationship between sensitivity and creativity is consistent 
with early behavioural and physiological evidence from Martindale and colleagues for the 
cognitive disinhibition and hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis of creativity (for reviews, see 
Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999), and this evidence is also consistent with 
a role for sensitivity of orienting attention in creativity. For example, Martindale et al. (1996) 
found that creative people, as defined by RAT and AUT performances, were more 
physiologically responsive with slower habituation of the orienting response to auditory 
stimulation (i.e., white noise). Thus creativity is associated with lower ability to habituate to 
sensory stimulation, which is associated with a higher OR. In addition, Aron and Aron (1997) 
noted that about 70% of highly sensitive people are introverts, and introverts show a higher 
physiological orienting response with moderate stimulation (Zahn, Kruesi, Leonard, & 
Rapoport, 1994) and are slower to habituate than extraverts at high levels of stimulation (for a 
review, see O'Gorman, 2016). However, this was based on the HSPS, and recent work 
indicates that OS is an independent factor from introversion (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). Thus 
early work suggests sensitivity is related to a higher orienting response, and higher sensitivity 




The orienting response (OR) reflects activity in basic motivational systems for behavior 
(defensive vs. appetitive) that evolved to support perception, action, and ultimately, survival 
(Bradley, 2009). The function of the OR is to immediately orient attention towards novel, 
important and relevant events in the environment (Sokolov, 1963, 1990). The orienting 
response is associated with several brain electrical potentials, including the centro-parietal 
“novelty P300” ERP known as the late positive potential (LPP), or the orienting “O-wave” 
(Bradley, 2009; Polich, 2007). The O-wave, starting from 300 to 400 msec after presentation 
of simple stimuli, shows the largest modulation in response to arousing and emotionally 
significant (pleasant or unpleasant) images and responds similarly to the skin conductance 
response associated with orienting attention (for a review, see Bradley, 2009). The OR can be 
active/voluntary or passive/involuntary (Sokolov, 1990) and has a neural basis in the 
distributed dorsal and ventral fronto-parietal orienting attention networks (Barry et al., 2013; 
Chica, Bartolomeo, & Valero-Cabre, 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Fan, McCandliss, 
Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005; Knight, 1996; Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Posner, 
Rothbart, & Tang, 2015; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Spreng, Sepulcre, Turner, Stevens, & 
Schacter, 2013). Thus early work on creativity suggested that sensitivity of the orienting 
attention networks is associated with creativity.  
Two modes of orienting sensitivity. Temperament theory of Evans and Rothbart 
(2009) suggest that emotion and motivation form the basis of human temperament through 
processes of reactivity and self-regulation. Reactivity relates the emotional characteristics of 
the individual’s response to an event, a process inextricably linked with the orienting reflex 
(Bradley, 2009). Self-regulation is the process which modulates reactivity, which includes 
patterns of approach/avoidance, and attentional orientation and selection (for a review, see 
Rothbart, Derryberry, & Posner, 1994). Two modes of orienting present in this theory include 




according to task goal (e.g., self-regulation). This thesis is, in part, focused on how sensitivity 
of the orienting attention system relates to temperament, personality and creativity. 
To understand orienting sensitivity one must consider the processes underlying the 
dorsal and ventral attention networks that Rothbart and colleagues propose underlie this 
temperament. Orienting attention could reflect two modes that serve a single system (Jonides, 
1981; Posner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985) or two independent systems (e.g., Muller & 
Rabbitt, 1989). Recent evidence suggests spatially distinct, functionally competitive but 
interactive neural systems that subserve internally and externally oriented cognitions (Chica, 
Lasaponara, et al., 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dixon, Fox, & Christoff, 2014; Fox, 
Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Spreng et al., 2013). The dorsal network 
supports endogenous attention, and the ventral network supports exogenous attention. 
Endogenous orienting attention is voluntary, controlled internally, and oriented to spatial 
locations or non-spatial features of stimuli that are relevant to the task goal and long term 
cognitive strategies. For example, biasing attention towards colored spots if hungry, or sudden 
movements or animal-like shapes if fearing a predator (Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004). 
Endogenous attention involves top-down feedback from dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex, frontal 
eye fields (FEF), and intraparietal (IPS), although FEF and IPS are also modulated by stimulus-
driven attention, as during stimulus driven reorienting of attention to relevant targets (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002). The dorsal attention network has been suggested to be a multiple-demand 
system of attentional control for flexible cognition that has a necessary role in standard tests of 
fluid intelligence, such as problem solving (Crittenden & Duncan, 2014; Duncan, 2010, 2013; 
Erez & Duncan, 2015; Fedorenko, Duncan, & Kanwisher, 2013). 
Exogenous orienting attention has been implicated in early processes of bottom-up, 
involuntary/automatic, stimulus-driven attention and re-orienting of attention (Corbetta & 




up processing of relevant sensory stimulation, such as becoming aware of a colored potentially 
fruitful blob in a bush or the sudden movements of an approaching predator (Connor et al., 
2004; Posner & Rothbart, 2007), or with explicit memory (Binder & Desai, 2011; Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008), as described in the attention to memory model (Cabeza et 
al., 2011; Daselaar, Huijbers, Eklund, Moscovitch, & Cabeza, 2013). The neuroanatomy of the 
ventral frontoparietal exogenous attention network includes the TPJ and the ventral frontal 
cortex (VFC). The parts of the TPJ component of the ventral system may have a role in 
switching between exogenous and endogenous orienting. Connections between the TPJ and 
IPS act as a circuit breaker on the endogenous attention, reorienting attention to relevant, 
unexpected information detected using exogenous orienting attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002).  
Orienting sensitivity as ventral exogenous attention. Evans and Rothbart (2007) 
originally defined orienting sensitivity in a way that suggests an emphasis on exogenous 
more than endogenous orienting of attention. However, the neuroimaging studies using the 
attention network task (ANT; Fan et al., 2005), and work by Posner that informed 
development of the two attention temperament constructs of the ATQ (OS, EC) focus 
primarily on endogenous or dorsal (anterior) attention network (for a review, see Rothbart et 
al., 1994). Nonetheless, orienting sensitivity was originally defined as reactive attention that 
is separate from effortful attention (Evans & Rothbart, 2007) and later defined as “automatic 
attention to both external sensory events and internal events”, such as spontaneously 
occurring thoughts and images (Evans & Rothbart, 2008). Spontaneity in the definition fits 
ideas about exogenous orienting attention and sudden awareness, placing emphasis on a 





Exogenous attention has been considered to be purely automatic but may not be 
entirely, as some studies have found it to be modified by endogenous orienting attention, which 
is thought to be effortful and intentional (Chica, 2012). Further, while endogenous orienting 
was thought to be more closely related to consciousness, recent work indicates that exogenous 
attention is more strongly linked to conscious perception than endogenous attention (Chica, 
2012). Recent findings suggest that exogenous attention is necessary, but insufficient for 
conscious perception, whereas endogenous attention may not be necessary or sufficient (Chica 
& Bartolomeo, 2012; Chica, Lasaponara, et al., 2011). Consistent with the association between 
consciousness and exogenous orienting, the orienting sensitivity items ask about awareness 
(“aware”, “notice”, “detect”, and “consciously”) of subtle information from perceptual, 
emotional, and memory sources. Intriguingly, the sensitive individual has been characterized 
as being more consciously aware of stimuli (Aron et al., 2012). In addition, the ventral attention 
system has been implicated in unilateral neglect (Corbetta, Kincade, Lewis, Snyder, & Sapir, 
2005; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), and neglect patients are highly insensitive to stimuli in space 
contralateral to the lateral parietal lesion. For example, lesions to the TPJ can result in 
visuospatial neglect which can cause deficits in orienting of attention (Friedrich, Egly, Rafal, 
& Beck, 1998), although considerable pre-attentive processing of neglected stimuli can still 
take place without reaching conscious awareness (Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001). Thus, while 
dysfunction of the ventral attention system results in stimulus insensitivity, high function of 
this system might result in high stimulus sensitivity, as in the sensitive temperament. How 
orienting sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2007) and SPS (Aron & Aron, 1997) or environmental 
sensitivity (Pluess, 2015a) relate to cognitive measures of endogenous and exogenous attention 





Implications for creativity due to sensitivity of exogenous orienting. As mentioned 
previously, the neurobiological account of Martindale (1999) suggests that cognitive 
disinhibition and hemispheric asymmetry reflect two separate stages of creative cognition 
(Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010). Cognitive disinhibition facilitates internally directed 
thought processes, such as day-dreaming, fantasy and ideation, and the exogenous attention 
network monitors, detects and signals the mind to orient towards novelty. How then would 
sensitivity, as defined in this thesis, relate to creativity? We now talk about sensitivity in 
relation to theories of creative cognition, with a particular focus on orienting sensitivity. 
Orienting sensitivity represents a positive outcome (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), a vantage 
sensitivity (Pluess, 2015b), or a sensitivity without childhood adversity (Aron & Aron, 1997). 
Thus, orienting sensitivity captures positive outcomes of all three perspectives of the 
sensitive temperament reviewed herein. 
This thesis investigates whether sensitivity affects cognitive processes that play a role 
in key parts of the creative process. The four-stage model of creativity (for a review, see 
Lubart, 2001; Wallas, 1926) breaks the creative process down into separate cognitive 
processes involving preparation, incubation, illumination and verification. In this model the 
creative process begins with conscious work on a problem, which is followed by unconscious 
work involving exploration and rejection of associations and ideations related to a solution. 
Illumination is characterized as a flash of enlightenment or insight (the “A-ha” moment) and 
occurs when an interesting idea springs into conscious awareness. The insight is followed by 
verification, evaluation and refinement of the idea. Stage models can be recursive, in which 
an individual can, for example, go back to incubation stage in order to resolve difficulties in 
verification. The original stage models were based on introspective evidence but have since 
received some empirical support (Lubart, 2001). The first stage of preparation involves 




(Posner, 1980; Sokolov, 1963, 1990), and of particular importance would be orientation 
towards novelty. Novelty seeking is a behavioral trait associated with positive affect and 
openness to experience, both of which are orienting sensitivity correlates (DeYoung et al., 
2002; DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005; Evans & Rothbart, 2007; Sobocko & Zelenski, 
2015). A sensitive orienting system would be more able to extract and encode information. 
During incubation, cognitive disinhibition, a proposed mechanism of neurosensitivity 
(Homberg et al., 2016), that could also result from low arousal and low effortful control, 
could facilitate spontaneous mind wandering, day-dreaming etc. Recall, the orienting 
attention reflex responds to relevant information, surprise and novelty. Whilst unconscious 
associative processes take place during incubation, a sensitive exogenous attention system 
could have a greater ability to orient towards and retrieve low threshold novel and surprising 
associations in memory and bring them to the forefront of consciousness in a spark of insight, 
or illumination (e.g., Lin et al., 2013). This would predict, for example, higher scores on tasks 
such as the RAT, which has been used to measure creativity and insight. Consistent with this, 
greater insight in RAT performance is associated with higher alpha EEG (Jung-Beeman et al., 
2004; Kounios et al., 2008). Indeed, reductions in alpha are associated with increasing 
demands of endogenous attention (Cooper, Croft, Dominey, Burgess, & Gruzelier, 2003; 
Klimesch, Doppelmayr, Russegger, Pachinger, & Schwaiger, 1998; Laufs et al., 2003). Thus 
greater alpha may reflect internally directed cognitions required for associative ideation (cf. 
Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Fink & Benedek, 2014; Martindale & Armstrong, 1974a) and also 
exogenous attention processes implicated through anti-correlation of exogenous and 
endogenous attention networks.  
The hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis of creativity may also account for the role of 
orienting attention sensitivity in creativity. Recall from Appendix A, the right hemispheric 




Robertson, 1998). Global, diffused attention may facilitate RAT performance (Förster & 
Dannenberg, 2010; Mendelsohn, 1976), creative insight (Schooler & Melcher, 1995), cognitive 
flexibility (Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010) and divergent thinking (Förster & 
Dannenberg, 2010; Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003; Friedman & Förster, 2001). 
Orienting sensitivity may index diffused, exogenous attentional processes associated with 
global hierarchical perception. Thus, higher orienting sensitivity could be associated with 
higher RAT, insight, and DT performance.  
Thesis Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to determine individual differences in temperament and 
personality and associated perceptual and cognitive processing that characterize the creative 
person. The first aim is to establish relationships between temperament, personality and 
creative potential and achievement using state-of-the-art measures, which are primarily based 
on self-report plus one objective test of creativity. The second aim is to establish objective 
measures of the cognitive processes associated with the temperament and personality factors 
that are associated with creativity, thus providing a possible neurocognitive basis for 
creativity. This thesis recognises the global dimension of sensitive temperament, termed SPS 
or neurosensitivity, but explores multiple factor solutions of the HSPS that suggest an 












The Sensitive, Open Creator 
 
Abstract 
Identifying a creative personality has been challenging. Sensitivity was implicated in 
creativity in early studies but more recently defined as a personality dimension with a 
biological basis. This laboratory study with a large diverse sample used multiple recently 
established sensitivity and creativity measures while controlling negative-affect and Big-Five 
personality traits. Only higher orienting sensitivity and openness personality are associated 
with higher creativity by all measures and independently predict creative achievement and 
ideation. Further, orienting sensitivity predicts creative achievement and products in open 
personalities, but conscientiousness also predicts products. Only positive-affect-related 
orienting sensitivity and openness primarily determine diverse creative abilities, providing 
needed evidence and strongest to date that high sensitive personality (“vantage sensitivity”) 
promotes creativity. Neural mechanisms of attention, plasticity genes, and latent-inhibition 




































































The present study investigated the relationship between sensitivity and creativity, 
using multiple state-of-the-art measures of each that reflect recent advances, while controlling 
negative affect-related factors and Big Five dimensions. Sensitivity measures were reviewed 
in Chapter 1, and so this chapter begins with a brief review of literature focusing on the 
measurement of creative potential and achievement, because those concepts will be explored 
in relation to sensitivity. 
Creativity: Concepts and Measurement 
 Different conceptualizations of creativity tend to be associated with different 
measurements. One important distinction to make is that between creative potential and 
creative achievement, as the two concepts may not actually be related (Runco, 2014). 
Creative potential is a normally distributed, person-oriented little-c creativity and refers to an 
ability to produce new and useful ideas, whereas creative achievement is a positively skewed, 
product-oriented dimension referring to tangible big-C achievements, such as awards, 
patents, or publications (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005; Jauk, Benedek, Dunst, & 
Neubauer, 2013; Runco, 2014). In this project, we investigate how individual differences in 
temperament, personality and cognition relate to both creative potential and achievement, 
considered as two measures on a single continuum of creative magnitude.  
Measurement of Creative Potential.  Creative potential can be observed by 
measuring divergent thinking (DT) abilities. It was Guilford (1950) who linked divergent 
production (i.e., thinking) to creative potential. DT has been defined as the ability to give a 
diversity of responses to open-ended problems and, through ideation, this often leads to 
originality, a central feature of creativity (Runco & Acar, 2012). In the Structure of Intellect 
theory (Guilford, 1967), divergent thinking was defined as a major operation of the human 




leads to a conventional, correct response to a clearly defined question and is more often 
associated with intelligence (Gardner, 2011a). Although seemingly distinct, divergent and 
convergent thinking are thought to exist on a single divergence-convergence continuum 
(Eysenck, 1993; Runco, 2014), in which both styles of thinking are important for creativity 
(Cropley, 2006). Indicators of divergent thinking measure cognitive abilities such as fluency, 
flexibility, originality and elaboration, and whilst not considered the same as creative 
thinking, can be seen as an indicator of creative potential (Runco, 2014).  
Divergent thinking tasks generally have adequate reliability (Runco & Acar, 2012), 
although reliability estimates of originality differ across verbal and figural DT tasks and may 
be over-inflated due to high correlations with the fluency factor. Fluency contaminates 
originality in verbal DT tasks (Hocevar, 1979b), but originality is reliable in figural DT tasks 
at certain levels of achievement (Runco & Albert, 1985). To counteract this problem, 
alternative scoring methods which control for the effect of fluency on originality are used 
(e.g., Benedek, Mühlmann, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2013).  
The discriminant validity of DT tasks is questionable. For example, Wallach and 
Kogan (1965) show the relation between DT and intelligence depends on the task instructions 
given. That is, under test-like conditions, the discriminant validity is affected by low 
correlations between IQ and DT, but under game-like conditions there is no correlation. A re-
analysis of Wallach and Kogan’s (1965) data suggests that, whilst fluency is strongly related 
to originality, it also has a significantly modest positive relation with IQ (Silvia, 2008). The 
discriminant validity of DT measures is further complicated by the divergence-convergence 
continuum which suggests overlap between the two processes of divergent and convergent 
thinking (Runco & Acar, 2012).  
Regarding convergent validity, DT tasks are positively correlated with various 




2006), including measures of real world creative achievements (r = .47) across several 
domains (Carson et al., 2005), although a recent meta-analysis by Kim (2008) suggest the 
correlation is weak (r = .216). Scores in DT tasks have also been shown to be three times 
better than intelligence measures at predicting creative achievements (Plucker, 1999). 
However, the predictive validity of DT tasks is unstable and influenced by testing conditions 
(e.g., game-like vs. test-like, timed vs. untimed, instructions to “be creative” vs. generic 
instructions) and may also be susceptible to training effects (Plucker & Makel, 2010).  
While this seems to cast doubt on the validity of DT tasks as measures of creative 
potential, the use of creative achievements as criterion measures of divergent thinking have 
been criticised. Runco, Plucker, and Lim (2000-2001) argue that DT is a measure of ideation 
and the potential for problem solving, rather than past creative achievements. As such, DT 
tests are improperly validated when past creative accomplishments are used as the criterion 
measure, which may explain the moderate or low predictive validity found in studies of 
divergent thinking (Kim, 2008). The evidence of discriminant, convergent and predictive 
validity presented is therefore adequate considering DT tasks are not considered as 
synonymous with creativity, but rather as indicators of ideation and creative potential (Runco 
& Acar, 2012).  
The Runco Ideational Behavioural Scale (RIBS; (Runco et al., 2000-2001) was 
designed to address the need for a more appropriate criterion measure when looking at the 
predictive validity of divergent thinking/creative ideation. The RIBS is based on the notion 
that ideas are products of original, divergent and creative thinking. The scale is a self-report 
measure of overt behaviours that clearly reflect an individual’s use, appreciation and skill 
with ideation. The RIBS shows good reliability (Cronbach’s α > .9) and discriminant validity 
with estimates of intellectual ability and other self-report measures of creative thinking. The 




form RIBS-V (r = .94). In addition, RIBS-V offers no incremental predictive validity over 
RIBS-S, which itself shows concurrent validity with measures of creative activities and 
achievement, accounting for 22% variance in scores. RIBS is positively correlated with 
openness to experience (Batey, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Von Stumm, Chung, 
& Furnham, 2011), the Big-Five trait with the strongest relationship with creativity (Feist, 
2010; Kaufman et al., 2016; Runco, 2014; Sawyer, 2012) and shows weak positive 
correlations with DT tasks (Ames & Runco, 2005; Plucker, Runco, & Lim, 2006; Von 
Stumm et al., 2011). Weak correlations between DT and RIBS are consistent with the 
ambiguous construct validity of the RIBS (Runco et al., 2000-2001), which suggests creative 
potential may be more adequately captured with both objective divergent thinking tasks and 
subjective, self-report measures of creative ideation. 
Together, DT tasks and self-report creative ideation can be used to measure creative 
potential, the little-c creativity differing only in magnitude to Big-C creativity (Finke, Ward, 
& Smith, 1992; Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995). As both measures capture little-c creativity, 
they are useful indicators of everyday creative ideation, problem-solving and insight which is 
normally distributed throughout the population (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009) making any 
findings highly generalizable. Whilst DT tasks and creative ideation are not synonymous with 
creativity (Runco, 2014), they will help fulfil the aims of this thesis by providing insights into 
specific cognitive processes responsible for any magnitude of creative achievement (Finke et 
al., 1992; Smith et al., 1995) which may differ across temperament and personality traits. 
Measurement of Creative Achievement. The best predictor of creative behavior 
may be past creative behavior (Colangelo, Kerr, Hallowell, Huesman, & Gaeth, 1992). For 
example, greater engagement in everyday creative activities (e.g., wrote a poem, designed a 
piece of music, made a present) predicts real world creative achievement. Self-report 




perception (for reviews, see Jauk, Benedek, & Neubauer, 2014b; Plucker & Makel, 2010; 
Silvia, Wigert, Reiter-Palmon, & Kaufman, 2012). The Creative Achievements Questionnaire 
(CAQ; Carson et al., 2005) is a recent self-report measure that captures creative achievements 
across 10 domains, focusing on observable but uncommon big-C creative accomplishments. 
The CAQ has adequate reliability and validity; the internal consistency of the CAQ is high (α 
= .96); the predictive validity is evident with CAQ scores strongly positively correlated with 
ratings of creative products (r = .59); convergent validity is demonstrated through moderate 
positive correlations with divergent thinking tests (r = .47) and openness to experience (r = 
.33), a personality trait associated with higher creativity (Carson et al., 2005). The CAQ also 
covaries well with other measures of self-reported creative behavior, achievement and self-
perception (Silvia et al., 2012). CAQ has discriminant validity but shows weak positive 
correlations with IQ (Carson et al., 2005; Keri, 2011). The focus on capturing big-C creativity 
means that CAQ scores are severely skewed with most scores piling up at the lower end of 
the scale and relatively few scores indicating significant creative achievements. CAQ scores 
also tend to be over-dispersed with variances larger than the mean resulting from excessive 
zero scores. The nature of CAQ distributions mean that researchers should pay attention to 
the assumptions of common statistical analysis techniques, and use robust methods or data 
transformations where appropriate (Silvia et al., 2012). 
Study Aims and Hypothesis 
It is recommended that in order to gain accurate measurement of big-C and little-c 
creative achievements, as many measures as possible should be employed, given the time and 
resources available (Silvia et al., 2012). Creativity measures used in this study were (1) the 
Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale (RIBS), which is a questionnaire about creative ideation 
(Runco et al., 2000-2001), (2) the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ), which 




Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA) (Goff & Torrance, 2002), which is a gold standard, 
objective and independently verifiable measure of creative products and divergent thinking 
abilities critical for creativity (Runco et al., 2014). The CAQ and ATTA are not personality 
questionnaires and thus avoid shared method variance. 
Sensitivity measures used in this study include the Highly Sensitive Person Scale 
(HSPS; Aron & Aron, 1997) and the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (Evans & Rothbart, 
2007) which includes Orienting Sensitivity (OS) and Negative Affect (NA) components. The 
Big-Five personality traits were assessed using the Big-Five Inventory (Benet-Martinez & 
John, 1998; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008) because of the 
importance of measuring sensitivity independent of related personality traits, in order to 
determine pure sensitivity effects independent of the Big-Five traits, in particular Neuroticism  
(Aron & Aron, 1997) and Openness (Evans & Rothbart, 2007).  
(i) The primary hypothesis is that different factors of sensitivity have different 
relationships with creativity. (ii) For positive affect-related personality traits, OS improves 
creativity, and the association between creativity and openness depends on sensitivity, insofar 
as openness reflects experience interacting with sensitivity and other factors to develop 
personality (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), and this interaction will vary with different sensitivity 
factors (i.e., specific to OS). In addition, we expect positive correlations between (a) OS and 
openness (Evans & Rothbart, 2007; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) and (b) openness and 
creativity (Feist, 2010; Lin et al., 2013). (iii) For negative affect-related traits, neuroticism is 
related to lower creativity, and the association between neuroticism and creativity depends 
upon NA (or EOE/LST) factors. NA has been associated positively with both neuroticism and 
negative emotion but negatively with both extraversion and positive emotion, while OS 




HSPS models (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015). This suggests that any association between 
neuroticism and creativity may vary with negative affect-related sensitivity factors. 
Method 
Participants  
Stable correlation estimates require a sample size approaching 250 (Schönbrodt & 
Perugini, 2013). A diverse sample of 288 (215 female; aged 18-67 years, M = 21.05, SD = 
5.02; education 7 - 27 years, M = 14.93 years, SD = 2.18) of 297 participants recruited from 
University of Plymouth students (n=252) and local communities (n=45), excluding 9 who did 
not complete, were educated to postgraduate level (n=8), bachelor’s degree level (n=73), A-
level (n=170), college and or other vocational course (n=21), GCSE (n=3) or other (n=13). 
Participants received £8 per hour or course credit. Study approved by Human Ethics 
Committee in the Faculty of Science and Environment at University of Plymouth. 
Participants gave informed consent beforehand and were debriefed afterwards. 
Apparatus and Materials 
The study was lab-based, ensuring participant motivation, compliance, and data 
integrity compared to prior studies of sensitivity and personality where items were answered 
online (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), at home (Smolewska et al., 2006) or at an unspecified 
location (Evans & Rothbart, 2008). An online computerized battery was developed on 
SurveyMonkey (surveymonkey.co.uk) to assess sensitivity, personality and creativity and 
administered in the lab. Each questionnaire was presented on a separate webpage. 
Participants used a mouse to tick the response that best applied from response options on the 
right of each item. Sensitivity was measured using two questionnaires. 1) The full 27-item 
HSPS (Aron & Aron, 1997) is a modality general, self-report scale measuring SPS using 
items asking about tendencies to startle easily, become easily overwhelmed by sensory inputs 




scents, tastes, sounds, and works of art (Aron & Aron, 2013). Responses range from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (extremely). 2) The 77-item, Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ) short-form 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007) is a self-report scale measuring 4 temperament constructs, 
including the 2 HSPS factors of OS and NA, as well as effortful control and 
extraversion/surgency. Responses range from 1 (extremely untrue) to 7 (extremely true) and 
“not applicable”.  
Five dimensions of personality were measured using the 44-item, Big Five Inventory 
(BFI) self-report questionnaire of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, 
neuroticism (BFI-O, C, E, A, N, respectively, henceforth) (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; 
John et al., 1991; John et al., 2008); note, the first 43 participants also completed the full 48-
item openness scale of the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992), which includes all BFI-O 
items. Responses range from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). We were primarily 
interested in openness, which is related to sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2008) and has most 
often been associated with creativity (Sawyer, 2012), and secondarily in neuroticism, as a 
measure of negative affect (Aron & Aron, 2013; Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008), and 
extraversion, which is a second personality factor sometimes linked to creativity (Sawyer, 
2012) and inversely associated with sensitive temperament based on the HSPS (Aron et al., 
2012; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015).  
Creativity was measured using three of the most established and validated measures. 
(1) The RIBS (Runco et al., 2000-2001; Runco et al., 2014) is a 19-item questionnaire 
designed to measure a single factor, creative ideation, and has discriminant validity (Runco et 
al., 2000-2001; Runco et al., 2014). Items probe behavioural tendencies and abilities about 
ideas and thinking, with many items emphasizing creative, unusual, or imaginative thought 
(e.g., “I have many wild ideas.”). Responses range from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). (2) The 




across 10 domains. Common method bias (CMB) is not a problem between RIBS and ATQ-
OS. Based on factor analysis testing with a 1-factor solution, if the model accounts for less 
than 50%, the CMB is not a problem, in this case it was 22%, and common variance using 
AMOS indicated a value of 15%. CMB is not a problem between RIBS and HSPS. Based on 
factor analysis testing for a 1-factor solution, the model accounts for 20% variance and 
common variance using AMOS indicated a value of 21%. (3) The ATTA (Goff & Torrance, 
2002) consists of 3 timed (3-minute) figural and verbal tests administered in paper format 
with a pencil and eraser, and could not be part of the SurveyMonkey battery.  
This study was also lab-based in order to administer additional pencil and paper and 
computerized tests as part of multiple studies used in this thesis (study 1 with n = 43, study 2 
with n = 99 [see Chapter 4], study 3 with n = 65 [see Chapter 5], study 4 with n = 80 [see 
Chapter 6 & 7], study 5 with n = 29). As recommended for HSPS research (Aron & Aron, 
2013), negative affect was controlled using BFI-N, as recommended by Aron and Aron 
(2013), and using the ATQ-NA.  
Procedure 
This study used a within subjects correlational design to explore relations between 
temperament, personality, affect, and creativity. Participants sat at a table in a room with the 
experimenter. Participants first completed the ATTA and then were given a Toshiba Satellite 
laptop and mouse to complete the SurveyMonkey battery (see above). Order of questionnaires 
was: CAQ, RIBS, HSPS, BFI, and ATQ. Participants were instructed that the task was not 
timed, to complete the questionnaires in their own time, and to give honest answers.  
Analysis 
The items of the HSPS were analysed in full and split according to factors of 
sensitivity. Based on the 2-factor solution (Evans & Rothbart, 2008), 7 items measured OS 




factor solution (Smolewska et al., 2006), 12-items measured ease of excitation (HSP-EOE), 
6-items measured low sensory threshold (HSP-LST), and 7 items measured aesthetic 
sensitivity; note, for the HSP-OS/AS factor, 5 items were the same as in the 2-factor HSP-
OS, 1 was the same as in the 2-factor HSP-NA, and 1 was the only conscientiousness item; 
because 5 of 7 items are the same as the HSP-OS factor, and the HSP AS factor is mainly 
orienting sensitivity (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) plus components of NA and conscientious 
personality; henceforth, we refer to this as HSP-OS/AS. For the ATQ, we focused on the two 
factors associated with the HSPS: orienting sensitivity (ATQ-OS) and negative affect (ATQ-
NA). Negative affect was taken into account (Aron et al., 2012) using the NA temperament 
factor of both the HSPS and the ATQ, and the BFI-Neuroticism personality factor, all of 
which assess negative affect as a trait. For completeness, we explored the remaining 
temperament factors of effortful control and extraversion/surgency for correlations with 
creativity and personality and the remaining BFI personality traits (conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness) for correlations with temperament and creativity.  
Before analysis, missing data points were replaced with the mean score across all 
participants (not including excluded participants) for that particular item of the scale. 
Following this, all variables were scaled so values ranged between 0 and 1, as follows. CAQ 
and ATTA scores were scaled so the score was a percentage of the maximum score achieved 
by the highest scoring participant. CAQ scaled scores were: participant CAQ score/max score 
(86). ATTA scaled scores were: participant creative index/max score (92). RIBS scaled 
scores were: (participant mean score for all items – 1)/(maximum possible mean score – 1). 
For personality and temperament scales, scaled scores for each factor in each scale were: 
(participant factor mean score – 1)/(maximum possible mean score - 1). For the HSPS, each 
participant was scored using the mean for the full HSPS and mean scores for each HSP factor 




(HSP-OS/AS, HSP-LST, and HSP-EOE) (Smolewska et al., 2006). For the ATQ, each 
participant was scored on each factor giving a mean factor score for OS, NA, EC, and ES. 
For the BFI, each participant was scored on each personality factor yielding a mean factor 
score for each trait. The assumptions of linear regression were first checked (i.e., linearity, 
normality, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity). If violations could not be corrected, we chose 
non-parametric alternatives to analysis (e.g., Spearman’s Rho correlation). For regression 
analysis, we chose to test 6 models looking at the predictive power of sensitivity measures 
with and without personality variables as covariates. Moderated regressions were performed 
using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
See Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics. 
Correlations 
 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that HSP-NA and EOE factors and ATQ-OS, 
NA and EC factors were the only normally distributed variables (p >.05; see Table 2.1 for 
skewness and kurtosis values). Table 2.1 summarizes non-parametric Spearman’s Rho (rs) 
correlations (two-way; n=288).  
Creativity and personality. Correlations between creativity and the personality 
factors demonstrated that (a) OS was the only factor of sensitivity and the only temperament 
factor, and (b) openness to experience was the only personality factor that correlated 
positively with creativity, as defined by all three measures (CAQ, RIBS, ATTA). Thus higher 
OS and higher openness are related to higher creativity. Specifically, creativity, as measured 
by the CAQ and RIBS, correlated highly positively only with all three measures of OS, the 
ATQ-OS, HSP-OS, and HSP-OS/AS, and with openness personality. Creativity, as measured 




captured by the ATQ-OS, and with openness personality. Notably, only the ATQ-OS and 
BFI-O correlated positively with all three creativity tests. While not our primary goal, for 
completeness, we report that the RIBS showed a weak significant negative correlation with 
ATQ-EC, which measures effortful control (rs =-.177, p < .01). 
Creativity. RIBS was weakly positively correlated with both the CAQ and ATTA. 
CAQ was weakly positively correlated with ATTA. 
Creativity and personality. CAQ and RIBS correlated highly positively only with all 
three measures of OS (ATQ-OS, HSP-OS, and HSP-OS/AS) and with openness, whereas 
ATTA showed small positive correlations only with ATQ-OS and openness. 
Regression 
The correlations suggested that orienting sensitivity (especially for ATQ-OS) and 
openness, which are positive-affect-related factors (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), are most 
consistently positively related to creativity. This supports the primary hypothesis. Model 1 
tested the hypotheses that sensitivity and openness predict creativity using all Big-Five factors 
and ATQ-OS and NA. The two-factor sensitivity model was selected because this emerged as 
the most consistent solution in factor analysis using HSPS, ATQ-OS and openness items (see 
Chapter 3). In Model 2, hierarchical regression analysis was used to identify and remove 
redundant variables, and Model 3 used moderated regression to determine potential 
interactions. 
Simultaneous multiple regression. 
Model 1. Model 1 explained significant variance in creativity scores (Table 2.2). Fits 
were significant for creative achievement (CAQ): F(7, 280)=11.58, p<.001, R²=.21; Ideation 
(RIBS): F(7, 280)=25.87, p<.001, R²=.38; Products (ATTA): F(7, 280)=3.02, p<.01, R²=.05.  
OS and openness explain unique variance in creative achievement (CAQ) and ideation (RIBS). 




Refined model 2. Model 1 was simplified by removing redundant and nonsignificant 
personality covariates: Extraversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness were removed in 
that order, and the model fit assessed at each change. To control negative-affect most 
completely for theoretical reasons (Aron & Aron, 2013), both ATQ-NA and neuroticism were 
always retained. 
For CAQ and RIBS, no significant differences in model fit occurred at any stage (ps 
>.05) so ATQ-OS and ATQ-NA, openness and neuroticism were retained. For the ATTA 
only, removing conscientiousness changed the model significantly, F(1,282) = 7.986, p<.01, 
so conscientiousness was retained. Table 2.2 summarizes results for refined model 2, 
demonstrating openness was a unique predictor for all creativity measures. For CAQ and 
RIBS, ATQ-OS was a unique predictor. For ATTA, conscientiousness was a unique 
predictor. For all creativity measures, changes in fit between models 1 and 2 were not 
significant (ps>.05). Note, model 2 fit remained unchanged after removing negative-affect 
variables (ATQ-NA and BFI-N: CAQ, ps>.768;  RIBS, ps>.562; ATTA, ps>.150), or when 
HSPS  (ps>.231) or HSP-OS/AS (ps>.230) replaced ATQ-OS. 
 Moderated regression: Model 3. Moderated regression assessed whether openness (as 
an estimate of effects of experience and other factors manifesting in behavior patterns) as a 
predictor of creativity varies with sensitivity. Mean-centred variables were used to reduce 
potential multicollinearity between predictor variables. Model 3 for each creativity measure 
differed from Model 2 by adding the interaction term (BFI-O×ATQ-OS). Using PROCESS 
(Hayes, 2013), simple slopes analysis assessed interactions (Aiken & West, 1991), and 
significant interactions were probed using the Johnson-Neyman (1936). Table 2.2 
summarizes results and Figure 2.1 plots the points among ATQ-OS values where the 




CAQ. Fit was significant and significantly ~4% higher than model 2, F(1,282)=4.9, 
p=.028. Both ATQ-OS and openness still explained unique variance with the 2-way interaction 
between openness and ATQ-OS included, and this was significant, explaining unique variance. 
Johnson-Neyman results (Figure 2.1a) showed that the conditional effect of openness on CAQ 
became significant at scaled ATQ-OS value of -.17 below the mean, b=.12, t(282)=1.97, p=.05, 
and above, which includes 89.58% of participants. A caveat is that skewness of CAQ scores 
violates assumptions of parametric tests, and analyses using robust Poisson regression or log10 
transforms (which yields the most normal distribution, though Shapiro-Wilks test of normality 
is significant, p=.044) reveal independent effects but not the interaction. 
 RIBS. Fit was significant but nonsignificantly higher than model 2, F(1,282)=.386, 
p=.535. Both ATQ-OS and openness still explained unique variance with the 2-way interaction 
between openness and ATQ-OS included, but this was not significant. Thus openness and 
ATQ-OS independently predict RIBS.  
ATTA. Fit was significant and significantly higher than model 2, F(1,281)=5.57, 
p=.017. Openness explained unique variance. The covariate of conscientiousness and the 
interaction product were also significant, explaining unique variance. Critically, the 2-way 
interaction between openness and ATQ-OS was significant at average levels of ATQ-OS and 
above. Johnson-Neyman results showed that the conditional effect of openness on ATTA 
became significant at scaled ATQ-OS values of -.04 below the mean, b=.113, t(281)=1.97, 





Figure 2.1. Model 3 conditional effects of openness on a) creative achievement (CAQ), b) 
creative ideation (RIBS) and c) creative products (ATTA) by levels of orienting-sensitivity, 
controlling negative-affect 
Negative-affect. Results provided no evidence for the third hypothesis about negative-
affect-related traits and creativity. 
Discussion 
Overall, OS and openness, independently and/or interactively, underlie individual 
differences in diverse creative processes. Findings support the first two hypotheses: OS and 
openness are related to and predict creativity, and the relationship between openness and 
creativity increases with higher OS. No support was found for the third hypothesis that NA 
factors are related to creativity. Supporting the first hypothesis, only higher OS and openness 
are associated with higher creativity by all 3 measures. Further, only OS and openness 
independently predict creative achievement (CAQ) and ideation (RIBS). The second 
hypothesis is supported with the association between openness and creativity being 
moderated only by OS. Specifically, openness increases (i) creative achievement when OS is 
below average or higher and (ii) products (ATTA) when OS is average or higher. Thus, for 
the first time, OS and openness interact to predict creativity. These findings constitute the 




sensitivity benefits multiple creative processes, not just insight (Lin et al., 2013). Highly 
sensitive people are more creative.  
Additional findings emerged. High correlations of openness with OS (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2007) and creativity replicated, the latter consistent with prior evidence that open 
personalities are more creative (e.g., Feist, 1998; Feist, 2010; Kaufman et al., 2016). 
Conscientiousness is weakly negatively related to OS and predicts higher creative products, 
although conscientiousness has a complex relationship with creativity that varies by task (King, 
McKee Walker, & Broyles, 1996; Runco, 2014). For correlations unrelated to the study aims, 
see Appendix B.   
Altogether, the present findings provide strong evidence that people higher in OS are 
more open and creative, supporting early behavioural and physiological experiments 
associating sensitivity with creativity (for a review, see Martindale, 1999). Overall, findings 
to date indicate that OS predicts a wide range of creative processes associated with verbal and 
figural insight, achievement, ideation, and products (including divergent thinking). Our 
findings for openness and OS (on HSPS and ATQ), while controlling for NA, are consistent 
with those from a study using Asian versions (of ATQ and ATTA) and support cultural 
generalizability of OS as a strong indicator of creative potential. Lin and colleagues (2013) 
found openness predicts ATTA subscales and verbal insight on the remote associates task 
(RAT) when general intelligence is controlled. Further, ATQ-OS correlates with all ATTA 
subscales (fluency, flexibility, originality, elaboration) and verbal insight and predicts verbal 
and figural insight, but not ATTA subscales, when controlling for intelligence, 6 personality 
factors, and ATQ effortful control. In contrast, we found that, when conscientiousness and 





Altogether, the findings indicate that different creativity measures are associated with 
somewhat different processes. First, all creativity measures correlate but only moderately 
between achievement and ideation, which are weakly related to products; note, using the 
same measures, other studies did not find a correlation between total scores on achievement 
and products (Zabelina, Colzato, Beeman, & Hommel, 2016) perhaps due to smaller sample 
size (N=100) yielding lower statistical power (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). Second, OS 
and openness predict (a) creative ideation only independently, and (b) achievement both 
independently and interactively, and (c) openness predicts products alone and interactively 
with OS. Altogether, these findings suggest at least three personality-related processes 
underlie creativity: one for OS, a second for openness, and a third OS-openness interaction 
process that enables OS to influence the effect of openness on products and achievement. The 
present evidence that achievement involves multiple processes provides further evidence that 
multiple cognitive, personality and other individual differences contribute to real-world 
creative achievement (Carson et al., 2005; Eysenck, 1995; Jauk, Benedek, & Neubauer, 
2014a), adding sensitivity to this list. 
Mechanisms of the Sensitive, Open Creator 
Direct links between sensitivity, openness and creativity remain to be determined, but 
neural mechanisms of attention, dopamine, serotonin, and latent inhibition (LI) may explain 
why sensitive, open people are more creative (see Chapter 7). For example, an attentional-
associative model of creativity (Schmajuk, Aziz, & Bates, 2009) proposes neural mechanisms 
that link attention, dopamine, learning and memory, and creativity, and we suggest may link 
these to sensitivity and openness. The model assumes that creative people attend more to 
novel stimuli and explains how enhanced attention to novelty improves creative processes but 
impairs generalization and LI. LI is a reduction in learning of a specific stimulus because that 




conditioning effects become greater (i.e., learning improves). LI is due to memory retrieval 
mechanisms and attention processes within a "default automatic processing mode" (Lubow & 
Gewirtz, 1995; Lubow & Kaplan, 2005) which resembles the automatic reactive attention 
underlying OS. In the model, an increase in dopaminergic activity enhances effects of novelty 
on attention, thereby increasing attention and decreasing LI. Lower LI is thus associated with 
increased attention to previously-experienced irrelevant stimuli (i.e., as if they are more 
novel), and this manifests as a lower attentional gating threshold for sensory stimulation. 
Consequently, people with low LI show improved creativity on tests that involve these 
novelty, attention, and memory mechanisms, such as insight on the RAT and divergent 
thinking (ATTA) tasks.  
 Support for this model implicates evolutionary, genetic and epigenetic, 
developmental, and neural mechanisms that involve default or automatic reactive attention 
systems interacting with other attention and cognitive control systems, LI and “plasticity 
genes”, especially those for dopamine systems. Regarding links with creativity, dopamine 
variation is related to creativity (Jauk, Neubauer, Dunst, Fink, & Benedek, 2015), and lower 
LI is associated with higher creativity (Carson et al., 2003; Chirila & Feldman, 2012). 
Further, neurophysiology (i.e., a P50) supports the idea that stronger very early, automatic 
attentional capture by an external stimulus (“sensory gating”), which is related to low LI, is 
associated with higher creativity (Zabelina, O'Leary, Pornpattananangkul, Nusslock, & 
Beeman, 2015; Zabelina, Saporta, & Beeman, 2016). Low LI is proposed to be a form of 
cognitive disinhibition that enables awareness of more information for creative association 
(Carson, 2014b). According to the cognitive disinhibition theory of creativity (Eysenck, 
1995; Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999), highly creative people have lower 




This theory and the attentional-associative model of creativity are consistent with 
evidence implicating anti-correlated attention networks for internally and externally directed 
cognition (Dixon et al., 2014) in creativity and studies linking ‘disinhibition‘ (Takeuchi et al., 
2011), increased grey matter volume (Jauk et al., 2015; Kuhn et al., 2013), density (Fink et 
al., 2013) and function (Fink et al., 2012) of areas of a default mode network (DMN) with 
divergent thinking. The DMN is the large-scale frontoparietal cortical network for attention 
and cognitive control that has been most strongly implicated in creativity (Beaty, Benedek, 
Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015; Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016; Beaty et al., 2014; 
Beaty, Kaufman, et al., 2016; Jagiellowicz et al., 2011; Jauk et al., 2015) contributes to 
creativity interactively with other frontoparietal attention and cognitive control networks, see 
Chapter 1. 
Other evidence links sensitivity and openness with creativity, DMN attention, LI, 
dopamine, and plasticity genes. Regarding openness, lower LI is associated with higher 
openness (Peterson & Carson, 2000) and higher creative achievement, especially in highly 
intelligent people, suggesting creative people are more open to environmental stimuli (Carson 
et al., 2003; Chirila & Feldman, 2012; Keri, 2011). Such findings motivated a shared 
vulnerability model of creativity and psychopathology (Carson, 2014b) when combined with 
evidence that LI is low in people with schizotypal personality and schizophrenia, especially 
the acute form, and dopamine abnormalities in schizophrenia are associated with low LI (e.g., 
Carson, 2014b; Nelson & Rawlings, 2010).  
Both sensitivity and openness have been associated with ‘plasticity’ genes, including 
genetic variation in the dopaminergic system that have roles in attention (Deyoung, 2013; 
Deyoung et al., 2011; Jauk et al., 2015; Pluess, 2015a, 2015b; Pluess & Belsky, 2013). DRD4 
dopamine variants are associated with both sensitivity and openness. However, sensitivity has 




al., 2016), whereas openness is linked to COMT genes (catechol-O-methyltransferase - an 
enzyme that degrades dopamine and important for synaptic clearance) that affect the cortex 
and may be important for cognitive exploration (DeYoung, 2014) and creativity, as in 
divergent thinking and achievement (Zabelina, Colzato, et al., 2016). Similar genetics of 
sensitivity and openness could explain their interactions for creativity, while differences 
could explain their independent effects.  
Consistent with attentional-associative model of creativity (Schmajuk et al., 2009), the 
sensitive behavioural profile suggests lower LI and greater automatic attention. HSPs seem to 
have a nonconscious tendency to attend irrelevant stimuli, i.e., trouble ignoring or filtering 
them out (Rizzo-Sierra, Duran, & Leon-Sarmiento, 2011), and, in lower LI, attention to 
previously irrelevant stimuli increases. Further, early work implicated automatic attention as 
a mechanism linking sensitivity and creativity. Specifically, early work defined sensitivity as 
less habituation to white noise, and this sensitivity was associated with creative potential (i.e., 
divergent thinking) and higher skin conductance response (Gearhart, 2014; Martindale et al., 
1996), which indexes an automatic attention orienting response (OR) to irrelevant 
stimulation, but also greater novelty detection (Barry et al., 2013; Bradley, 2009).  
Sensitivity and openness, alone among the big five factors, have both been associated 
with activity in the DMN, which suggests automatic reactive attention in the DMN links 
sensitivity, openness, and creativity. Both openness and creativity are associated with 
increased connectivity in the DMN (DeYoung, 2014), and openness is associated with the 
spatial distribution of automatic exogenous orienting attention (as defined by inhibition of 
return), a function of the DMN (Wilson, Lowe, Ruppel, Pratt, & Ferber, 2016). Both 
sensitivity frameworks imply an attention mechanism, and behavioural, brain imaging, and 
genetic findings support the idea that sensitivity affects attention (Aron et al., 2012). 




systems (Kantor-Marynuska, 2012). The emotion-attention framework defines OS as 
differences in automatic reactive attention (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008). Indeed, evidence 
reviewed in Chapter 4 links sensitivity to variations in attention networks associated with 
frontoparietal control and right lateralised exogenous orienting (Jagiellowicz et al., 2011), 
part of the DMN (Spreng et al., 2013). Right lateralisation of sensitivity effects is consistent 
with right hemisphere contributions to global, diffuse attention (Ivry & Robertson, 1998), 
insight (Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Mendelsohn, 1976; Schooler & Melcher, 1995), and 
the hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis of creativity that posits a particularly important role 
for the right hemisphere (Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010). The aim of Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5 is to explore the relation between attention networks, sensitivity, personality, and creativity 
and to provide the first behavioural evidence that attention mechanisms partially explain the 
relationship between sensitivity, openness and creativity. 
Relationship between Sensitivity and Openness  
Sensory sensitivity has been acknowledged as an aspect of openness (Shiner et al., 
2012a; Shiner & DeYoung, 2013b) in part due to correlations between OS and openness 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007), but SPS has been called a higher-order personality trait (Pluess & 
Boniwell, 2015a), and, as Aron and Aron (1997) suggested, the Big Five traits may not 
capture sensitivity adequately, and thus, openness does not capture sensitivity fully. This 
conclusion is supported by our findings that sensitivity and openness are related but not 
identical, and OS promotes creativity strongly independently and/or interactively with 
openness (i.e., OS predicts creativity even after controlling for openness). As OS and 
openness correlate imperfectly (rs up to .62), OS only partially explains openness. Further, 
OS influences negative affect-related personality traits slightly, as indicated by mostly small 




whereas openness shows no correlations with these personality traits. Such differences 
between OS and openness may underlie their ability to independently predict creativity.  
This conclusion may be limited by the use of short-forms of the ATQ-OS and BFI-O 
here as the incremental predictive validity of these two measures needs to be determined. 
However, short-forms do capture the core of each trait independent of other traits (Aron & 
Aron, 2013; Evans & Rothbart, 2008; John et al., 2008) so if short-forms miss sensitivity then 
the core definitions of the personality domains may be inadequate. Further, these short-forms 
have high reliability and validity, and both the HSPS and the ATQ-OS have good 
discriminant validity from personality factors “suggesting that sensitivity is not fully 
contained within the Big Five” (Aron & Aron, 1997). Also, our factor analysis (see Chapter 
3) identified NA, OS, and openness as independent factors. Further, here, long-forms of the 
ATQ-OS and NEO-PI-R openness were used for 43 subjects, and, with the normal regression 
models (and controlling for NA), ATQ-OS accounts for unique variance in RIBS scores when 
controlling for full openness (p < .01), which alone does not account for unique variance; no 
other effects were significant, presumably due to low power with this small sample. Finally, 
factor analysis of many personality and temperament scales in preschool children yields no 
evidence for an independent openness component but shows that OS is one of six higher-
order factors and loads only on temperament scales (De Pauw, Mervielde, & Van Leeuwen, 
2009).  
Altogether, this suggests that either a) openness and sensitivity are different 
dimensions, or b) definitions and assessments of openness need to capture sensitivity better, 
and, if the latter, OS captures a biologically-based core of openness. Chapter 3 elaborates 
further on the relation between openness to experience, HSPS and ATQ-OS with supporting 




with the main aim to determine whether the orienting sensitivity factor of sensitivity 
measures is separate from, but related to, the openness personality trait. 
Conclusions 
Individual differences in positive affect-related personality factors of OS and 
openness have major roles in determining a wide range of creative cognitive abilities: 
achievement-related processes, ideation, divergent thinking and insight. Different factors that 
have been associated with the HSPS (i.e., OS vs. NA, respectively) are related to positive 
versus negative affect-related Big Five factors (i.e., openness vs. neuroticism, respectively). 
Positive affect-related personality factors influence creativity, even when negative affect is 
controlled: higher OS and openness personality predict higher creativity. How they do so 
varies with the creative process: OS and openness both independently and uniquely predict 
creative achievement and ideation, and openness independently predicts creative products, 
but openness further predicts products and achievement with increasing sensitivity. Creativity 
is thus a benefit of the sensitive personality (“vantage sensitivity”) but especially so when 
higher OS develops into higher openness. The present evidence highlights the OS component 
of sensitivity is the most important for creativity. Multiple processes or factors underlie the 
relationship between OS, openness and creativity. Definitions and assessments of openness 
may need to capture sensitivity better, and OS may be a biologically-based core of openness. 
Individual differences research on creativity should focus more on higher-order personality 
factors that reflect stable, fundamental physiological and related behavioural characteristics 
that comprise the biologically-based core of personality. Future work will need to determine 
the underlying mechanisms by which OS and openness determine creative cognition by 
investigating evolutionary, genetic and epigenetic, developmental, and neural bases (i.e., 




DMN interacting with other frontoparietal attention systems), “plasticity genes” in dopamine 






Descriptive statistics and non-Parametric Spearman’s Rho (rs) correlations (N=288) 
   Creativity Descriptive 
   CAQ RIBS ATTA Raw. µ Scale. µ SD 
Creativity        
Creative Achievement Questionnaire CAQ -   9.61 .11 1.00 
Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale RIBS .343*** -  2.95 .49 .68 
Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults ATTA .153** .279*** - 67.86 .74 .85 
Temperament factors      
Highly-Sensitive Person Scale HSPS .247*** .300*** .083 4.15 .53 .77 
Orienting Sensitivity HSP-OS .410*** .489*** .201*** 4.44 .57 .81 
Negative Affect HSP-NA .153** .186** .019 4.05 .51 .79 
Orienting/Aesthetic Sensitivity HSP-OS/AS .459*** .555*** .236*** 4.42 .57 .92 
Ease-of-excitation HSP-EOE .093 .171** -.007 4.51 .59 .78 
Low-sensory-threshold HSP-LST .185** .187*** .072 3.43 .40 .95 
Adult Temperament Questionnaire ATQ       
Orienting Sensitivity ATQ-OS .442*** .561*** .201*** 4.58 .60 .13 
Negative Affect ATQ-NA .072 .095 .031 4.09 .51 .12 
Effortful Control ATQ-EC -.112 -.177** .105 3.90 .48 .78 
Extraversion/Surgency ATQ_ES .100 .064 -.075 4.61 .60 .68 
Big-Five Inventory of Personality BFI      
Openness BFI-O .456*** .530*** .253*** 3.24 .56 .85 
Conscientiousness BFI-C -.109 -.117* .084 3.38 .59 .94 
Extraversion BFI-E .123* .103 .046 3.26 .56 .91 
Agreeableness BFI-A .010 -.058 -.158** 3.76 .69 .75 
Neuroticism BFI-N .086 .113 .083 3.17 .54 1.00 
Note. 2-tailed significance: * p< 0.05 level, ** p < .01, *** p <.001. Raw. µ = Raw mean score. Scale µ = Scaled mean score.  
SD = standard deviation for scaled scores. Raw ATQ and HSPS scores = (score*6)+1, raw personality and  





Summary of hierarchical multiple regression (Models 1-3) predicting creative achievement 
(CAQ), creative ideation (RIBS), and creative products (ATTA) 
 CAQ  RIBS  ATTA 
  Beta  Beta  Beta 
Model 1      
ATQ-OS .163*  .343***  .030 
ATQ-NA .023  .056  -.022 
BFI-O .329***  .324***  .163* 
BFI-C -.091  -.032  .182** 
BFI-E .044  .089  .029 
BFI-A .000  -.034  -.092 
BFI-N -.017   .024   .120 
Refined model 2      
ATQ-OS .168*  .345***  .023 
ATQ-NA .008  .039  -.018 
BFI-O .343***  .338***  .171* 
BFI-N -.016  .003  .115 
BFI-C -  -  .166* 
Moderated regression model 3 
ATQ-OS .135*  .35***  .005 
BFI-O .362***  .335***  .18* 
ATQ-OS × BFI-O .171*  -.024  .09* 
ATQ-NA -.03  .044  -.038 
BFI-N .008  0  .127 
BFI-C -  -  .162* 















Sensitivity and Openness: A Factor Analysis 
 
Abstract 
Factor analysis was used to explore the factor structure of the Highly Sensitive Person 
Scale (HSPS) alone, and together with the Adult Temperament Questionnaire Orienting 
Sensitivity (ATQ-OS) and Big Five Inventory Openness (BFI-O) factors, with the goal of 
establishing whether the OS factor of the HSPS and ATQ-OS relates to, but is separate from, the 
openness personality trait.  
The factor analysis supports previous findings that the HSPS is best characterised by a 
three factor (Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) or two factor model (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2008) in contrast to the unidimensional view of sensory-processing sensitivity (Aron & 
Aron, 1997). When HSPS, ATQ-OS and BFI-O are combined, results indicate that negative 
affect, OS, and openness emerge as distinct factors, with discriminant validity demonstrated 
between highly positively correlated OS and openness factors. Findings are consistent with the 
idea that OS is one distinct, but related factor that contributes to the development of openness 


















There are several aims to this factor analysis described below, but the ultimate goal is to 
look for evidence that the orienting sensitivity factor of the HSPS and ATQ OS is related to, but 
separate from, openness personality trait. This evidence can justify the use of orienting 
sensitivity measures in addition to openness measures in studies of creativity, but will also show 
the inadequacy of the BFI-O measure for capturing the related but important construct of 
orienting sensitivity (see Chapter 2), given that some argue orienting sensitivity may be 
subsumed under the openness trait (Shiner et al., 2012b; Shiner & DeYoung, 2013a).  
 Aim 1: We will use exploratory factor analysis to explore the factor structure of HSPS. 
Previous research suggests a 2 (Evans & Rothbart, 2008) or 3 factor solution (Smolewska et al., 
2006). Principal components analysis will identify an underlying factor structure, and CFA is 
used to analyse the model fit in relation to the unidimensional account of SPS, and with other 
multi-factor solutions. 
Aim 2: Considering the HSPS is thought to be NA heavy (Evans & Rothbart, 2008), we 
will combine the ATQ OS with the HSPS to explore the factor structure thus balancing 
approximately the OS and NA items. Again, a unidimensional model of combined HSPS and 
ATQ OS will be compared with the multifactor models. 
Aim 3: We will combine the HSPS, ATQ OS and Openness measures and explore which 
factors emerge. If openness and orienting sensitivity are the same construct, we would expect 
only two factors to emerge, a negative affect factor, and an orienting sensitivity/openness factor. 
However, if orienting sensitivity and openness are separate, we expect three factors to emerge. 
Following the PCA, we use CFA in two ways. First, the independence of the overarching latent 




factor, i.e., all items measure only a single openness or sensitivity construct. Second, the factor 
structures emerging from the PCA will be compared with the unidimensional model. Finally, to 
look for independence between the OS and openness factors, a 2 factor structure consisting of 
NA and Openness/OS (OS and BFI O combined into a single factor) will be compared to the 
three factor structure emerging from the PCA showing OS and openness are independent but 
related factors. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Model Fit Indices Explained 
For model fits, we look at converging evidence from chi-square, RMSEA, CFI and AIC 
(Kline, 2015). Chi-square compares model fits to a perfect “just-identified” model fit. Chi-square 
is a “badness of fit” statistic in which larger values indicate a models greater deviance from 
explaining the data. Thus, smaller chi-squares and failure to reject the null hypothesis suggests a 
good model. However, chi-square is implausible to ask for a perfect fit to the data, furthermore 
such a model is not interesting. The chi–square is also very sensitive to sample size, thus 
converging evidence is required using several fit statistics. The RMSEA is a “badness of fit” 
index where values close to zero indicate a good fit, and higher values indicate a bad fit. RMSEA 
scores <= .05 indicate a close approximate fit, values between .05 and .08 indicate reasonable 
error in approximation, values between .08 and .1 indicate a mediocre fit, and values>.1 indicate 
a poor fit (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). The CFI is a comparative fit index, which 
compares model fit to a baseline (Kline, 2015). For the CFI, values <.90 indicate a poor fit (Hu 
& Bentler, 1999). The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a comparative fit used when 








A diverse sample reported previously in Chapter 2 consisted of 288 (215 female; aged 18-
67 years, M=21.05, SD=5.02; education 7 - 27 years, M=14.93 years, SD=2.18) of 297 participants 
recruited from University of Plymouth students  (n=252) and local communities (n=45), excluding 
9 who did not complete, were educated to postgraduate level (n=8), bachelor’s degree level (n=73), 
A-level (n=170), college and or other vocational course (n=21), GCSE (n=3) or other (n=13). 
Participants received £8 per hour or course credit. Study approved by Human Ethics Committee 
in the Faculty of Science and Environment at University of Plymouth. Participants gave informed 
consent beforehand and were debriefed afterwards. 
Apparatus and Materials 
The study was lab-based as reported in Chapter 2. An online computerized battery was 
developed on SurveyMonkey (surveymonkey.co.uk) to assess sensitivity, personality and creativity 
and administered in the lab. However, this factor analysis will focus specifically on temperament 
and personality. Each questionnaire was presented on a separate webpage. Participants used a 
mouse to tick the response that best applied from response options on the right of each item. 
Sensitivity was measured using two questionnaires. 1) The full 27-item HSPS (Aron & Aron, 
1997) is a modality general, self-report scale measuring SPS and responses range from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (extremely). 2) The 77-item, Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ) short-form (Evans 
& Rothbart, 2007) is a self-report scale measuring 4 temperament constructs, including the 2 HSPS 
factors of OS and NA, as well as effortful control and extraversion/surgency. Responses range 
from 1 (extremely untrue) to 7 (extremely true) and “not applicable”. This factor analysis uses 




Five dimensions of personality were measured using the 44-item, Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
self-report questionnaire of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism 
(BFI-O, C, E, A, N, respectively, henceforth) (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; John et al., 1991; 
John et al., 2008). Responses range from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). This factor 
analysis uses only BFI O from the Big Five Inventory. 
Factor Analysis 
Each principal components analysis was conducted with direct oblimin oblique rotations 
(delta=0). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified sampling adequacy for the analysis 
if KMO>.5 (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977). Items were retained based on factor *loadings >=.3; the mean 
of criteria used by Evans and Rothbart (2008) and Smolewska et al. (2006). When an item loaded 
on two factors, it was also excluded from further analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis was 
performed using Amos (SPSS Version 22).  
Results 
Aim 1: Explore and Replicate Factor Structure of the HSPS 
Principal components analysis was conducted on the 27-item HSPS. The KMO=.89 
verified sampling adequacy, and the Bartlett’s test of Sphericity, χ²(351)=6005.21, p <.001, 
indicates that correlations between items were large enough for PCA. The Velicer minimum 
average partial (MAP) test (O’Connor, 2000) suggested the extraction of three components, 
consistent with the Smolewska et al. (2006) three factor model of the HSPS. Table 3.1 shows the 
factor matrix of rotated components. Three components explained 43.06% of the variance. Item 
4 was not retained as it did not meet the loading criteria, and items 19, and 21 loaded on two 
factors and were thus excluded. For comparison purposes and in line with theory and evidence 




not reported) for comparison in the later stages of analysis. The 2-factor model explained 37.81% 
of the variance. A single item did not reach loading criteria (item 20) and was thus removed from 
future analysis.  
Confirmatory factor analysis of the HSPS.  Confirmatory factor analysis was used to 
test the model fit of the HSPS factor structure identified using the PCA. First, the unidimensional 
model of the HSPS was tested. For the unidimensional model, the model fit was poor χ² 
(324)=1136.06, p<.001, CFI=.698, RMSEA=.093, 90% CI [.09, .1], AIC=2485.1. The two factor 
model was a mediocre fit, χ² (298)=882.05, p<.001, CFI=.781, RMSEA=.083, 90% CI [.076, 
.089], AIC=988.05. A positive correlation was found between NA and OS factors (r=.51). For 
the three factor model, the model fit was reasonable, χ² (272)=668.48, p<.001, CFI=.831, 
RMSEA=.071, 90% CI [.064, .078], AIC=774.48. Correlations between EOE and LST were high 
(r=.74) and moderate between EOE/LST and OS (r=.45, r=.5, respectively).  
The three factor model provides a better fit to the data than the unidimensional one factor 
model χ²diff (52)=467.52, p<.001, as did the two-factor model χ²diff (26)=254.01, p<.001. 
However, the three factor model provides a better fit than the two factor model χ²diff (26)=213.51, 
p<.001. In comparison to Smolewska et al. (2006) factor analysis, the OS factor in Table 3.1 
shares five (items 2,8,10,12,15,22) out of seven items, the EOE shares six (items 14, 16, 20, 21, 
23, 24) out of twelve items, and LST shares four (items 7, 9, 18, 25) out of six items reported by 
Smolewska et al. (2006). The reliability coefficients and mean inter-item correlations are also 
very similar to those reported previously (Smolewska et al., 2006), although not directly 
comparable as each factor consists of different items.  
The evidence suggests that the HSPS is best characterised by a three factor (Smolewska 




However, regarding the three factor model, the high correlation between LST and EOE may 
suggest a two factor interpretation given the limitations of factor analysis. That is, both LST and 
EOE factors may represent negative affect at different levels of the same conceptual hierarchy, 
i.e., one general factor and one sub factor, but factor analysis is unable to detect this problem and 
would thus treat items representing a single NA factor as two different factors (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2008).  
Aim 2: Explore Factor Structure of HSPS and ATQ OS Combined 
Principal components analysis was conducted on the 27-item HSPS combined with 15-
item ATQ OS. The KMO=.87 verified sampling adequacy, and the Bartlett’s test of Sphericity, 
χ²(861)=4507.18, p <.001, indicates that correlations between items were large enough for PCA. 
The Velicer minimum average partial (MAP) test (O’Connor, 2000) suggested the extraction of 
three components, consistent with the Smolewska et al. (2006) model of the HSPS. Table 3.2 
shows the factor matrix of rotated components. Three components explained 36.44% of the 
variance. Note, a unidimensional model accounts for 21.52% variance. However, one factor in 
the model with only 3 unique indicator variables consisting of reverse scored OS had poor 
Cronbach’s Alpha (.4) and inter-item correlations (.19), and so a two factor model was chosen 
instead. Justification for forcing the two factor model follows the common finding that reverse 
coded items tend to load onto a separate methods factor, and thus relates not to the construct 
under investigation, but to reverse item response bias (Weijters, Baumgartner, & Schillewaert, 
2013). The 2-factor model explained 32.03% of the variance. Items which did not reach loading 
criteria include HSPS item 6 and 20, and ATQ OS item 6 and 14. The HSPS items relate to 
bodily sensations and OS items were reverse scored items, although OS item 1 is a reverse 




for both the 3-factor HSPS alone model and this combined 2-factor HSPS and ATQ model are 
the same as for previous OS (Evans & Rothbart, 2008) and AS/OS factors (Smolewska et al., 
2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015).  
Confirmatory factor analysis of the HSPS and ATQ OS. Confirmatory factor analysis 
was used to compare the model fits of the factor structures identified with PCA for the 27-item 
HSPS and 15 item ATQ OS. First, the unidimensional model of the HSPS and ATQ OS 
combined was tested. Then the 2 factor model identified in the PCA is tested, and compared with 
the unidimensional model.   
  For the unidimensional model, the model fit was poor χ² (665)=2333.1, p<.001, CFI=.55, 
RMSEA=.093, 90% CI [.09, .1], AIC=2485.1. The 2 factor model was a reasonable fit for the 
data χ² (664)=1529.35, p<.001, CFI=.77, RMSEA=.067, 90% CI [.063, .072], AIC=1683.35. 
The correlation between factors was small (.38), suggesting discriminant validity between the 
two factors. Comparison of the two models shows that the two factor model provided a closer fit 
to the data than the unidimensional model χ²diff (1)=803.75, p<.001. 
Results so far indicate a 2-factor model best characterizes the HSPS and ATQ OS 
together, wherein similar numbers of negative affect and neutral/positive affect items are 
included, consistent with other models of adult temperament (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2009). 
While OS and NA are clear temperament factors, a third weak methods factor relates not to the 
HSPS or the sensitivity construct, but to reverse item response bias (Weijters et al., 2013). 
Notably, the combination of the HSPS OS and ATQ OS items have lower reliability than the full 
HSPS (.85) (Aron & Aron, 1997) and the ATQ OS short form (.85), but is still acceptable. The 
inter-item correlation is lower for the OS versus NA factor, suggesting fewer items are 




Aim 3: Explore Factor Structure of HSPS, ATQ OS and BFI O Combined 
Principal components analysis was conducted on the 27-item HSPS combined with 15-
item ATQ OS and the 10-item openness to experience scale from the BFI. The Velicer minimum 
average partial (MAP) test (O’Connor, 2000) suggested the extraction of four components. The 
four factor model accounted for 38.4% variance, but again one factor in the model with only 3 
unique indicator variables consisted of reverse coded OS items and so a 3 factor model was 
chosen. Table 3.3 shows the factor matrix of rotated components. The 3 factor model accounted 
for 34.85% variance. The KMO=.87 verified sampling adequacy, and the Bartlett’s test of 
Sphericity, χ²(1326)=6046.39, p <.001, indicates that correlations between items were large 
enough for PCA. Items which did not reach loading criteria include HSPS item 6, ATQ OS item 
6 and 14 and BFI O item 9. The HSPS item relate bodily sensations and ATQ OS and BFI O 
items were reverse coded items related to a methods factor (Weijters et al., 2013). The items 
which loaded on to two or more factors include only items which load on OS and openness 
factors (HSPS item 22, and BFI O items 6 and 10). For example, Table 3.3 shows BFI O item 6 
loads onto both OS and Openness factors in the model. Those items failing the meet the criteria 
are excluded from further calculations, including Cronbach’s alpha and inter-item correlations. 
Items failing to load on factors are removed from Table 3.3, but see Table 3.1 or Table 3.2 item 
details.  
The three HSPS items in this OS factor (10, 15, 22) were included in both the three 
(Table 3.1) and two factor (Table 3.2) models above and are the same as for previous OS (Evans 
& Rothbart, 2009) and AS/OS factors (Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), but 
HSPS item 22 also loaded on openness, and the other 2 items that loaded on OS in all other 




15 are the two best items to capture OS, item 22 captures both OS and openness, and 2 and 8 are 
related to openness consistent with the correlations between OS and openness (see Chapter 2). 
Confirmatory factor analysis of the HSPS, ATQ OS and BFI openness. Amos (SPSS 
Version 22) was used to perform a confirmatory factor analysis using the 27-item HSPS, 15-item 
ATQ OS and 10-item BFI O to test the model fit of the factor structure identified using the PCA 
for model comparison. First, the unidimensional model of the HSPS, ATQ OS and BFI O 
combined was tested. Then the 3 factor model identified in the PCA will be tested, and compared 
with the unidimensional model.   
  For the unidimensional model, the model fit was poor χ² (945)=3215.47, p<.001, 
CFI=.48, RMSEA=.091, 90% CI [.088, .095], AIC=3395.47. The 3 factor model was a 
reasonable fit for the data χ² (942)=2049.72, p<.001, CFI=.74, RMSEA=.065, 90% CI [.06, 
.068], AIC=2235.72, although whilst the CFI fit indices indicates a poor fit the 3 factor model is 
a better fit than a unidimensional model which makes no distinction between sensitivity (OS and 
NA) and openness (OP), χ²diff (2)=1165.75, p<.001. The correlation between OS and NA (r=.34) 
and OP and NA (r=.2) factors was small and the correlation between OS and OP factors was 
high (r=.67). However, the result still suggests discriminant validity between OS/OP factors and 
NA, as well as between OS and OP factors since the correlations between factors is <.85 (Kline, 
2015). Due to the high correlation between OS and OP factors, we compared the fit of the 3 
factor model to a 2 factor model in which OP and OS factors are collapsed into one factor. The 
fit of the 2 factor model was reasonable, χ² (944)=2223.20, p<.001, CFI=.71, RMSEA=.069, 
90% CI [.065, .072], AIC=2405.20, with a weak positive correlation (r=.32) between NA and 




model χ²diff (2)=173.48, p<.001, as shown also by a smaller AIC for 3 versus 2 factor model, 
although there is little difference in CFI and RMSEA fit indices. 
These results indicate that NA, OS, and openness are distinct factors. OS and openness 
are highly correlated, but with discriminant validity. The results from the PCA and CFA could 
mean one of two things a) OS and openness are separate constructs, or b) OS and openness are 
different levels of the same conceptual hierarchy, i.e., one general factor and one sub factor, 
which cannot be determined due to the limitations of factor analysis (Evans & Rothbart, 2008). 
However, the findings are consistent with the idea that OS is one factor that contributes to 
development of openness personality (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008). 
Discussion 
Factor analysis was used to explore the factor structure of the HSPS alone, and together 
with the ATQ OS and BFI O, with the ultimate goal of establishing whether the orienting 
sensitivity factor of the HSPS and ATQ OS relates to, but is separate from, the openness 
personality trait. The factor analysis supported previous findings that the HSPS is best 
characterised by a three factor (Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) or two factor 
model (Evans & Rothbart, 2008) in contrast to the unidimensional view of sensory-processing 
sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997). However, whilst the limitations of factor analysis mean that 
conclusions drawn regarding the best fitting model are theoretically driven, results suggest more 
strongly that a 2-factor model best characterizes the HSPS and ATQ OS when considered 
together, wherein similar numbers of negative affect and neutral/positive affect items are 
included, consistent with other models of adult temperament (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2009). 
When HSPS, ATQ-OS and BFI-O are combined, results indicate that NA, OS, and openness 




factors. However, as with NA factors of the HSPS, the limitations of factor analysis do not allow 
strong conclusions to be drawn about the distinctness of OS and OP factors, but the findings are 
consistent with the idea that OS is one related factor that contributes to the development of 
openness personality (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008). 
It is important to establish whether OS and OP are distinct traits, as this will advance our 
understanding of the development of openness traits, and more generally how personality and 
temperament manifest in adulthood. If OS and OP are two similar factors at different levels of 
the same conceptual hierarchy, i.e., the broader openness trait that subsumes OS (Shiner et al., 
2012b; Shiner & DeYoung, 2013a) then openness needs to capture sensitivity more completely. 
The definitions of openness and sensitivity do suggest fundamental differences in how each trait 
manifests. Openness forms part of the plasticity meta-trait (DeYoung et al., 2002; Digman, 1997) 
which relates to reward sensitivity, flexible cognition, explorative and novelty seeking 
behaviours (DeYoung et al., 2006). Sensitivity is associated with an inhibited, “quiet vigilance”, 
pause to check approach to exploration, although a sensitive animal or child who is shy and 
introverted in an unfamiliar, novel environment may become instead more curious and 
exploratory in a well-known, familiar context (Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron et al., 2012; Pluess, 
2015a). The domain of openness that is closest to OS is aesthetic sensitivity (DeYoung, 2014) 
with items evaluating “values artistic, aesthetic experiences” and how many “artistic interests” 
(BFI-O). However, HSP-OS items ask about being “deeply moved by the arts or music”, which 
reflects a reactivity not captured adequately by openness. To “notice and enjoy delicate or fine 
scents, tastes, sounds, works of art” is a HSP-OS item which loads on to both OS and OP factors, 
and is an item capturing the fine resolution of sensory processing which is characteristic of OS, 




asking, “looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement”, and such “aesthetic chills” 
may be a universal marker of openness that captures the tendency of highly open people to be 
particularly sensitive to art (McCrae, 2007). Interestingly, the OP and OS (ATQ) items with the 
highest loading on the OP factor are ATQ-OS and BFI-O items relating to ideation, suggesting 
that those aspects of creativity are adequately captured by openness.  
In summary, more OS questions could be added to openness inventories to capture 
sensitivity more fully if OS is subsumed under openness (Shiner et al., 2012b; Shiner & 
DeYoung, 2013a). Personality research may thus benefit from better capturing biologically-
based elements of temperament, or higher-order personality traits, which are more clearly 
grounded in animal studies, child development, and biology (Aron et al., 2012; Rothbart, 2011; 

















Three factor model of HSPS emerging from PCA 
    
Factor 
LST OS EOE 
1 Are you easily overwhelmed by strong sensory input? .68   
7 Are you easily overwhelmed by things like bright lights, strong smells, coarse fabrics, or sirens 
close by? 
.70   
9 Are you made uncomfortable by loud noises? .76   
13 Do you startle easily? .63   
17 I try hard to avoid making mistakes or forgetting things. .33   
18 I make a point to avoid violent movies and TV shows. .44   
25 I am bothered by intense stimuli, like loud noises or chaotic scenes. .72   
26 When I must compete or be observed while performing a task, I become so nervous or shaky 
that I do much worse than I would otherwise. 
.48   
27 When I was a child, my parents or teachers seemed to see me as sensitive or shy. .48   
2 Do you seem to be aware of subtleties in your environment?  .68  
3 Do other people's moods affect you?  .36  
6 Are you particularly sensitive to the effects of caffeine?  .36  
8 Do you have a rich, complex inner life?  .62  
10 Are you deeply moved by the arts or music?  .73  
12 Are you conscientious?  .43  
15 When people are uncomfortable in a physical environment do you tend to know what needs to 
be done to make it more comfortable (like changing the lighting or the seating)? 
 .61  
22 I notic  and enjoy delicate or fine scents, tastes, sounds, works of art.  .70  
5 Do you find yourself needing to withdraw during busy days, into bed or into a darkened room 
or any place where you can have some privacy and relief from stimulation? 
  .64 
11 Does your nervous system sometimes feel so fr zzled that you just have to go off by yourself?   .49 
14 Do you get rattled when you have a lot to do in a short amount of time?   .71 
16 I am annoyed when people try to get me to do too many things at once.   .76 
19 I become unpleasantly aroused when a lot is going on around me. .39  .40 
20  Being very hungry creates a strong reaction in me, disrupting my concentration or mood.   .37 
21 Changes in my life shake me up. .32  .53 
23 I find it unpleasant to have a lot going on at once   .76 
24 I make it a high priority to arrange my life to avoid upsetting or overwhelming situations.   .41 
4 Do you tend to be more sensitive to pain? - - - 
         
 Cronbach’s alpha .82 .75 .80 

















HSP1 Are you easily overwhelmed by strong sensory input? .68  
HSP3 Do other people's moods affect you? .33  
HSP4 Do you tend to be more sensitive to pain? .44  
HSP5 Do you find yourself needing to withdraw during busy days, into bed or into a darkened room or any 
place where you can have some privacy and relief from stimulation? .64  
HSP7 Are you easily overwhelmed by things like bright lights, strong smells, coarse fabrics, or sirens close 
by? .67  
HSP9 Are you made uncomfortable by loud noises? .72  
HSP11 Does your nervous system sometimes feel so frazzled that you just have to go off by yourself? .64  
HSP13 Do you startle easily? .58  
HSP14 Do you get rattled when you have a lot to do in a short amount of time? .64  
HSP16 I am annoyed when people try to get me to do too many things at once. .56  
HSP17 I try hard to avoid making mistakes or forgetting things. .38  
HSP18 I make a point to avoid violent movies and TV shows. .39  
HSP19 I become unpleasantly aroused when a lot is going on around me. .69  
HSP21 Changes in my life shake me up. .69  
HSP23 I find it unpleasant to have a lot going on at once .76  
HSP24 I make it a high priority to arrange my life to avoid upsetting or overwhelming situations. .54  
HSP25 I am bothered by intense stimuli, like loud noises or chaotic scenes. .79  
HSP26 When I must compete or be observed while performing a task, I become so nervous or shaky that I do 
much worse than I would otherwise. .61  
HSP27 When I was a child, my parents or teachers seemed to see me as sensitive or shy. .47  
HSP2 Do you seem to be aware of subtleties in your environment?  .58 
HSP8 Do you have a rich, complex inner life?  .43 
HSP10 Are you deeply moved by the arts or music?  .69 
HSP12 Are you conscientious?  .32 
HSP15 When people are uncomfortable in a physical environment do you tend to know what needs to be done to make 
it more comfortable (like changing the lighting or the seating)? .48 
HSP22 I notice and enjoy delicate or fine scents, tastes, sounds, works of art.  .65 
OS1 Barely noticeable visual details rarely catch my attention.  .34 
OS2 When I am listening to music, I am usually aware of subtle emotional tones.  .68 
OS3 I tend to notice emotional aspects of paintings and pictures.  .74 
OS4 I’m often aware of the sounds of birds in my vicinity.  .50 
OS5 I sometimes seem to understand things intuitively.  .51 
OS7 When I am resting with my eyes closed, I sometimes see visual images.  .51 
OS8 Sometimes my mind is full of a diverse array of loosely connected thoughts and images. .46 
OS9 I often notice mild odors and fragrances.  .38 
OS10 I am often aware how the color and lighting of a room affects my mood.  .56 
OS11 I sometimes dream of vivid, detailed settings that are unlike anything that I have experienced when awake. .47 
OS12 When I watch a movie, I usually don’t notice how the setting is used to convey the mood of the characters. .48 
OS13 I am often consciously aware of how the weather seems to affect my mood.  .53 
OS15 Without applying effort creative ideas sometimes present themselves to me.  .60 
   
Cronbach’s alpha .90 .81 
Inter-item correlation .32 .24 






A three factor model of the HSPS (HSP), ATQ OS (OS) and BFI O (O) 
Items Factor 
 OS NA OP 
HSP10 Are you deeply moved by the arts or music? .61   
HSP15 When people are uncomfortable in a physical environment do you tend to know what needs to be done 
to make it more comfortable (like changing the lighting or the seating)? 
.34   
HSP20 Being very hungry creates a strong reaction i  me, disrupting my concentration or mood. .39   
HSP22 I notice and enjoy delicate or fine scents, tastes, sounds, works of art. .44  .37 
OS2 When I am listening to music, I am usually aware of subtle emotional tones. .70   
OS3 I tend to notice emotional aspects of paintings and pictures. .60   
OS4 I’m often aware of the sounds of birds in my vicinity. .31   
OS5 I sometimes seem to understand things intuitively. .39   
OS7 When I am resting with my eyes closed, I sometimes see visual images. .58   
OS8 Sometimes my mind is full of a diverse array of loosely connected thoughts and images. .48   
OS9 I often notice mild odors and fragrances. .38   
OS10 I am often aware how the color and lighting of a room affects my mood. .60   
OS11 I sometimes dream of vivid, detailed settings that are unlike anything that I have experienced when 
awake. 
.41   
OS12 When I watch a movie, I usually don’t notice how the setting is used to convey the mood of the 
characters. 
.43   
OS13 I am often consciously aware of how the weather seems to affect my mood. .62   
O6 Values artistic, aesthetic experiences .50  .33 
HSP1 Are you easily overwhelmed by strong sensory input?  .69  
HSP11 Does your nervous system sometimes feel so frazzled that you just have to go off by yourself? .63  
HSP12 Are you conscientious?  .31  
HSP13 Do you startle easily?  .56  
HSP14 Do you get rattled when you have a lot to do in a short amount of time?  .60  
HSP16 I am annoyed when people try to get me to do too many things at once.  .54  
HSP17 I try hard to avoid making mistakes or forgetting things.  .40  
HSP18 I make a point to avoid violent movies and TV shows.  .39  
HSP19 I become unpleasantly aroused when a lot is going on around me.  .69  
HSP21 Changes in my life shake me up.  .68  
HSP23 I find it unpleasant to have a lot going on at once  .74  
HSP24 I make it a high priority to arrange my life to avoid upsetting or overwhelming situations.  .56  
HSP25 I am bothered by intense stimuli, like loud noises or chaotic scenes.  .81  
HSP26 When I must compete or be observed while performing a task, I become so nervous or shaky  
that I do much worse than I would otherwise. 
.60  
HSP27 When I was a child, my parents or t achers seemed to see me as sensitive or shy.  .45  
HSP3 Do other people's moods affect you?  .32  
HSP4 Do you tend to be more sensitive to pain?  .39  
HSP5 Do you find yourself needing to withdraw during busy days, into bed or into a darkened room or any place 
where you can have some privacy and relief from stimulation? 
.62  
HSP7 Are you e sily verwhelmed by things like bright lights, strong smells, coarse fabrics, or sirens close by? .70  
HSP9 Are you made uncomfortable by loud noises?  .76  
O7 Prefers work that is routine  .30  
HSP2 Do you seem to be aware of subtleties in your environment?   .45 
HSP8 Do you have a rich, complex inner life?   .36 
O1 Is original, comes up with new ideas   .80 
O2 Is curious about many different things   .49 
O3 Is ingenious, a deep thinker   .44 
O4 Has an active imagination   .57 
O5 Is inventive   .71 
O8 Likes to reflect, play with ideas   .61 
O10 Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature .41  .44 
OS1 Barely noticeable visual details rarely catch my attention.   .40 
OS15 Without applying effort creative ideas sometimes present themselves to me.   .63 
    
Cronbach’s Alpha .82 .9 .8 
Inter-item correlation .24 .31 .31 
































Change Detection and Attention Networks in the Sensitive Creator 
 
Abstract 
 This chapter explores how sensitivity may explain individual differences in attention 
tasks, and how this performance relates to creativity. We employ a change detection task 
(Mueller, 2011) as change detection activates attention networks in high sensitive groups 
(Jagiellowicz et al., 2011), and the Attention Network Task (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & 
Posner, 2002) to measure individual differences in alerting, orienting and executive attention 
network efficiencies. 
For the change detection task, positive correlations were observed between minor versus 
major difference response times (RT) and RIBS, as well as ATQ-OS, which also positively 
correlates with RIBS (see Chapter 2). Hierarchical multiple regression shows the relationship 
between minor versus major change detection can be explained by ATQ-OS, as change detection 
variance in RIBS is absorbed into the broader construct of ATQ-OS, suggesting a shared 
attention mechanism between the three measures. With the ANT, we show that sensitivity is not 
related to orienting attention networks, as hypothesised given the definition of OS as reflecting 
exogenous orienting (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), but is associated with individual differences in 
how alerting networks associated with broad, diffused attention states interact with executive 
control networks in flanker tasks. Further, we show those network interactions also predict 
creative ideation, but have substantial overlap with orienting sensitivity measures, providing 
support for the hypothesis that a shared attention mechanism underlies orienting sensitivity, 































This chapter explores how sensitivity may explain individual differences in attention 
tasks, and how this performance relates to creativity. In chapter 1 and 2 we have explained how 
the relationship between orienting sensitivity and creativity may be explained by individual 
differences in the orienting attention brain networks. Environmental sensitivity (Aron et al., 
2012; Pluess, 2015a) and emotion-attention temperament frameworks (Evans & Rothbart, 2007) 
both imply an attention mechanism, and behavioral, brain imaging, and genetic findings support 
the idea that sensitivity affects attention (Aron et al., 2012; Jagiellowicz et al., 2011), with 
theoretical accounts placing emphasis on exogenous attention (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008). 
Thus, if exogenous orienting networks underlie the sensitivity construct, they may explain the 
how sensitivity relates to diverse creative processes (see Chapter 2). 
Change Detection and Attention 
Change blindness refers to the observation that human beings are notoriously bad at 
detecting salient changes in visual scenes if they occur in the presence of visual disruptions, such 
as eye movement or screen flicker (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). This surprising limitation 
of the human visual system was demonstrated in empirical studies showing visual change 
detection can only occur when attention is oriented towards change, for example by motion or 
high-level (top-down) interest (O'Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 1999; Rensink et al., 1997). 
Orienting attention networks (for a review, see Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) play an important 
role in change detection. Neuroimaging studies found that change detection results in greater 
activation of dorsal frontoparietal attention networks as well as ventral extrastriate visual areas, 
whereas the same dorsal frontoparietal activation is absent during periods of change blindness 




implicate the P300 as an index of change detection, with greater P300 amplitudes around parietal 
sites associated with awareness (vs. unawareness) of change (Eimer & Mazza, 2005; Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2003). The “novelty P300” ERP component consists of two components (P3a, P3B) 
which reflect attention and memory processes involved in change detection, including (a) 
stimulus-driven frontal orienting networks which orient towards change and perform context-
updating processes in working memory, and (b) temporal-parietal attention and memory 
processes associated with context-updating and subsequent memory storage (Polich, 2007). 
Change detection studies suggest that perceptual awareness depends on attention, and 
implicate orienting networks thought to underlie the reactive orienting sensitivity construct 
(Rothbart & Posner, 2001). Accordingly, neuroimaging studies of change blindness have 
provided some evidence for individual differences in attention mechanisms in the sensitive 
personality. Jagiellowicz et al. (2011) found that sensitive versus non-sensitive participants (as 
defined using the HSPS) were slower, but no less accurate at detecting minor versus major 
changes in complex visual scenes. Further, sensitive groups show greater activation in brain 
areas related to higher-order visual and attentional processes during detection of minor versus 
major changes. Differences in visual attentional processes were evidenced by increased 
activation in the right hemisphere temporal-parietal junction (TPJ; inferior parietal lobule and 
superior temporal gyrus) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS; lying between the superior and inferior 
parietal lobes), and the middle frontal gyrus (i.e. precentral sulcus), all areas of the brain 
associated with the orienting attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Fan et al., 2005) and 
frontoparietal control networks which form part of, or interact with, the default mode network 




Attention Brain Networks 
Recent theories view attention as a system of three anatomically discrete brain networks 
responsible for different sets of attentional processes, including alerting, orienting and executive 
control (for reviews, see Petersen & Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990). The alerting 
network includes the thalamic, frontal and parietal regions of the right hemisphere (Fan et al., 
2005) which function to increase vigilance to important information by creating spatially broad, 
global attentional states required for rapid, but low quality information extraction (Fernandez-
Duque & Posner, 1997; Posner & Petersen, 1990). The alerting network interacts with other 
networks, for example alerting inhibits the executive network leading to higher error rates, but 
produces a faster orienting response (Callejas, Lupiáñez, & Tudela, 2004; c.f., Fernandez-Duque 
& Posner, 1997; Posner, 1994). The orienting network operates to prioritize and select specific 
information from various sensory or internal events. Orienting can be reflexive (bottom-up), as 
when something catches attention, or voluntary (top-down), as during visual search. The 
orienting network subsumes (a) the dorsal top-down visuo-spatial orienting network, consisting 
of the frontal eye fields (FEF) and the intraparietal sulcus/superior parietal lobule (IPS/SPS) and 
(b) the ventral bottom-up reorienting system, consisting of regions of the TPJ, including the 
inferior parietal lobule/superior temporal gyrus (IPL/STG), and the ventral frontal cortex (VFC), 
including the inferior frontal gyrus/middle frontal gyrus (IFg/MFg) (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
The executive control network, consisting of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and lateral 
prefrontal cortex (lPFC) (Fan et al., 2005; Petersen & Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990), is 
described as a limited capacity attention system responsible for focal attention and diverse 




additionally regulates activation in the orienting and alerting networks, and may be a central 
component to conscious self-regulation (Rothbart, Sheese, & Posner, 2007).  
The attention network task (ANT; Fan et al., 2002) was developed to measure efficiencies 
of alerting, orienting and executive control networks and has been used to evaluate attentional 
abnormalities in clinical populations, including patients with stroke/brain injury, attention-deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder (for a review, see Fan & 
Posner, 2004; MacLeod et al., 2010) and also in individual differences studies identifying 
sources of individual variation in attention network efficiency (Fan, Fossella, Sommer, Wu, & 
Posner, 2003; Fan, Wu, Fossella, & Posner, 2001; Fossella et al., 2002).  
Cognitive tasks which measure performance of attention networks are particularly useful 
tools for identifying the attention mechanisms underlying temperament constructs, including 
effortful control and orienting sensitivity components of the emotion-attention temperament 
framework (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008, 2009). For example, temperamental effortful control 
has been linked to performance in conflict resolution tasks in child (Gerardi‐Caulton, 2000; 
Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, & Posner, 2003) and adult populations (Posner et al., 2002), and conflict 
resolution is a function of the executive control networks (Fan et al., 2005). The evidence linking 
temperamental effortful control to conflict resolution has lead researchers to stress the link 
between the executive control network and temperament constructs of effortful control (Rothbart 
et al., 2007). The orienting attention system is thought to underlie the reactive orienting 
sensitivity (OS) temperament (Rothbart & Posner, 2001), but there is little evidence linking 
orienting sensitivity to the orienting attention network. Using a modified ANT with only alerting 
and conflict conditions, Costa et al. (2013) show RTs following ‘alerting’ cues are slower for 




component for cued, but not uncued trials, which could reflect group differences in response 
conflict (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008) for cued trials. This suggests that high OS groups are 
more sensitive to alerting cues which can impair ANT performance (Fan et al., 2002). Matthews 
and Zeidner (2012) show personality traits relate to ANT performance, which is interesting 
considering the associations between measures of temperament and personality (e.g., Evans & 
Rothbart, 2007, 2008, 2009). Matthews and Zeidner (2012) found openness to experience was 
significantly negatively correlated (r=-.21) with alerting RTs, emotional stability (inverse 
neuroticism) was significantly negatively correlated (r=-.23) with orienting RTs, and both 
extraversion and conscientiousness show significant negative correlations (r=-.31, r=-.24, 
respectively) with executive control.  
The Costa et al. (2013) findings are consistent with change detection studies using 
sensitivity dichotomies (e.g., Jagiellowicz et al., 2011) as both show slower performance in 
sensitive versus non-sensitive groups. However, the personality evidence is inconclusive. 
Openness is a positive correlate of orienting sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), and higher 
openness is associated with faster alerting RTs (Matthews & Zeidner, 2012), however evidence 
suggests high versus low OS is associated with slower alerting RTs (Costa et al., 2013) and 
change detection performance (Jagiellowicz et al., 2011). Neuroticism is also a positive correlate 
of sensitivity due to a strong NA component (Aron & Aron, 1997; Evans & Rothbart, 2008), 
however neuroticism is associated with slower orienting RTs (Matthews & Zeidner, 2012) as 
with studies showing sensitive versus non-sensitive groups are slower in attention tasks (Costa et 
al., 2013; Jagiellowicz et al., 2011).  
Further work is required to clarify the link between sensitivity and attention, and no links 




linked parts of the DMN with sensitivity. The DMN is strongly implicated in creativity (Beaty et 
al., 2015; Beaty, Benedek, et al., 2016; Beaty et al., 2014; Beaty, Kaufman, et al., 2016; 
Jagiellowicz et al., 2011; Jauk et al., 2015), contributing to creativity interactively with other 
frontoparietal attention and cognitive control networks. DMN functions include processes 
important for creative cognition, including automatic orienting of attention towards internal (i.e., 
explicit episodic and semantic memory, thoughts, ideas) and external (i.e., exogenous) 
information (Binder & Desai, 2011; Cabeza et al., 2011), and mind wandering (Beaty, Benedek, 
et al., 2016). Right lateralization of sensitivity effects is consistent with right TPJ contributions 
to holistic, diffuse, insight and integrative creative processes, including attention, and the 
hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis of creativity that posits a particularly important role for the 
right hemisphere (Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010).  
Aims 
The aim of this study was to replicate the findings that sensitive versus non-sensitive 
groups perform differently in visual change detection tasks. In addition, we aim to look at how 
different sensitivity factors (OS vs. NA) relate to change detection. Further, we aim to explore 
how between-groups performance on the change detection task may relate to creativity. Based on 
previous findings reported by Jagiellowicz et al. (2011), we expect high sensitivity to be 
associated with slower RTs (positive correlation) in change detection tasks, specifically when 
detecting minor versus major changes. ATQ-OS is a positive-affect related factor (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2009; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) thought to index automatic attention orienting 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007). How orienting sensitivity relates to change detection has not yet been 
examined. Based on prior studies exploring change detection in sensitivity (Jagiellowicz et al., 




change detection performance for minor versus major changes in visual scenes. If those attention 
processes at least partially underlie the association between sensitivity and creativity observed in 
Chapter 2, then minor versus major change detection performance should predict creative 
achievement, ideation and divergent thinking. 
In a further extension, we look at how temperament and personality relate to efficiency of 
the attention networks, using the ANT (Fan et al., 2002). Specifically, we aim to look at how 
orienting sensitivity relates to efficiency of attention networks, and how this performance relates 
to creativity. Specifically, based on previous work by (Jagiellowicz et al., 2010), we expect 
orienting sensitivity to be associated with slower but no less accurate performance in measures of 
the orienting networks using the ANT, considering orienting sensitivity is defined as exogenous 
orienting attention (Evans & Rothbart, 2008). Further, based on work by Costa et al. (2013), we 
could expect higher orienting sensitivity to be associated with slower RTs following cued 
(alerting) versus uncued trials, and impaired conflict resolution following alerting cues (Fan et 
al., 2002). This is because alerting cues of the ANT are designed to produce broad, spatially 
diffused attentional states required for rapid information extraction which occurs at the expense 
of information quality, resulting in higher ER in attention tasks (Callejas et al., 2004; Fan et al., 
2002; Posner & Petersen, 1990). Higher sensitivity of exogenous attention, as in high OS (Evans 
& Rothbart, 2007), may mean that HSPs are more sensitive to alerting cues, meaning greater 
global alerting states and thus poorer conflict resolution abilities than non-HSPs. Further, if those 
attention processes at least partially underlie the association between sensitivity and creativity 
observed in Chapter 2, then slower and less/more accurate performance following alerting cues 







A sample of 99 participants were recruited for the study, however 2 Participants did not 
complete the study and so the final sample consisted of 97 participants (84 female and 13 male, 
aged between 18-33 years, M=19.76, SD=2.29). Participants were rewarded with course credit. 
This study was approved by Human Ethics Committee in the Faculty of Science and 
Environment at University of Plymouth. Participants gave informed consent before the study and 
were debriefed after completing the study. 
Apparatus and Materials 
A computerized battery was developed on Survey Monkey to assess sensitivity, 
personality and creativity and administered in the lab. Each questionnaire was presented on a 
separate page within the software. For each item, the participant checked the blank in front of 
any item corresponding to the response that best applied to them. 
Sensitivity was measured using two questionnaires. 1) The Highly Sensitive Person scale 
(HSPS) from Aron and Aron (1997) is a 27-item, modality general, self-report scale measuring 
sensory processing sensitivity using items asking about tendencies to startle easily, become 
easily overwhelmed by sensory inputs but also awareness of subtleties in the environment, and 
enjoyment of fine and delicate scents, tastes, sounds, and works of art. Item responses ranged 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 2) The two HSPS factors of orienting sensitivity and negative 
affect were also measured using the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ)-short form 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007). The ATQ is a self-report scale with 77 items measuring general 




EC), and extraversion/surgency (ATQ ES). Item responses ranged from 1 (extremely untrue) to 7 
(extremely true) and “not applicable”. 
The Big Five Inventory (BFI) assessed personality. This 44-item self-report questionnaire 
measures the Big Five dimensions of personality: Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; John et al., 1991; 
John et al., 2008; John & Srivastava, 1999). Item responses ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 
5 (agree strongly). 
Creativity was assessed using three of the most established and validated measures of 
creative processes. The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al., 2005) was 
chosen as an objective self-report measure of creative achievement across 10 domains of 
creativity. The Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale (RIBS; Runco et al., 2000-2001) is a 19-item 
questionnaire designed to measure creative ideation, which is thought to measure a single factor 
and has discriminant validity. Items probe behavioural tendencies and abilities regarding ideas 
and thinking, with many items emphasizing creative, unusual, or imaginative thought (e.g., “I 
have many wild ideas.”). The RIBS responses ranged from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). This study 
was lab-based in order to administer one pencil and paper creativity test: The Abbreviated 
Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA; Goff & Torrance, 2002) consists of 3 timed (3-minute) tests of 
figural and verbal divergent thinking abilities thought to be critical for the creative process 
(Runco, 2014). The ATTA is a gold standard, objective measure of divergent thinking. The 
ATTA thus is the one test that independently verifies creative products/divergent thinking. The 
ATTA was presented in the lab in paper format with a pencil and eraser, not part of the Survey 




 The two experimental measures used in this experiment 1) a change detection task 
(Mueller, 2011) and b) the Attention Network Task (ANT; Fan et al., 2002) both presented using 
the Psychological Experiment Building Language (PEBL) and PEBL Test Battery (Mueller & 
Piper, 2014). All tasks were presented using a Philips Brilliance LED monitor 221P3LPYES P-
line 21.5" widescreen operating at 1920 × 1080 pixels with a 60Hz refresh rate. 
Design 
This study used a within-subjects correlational and quasi-experimental design to explore 
relations between temperament, personality, creativity and objective measures of attention. 
Change detection task (CDT). There were 4 conditions in which targets to be detected 
changed in colour, size, location and presence. There were 10 unspeeded trials per condition. 
Arrays of 50 circles occupying a 600 × 400 (h × v) pixel field were presented for durations of 
400ms and were separated by a blank screen for durations of 100ms. Each circle varied randomly 
in size between 10 and 30 pixels with a pixel tolerance of 30 pixels for target circles. See Figure 
4.1a for a visual demonstration of the different conditions. 
Attention Network Task (ANT). The ANT has 4 cue types (no cue, centre cue, double 
cue and direction cue), two target locations (above or below fixation), target direction (left or 
right facing target arrow) and flanker type (congruent, incongruent or neutral). Note, direction 
cues were 100% predictive. There were 72 trials per cue type, and 96 trials per flanker type 
giving a total of 288 trials. Flanker types were each presented for 24 trials with each cue type. 
Before the main experiment block, participants were given 24 practice trials. Trial order was 
randomized. See Figure 4.1b for a visual demonstration of the different conditions and trial 




defined for behavioural analysis so as to create a positive score for each condition for reaction 
times (for accurate data only) and error rates (Fan et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2002):  
Alerting effect: no cue – double cue 
Orienting effect: centre cue – direction cue 
Conflict effect: incongruent – congruent 
Outlier detection. The CDT and ANT tasks were subject to outlier removal using the 
MAD median method. Mean RTs for each task are calculated based on correct responses only 
following outlier removal. Accuracy data is computed independently of outlier removal. 
Individual differences. To replicate Jagiellowicz et al. (2011), additional sensitivity 
scores for both HSPS and ATQ-OS were calculated with BFI-E (introversion inverted) and BFI-
N (neuroticism/negative affect) partialled-out (see also Aron & Aron, 2013) to create new 
variables henceforth referred to as HSPS (E, N) residuals and ATQ-OS (E, N) residuals.  
The HSPS may be a taxon consisting of HSP’s (i.e., those high on HSPS) and non-HSP’s, 
therefore Aron and Aron (2013) suggest dichotomizing the sample allowing for group 
comparison using ANOVA and related methods. As the sample majority consists of Psychology 
majors who may include a larger percentage of HSPs than the typical 20%, the break point was 
chosen to be 30% (high) HSP’s and 70% (low) non-HSP’s (Aron & Aron, 2013). The HSP 
groups consisted of n=29 participants and the non-HSP groups consisted of n=68 participants. 
The HSP group (M=5.12, 95% CI [4.97, 5.28]) have significantly higher ratings on the HSPS, 
t(95)=12.21, p<.001, than non-HSP groups (M=3.82, 95% CI [3.7, 3.95]). 
 For each creativity measures, groups were formed based on a median split, where high 
creativity groups>median score, and low creativity groups <= median score. The medians for 




the high CAQ group (n=50; M=12.68, 95% CI[11, 14.58]) are significantly higher than the low 
CAQ group (n=47; M=3.68, 95% CI[3.14, 4.21]), t(95)=9.12, p<.001. The RIBS scores for the 
high RIBS group (n=49; M=3.26, 95% CI[3.16, 3.36]) are significantly higher than low the RIBS 
group (n=48; M=2.44, 95% CI[2.35, 2.52]), t(95)=12.09, p<.001. The ATTA scores for the high 
ATTA group (n=49; M=73.59, 95% CI[72.68, 74.55]) are significantly higher than the low 
ATTA group (n=48; M=62.48, 95% CI[59.44, 64.73]), t(95)=8.3, p<.001. Note, all personality, 
temperament, and creativity measures are scaled between 0 and 1, see Chapter 2 for scaling. Max 
scores used for scaling CAQ are 31, and 83 for the ATTA in this chapter only. 
Procedure  
Participants sat in a room at a table with a computer and positioned with their eyes at a 
distance of 60cm, in line with the top of the computer monitor. Participants were first 
administered the experimental attention tasks (CDT and ANT), with task order counterbalanced 
across participants.  
Change detection task. For the CDT, participants were told that they would be searching 
for changes in colour, size, location or presence of a target circle appearing among an array of 
different circles. Participants were told that in each trial they would see a series of scenes made 
of coloured circles which flash briefly, and between blank screens one of the circles will change. 
Their task was to find the circle which changes as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Participants were instructed to press the space bar as soon as the change was detected, and to use 
the mouse to indicate on screen where the change was detected. As each trail ended participants 
were given the opportunity to check their decision by tapping the return key, or simply to press 





Figure 4.1a. Change detection task showing conditions of location, presence, size and colour. 
Changes occur between screen flicker.  
Attention network task. Participants were informed the task measures how they use and 
ignore information to make a decision to determine the direction of the center arrow, in an array 
of five. If the arrow was pointing left, participants were asked to press the left shift key, and if 
the arrow was pointing right, to press the right shift key. Participants were informed that target 
arrows would be either be surrounded to the left and right by arrows pointing in the same or 
opposite direction, or by neutral lines, but were asked to always ignore the surrounding symbols 
and respond only to the central arrow. Participants were then given examples. Participants were 
also informed that preceding the target, a cue would appear which may or may not provide 
information about the location of the target arrow (above or below fixation) and were given 
further examples. Participants were asked to perform the task as quickly and accurately as 






Figure 4.1b. Experimental procedure of the Attention Network Task showing order and timing 
of events, cue and target conditions.  
Survey data. Following the experimental tasks participants were informed they could 
relax their seating position from the screen. Participants were provided with pencils and erasers, 
and were administered the ATTA. After completing this, participants were completed the Survey 
Monkey battery in order of the: CAQ, RIBS, HSPS, BFI, and ATQ. Participants were told that 
the task was not timed, to complete the questionnaires in their own time, and to give honest 
answers. 
Results 
Change Detection Task: Overall Performance 
Correlations. A Shapiro-Wilks test of normality indicated that all RT and error rate 
variables of the CDT were not normally distributed (ps<.01), with the exception of overall RT 
and location RT conditions. Therefore, non-parametric tests were selected to assess correlations 




 For RTs, each condition is at least significantly moderately positively correlated with 
overall RTs. Size is significantly positively correlated with location, size and colour. Location is 
weakly significantly positively correlated with presence and size. Presence is weakly positively 
correlated with size. For error rates, each condition is at least significantly moderately positively 
correlated with overall error rates and all conditions are positively inter-correlated. The relation 
between RTs and error rates can determine whether speed-accuracy trade-off strategies were 
implemented by participants. Overall RTs are significantly weakly negatively correlated with 
overall error rates, and both presence and colour RTs are weakly negatively correlated with error 
rates in those conditions. Scatterplots suggest that participants adopted a speed-accuracy trade-off 
strategy overall, but mainly in presence and colour conditions, where faster RTs are associated 
with higher error rates. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA). Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 show the mean RTs and error 
rates overall, and per condition with 95% confidence intervals. 
Main effects for reaction times. One-way repeated-measures ANOVA compared 
performance across conditions (location, presence, colour, size). Sphericity (ε=.225, p<.001) was 
not assumed so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (ε<.75) was applied. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of condition, F(2,148)=85.99, p<.001. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni 
correction revealed that all mean RTs across cue conditions were significantly different from 
each other (ps<.001) with exception of presence and size conditions (p=.091). The largest mean 
difference (M=12092ms) was found between location and colour conditions. 
Main effects for error rates.One-way repeated-measures ANOVA compared error rates 
across conditions (location, presence, colour, size). Sphericity (ε=.583, p<.001) was not assumed 




effect of condition, F(2,207)=78.82, p<.001. Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that all mean error rates across cue conditions were significantly different from each 
other (ps<.001) with exception of presence and size conditions, which were not significantly 
different (p=.376). The largest mean difference (M=23.61%) was found between location and 
colour conditions.  
 
Figure 4.2. CDT performance showing mean a) RTs and b) error rates by condition. Error bars 
show 95% confidence interval, and silver dashed line represents overall mean performance. 
Minor versus major changes. Further analysis compared differences in performance for 
minor and major changes in the CDT to replicate Jagiellowicz et al. (2011). We created variables 
based on correlational data (see Table 4.3) representing major (mean score of location and 
presence) and minor (colour) changes. The major variable was created on the reasoning that 
presence and location RTs were significantly faster and more accurate than colour RTs, and 
these conditions were also uncorrelated with colour RTs. Size RTs were not significantly 




thus were excluded from the minor versus major analysis. ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference in RTs for minor and major conditions, F(1,96)=107.0, p<.001, where major changes 
were detected faster than minor changes. There was also a significant difference in error rates for 
minor and major conditions, F(1,96)=126.43, p<.001, where major changes had lower error rates 
than minor changes. Both minor RTs and error rates were significantly higher than overall RT 
and error rates (ps<.001) and both major RTs and error rates were significantly lower than 
overall RTs and error rates (ps<.001). See Table 4.2 for means and 95% confidence intervals by 
condition. 
Individual Differences in CDT Performance 
 A Shapiro-Wilkes test of normality revealed that several variables (BFI-C, BFI-A, BFI-N, 
and CDT minor vs. major difference variables) were not normally distributed (ps<.05) so non-
parametric methods (Spearman) were used to assess correlations between variables. See Table 4.1 
for summary statistics of creativity, sensitivity and personality variables and Table 4.4 for 
correlation table summary of individual differences in CDT performance. Note, no significant 
correlations emerged between creativity, sensitivity, personality and CDT error rates.  
Creativity and CDT reaction time correlations. RIBS weakly positively correlates with 
colour RTs and minor versus major difference RTs. The CAQ or ATTA scores do not 
significantly correlate with any CDT condition RTs (see Table 4.4). 
ATQ temperament and CDT reaction time correlations. ATQ-OS weakly positively 
correlates with colour RTs and minor versus major difference RTs. ATQ-EC does not 
significantly correlate with RTs from any CDT condition, although shows a weak negative 
correlation with overall RT performance (p=.062) and presence RTs (p=.076). ATQ-NA weakly 




RTs. Note, the ATQ-OS (N, E) residuals correlates weakly positively with colour RTs (p=.057) 
and significantly with minor versus major difference RTs, suggesting the ATQ OS correlations 
with colour and minor versus major RTs are not specific to NA. 
Hierarchical multiple regression: Sensitivity, personality and change detection as 
predictors of creative ideation. The Spearman’s rank order correlation (see Table 4.4) revealed 
that ATQ-OS, minor versus major difference RTs and RIBS are all weakly positively correlated. 
One question emerges whether the positive correlations between ATQ-OS, minor versus major 
RTs and RIBS reflect shared (i.e., attention) or independent but related processes. A hierarchical 
regression model will demonstrate whether ATQ-OS and CDT can account for unique variance 
in RIBS scores. In the hierarchical multiple regression, model 1 regressed minor versus major 
difference RTs onto RIBS. Model 2 added orienting sensitivity variables to Model 1. Model 3 
added BFI-E and BFI-N variables to account for NA. Adding NA to this hierarchical model 
allows the examination of sensitivity effects with and without NA controlled. Model 4 added 
BFI-O, a strong correlate of ATQ-OS (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), to examine whether CDT and 
ATQ-OS effects are redundant in the presence of BFI-O. CAQ and ATTA were not analyzed 
using regression analysis as no relation was found between those measures and CDT 
performance (see Table 4.4). Table 4.5 summarize the hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
and model fits for continuous sensitivity. See Appendix C for dichomous sensitivity analysis. 
 Assumptions of ordinary least squares regression were checked. Note, the minimum 
number of participants required for multiple regression is N>= 50+m, where m is the number of 
predictors. Regression equations with 6 or more predictor variables should aim for a minimum of 
N=10m (VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). In this study, N=97 and regression models use 5 




Scatterplots indicate linearity between variables. Distributions were inspected using P-P plots and 
histograms which showed only the minor versus major RTs are positively skewed. Although no 
assumptions are made regarding independent variables in regression models, it is useful to find 
whether influential cases or outliers exist. Standardised residuals of the models indicate no 
outliers, and converging results from Mahalonobis distance, Cooks D, leverage and standardized 
DFBeta values suggest that no cases substantially influence the model parameters (Field, 2013). 
Homoscedasticity cannot be assumed as variance increases variance across residuals. Violation of 
this assumption may limit the generalisability of the findings beyond the sample. 
ATQ-OS. Model 1 accounting for 5.2% variance shows that minor versus major RTs 
account for unique variance in RIBS scores. Model 2 accounts for 18.6% variance and gives a 
significantly better fit for the data. In Model 2, ATQ-OS accounts for unique variance in RIBS 
scores, however the addition of ATQ-OS in Model 2 renders minor versus major RTs coefficients 
non-significant, suggesting redundancy and overlap. Model 3 accounts for 19.2% but does not 
give a significantly better fit for the data (p=.26), and neither BFI-E nor BFI-N account for 
unique variance, nor do they reduce the capacity of ATQ-OS to account for unique variance in 
RIBS scores. Model 4 accounts for 32.2% and gives a significantly better fit for the data. In 
Model 4, both ATQ-OS and BFI-O account for unique variance in RIBS scores. The final 
regression equation for Model 4: Ŷ(RIBS)=.169 + .077(minor vs. major RT) + .258(ATQ-OS) + 
.111(BFI-N) + .168(BFI-E) + .402(BFI-O). 
Summary of CDT Results 
 RTs and error rates from each CDT condition correlated positively with overall 
performance, suggesting each condition measured change detection. There are differences in 




only correlate with size. However, all error rates correlate positively across conditions. The 
ANOVA revealed that the colour condition shows the highest RTs and error rates than all other 
conditions. This analysis was used to divide conditions into minor (colour) and major (presence 
and location) conditions to replicate Jagiellowicz et al. (2011). Major conditions were faster and 
more accurate than overall performance, and minor conditions were slower and less accurate 
than overall performance (see Figure 4.2).  
Summary of Individual Differences in CDT Performance 
The RIBS is the only creativity measure to correlate with CDT RT performance, 
specifically the colour and minor versus major difference RTs. Similarly, ATQ-OS (which 
positively correlates with RIBS, see Chapter 2) shows the same pattern of correlations, 
suggesting a link between creative ideation, orienting sensitivity and detection of minor versus 
major changes in the CDT. Further, the correlations are not strongly affected when NA is 
controlled, which is expected considering ATQ-OS is a positive-affect-related trait (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2009; Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015).  
 Key findings from the correlation analysis indicate a positive relation between minor 
versus major difference RTs (which includes colour) and RIBS. ATQ-OS also positively 
correlates with minor versus major difference RTs and RIBS (see also chapter 2). This suggests 
these measures have some shared underlying mechanism (i.e., orienting attention sensitivity). The 
hierarchical multiple regression was performed to see whether ATQ-OS and CDT performance 
could each account for unique variance in RIBS scores, or whether the shared underlying process 
would result in overlap and redundancy. The results (see Table 4.5) indeed show the relationship 
between minor versus major change detection can be explained by ATQ-OS as CDT variance in 




attention mechanisms associated with a) minor versus major change, and b) creative ideation. 
These effects change when ATQ-OS is treated as dichotomous (see Appendix C), probably 
because a dichotomous split will reduce the power of ATQ-OS to account for unique variance in 
RIBS (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). Similar effects were not found with the 
full HSPS, and the lack of correlation between HSP OS/AES factors and minor versus major 
difference RTs suggests negligible overlap between those measures when accounting for variance 
in RIBS scores (see Appendix C).  
One caveat is that whilst ATQ-OS shows overlap with minor versus major RT, the same 
could be said for BFI-O, considering the minor versus major RT coefficients become 
nonsignificant in Model 4 of the HSPS regression when BFI-O is introduced (see Table 4.5). 
Indeed, when the regression analysis is repeated, but with BFI-O replacing ATQ-OS in Model 2, 
the minor versus major RT coefficient becomes nonsignificant (p=.097) when BFI-O is 
controlled, suggesting that the attention mechanism associated with minor-major RT performance 
is common to ATQ-OS and BFI-O. 
The Attention Network Task 
 Fan et al. (2002) found that target arrows flanked by incongruent flanker arrows produce 
slower response times than when targets are surrounded by congruent or neutral flankers (see 
Figure 4.1b for cue and flanker types). However, the type of cue used to alert or orient attention 
to the target onset location modulates the incongruency effect. Specifically, when alerting cues 
containing no spatial orienting information precede a target with incongruent flankers, RTs 
increase compared with no cue, or direction cue conditions. Further, incongruent flankers impair 
the ability to accurately resolve target conflict, compared with both neutral and congruent 




using a larger sample (see Appendix D). We then explore how ANT performance can be 
explained by individual differences in creativity, temperament and personality. 
Individual Differences in ANT Performance by Condition 
 A mixed ANOVA using within-groups factors of cue (none, centre, double, direction) and 
flanker (neutral, congruent, incongruent) and between-groups factors of group were used to 
explore individual differences in both ANT reaction time and error rate performance. Group 
differences were analyzed using ANOVAs for dichotomous orienting sensitivity groups. In 
ANOVAs where Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant, the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was applied. See Appendix D for ANOVAs using between groups factors of HSPS, 
and all three creativity measures. 
Mixed ANOVA for ANT performance using dichotomous ATQ-OS. The mixed 
ANOVA revealed no significant between-groups effects (ps>.087), 3-way (ps>.434), or 2-way 
(ps>.490) interactions for ATQ-OS or ATQ-OS (E, N) residual groups (see Table 4.6). 
The mixed ANOVA revealed significant between-groups effect of ATQ-OS group (see 
Table 4.6) where HSP groups (M=2.58%, 95% CI [1.75, 3.41]) have higher ER overall than non-
HSP groups (M=1.51%, 95% CI [.97, 2.05]). A significant cue × flanker × ATQ-OS Split was 
also found. Simple contrasts reveal a significant effect of accuracy, F(1,95)=9.3, p=.003, 
ηp.
2=.089, for incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers following centre cues (vs. no cue) where HSP 
groups (M=6.38%, 95% CI [2.9, 10.14]) have higher ERs than non-HSP groups (M=1.24%, 95% 
CI [-.2, 2.76]). Simple contrasts also revealed a significant effect of error, F(1,95)=5.2, p=.025, 
ηp.
2=.052, for incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers following double cues (vs. no cue) where HSP 
groups (M=4.9%, 95% CI [2.14, 7.85]) have higher ER than non-HSP groups (M=1.4%, 95% CI 




between-groups effects and interactions, remains the same for ATQ-OS (E, N) residuals (see 
Table 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.3. Visualization of the cue × flanker × ATQ-OS group interaction for error rates in the 




Individual differences in alerting and orienting by congruity. The mixed ANOVA 
conducted to explore individual differences in ANT performance was informative. However, the 
analysis suffers from limitations as measures of attention network efficiencies are obtained 
through comparison of conditions with appropriate reference conditions, as with alerting, 
orienting and conflict variables (Fan et al., 2002). Correlations suggest sensitivity relates to 
alerting RT and ER, and also conflict ER (see Appendix D), but no effects of orienting were 
found. However, the alerting and orienting variables suggested by Fan et al. (2002) do not 
consider the effects of cue on flanker congruity. In addition, the alerting variable does not 
consider centre and double cues separately, and evidence in this study suggests double and centre 
alerting cues are different and should be analyzed separately. Therefore, to study group 
differences in alerting, orienting and conflict networks we created additional alerting and 
orienting variables split by the flanker congruity factor: alerting-centre (centre cue – no cue) and 
alerting-double (double cue – no cue) and orienting (centre-direction) for congruent and 
incongruent flankers. Thus, for each flanker condition, positive alerting effects reflect slower and 
less accurate performance than no-cue conditions, and positive orienting effects reflect slower 
and less accurate performance in centre alerting versus orienting conditions. The conflict 
network can be studied using overall flanker effects in the analysis. A 3-way mixed ANOVA 
using within-subjects factors of cue (Alerting-Centre, Alerting-Double, and Orienting) by flanker 
(congruent, incongruent) and between-groups factors of group was conducted for RT and ER 
data separately. Group differences were analyzed in separate ANOVAs for a) dichotomous 
sensitivity: HSPS, and HSPS (E, N) residuals (see Appendix D) and for ATQ-OS, and ATQ-OS 




ANOVAs where Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was applied. 
ATQ-OS. No significant between-groups effects (ps>.72) and no significant 3-way 
(ps>.72) or 2-way (ps>.15) interactions were found with RT data for any ATQ-OS or ATQ-OS 
(E, N) residuals groups, see Table 4.7. 
 The mixed ANOVA with ER data revealed a significant ATQ-OS main effect of group, 
and ATQ-OS × flanker interaction, see Table 4.7. The between-groups effect is the result of HSP 
groups (M=2.99%, 95% CI[1.93, 4.06]) having significantly higher ER than non-HSP groups 
(M=.98%, 95% CI[.28, 1.67]) overall. However, Figure 4.4 shows that the interaction was found 
because HSP groups have higher ER than non-HSP groups for incongruent (p<.01), but not 
congruent flanker conditions (p=.66). Further, the effects remain significant when controlling for 
NA using ATQ-OS (E, N) residual as a between-groups factor in the ANOVA. 
 





Sensitivity and ANT as Predictors of Creativity 
 Sensitivity is associated with greater incongruity effects (i.e., higher ER for incongruent 
vs. neutral targets) following alerting cues, and greater incongruity effects overall when alerting 
and orienting variables split by flanker condition are considered together. These effects remain 
significant when NA is partialled out in the ATQ-OS (E, N) residuals group. High versus low 
creative ideation (RIBS) is also associated with higher ER for incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers 
(Appendix D). One question emerges whether incongruity effects associated with both ATQ-OS 
and RIBS reflect shared (i.e., attention) or independent processes. A hierarchical regression 
model will demonstrate whether ATQ-OS and incongruity effects can account for unique 
variance in RIBS scores. To finish, we explore using hierarchical multiple regression whether 
flanker congruity following alerting cues and ATQ-OS can account for unique variance in RIBS 
scores. For flanker effects, a new ‘congruity’ variable was created reflecting the difference in 
errors between incongruent and neutral conditions collapsed across centre and double alerting 
cues. The use of neutral versus congruent flankers is supported by the fact that only small 
differences are found between congruent and neutral flanker conditions (Fan et al., 2002), and 
because we found no difference between congruent and neutral flankers for ER (p=.931). Also, 
there are no differences found between incongruent versus neutral flankers for centre versus 
double conditions (p=.691). Thus, we can argue that any effects found relate to individual, rather 
than overall effects. In the regression, we use continuous variables to restore statistical power lost 
when using dichotomisation (MacCallum et al., 2002), but see Appendix D for dichotomous 
regression analysis. Regression analysis was also performed with the HSPS (Appendix D). 
Hierarchical multiple regression. In the hierarchical multiple regression, Model 1 




3 added BFI-E and BFI-N variables to account for NA Adding NA measures to this hierarchical 
model allows the examination of sensitivity effects with and without NA controlled. Model 4 
added BFI-O, a strong correlate of ATQ-OS (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), to examine whether 
flanker congruity and sensitivity effects are redundant in the presence of BFI-O. CAQ and ATTA 
were not analyzed using regression analysis as the ANOVA did not reveal group differences in 
ANT performance (Appendix D). See Table 4.8 for regression coefficients and model fits of the 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses using continuous sensitivity. 
 Assumptions of ordinary least squares regression were checked. Scatterplots indicate 
linearity between variables. Distributions were inspected using P-P plots and histograms showing 
only the flanker congruity variable was positively skewed with kurtosis. Although no 
assumptions are made regarding independent variables in regression models, it is useful to find 
whether influential cases or outliers exist. Standardised residuals of the models indicate no 
outliers, however one influential case was identified if Mahalonobis distances>15 and leverage 
values greater than (3[k + 1]/n), although all standardized DFBeta values were<1, which may 
also suggest that no cases substantially influence the model parameters (Field, 2013). Note. 
removal of the influential case identified by the converging Mahalonobis distance and leverage 
values did not change the outcome of the regressions.Residual variance indicates that 
homoscedasticity can be assumed. 
ATQ-OS. Model 1 accounting for 5.1 % variance shows that congruity accounts for 
unique variance in RIBS scores. Model 2 accounts for 17.9% variance and gives a significantly 
better fit for the data. In Model 2, ATQ-OS accounts for unique variance in RIBS scores, 
however the addition of ATQ-OS in Model 2 renders congruity coefficients non-significant 




significantly better fit for the data (p=.127). In Model 3, BFI-E, but not BFI-N, approaching 
significance accounts for unique variance (p =.058), but this does not reduce the capacity of 
ATQ-OS to account for unique variance or change the effect of congruity. Note, in the 
dichotomous sample, the BFI-E coefficient is marginally significant (p =.048). Model 4 accounts 
for 33.4% and gives a significantly better fit for the data. In Model 4, both ATQ-OS and BFI-O 
account for unique variance in RIBS scores and BFI-E approaches significance (p=.068), as with 
the dichotomous sample (p=.061), but not congruity or BFI-N. The final regression equation for 
Model 4: Ŷ(RIBS)=.087 + .135(congruity) + .234(ATQ-OS) + .140(BFI-N) + .201(BFI-E) + 
.407(BFI-O). 
Summary of Individual Differences in ANT Performance 
 Mixed ANOVA did not reveal any sensitivity group effects in RTs, for either HSPS or 
ATQ-OS groups, or with NA controlled. The null findings with sensitivity measures does not 
support the hypothesis that sensitivity would be associated with slower RT performance for 
alerting cues, and thus not consistent with Costa et al. (2013) who found ATQ-OS group 
differences in RTs for alerting trials using a modified ANT. However, group interactions were 
found for ER with ATQ-OS measures, and for RIBS creative ideation (Appendix D). Group 
comparisons with the ATQ-OS support the hypothesis that high sensitivity groups would have 
poorer conflict resolution abilities following alerting cues. In this study, ATQ-OS groups show 
greater incongruity effects for both centre and double alerting cues, where HSP groups have 
higher ER than non-HSP groups for targets with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers following 
both centre and double cues, and greater incongruity effects overall when alerting and orienting 
variables split by flanker condition are considered together. These effects remain significant 




evidence, using the full ANT, that attention network efficiencies differ between HSPs and non-
HSPs. However, no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that sensitivity would be 
associated with differences in efficiency of the orienting networks of the ANT, as the mixed 
ANOVAs did not reveal group interactions with spatial orienting cues, and no correlations 
(Appendix D) were found between sensitivity and orienting variables, for RTs or ERs, altogether 
suggesting that sensitivity as a continuous or dichotomous variable do not differ in their use of 
spatial orienting information in this task. The findings show that ATQ-OS affects only processes 
unique to the incongruency effect which are enhanced when alerting cues are given. As no RT 
effects were found, the group differences in ER do not reflect speed-accuracy tradeoff, 
suggesting that ATQ-OS HSPs maintain speed but at a cost of accuracy. Given that the ANT 
used was a speeded task, HSPs may have achieved slower, but no less accurate performance than 
non-HSPs given enough time. Indeed, this is evident in studies of change detection (Jagiellowicz 
et al., 2011) which involve attention (Beck et al., 2001; Rees & Lavie, 2001).  
The creative groups showed very little difference in ANT performance across multiple 
analyses, however high RIBS groups was associated with greater ER for incongruent (vs. 
neutral) flankers compared with low RIBS groups (Appendix D). This suggests that measures of 
creative ideation are associated with differences in ANT conflict resolution, as with ATQ-OS. 
One question emerged whether congruity effects associated with both ATQ-OS and RIBS reflect 
shared (i.e., attention) or independent processes. The results from the hierarchical multiple 
regression (see Table 4.8) show the relationship between RIBS and congruity effects can be 
explained by ATQ-OS as congruity effects are absorbed into (i.e., made redundant by) the 
broader construct of ATQ-OS. This suggests that ATQ-OS measures attention mechanisms 




creative ideation. Interestingly, similar effects were not found with the HSPS, suggesting that the 
HSPS does not capture the same underlying construct as completely as the ATQ-OS measure 
(Appendix D).  
The CDT analysis showing both ATQ-OS and BFI-O overlap with CDT attention 
variables when accounting for RIBS variance suggest the same effects could be observed in the 
ANT analysis. However, the differences between ATQ-OS and HSPS regression models 
(Appendix D) are informative in showing that BFI-O does not overlap with congruity 
coefficients for RIBS scores. Table 4.8 shows in Model 4 of the HSPS regression analysis that 
congruity accounts for unique variance in RIBS scores in the presence of BFI-O, but not in the 
ATQ-OS regression models. Thus, the alerting congruity effects are specific to ATQ-OS, not 
BFI-O. However, considering the congruity variable is a subset of the conflict variable, ATQ-
effortful-control (EC) is associated with conflict scores (Gerardi‐Caulton, 2000; Posner et al., 
2002), it is possible that these congruity effects may instead relate to ATQ-EC, rather than ATQ-
OS. However, when the regression analysis is repeated, but with ATQ-EC replacing ATQ-OS in 
Model 2, the congruity coefficient remains significant (p=.015) thus ruling out ATQ-EC effects. 
It is not clear whether any single attention network is responsible, although alerting and 
conflict networks are implicated in ATQ-OS, and only conflict networks in RIBS, but this does 
not include temperament effortful-control thought to be linked to the executive control network 
(Rothbart et al., 2007). The alerting cues of the ANT are designed to produce broad, spatially 
diffused attentional states required for rapid information extraction which occurs at the expense 
of information quality, resulting in higher ER in attention tasks (Callejas et al., 2004; Fan et al., 
2002; Posner & Petersen, 1990). The results from this study are consistent with the idea that 




tend to have a harder time filtering out (inhibiting) the distracting incongruent information (i.e., 
more sensitive to irrelevant information) when attention has been alerted and diffused, similar to 
people high in creative ideation whose conflict resolution abilities are not specific to cue type. 
The mechanisms that could explain this performance include the cognitive disinhibition and 
hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis of creativity (Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 
1999). Alerting cues produce higher ERs because alerting networks in the right hemisphere 
inhibit the executive control network, in particular the anterior cingulate which activates during 
inhibition of pre-potent responses required for conflict resolution (Posner, 1994). Alerting cues 
also decrease alpha power reflecting attention demands (Klimesch et al., 1998). Recall that high 
versus low creativity groups show higher alpha blockade (i.e., alpha suppression) during 
habituation to tones (Martindale & Armstrong, 1974b) and increased alerting skin potentials over 
time in response to bursts of white noise (Martindale et al., 1996) suggesting that higher 
creativity is associated with higher sensitivity of the alerting response. Considering that alerting 
inhibits executive control (Callejas et al., 2004; Posner, 1994), thus creating a state of 
disinhibition, one can speculate that higher ER for incongruent versus neutral flankers produced 
by alerting cues reflect a greater tendency towards cognitive disinhibition in sensitive, creative 
people. 
Discussion 
Overall, this study replicates findings linking sensitivity to change detection of minor 
versus major changes in visual scenes (Jagiellowicz et al., 2011) and extends these findings by 
linking sensitivity, creativity and attention mechanism involved in change detection. 
Specifically, we argue that overlap between minor versus major RTs and ATQ-OS measures 




automatic attention orienting) which partly define these measures. However, this effect is 
specific to positive-affect-related traits of orienting sensitivity and openness (Sobocko & 
Zelenski, 2015), and not the broader environmental sensitivity captured by the HSPS (Aron & 
Aron, 1997; Evans & Rothbart, 2008). 
We update the literature regarding individual differences in the efficiencies of the three 
attention networks measured by the ANT, and provide a greater understanding of the attention 
networks associated with sensitivity and creativity. Specifically, we present evidence suggesting 
that sensitivity is associated with differences in how alerting networks interact with executive 
control networks to resolve conflict in flanker tasks. Further, we show those network interactions 
also predict creative ideation, but have substantial overlap with orienting sensitivity, rather than 
broader measures of environmental sensitivity captured by the HSPS, and are not explained by 
negative affect, BFI-O, or ATQ-EC. This suggests the shared underlying mechanism between 
creative ideation and congruity effects following alerting cues relates to automatic attention 
processes measured by the ATQ-OS, and can be explained more generally by cognitive 
disinhibition and hemispheric asymmetry hypotheses of creativity (Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 
2010; Martindale, 1999). The shared underlying mechanism proposed does not appear to include 
orienting attention networks measured by the ANT, as no effects were found with spatial cueing 
or orienting variables. This is interesting considering that ATQ-OS is thought to measure 
orienting attention. However, this null finding could be explained by the low reliabilities 
reported for the orienting network which potentially result from the calculation of difference 
scores. Low reliability can reduce statistical power and resulting in failure to identify between-
groups effects (MacLeod et al., 2010). Further, the ANT specifically measures endogenous 




processes. Thus, one aim of Chapter 5 is to establish whether orienting sensitivity of the ATQ 
has a brain basis in exogenous attention networks by exploring individual differences in a spatial 

























Mean, standard deviation (SD) and lower (LCI) and upper (UCI) 95% confidence intervals for 
creativity, temperament, personality variables (N=97) 
  Mean SD LCI UCI 
Creativity     
CAQ 8.32 6.62 7.08 9.66 
RIBS 2.85 .53 2.75 2.96 
ATTA 68.09 8.62 66.2 69.79 
Temperament    
ATQ-OS 4.53 .74 4.39 4.68 
Personality     
BFI-O 3.16 .57 3.05 3.28 
BFI-C 3.46 .68 3.33 3.6 
BFI-E 3.22 .78 3.07 3.38 
BFI-A 3.81 .66 3.68 3.94 
BFI-N 3.36 .8 3.21 3.52 
Note: CAQ=Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA=Abbreviated Torrance Test for 
Adults; ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; BFI-O=openness to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory (BFI); BFI-
C=conscientiousness factor of the BFI; BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-A=agreeableness factor of the BFI; BFI-















Mean reaction times (msec) and error rates (%) with standard deviations (SD) and 95% 
confidence lower (LCI) and upper (UCI) intervals for change detection task overall and by 
condition (N=97) 
 
  Reaction Times (msec) Error rates (%) 
  Mean SD LCI UCI Mean SD LCI UCI 
Overall 12505 3446 11820 13191 11.67 11.48 9.39 13.95 
Location 7787 2460 7298 8277 3.61 7.53 2.11 5.11 
Presence 11096 3866 10326 11865 7.32 13.27 4.68 9.96 
Color 19880 9946 17900 21859 27.22 22.53 22.73 31.7 
Size 12259 4342 11395 13123 9.59 13.91 6.82 12.36 
Major 9441 2490 8946 9937 5.46 8.81 3.71 7.22 
Minor 19880 9946 17900 21859 27.22 22.53 22.73 31.7 





Correlations between mean RT and error rate performance overall and across condition for the change detection task 
 Reaction Times        `     Error rates         
  Overall Location Presence Color Size Major  Minor Mi-Ma Overall Location Presence Color Size Major  Minor 
Overall -               
Location .396** -              
Presence .540** .204* -             
Color .774** .03 .122 -            
Size .674** .356** .367** .306** -           
Major .608** .650** .849** .105 .481** -          
Minor .774** .03 .122 1.00** .306** .105 -         
Mi-Ma .598** -0.15 -.105 .957** .168 -.159 .957** -               
Overall -.328** .021 -.159 -.363** .011 -.089 -.363** -.330** -       
Location -.146 .098 -.174 -.188 -.032 -.066 -.188 -.172 .523** -      
Presence -.337** -.093 -.207* -.308** -.089 -.178 -.308** -.251* .674** .292** -     
Color -.328** -.001 -.163 -.308** -.012 -.132 -.308** -.267** .897** .358** .471** -    
Size -.16 .089 -.045 -.280** .057 .027 -.280** -.272** .705** .454** .488** .447** -   
Major -.267** .012 -.217* -.284** -.035 -.118 -.284** -.247* .741** .681** .856** .479** .549** -  
Minor -.328** -.001 -.163 -.308** -.012 -.132 -.308** -.267** .897** .358** .471** 1.00** .447** .479** - 
Mi-Ma -.267** -.015 -.115 -.244* .022 -.121 -.244* -.208* .737** .154 .248* .942** .328** .206* .942** 










Spearman’s correlations showing associations between creativity, temperament and personality measures and the reaction time and 
error rates for the CDT task 
  Reaction Times         Error Rates         
  Overall Location Presence Color Size Mi-Ma Overall Location Presence Color Size Mi-Ma 
Creativity                         
CAQ .057 -.005 -.106 .135 .019 .154 -.024 .009 -.017 -.003 .018 .028 
RIBS .114 .036 -.109 .204* .091 .211* -.007 -.06 .04 .031 -.018 .044 
ATTA .105 .015 .156 .061 .074 .042 -.076 -.196 -.088 -.041 -.089 -.005 
Temperament                         
ATQ OS .111 .009 -.125 .202* .003 .215* -.086 -.088 -.116 -.049 -.101 -.012 
Personality                         
BFI O -.012 -.098 -.193 .1 -.045 .158 -.132 -.008 -.002 -.144 -.032 -.146 
BFI C -.126 -.109 -.171 -.03 -.053 .005 .121 .136 -.068 .178 .06 .191 
BFI E -.015 -.221* .043 .124 -.115 .148 .024 -.027 .077 .113 -.021 .132 
BFI A -.087 -.104 -.165 -.064 .005 -.025 -.059 .031 -.04 -.037 -.107 -.053 
BFI N .135 .241* .044 -.012 .239* -.034 -.056 -.065 -.095 -.142 .083 -.143 
Note. * p< 0.05 level, ** p<.01 (2-tailed). Note: CAQ=Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA=Abbreviated Torrance Test for 
Adults; ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; BFI O=openness to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory (BFI); BFI C=conscientiousness factor of the BFI; BFI 





Hierarchical multiple regression – Continuous sensitivity, personality and change detection as 
predictors of creative ideation 
  RIBS       
  ATQ-OS   
    Beta SE t   
Model 1      
Mi-Ma RT  .248 0 2.5*  
Model 2      
Mi-Ma RT  .159 0 1.68  
Sensitivity  .386 .068 4.08***  
Model 3      
Mi-Ma RT  .121 0 1.249  
Sensitivity  .407 .069 4.246***  
BFI-N  .045 .081 .369  
BFI-E  .181 .083 1.476  
Model 4      
Mi-Ma RT  .077 0 .862  
Sensitivity  .258 .068 2.739**  
BFI-N  .111 .074 .989  
BFI-E  .168 .076 1.491  
BFI-O   .402 .087 4.321***   
Model fit  F df R²  
Model 1  6.23* 1,95 .052  
Model 2  16.66*** 1,94 .186  
Model 3  1.37 2,92 .192  
Model 4  18.67*** 1,91 .322  
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01,*** p<.001; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; Mi-Ma RT=Major – Minor RT; ATQ-
OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; BFI-N=neuroticism factor of the Big Five Inventory; BFI-E=extraversion factor of 












Mixed ANOVA output showing between-group effects for ATQ-OS (and ATQ-OS (E, N) 
residuals) and group interactions with cue and flanker conditions for reaction times (RT) and 
error rates  
  
  
  RT   Error rates 
F df ηp.2 F df ηp.2 
ATQ-OS       
Group 2.98 1,95 .03 4.55* 1,95 .046 
Group × Cue .08 3,255 .001 3.54* 3,242 .036 
Group × Flanker .65 2,150 .007 5.99* 1,103 .059 
Group × Cue × Flanker .97 5,449 .01 3.51 3,322 .036 
ATQ-OS (E, N) residuals       
Group 2.19 1,95 .023 6.74* 1,95 .066 
Group × Cue .27 3,255 .003 2.95* 3,240 .03 
Group × Flanker .33 2,150 .003 6.54** 1,104 .064 
Group × Cue × Flanker .66 5,449 .007 3.02* 3,321 .031 





Mixed ANOVA output showing between-group effects for ATQ-OS, including ATQ-OS (E, N), 
residuals and group interactions with cue (centre – none, double – none, centre-direction) and 
flanker (congruent, incongruent) factors for reaction times (RTs) and error rates 
  RTs 
 
Error rates 
   F df ηp.2 F df ηp.2 
ATQ-OS       
Group .13 1,95 .001 9.88** 1,95 .094 
Group × Cue .73 1,136 .008 .89 1,132 .009 
Group × Flanker 2.09 1,95 .021 7.63** 1,95 .074 
Group × Cue × Flanker .25 2,147 .003 .26 1,131 .003 
ATQ-OS (E, N) residuals       
Group .04 1,95 0 7.07** 1,95 .069 
Group × Cue .86 1,136 .009 .65 1,132 .007 
Group × Flanker 1.66 1,95 .017 6.85** 1,95 .067 
Group × Cue × Flanker .03 2,147 0 .51 1,132 .005 

















Hierarchical multiple regression: Sensitivity (continuous), personality and congruity 
(incongruent – neutral flankers collapsed across alerting cue conditions) as predictors of 
creative ideation 
  RIBS             
  ATQ-OS   HSPS 
    Beta SE t   Beta SE t 
Model 1         
Congruity  .247 .007 2.49* 
 .247 .007 2.49* 
Model 2  
       
Congruity  .139 .007 1.44 
 .25 .007 2.51* 
Sensitivity  .384 .069 3.98*** 
 .089 .069 0.9 
Model 3  
       
Congruity  .144 .007 1.51 
 .263 .007 2.69** 
Sensitivity  .393 .069 4.06*** 
 .253 .097 1.81 
BFI-N  .08 .08 .67  .014 .099 0.09 
BFI-E  .229 .081 1.92 
 .296 .089 2.26* 
Model 4  
       
Congruity  .135 .007 1.55 
 .195 .006 2.24* 
Sensitivity  .234 .068 2.46* 
 .068 .089 0.53 
BFI-N  .14 .074 1.27  .15 .089 1.13 
BFI-E  .201 .074 1.85 
 .216 .079 1.85 
BFI-O   .407 .085 4.45***  .479 .085 5.26*** 
Model fit  F df R²  F df R² 
Model 1  6.18* 1,95 .051  6.18* 1,95 .051 
Model 2  15.84*** 1,94 .179  .80 1,94 .049 
Model 3  2.11 2,92 .198  2.94 2,92 .063 
Model 4  19.81*** 1,91 .329  27.69*** 1,91 .292 
Note. * p<.05,*** p<.001. RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATQ-OS=orienting 
sensitivity factor of the ATQ; HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); BFI-N=neuroticism 
factor of the Big Five Inventory; BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-O=openness to 




































Endogenous and Exogenous Attention in the Sensitive Creator 
 
Abstract 
Tasks used in Chapter 4 were inadequate to fully investigate the hypothesis that 
sensitivity is grounded in exogenous orienting networks and did not capture all orienting sub-
functions, including detection, disengagement, movement, and engagement of attention (Posner, 
1980; Posner & Petersen, 1990) and evidence suggests temperament moderates particular 
orienting sub-functions (Avila, 1995; Derryberry & Reed, 1994; Poy, del Carmen Eixarch, & 
Ávila, 2004). In this chapter, we establish a) whether orienting sensitivity is grounded in 
exogenous attention networks by exploring individual differences in a spatial Stroop task 
sensitive to both endogenous and exogenous orienting, and detection, disengagement, movement, 
and engagement sub-functions thereof, and b) whether exogenous orienting and sub-functions 
are underlying mechanisms in the sensitive creator (Chapter 2). 
ATQ-OS shows reliable Inhibition-of-Return (IOR) in exogenous attention tasks, 
consistent with ATQ-OS as “automatic” exogenous attention. However, ATQ-OS measures do 
not relate to orienting sub-functions. No evidence was found to suggest exogenous IOR 
mechanisms associated with orienting sensitivity are implicated in higher creativity by any 

































In Chapter 4, we hypothesized sensitivity would be associated with individual differences 
in efficiency of the orienting networks measured with the attention network task (ANT; Fan et 
al., 2002). However, null findings were explained to result from task limitations as the ANT 
specifically measures endogenous attention, meaning the ANT is inadequate to fully investigate 
the hypothesis that sensitivity, specifically orienting sensitivity, is grounded in exogenous 
orienting attention. Further, the ANT does not capture all important aspects of the orienting 
process, including detection, disengagement, movement, and engagement of attention (Posner, 
1980; Posner & Petersen, 1990) and evidence suggests temperament moderates particular 
orienting sub-functions (Avila, 1995; Derryberry & Reed, 1994; Poy et al., 2004). The aim of 
Chapter 5 is to establish a) whether orienting sensitivity has a brain basis in exogenous orienting 
attention networks by exploring individual differences in a spatial Stroop paradigm, which 
includes tasks sensitive to both endogenous and exogenous orienting and the detection, 
disengagement, movement, and engagement sub-functions thereof, and b) whether the 
exogenous orienting networks and sub-functions are underlying mechanisms in the sensitive 
creator (see Chapter 2). 
Endogenous and Exogenous Orienting 
To understand how orienting attention may relate to sensitivity one must consider the 
processes underlying the dorsal and ventral orienting attention networks that may underlie this 
temperament. The function of orienting is to align attention towards novel, important and relevant 
sensory input or internal cognitive events (Posner, 1980). Orienting of attention is strongly related 
to the orienting reflex (Sokolov, 1963, 1990), although the orienting reflex does not distinguish 




orienting (Posner, 1980; Posner & Petersen, 1990). A general framework explains orienting of 
attention in terms of elementary mental operations of facilitation and inhibition (Posner, 1980; 
Posner & Cohen, 1984; Posner et al., 1985). This framework has been extensively tested using 
spatial cueing paradigms (for reviews, see Chica, Martín-Arévalo, Botta, & Lupiánez, 2014; 
Posner & Petersen, 1990), in which participants must detect or discriminate targets that appear at 
cued or uncued locations. Intervals between cue and target are known as the stimulus-onset-
asynchrony (SOA) and manipulation of this interval can provide facilitation or inhibition of target 
processing depending on length of SOA and cue type (Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980). Spatial cueing 
paradigms can capture two modes of orienting (for a review, see Chica et al., 2014). Top-down, 
endogenous, voluntary orienting can be manipulated with a central symbolic indicator, such as a 
central arrow (but see Tipples, 2002), that predicts the location of a target stimulus with high 
probability (typically 75% predictability). Bottom-up, exogenous, involuntary orienting can be 
manipulated using non-predictive peripheral cues, such as salient, abrupt changes in luminance 
giving the impression of a brief flash that occurs equally often at target locations (Chica et al., 
2014; Posner, 1980). Facilitation effects in spatial cueing paradigms are found for both endogenous 
and exogenous cues (Posner, 1980), but with some differences. Typically, endogenous cue 
facilitation effects are observed with long cue-target SOAs of approximately 300ms and can last 
for several seconds (Posner, 1980), and exogenous cue facilitation effects are observed more 
briefly with short cue-target SOAs of approximately 100ms, but not with cue-target SOAs greater 
than 250ms (Jonides, 1981; Muller & Rabbitt, 1989). Instead, at longer SOAs and following 
exogenous cues only (cf. Frischen & Tipper, 2004), both reaction times (Posner & Cohen, 1984) 
and accuracy (Klein & Dick, 2002) show negative facilitation effects, or impairment of target 




2004; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Posner et al., 1985), an adaptive impairment of reflexive attention 
and perception mechanisms (Klein & Dick, 2002) that bias attention in favor of novel versus 
familiar locations, thus creating favorable conditions for foraging, visual search and novelty 
detection (for a review, see Klein, 2000).  
Individual Differences in Spatial Cueing 
The spatial cueing paradigm has been useful for exploring individual differences in 
orienting attention, providing valuable information regarding the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms associated with major personality dimensions, such as Behavioural Inhibition System 
(BIS) and BAS Behavioural Activation System (BAS; Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1981), which 
is relevant considering the conceptual overlap of the sensitive temperament with BIS/BAS factors. 
Conceptually, sensory-processing sensitivity (SPS) measured by the HSPS is related to the BIS, a 
"pause and reflect" inhibitory system sensitive to punishment, non-reward and novelty. The BIS 
is more active in neurotic-introverts, or those prone to anxiety (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1981), 
although SPS is partially independent of introversion and neuroticism (Aron & Aron, 1997). 
Further, orienting sensitivity, a subfactor of the HSPS (Aron & Aron, 1997; Evans & Rothbart, 
2008) and the emotion-attention model of temperament (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2009), is a 
positive correlate of openness to experience (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), a trait associated with the 
neurotransmitter dopamine which mediates BAS-related approach behavior, positive affect and 
reward sensitivity (DeYoung et al., 2002, 2005). Openness (Li et al., 2015; Smits & Boeck, 2006) 
and orienting sensitivity factors of the HSP-AS/OS (Smolewska et al., 2006) have been shown to 
correlate positively with reward–responsiveness subfactors of BAS. Further, orienting sensitivity 
and openness (see Chapter 2) and also BAS (Dreu, Nijstad, & Baas, 2011) are each related to 




BIS/BAS provide a useful analogue to explore indirectly how orienting attention measured using 
spatial cueing paradigms may index cognitive processes associated with sensitivity and creativity. 
Derryberry and Reed (1994) found, using a spatial cueing paradigm with motivationally 
salient locations, that temperament regulates orienting sub-functions involved with disengagement 
of attention from significant stimuli. At short SOAs, across both endogenous and exogenous cue 
types, introverts (weak BAS, strong BIS) were slower than extraverts (strong BAS, weak BIS) 
when disengaging from aversive cues, and extraverts were slower than introverts at disengaging 
from appetitive cues, and in both cases the effects were strongest when neuroticism was high (i.e., 
stronger non-specific arousal resulting in lower BIS/BAS thresholds). Other studies have shown 
how temperament and personality relate to cognitive functioning regardless of emotional valence. 
Looking at general cognitive mechanisms of attention could explain how the function of two 
modes of orienting attention may influence the detection and processing of threat and reward and 
thus determine motivation preferences (Poy et al., 2004) and outcomes of the sensitive 
temperament. For example, in exogenous cueing tasks, high versus low BIS and BAS is associated 
with stronger IOR (Avila, 1995). However, high versus low BIS is associated with greater costs 
when disengaging from invalid peripheral cues at short SOA following exogenous cues, whereas 
high versus low BAS is associated with a greater ability to disengage from invalid target locations 
at long SOA following endogenous cues (Poy et al., 2004). 
Together, this evidence provides some support for the notion that temperament regulates 
attentional orienting processes involved with disengagement of attention from significant stimuli. 
Both introverts and extraverts are equally likely to notice, orient, attend to negative or positive 
events, but how they dwell in this information differs. Introverts are less able to disengage from 




on positive events, but have greater cognitive flexibility to voluntarily disengage attention. Further, 
sensitivity to motivational cues determines how strongly these effects are observed. This effect is 
attributed to neuroticism and non-specific arousal, however an alternative explanation implicates 
the lower-sensory-thresholds and ease-of-excitation characteristics of the sensitive temperament 
(Aron & Aron, 1997; Smolewska et al., 2006). Stronger BIS and BAS are related to greater IOR, 
and recent evidence also links openness to experience, a personality trait associated with orienting 
sensitivity and creativity (see Chapter 2), with a broader distribution of IOR across the visual field 
(Wilson et al., 2016). These findings are each important, showing that personality traits with strong 
links to the sensitive temperament may be grounded in orienting attention systems. Further, the 
evidence suggests that orienting mechanisms involving disengagement of attention from 
significant stimuli relates to temperament and this is something not captured by the ANT, 
providing further justification for investigations of temperament and orienting attention using 
measures sensitive to both endogenous and exogenous orienting and sub-functions therein.  
Sensitivity and Spatial Cueing Paradigms  
As definitions of sensitivity suggest individual differences in the exogenous orienting 
network (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), it is important that theoretical and empirical work supports an 
endogenous/exogenous taxonomy in order to justify further investigation beyond what has been 
found with existing measures, i.e., the ANT (see Chapter 4). Indeed, recent behavioural studies 
using spatial Stroop paradigms demonstrate qualitative differences representing a double 
dissociation between endogenous and exogenous orienting, wherein endogenous and exogenous 
cue types modulate spatial Stroop effects in opposite ways (Funes, Lupiáñez, & Milliken, 2007). 
Further, recent event-related transcranial magnetic stimulation studies have revealed a causal role 




et al., 2011), consistent with evidence identifying spatially distinct, functionally competitive but 
interactive neural networks that subserve endogenous and exogenous attention and internally and 
externally directed cognitions (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dixon et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2013). 
Thus, spatial cueing paradigms offer a useful tool to explore how individual differences in the 
sensitive temperament relate to efficiency of dissociated endogenous and exogenous attention 
networks.  
Hypothesis 
 Initially, using the spatial Stroop paradigm, we aim to replicate the dissociation of 
endogenous and exogenous tasks reported by Funes et al. (2007) wherein exogenous cues should 
reduce spatial Stroop interference, such that spatial congruency effects are smaller on valid versus 
invalid trials, whereas endogenous cues should either a) fail to reduce, or b) increase spatial 
congruency effects for valid versus invalid trials. Different SOAs are used in the spatial Stroop 
paradigm to observe maximal effects typically found for exogenous and endogenous cues at short 
(100ms) and long (850ms) SOA, respectively (Funes et al., 2007; Jonides, 1981; Posner & 
Cohen, 1984). This replication will provide evidence consistent with an endogenous/exogenous 
taxonomy, and thus provide further justification to investigate attention mechanisms beyond what 
has been found with existing measures, i.e., the ANT (see Chapter 4). Note, while Funes and 
colleagues manipulated attention task between subjects, the present study used a within-subject 
manipulation of task (see Appendix E). 
 Regarding individual differences, we predict ATQ-OS will relate to performance in the 
spatial Stroop task as both environmental sensitivity (Aron et al., 2012; Kantor-Martynuska, 
2012) and orienting sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2007) frameworks imply an attention 




suggest that orienting is also affected by neuroticism (Derryberry & Reed, 1994) and as HSPS 
captures both negative and positive sides of sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et 
al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), and ATQ-OS is a positive-affect-related vantage 
sensitivity (Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), differences in performance between sensitivity measures 
may emerge. Thus, it will be important to understand whether sensitivity relates to orienting 
performance with negative affect controlled. 
 Based on evidence linking strong BIS and BAS to IOR (Avila, 1995) and openness to a 
broader distribution of IOR (Wilson et al., 2016), and considering the conceptual overlap of 
sensitivity measures with  BIS/BAS and openness, we predict (i) ATQ-OS HSPs versus non-
HSPs will have stronger IOR effects in exogenous tasks as ATQ-OS has a strong relationship 
with openness. 
 Further, based on the associations between BIS/BAS scales and the ATQ-OS, we predict 
(ii) HSPs versus non-HSPs would be associated with a greater ability to disengage from invalid 
target locations at long SOA using endogenous cues, as found with strong BAS (Poy et al., 2004). 
Note, whilst the ANT has already been used to investigate HSP versus non-HSP performance in 
endogenous orienting tasks, it does not have a cue validity condition to measure disengagement 
of attention from invalid cued locations, thus it is possible that endogenous task effects will be 
observed beyond what have been reported using the ANT (Chapter 4).  
 Regarding sensitivity and creativity, we hypothesize (iii) that orienting sensitivity and 
IOR to predict creativity, and if IOR underlies the relationship between sensitivity and creativity, 
then redundancy of the IOR variable should be observed when controlling for sensitivity. Further, 
evidence shows BAS is associated with greater flexibility when disengaging endogenously cued 




(Dreu et al., 2011). Indeed, higher cognitive flexibility is important for creative 
products/divergent thinking (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010).  Thus, as orienting sensitivity 
correlates positively with reward–responsiveness subfactors of BAS (Smolewska et al., 2006) and 
creative products/divergent thinking (see Chapter 2), we predict that (iv) if hypothesis (ii) is 
supported and HSPs versus non-HSPs of the ATQ-OS have greater ability to disengage voluntary 
cued attention from invalid target locations at long SOA, then we expect this performance to 
predict creative products/divergent thinking. Further, if this subprocess of endogenous orienting 
underlies the relationship between sensitivity and creativity, then redundancy of this variable 
should be observed when controlling for sensitivity. 
Method 
Participants  
A sample of 65 participants were recruited for the study (47 female, 18male, aged between 
18-28 years, M = 20.42, SD = 2.34). Participants were rewarded with course credit. This study 
was approved by Human Ethics Committee in the Faculty of Science and Environment at 
University of Plymouth. Participants gave informed consent before the study and were debriefed 
after completing the study. 
Apparatus and Materials 
A computerized battery was developed on Survey Monkey to assess sensitivity, 
personality and creativity and administered in the lab. Each questionnaire was presented on a 
separate page within the software. For each item, the participant checked the blank in front of 
any item corresponding to the response that best applied to them. 
Sensitivity was measured using two questionnaires. 1) The Highly Sensitive Person scale 




sensory processing sensitivity using items asking about tendencies to startle easily, become 
easily overwhelmed by sensory inputs but also awareness of subtleties in the environment, and 
enjoyment of fine and delicate scents, tastes, sounds, and works of art. Item responses ranged 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 2) The two HSPS factors of orienting sensitivity and negative 
affect were also measured using the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ)-short form 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007). The ATQ is a self-report scale with 77 items measuring general 
constructs of orienting sensitivity (ATQ-OS), negative affect (ATQ NA), effortful control (ATQ 
EC), and extraversion/surgency (ATQ ES). Item responses ranged from 1 (extremely untrue) to 7 
(extremely true) and “not applicable”. 
The Big Five Inventory (BFI) assessed personality. This 44-item self-report questionnaire 
measures the Big Five dimensions of personality: Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; John et al., 1991; 
John et al., 2008; John & Srivastava, 1999). Item responses ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 
5 (agree strongly). 
Creativity was assessed using three of the most established and validated measures of 
creative processes. The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al., 2005) was 
chosen as an objective self-report measure of creative achievement across 10 domains of 
creativity. The Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale (RIBS; Runco et al., 2000-2001) is a 19-item 
questionnaire designed to measure creative ideation, which is thought to measure a single factor 
and has discriminant validity. Items probe behavioural tendencies and abilities regarding ideas 
and thinking, with many items emphasizing creative, unusual, or imaginative thought (e.g., “I 
have many wild ideas.”). The RIBS responses ranged from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). This study 




Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA; Goff & Torrance, 2002) consists of 3 timed (3-minute) tests of 
figural and verbal divergent thinking abilities thought to be critical for the creative process 
(Runco, 2014). The ATTA is a gold standard, objective measure of divergent thinking. The 
ATTA thus is the one test that independently verifies creative products/divergent thinking. The 
ATTA was presented in the lab in paper format with a pencil and eraser, not part of the Survey 
Monkey battery.  
 The experimental measures used in this experiment i.e., the spatial Stroop paradigm 
(Funes et al., 2007), and the presentation of stimuli, timing, and response collection was 
controlled using PsychoPy software (version 1.8; Peirce, 2007). Tasks were presented on a 
Viglen Windows 7 PC with Philips Brilliance LED monitor 221P3LPYES P-line 21.5" 
widescreen operating at 1920×1080 pixels with a 60hz refresh rate. Participants were sat in a 
cubicle with eyes at a distance of 60cm from the screen. On a black screen, the fixation point 
consisted of a white unfilled circle with a diameter of 3mm. The fixation was flanked by boxes 
on the left and right of the screen with a height and width of 24mm and 21mm respectively. The 
inner edge of each box measured 30mm from the centre of the fixation. In the exogenous task, 
the cue consisted of a brief and small increase in the line width of the box for 50ms, giving the 
impression of flicker. In the endogenous task, the cue consisted of a 50ms presentation of a red 
or green circle with a diameter of 7mm centred and overlaying the fixation.  
Design 
Previously, Funes et al. (2007) manipulated Cue type/Task between-subjects. However, 
because this was intended as a group study of individual differences, all attention factors were 
manipulated within-subjects. In this task, we used a fully within-subjects design of the spatial 




(endogenous cue, exogenous cue), SOA (100ms, 850ms), target location (valid or congruent with 
cue location, invalid or incongruent with cue location) and target direction (target direction 
congruent with target location, target direction incongruent with target location). The task 
presentation order was counterbalanced across participants such that there were equal numbers of 
times the exogenous and endogenous tasks were presented first. Each condition consisted of 7 
blocks of 64 trials for a total of 448 trials per condition. For the endogenous condition the cue 
predicted target location 75% of the time with 336 valid trials and 112 invalid trials (48 valid 
trials and 16 invalid trials per block). For the exogenous condition the cue predicted target 
location 50% of the time with 224 valid trials and 224 invalid trials (32 valid trials and 32 invalid 
trials per block). SOA types and target directions were presented an equal number of times 
across valid and invalid conditions. Trials were presented in randomized order in each task. The 
practice block consisted of 32 trials randomly selected from a block of 64 trials. Endogenous and 
exogenous task order was counterbalanced across participants. 
Individual differences. The HSPS may be a taxon consisting of HSP’s (i.e., those high 
on HSPS) and non-HSP’s, therefore Aron and Aron (2013) suggest dichotomizing the sample. 
As the sample majority consists of Psychology majors who may include a larger percentage of 
HSPs than the typical 20%, the break point was chosen to be 30% (high) HSP’s and 70% (low) 
non-HSP’s (Aron & Aron, 2013). For the ATQ-OS, the HSP group (n=20, M = 5.63, 95% 
CI[5.41, 5.85]) have significantly higher ratings on the ATQ-OS, t(63)=11.32, p<.001, than non-
HSP groups (n=45, M = 4.25, 95% CI[4.12, 4.37]).  
For each creativity measures, groups were formed based on a median split, where high 
creativity groups > median score, and low creativity groups <= median score. The medians for 




the high CAQ group (n=32; M=13.41, 95% CI[10.42, 16.76]) are significantly higher than the 
low CAQ group (n=32; M=13.41, 95% CI[10.42, 16.76]), t(63)=6.32, p<.001. The RIBS scores 
for the high RIBS group (n=30; M=3.39, 95% CI[3.26, 3.52]) are significantly higher than low 
the RIBS group (n=35; M=2.54, 95% CI[2.44, 2.64]), t(63)=10.64, p<.001. The ATTA scores for 
the high ATTA group (n=30; M=72.23, 95% CI[71.11, 73.45]) are significantly higher than the 
low ATTA group (n=35; M=59.97, 95% CI[56.02, 63.07]), t(63)=6.24, p<.001. Note, all 
personality, temperament, and creativity measures are scaled between 0 and 1, see Chapter 2 for 
scaling. Max scores used for scaling CAQ are 49, and 82 for the ATTA in this chapter only. 
Procedure 
Participants were first administered the spatial Stroop task using PsychoPy (Pierce, 
2007). The stimulus events during each trial are presented in chronological order in Figure 5.1. 
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation point with two peripheral boxes was presented for 
750ms, and then a cue appeared for 50ms. Following the cue, the fixation and peripheral boxes 
remained onscreen for a delay dictated by the SOA (50ms or 800ms). Following the SOA, a 
target arrow appeared in one peripheral box for 33ms. The fixation and peripheral boxes 
remained onscreen for 1500ms, or until a response was made. The inter-trial interval was a blank 
screen presented for a duration of 1000ms, but if the participant responded incorrectly they 
received a text of “Incorrect” as feedback for a 500ms duration, included at the beginning of the 
inter-trial interval. 
For every trial, participants were instructed to keep their eyes centred on the fixation 
point. They were instructed to press the left control key if the arrow was pointing to the left, and 
the right control key if the arrow was pointing to the right, and to respond as quickly and 




peripheral boxes at random, and were not predictive about the location of the target. In the 
endogenous task, participants were told that the central cue was highly predictive about the 
location of the target arrow. For half of the participants a green central cue indicated that 75% of 
the targets would appear in the left peripheral box, and a red central cue indicated that 75% of 
the targets would appear in the right peripheral box. For the other half of participants the color 
indicators were switched, such that red central cues indicated that 75% of the targets would 
appear in the left peripheral box and green central cue indicated that 75% of the targets would 
appear in the right peripheral box. In both tasks, the peripheral or central cues did not predict the 
direction of the arrow, and the arrow pointed equally often to the left and right in all conditions. 
After given a practice block, participants took part in the main experiment and were given rest 





Figure 5.1. Schematic view of a trial sequence for both the endogenous (centre) and exognenous 
(peripheral) cue group. This example shows an invalid (cued target location), incongruent (target 
direction) trial for the exogenous condition, and for the endogenous condition when red (or 
counter-balanced green) centre dots direct attention rightwards. Time runs from top to bottom. 
Analyses  
First analyses across all groups were conducted (Appendix E) to determine whether 
results from Funes et al. (2007) were replicated. Four factor repeated-measures ANOVA were 
conducted to analyze mean reaction times (RT) and error rate (ER) percentages (%). The 




validity (valid vs. invalid), and spatial congruity (congruent vs. incongruent). Following this, a 
mixed ANOVA was used to explore ATQ-OS group differenes in Spatial Stroop performance. 
Outlier detection. For the spatial Stroop tasks, error rates were computed. Mean RTs for 
correct responses on each task were calculated following outlier removal using the MAD median 
method.  
Results 
Sensitivity and Spatial Stroop Performance 
 In this analysis, we explore the individual differences in endogenous and exogenous 
orienting and how this relates with two measures of the sensitive temperament, the ATQ-OS and 
the HSPS (Appendix E).  
 Dichotomous samples in ATQ OS measures. A 4-way mixed ANOVA was used to 
explore within-subjects factors SOA (100ms, 850ms), Validity (valid, invalid cue), and congruity 
(congruent, incongruent target) and between subjects factors of HSP group (HSP, non-HSP) for 
exogenous and endogenous task reaction times and error rates. ANOVAs were performed in 
order to look at ATQ-OS group differences. The ANOVAs were performed separately for 
exogenous and endogenous tasks, because the hypotheses regarding sensitivity relate specifically 
to automatic exogenous attention. See Table 5.2 for a summary of mixed ANOVA results for 
ATQ-OS groups, and see Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics of sensitivity measures.  
ATQ-OS Mixed ANOVA for Reaction Times and Error Rates across Task 
Mixed ANOVA with endogenous task reaction times for ATQ-OS. No between-group 
effects or interactions were found for endogenous task RTs, see Table 5.2. 
Mixed ANOVA with exogenous task reaction times for ATQ-OS. No between-group 




Mixed ANOVA with endogenous error rates for ATQ-OS. No between-groups effects 
or interactions were found for exogenous task error rates, see Table 5.2 
Mixed ANOVA with exogenous error rates for ATQ-OS. The mixed ANOVA 
revealed a significant SOA×Validity×Congruity×ATQ-OS group interaction (see Table 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 shows the interaction is the result of ATQ-OS group differences in spatial congruency 
effects across SOA for valid vs invalid conditions. The spatial congruency effects in the valid 
condition for HSP groups are larger for 850ms (M=5.63%, 95% CI[3.3, 8.21]) versus 100ms 
SOA (M=1.61%, 95% CI[.27, 2.86]), t(19)=3.15, p<.01, and for non-HSP groups are 
numerically smaller for 850ms (M=3.81%, 95% CI[2.46, 5.32]) versus 100ms SOA (M=4.05%, 
95% CI[2.86, 5.28]), but this difference is not significant (p=.76). The spatial congruency effects 
in the invalid condition for HSP groups are not significantly larger (p=.27) for 850ms 
(M=7.14%, 95% CI[4.38, 10.09]) versus 100ms SOA (M=5.98%, 95% CI[3.48, 8.57]), but for 
non-HSP groups are significantly larger for 850ms (M=7.06%, 95% CI[5, 9.44]) versus 100ms 
SOA (M=5.12%, 95% CI[3.65, 6.79]), t(44)=2.15, p=.037. However, for HSP groups, the effect 
of SOA is larger for valid versus invalid conditions, t(44)=2.27, p=.028, but for non-HSP groups 
the effect of SOA is larger for invalid versus valid conditions, t(44)=2.27, p=.028. An 
independent samples t-test shows this group difference in spatial congruency effects across SOA 





Figure 5.2. The SOA (100ms, 850ms) × Validity (Valid, Invalid) × Congruity × ATQ-OS (HSP, 
Non-HSP) group interaction for exogenous task error rates (%). Error bars show 95% confidence 
intervals. 
The pattern of results (Figure 5.2) on valid trials shows that HSPs show the smallest 
congruency effect at the 100ms SOA compared to all other conditions, suggesting facilitation. 
Also, on valid trials, inhibition is suggested by the results that (a) the largest congruency effect at 
the 850ms SOA compared to all other conditions and (b) only HSPs show more errors at 850 
than 100ms SOA. This pattern suggests that HSPs show both facilitation and inhibition effects 
on valid trials, but non-HSPs do not, thus suggesting greater IOR in HSP than non-HSP groups. 
In contrast, invalid trial results suggest that non-HSPs show greater interference effects on 
invalid trials than HSPs. However, spatial congruency effects do not enable a pure test of the 
IOR effect. Thus, while the 4-way interaction indicates that sensitivity affects inhibition-of-




incongruent trials were done to determine whether IOR effects can be observed in each 
congruency condition.  
SOA×cue validity×ATQ-OS for congruent conditions. The 3-way interaction was 
significant, F(1,63)=4.75, p=.033, ηp
2=.07. For HSPs, ER for valid cues are higher at 100ms 
(M=2.05%, 95% CI[1.25,2.95]) versus 850ms (M=.89%, 95% CI[.27,1.7]), t(19)=2.8, p=.012, 
whereas ER for invalid cues are numerically fewer at 100ms (M=1.34%, 95% CI[.63,2.23]) 
versus 850ms (M=1.61%, 95% CI[.89,2.41]), but not significantly so (p=.64). For non-HSPs, ER 
for valid cues are equal (p=1) 100ms (M=.71%, 95% CI[.32,1.19]) versus 850ms (M=.71%, 95% 
CI[.4,1.11]), whereas ER for invalid cues are higher at 100ms (M=1.34%, 95% CI[.87,1.91]) 
versus 850ms (M=1.23%, 95% CI[.75,1.79]), but not significantly so (p=.69). 
SOA×cue validity×ATQ-OS for incongruent conditions. The 3-way interaction was 
significant, F(1,63)=4.96, p=.03, ηp
2=.073. For HSPs, ER for valid cues are fewer at 100ms 
(M=3.66%, 95% CI[2.41,5]) versus 850ms (M=6.52%, 95% CI[4.2,9.11]), t(19)=2.63, p=.017, 
and ER for invalid cues are numerically fewer at 100ms (M=7.32%, 95% CI[5,9.73]) versus 
850ms (M=8.75%, 95% CI[5.98,11.88]), but not significantly so (p=.12). For non-HSPs, ER for 
valid cues are numerically higher (p=.76) for 100ms (M=4.76%, 95% CI[3.49,6.11]) versus 
850ms SOA (M=4.52%, 95% CI[2.94,6.43]), whereas ER for invalid cues are higher at 100ms 
(M=6.47 %, 95% CI[4.76,8.33]) versus 850ms (M=8.29%, 95% CI[5.91,11.07]), t(44)=1.97, 
p=.056. 
Overall, the planned ANOVAs show that only HSPs display facilitation effects for valid 
cues at 850ms versus 100ms SOA for congruent targets, but negative facilitation effects for 
850ms versus 100ms SOA for incongruent targets. Thus, IOR in HSPs affects incongruent 




Interim Summary: Sensitivity and Spatial Stroop Performance 
 Sensitivity affects exogenous orienting. ATQ-OS measures of sensitivity show group 
differences in spatial Stroop performance, however findings are mainly specific to the exogenous 
task error rates as ATQ-OS groups show no significant effects for exogenous task RTs. ATQ-OS 
results show SOA effects on spatial congruency are mediated primarily by interference with 
invalid cues for non-HSPs, but facilitation with valid cues for HSPs. With ATQ-OS, non-HSPs 
show larger congruency effects on errors at 850ms versus 100ms SOA for invalid cues, and so 
the SOA effect is larger for invalid versus valid conditions. In contrast, ATQ-OS HSPs show this 
pattern instead for valid targets, wherein larger congruency effects for errors are observed at 
850ms versus 100ms SOA and so the SOA effect is larger for valid versus invalid conditions. 
Thus, while non-HSPs make more errors for incongruent targets at 850ms SOA and spatial 
congruency effects are mediated primarily by more interference for invalid cues, HSPs show no 
evidence for more errors for incongruent targets, and spatial congruency effects are mediated 
primarily by facilitation for valid for ATQ-OS HSPs. This supports the idea that exogenous 
orienting is better in HSP than non-HSP groups. 
As ATQ-OS groups show no significant effects for endogenous or exogenous task RTs, no 
support was found for hypotheses (ii) which was developed based on links between BIS/BAS scales 
and the ATQ-OS, and results from Poy et al. (2004) which suggest ATQ-OS would relate to more 
flexible disengagement of attention across cue types. Overall, results so far suggest exogenous 
attention benefits for HSPs and endogenous attention benefits at the 100 ms SOA for HSPs (vs. at 
the 850 ms SOA for non-HSPs); this suggests a vantage sensitivity for HSPs regarding exogenous 




Sensitivity and inhibition-of-return. The remaining effects reported relate specifically 
to sensitivity group differences in how inhibition-of-return affects error rates. Recall, exogenous 
cue facilitation effects (i.e., faster RTs and greater accuracy) are observed with short cue-target 
SOAs of approximately 100ms, but not with cue-target SOAs greater than 250ms (Jonides, 1981; 
Muller & Rabbitt, 1989). Instead, at longer SOAs, both reaction times (Posner & Cohen, 1984) 
and accuracy (Klein & Dick, 2002) show negative facilitation effects (i.e., slower RTs and 
greater error rates) for target processing. This negative facilitation effect is known as inhibition-
of-return (IOR; Lupiáñez et al., 2004; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Posner et al., 1985). In the spatial 
Stroop task, exogenous IOR is observed when the facilitation effects at short 100ms SOA invert 
to become negative facilitation effects at 850ms SOA (Funes et al., 2007).  
For the ATQ-OS, a significant SOA×Validity×Congruity×ATQ-OS group interaction 
was observed for exogenous, but not endogenous, error rates. Post-hoc tests revealed this effect 
is the result of greater ATQ-OS group differences in spatial congruency effects between SOAs 
for valid versus invalid conditions. Specifically, for HSPs the SOA modulates spatial congruency 
effects more strongly for valid versus invalid conditions, but for non-HSPs the SOA modulates 
spatial congruency effects instead for invalid versus valid conditions (Figure 5.2). For the HSP 
group, the differences in spatial congruency effects across SOA for valid conditions could be the 
result of either greater a) negative facilitation of spatial congruency effects from inhibition-of-
return at 850ms SOA, or b) positive facilitation of spatial congruency effects usually found at 
100ms SOA for exogenous tasks (Jonides, 1981; Posner & Cohen, 1984), or c) both. Indeed, 
post-hoc ANOVAs revealed c) to be true, as only HSPs display facilitation effects for valid cues 
at 850ms versus 100ms SOA for congruent targets, but negative facilitation effects for 850ms 




not congruent targets. There are also group differences in how SOA modulates spatial 
congruency effects for invalid conditions, although the effects are in the same direction. The lack 
of SOA effects for invalid conditions in HSP groups are probably due to greater variance in the 
smaller sample size, as shown in Figure 5.6.  
 This evidence is consistent with hypothesis that (i) HSPs versus non-HSPs on the ATQ-
OS will have stronger IOR effects in exogenous tasks, as ATQ-OS has a strong relationship with 
openness (see Chapter 2) and higher openness is associated with a broader distribution of IOR 
(Wilson et al., 2016). In this case, ATQ-OS was associated with IOR for error rates. 
 This study demonstrates that ATQ-OS measures of sensitivity show group differences in 
spatial Stroop performance, mainly in relation to exogenous task error rates, in line with the 
general hypothesis regarding the role of exogenous orienting attention in the sensitive 
temperament. In summary, for error rates in exogenous tasks, HSPs (for ATQ-OS groups) exhibit 
greater facilitation, or inhibition-of-return, for valid versus invalid cues depending on SOA.  
Overall, these findings are consistent with the idea that exogenous orienting attention may 
be one process underlying the sensitive temperament. Further, whilst group differences in 
sensitivity were found, they tend to be specific to error rates in the exogenous tasks. 
Sensitivity and Inhibition-of-Return as Predictors of Creativity 
  Using hierarchical multiple regression we test the prediction that orienting sensitivity, 
and inhibition-of-return (SOA×Validity×Congruity) for reaction times and error rates for 
exogenous tasks, can account for unique variance in creativity scores. Note, no analysis is 
performed for endogenous inhibition-of-return variables as the IOR phenomenon is only 
observed in exogenous tasks (Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980). The interaction term was condensed 




variable. The IOR term was created for reaction times and error rates by subtracting the 
differences of congruency conditions (incongruent – congruent) for each validity condition, and 
then subtracting validity conditions (invalid – valid) for each SOA, and finally subtracting SOA 
conditions from each other (long – short), separately for the exogenous task. In the regression, 
we use continuous variables to restore statistical power lost when using dichotomisation 
(MacCallum et al., 2002) and also dichotomous sensitivity variables, as recommended by Aron 
and Aron (2013). Regression analysis was also performed with the HSPS (Appendix E). 
Hierarchical multiple regression. In the hierarchical multiple regression, Model 1 
regressed IOR onto creativity scores. Model 2 added a sensitivity measure to Model 1. Model 3 
added BFI-E and BFI-N variables to account for NA Adding NA measures to this hierarchical 
model allows the examination of sensitivity effects with and without NA controlled. Model 4 
added BFI-O, a strong correlate of ATQ-OS (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), to examine whether IOR 
and sensitivity effects are redundant in the presence of BFI-O.  
 Assumptions of ordinary least squares regression were checked. Note, the minimum 
number of participants required for multiple regression is N>= 50+m, where m is the number of 
predictors. Regression equations with 6 or more predictor variables should aim for a minimum of 
N=10m (VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). In this study, N=65 and regression models use 5 
predictor variables, thus sample size requirements for multiple regression are satisfied. 
Scatterplots indicate linearity between variables, two outlier cases were observed for ATTA, but 
one unusual case was shared between CAQ and ATTA, with unusually high and low scores, 
respectively. Distributions were inspected using P-P plots and histograms which indicate non-
normality for CAQ and ATTA scores, but not RIBS. Standardised residuals >3 were found for a 




<15 indicate little influence with low leverage indicated by values less than (3[k + 1]/n) 
suggesting the outlier cases do not substantially influence the model parameters (Field, 2013). 
Residual variance indicates that homoscedasticity cannot be assumed for CAQ and ATTA. 
In no cases, for exogenous reaction times or error rates, did IOR account for unique 
variance in any of the creativity measures. IOR for exogenous reaction times do not account for 
significant variance in CAQ or RIBS (ps>.57), although they approach significance with the 
ATTA (p=.073). IOR for exogenous error rates do not account for significant variance in CAQ, 
RIBS or ATTA scores (ps>.37). As Models 2, 3 and 4 are of no interest unless Model 1 accounts 
for unique variance they are not reported, but see Chapter 2. 
 In summary, IOR for exogenous reaction times and error rates do not account for unique 
variance in CAQ, RIBS or ATTA scores. 
Discussion 
 Overall, this study, manipulating task within-subjects, provides further support for a 
endogenous/exogenous taxonomy by partially replicating findings reported by Funes et al. 
(2007) in a between-subject design, which are not consistent with a unitary view of attention 
(e.g., Jonides, 1981) and thus shows the spatial Stroop paradigm is a useful tool to explore how 
the sensitive temperament may relate to endogenous and exogenous orienting of attention, and 
how those mechanisms relate to creativity (see Appendix E). Regarding sensitivity, ATQ-OS 
was observed to show reliable IOR effects in the exogenous task, as predicted based on the 
notion that ATQ-OS relates to “automatic” exogenous attention, extending the understanding of 
sensitivity beyond that reported in Chapter 4 using different measures of attention network 
efficiency. However, the hypothesis that exogenous orienting attention processes associated with 
































Mean, standard deviation (SD), and lower (LCI) and upper (UCI) 95% confidence intervals for 
creativity, temperament and personality variables (n=65) 
  Mean SD LCI UCI 
Creativity     
CAQ 7.78 8.87 5.85 9.97 
RIBS 2.93 .56 2.81 3.06 
ATTA 65.63 10.00 62.95 67.95 
Temperament    
ATQ_OS 4.67 .81 4.5 4.85 
Personality     
B5_O 3.15 .56 3 3.29 
B5_C 3.39 .64 3.23 3.55 
B5_E 3.14 .81 2.95 3.32 
B5_A 3.87 .56 3.73 4 
B5_N 3.09 .89 2.89 3.29 
Note: CAQ = Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS = Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA = Abbreviated Torrance Test for 
Adults; ATQ-OS = orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; BFI-O = openness to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory (BFI); BFI-C 
= conscientiousness factor of the BFI; BFI-E = extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-A = agreeableness factor of the BFI; BFI-N = 
















Summary of separate mixed ANOVA for endogenous and exogenous tasks using within-groups 
factors of SOA, Validity and Congruity, and between-groups factors of ATQ-OS group, for 
reaction time and error rate performance  
 Reaction times Error rates 
 Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous 
  F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 
Main effects         
ATQ-OS .44 .007 .03 0 .05 .001 .41 .006 
Interactions         
ATQ-OS×SOA .21 .003 .13 .002 0 0 .51 .008 
ATQ-OS×Validity .92 .014 2.83 .043 .64 .01 .11 .002 
ATQ-OS×Congruity .39 .006 .01 0 .04 .001 .95 0 
ATQ-OS×SOA×Validity .39 .006 2 .031 1.42 .022 .29 .018 
ATQ-OS×SOA×Congruity 1.68 .026 .48 .008 1.78 .027 2 .031 
ATQ-OS×Validity×Congruity 1.23 .019 .13 .002 .23 .004 .51 .007 
ATQ-OS×SOA×Validity×Congruity .01 0 2 .031 1.59 .002 9.54** .131 

















Sensitivity and the Cognitive Unconscious 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we employ the Serial Response Time Task (SRTT) task used by 
Schendan, Searl, Melrose, and Stern (2003b) to investigate how sensitivity and creativity relate 
to explicit and implicit learning and memory performance. The SRTT provides measurements of 
sequence-specific learning in both implicit and explicit tasks. Following implicit and explicit 
SRTT learning, explicit memory tasks were performed to measure awareness and explicit 
memory for implicit and explicit task sequences.  
Performance on implicit and explicit SRTT did not differ significantly between orienting 
sensitivity groups. HSPs develop more explicit awareness of the exact repeating pattern 
following implicit tasks. However, explicit memory performance following implicit sequence 






































The ability to automatically and implicitly detect and learn critical covariations in the 
environment is a fundamental ability of unconscious cognition. Implicit learning takes place 
without intention or awareness and plays a significant role in structuring our conscious skills, 
perceptions and behaviours (Kaufman, DeYoung, et al., 2010; Kihlstrom, 1987; Reber, 1989, 
1992). Sensitivity is a biologically-based personality trait associated with automatic information-
gathering attention systems (Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron et al., 2012; Evans & Rothbart, 2008; 
Johnson, Posner, & Rothbart, 1991; Pluess, 2015a; Posner & Rothbart, 1980; Sokolov, 1963, 
1990) necessary for implicit learning and memory (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). In addition, 
sensitivity is thought to enhance the ability to enable minimally conscious or unconscious 
information, such as implicit memory, to be brought to conscious awareness and made explicit, 
potentially enhancing also explicit memory (Aron et al., 2012). Enhanced ability to bring 
nonconscious information into conscious awareness so that it can influence thinking is a 
hallmark of the creative process and higher creative ability (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & 
Parker, 1990; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Finke et al., 1992; Schooler & Melcher, 1995; 
Wallas, 1926). Thus, conceptualizations of sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron et al., 2012; 
Evans & Rothbart, 2007; Pluess, 2015a) are linked to individual differences in the unconscious 
cognitive processes underlying creative thought. In this chapter, we examine how individual 
differences in learning and memory abilities, especially implicit learning and memory and their 
relationship with explicit memory, define the sensitive creator. 
Multiple Memory Systems 
According to multiple memory systems theory, different brain systems support different 




of memory. Episodic memory refers to recollection, recognition, and feelings of familiarity about 
previous experiences within a specific spatiotemporal context, and semantic or knowledge 
memory, which refers to facts and concepts (e.g., word meanings) about the world independent 
of spatiotemporal context (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Tulving, 1972). In contrast, implicit 
learning and memory can influence stimulus, cognitive, and motor processing without conscious 
awareness, and is demonstrated by changes in performance as a result of prior experience, such 
as priming, skill-learning and habit formation (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; 
Schacter, 1997; Schendan, 2012). Explicit memory depends on the medial temporal lobe (MTL) 
memory system consisting of the hippocampus and surrounding cortex, including the entorhinal, 
perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortex (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). Adult neurological 
patients with amnesia due to damage to the MTL memory system demonstrate impaired explicit 
episodic memory encoding abilities, including the ability to acquire new semantic memory that 
depends on some MTL functions, while implicit learning and memory remain intact (e.g., Cohen 
& Squire, 1980; cf. Curran, 1997; Scoville & Milner, 1957). The observations of dissociated 
explicit episodic and implicit memory functions in MTL amnesia supports the theory of multiple 
memory systems and suggests that implicit memory depends on structures outside the MTL 
system, specifically neocortex and subcortical structures, such as the basal ganglia (Schendan, 
2012).  
The most established method for measuring implicit learning is the serial response time 
task (SRTT) developed by Nissen and Bullemer (1987), which measures learning abilities 
considered foundational to the acquisition of motor skills, such as typing, playing musical 
instruments, and route navigation (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Kaufman, DeYoung, et al., 




push buttons in response to targets appearing at corresponding spatial locations on a computer 
screen over extended periods of time. Unbeknownst to the participant, the sequence of stimuli 
follow a structured pattern governed by a set of rules, and increased exposure to the structured 
pattern improves task response time and accuracy due to accumulating knowledge about the 
structure of the sequence in the structured condition relative to unstructured, pseudo-random 
locations. Crucially, many participants can be unaware of the structured pattern, as evidenced by 
failure to explicitly report awareness of the pattern and knowledge about the sequence during 
explicit memory tests (e.g., Schendan et al., 2003b).  
Memory accounts of sequence learning (Schacter, 1997; Squire, 1992) argue that MTL 
activation during sequence learning varies as a function of awareness, with higher awareness 
resulting in greater MTL involvement. In contrast, relational accounts (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 
1993) argue that MTL is involved whenever learning is more complex than simple pairwise 
associations between temporally adjacent stimuli, known as higher-order association learning 
(Curran, 1997). Indeed, fMRI neuroimaging studies using the SRTT paradigm lend support to 
relational accounts showing MTL involvement during higher-order association learning, 
regardless of sequence awareness (Schendan et al., 2003b; Schendan, Tinaz, Maher, & Stern, 
2013).  
Intriguingly, Schendan and colleagues (2013) also found that elderly people and people 
with Parkinson’s disease show primarily implicit learning and far less evidence of becoming 
consciously aware of sequence information compared to young people who show more of both 
implicit and explicit learning and memory. Basal ganglia function, including dopamine function, 




dopamine dysfunction adversely affects implicit learning and the ability to develop explicit 
conscious awareness of memory about the structured sequence.  
Dopamine function is controlled by plasticity genes implicated in sensitive and open 
personalities and creativity (Belsky & Pluess, 2009b; Chen et al., 2011; DeYoung et al., 2002, 
2005). This predicts that changes in implicit and explicit sequence learning may be associated 
with sensitivity, openness, and creativity. To test this prediction and examine whether and how 
multiple memory systems vary with sensitivity, openness, and creativity, the SRTT paradigm 
that was used previously to demonstrate these dopamine-related changes (Schendan, et al., 2013) 
was adapted for this experiment. This paradigm enables sensitive assessment of multiple 
memory systems: implicit and explicit learning, implicit memory, explicit episodic memory, and 
sequence knowledge, including sensitive assessment of associated conscious awareness. 
Implicit Learning and Plasticity as Core Mechanisms of Sensitivity 
Relational accounts of memory are consistent with evolutionary models (Reber, 2013) 
explaining implicit learning as an emergent property of general plasticity that permeates 
information-processing networks across the brain to adaptively improve function via experience, 
hence operating as a universal principle, as opposed to a single coherent memory system, and 
implicit memory is distinct from the explicit MTL memory system. Implicit learning as a 
plasticity principle applies well to understanding the neural changes in environmental sensitivity. 
Highly sensitive people are disproportionately shaped by their experiences (Aron & Aron, 1997; 
Pluess, 2015a), suggesting neurosensitivity results in changes in neuroplasticity. However, 
implicit learning is theorized to be an evolutionarily-old function, well-defined and distributed 
throughout the general population (Reber, 1992) because it is essential for survival. This may 




However, evidence has emerged linking complex cognitive processes and personality to 
SRTT performance. Kaufman, DeYoung, et al. (2010) found that implicit learning in the SRTT 
predicts trait openness (cf. Norman, Price, & Duff, 2006; Norman, Price, Duff, & Mentzoni, 
2007), and whilst explicit learning was moderately positively correlated with intelligence, the 
effects of implicit learning on personality are independent of intelligence, consistent with the 
idea that implicit learning is evolutionarily old and thus precedes higher cognitive functions of 
human intelligence (Reber, 1992). Openness to experience is a strong correlate of the orienting 
sensitivity subfactor of the sensitive temperament (Evans & Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et al., 
2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) and subsumed under a broader meta-trait of plasticity defined 
as a dopamine-driven tendency towards exploration and novelty-seeking, which serves to 
encourage personal growth (DeYoung et al., 2002, 2005; Digman, 1997). Thus, implicit learning 
as a plasticity principle could be a core mechanism of vantage sensitivities (Pluess, 2015b) 
underlying the sensitive, open creator (see Chapter 2). Alternatively, negative-affect-related 
sensitivity resulting from childhood trauma (Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron et al., 2005) could 
negatively affect learning and memory. After all, (a) chronic stress damages the hippocampus, 
the core of the MTL memory system, in primates (Sapolsky, Uno, Rebert, & Finch, 1990), (b) 
vulnerability to psychological trauma is predicted by smaller hippocampal volume (Gilbertson et 
al., 2002), and (c) hippocampal dysfunction may be associated with memory impairments for 
neutral material, such as those in the SRTT task (for a review, see Pitman et al., 2012; Schendan, 
Searl, Melrose, & Stern, 2003a). Thus, negative-affect-related sensitivity could result in impaired 
unconscious cognitive processes relating to memory performance and creativity (cf. Deo & 




as individual differences in plasticity as indexed by explicit and implicit learning and memory 
tasks.  
Hypothesis 
In this study, we employ the SRTT task used by Schendan et al. (2003b) to investigate 
how sensitivity and creativity relate to explicit and implicit learning and memory performance. 
First, as a manipulation check, we aim to replicate findings of sequence-specific learning in both 
implicit and explicit tasks, where faster and more accurate responses are found for repeating 
versus random patterns. The sequences used allow analysis of higher-order associative learning 
related to complex associative learning across three or more locations that cannot be accounted 
for with simple item or bi-item frequencies. We aim to replicate higher-order associations 
demonstrated by a significant positive RT difference for transition pairs at all locations across 
runs and tasks (Schendan et al., 2003b). For explicit memory tasks, we aim to replicate the 
general finding that repeated versus random sequences are recognized more accurately, but that 
free generation of repeated sequences is higher in explicit than implicit conditions. For 
replication, see Appendix F. 
Hypotheses and predictions are based on evidence that implicit learning depends on 
automatic versus voluntary attention (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), and sensitivity has 
consequences for automatic exogenous attention which are related to creativity achievement and 
potential (see Chapter 1,2, 4 & 5; Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008). Overall, we predict sensitivity 
group differences in both implicit and explicit SRTT performance, but also higher-order 
associative learning independent of awareness, in line with relational accounts of memory 
(Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Schendan et al., 2003b). (i) In particular, regarding sensitivity, 




automatic information-gathering attention systems (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). This predicts that 
the ability to extract information incidentally during the implicit learning task will be greater in 
high than low sensitivity. Implicit learning will be demonstrated by faster RTs for repeated 
versus random sequences over the course of the implicit SRTT. (ii) Furthermore, temperament 
theories propose that higher sensitivity is associated with greater ability to bring non- or 
minimally- conscious information to conscious awareness (e.g., implicit knowledge). After all, 
the sensitive individual has been characterized as being more consciously aware of stimuli (Aron 
et al., 2012). This idea is also captured by the sensitivity measures that index exogenous attention 
ask about awareness (“aware”, “notice”, “detect”, and “consciously”) of subtle information from 
perceptual, emotional, and memory sources (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). Consequently, regarding 
explicit memory tests following explicit and implicit SRTT, this predicts sensitivity group 
differences in recall and recognition of repeating sequences across explicit memory tests. In 
particular, explicit memory will be greater in high than low sensitivity. (iii) Regarding creativity, 
this has been associated with greater capacity for global automatic attention and awareness of 
loose associations (for a review, see Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Mendelsohn, 1976). This 
predicts a similar pattern as for sensitivity such that implicit learning and/or explicit knowledge 
will predict creativity. 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 80 participants were recruited, but 1 participant was excluded for not 
completing the tasks (55 female, 24 male, aged between 18-46 years, M=22.1, SD=5.76). 
Participants were rewarded with course credit or paid £8 per hour pro-rata. This study was 




of Plymouth. Participants gave informed consent before the study and were debriefed after 
completing the study. 
Apparatus and Materials  
A computerized battery was developed on Survey Monkey to assess sensitivity, 
personality and creativity and administered in the lab. Each questionnaire was presented on a 
separate page within the software. For each item, the participant checked the blank in front of 
any item corresponding to the response that best applied to them. 
Sensitivity was measured using two questionnaires. 1) The Highly Sensitive Person scale 
(HSPS) from Aron and Aron (1997) is a 27-item, modality general, self-report scale measuring 
sensory processing sensitivity using items asking about tendencies to startle easily, become 
easily overwhelmed by sensory inputs but also awareness of subtleties in the environment, and 
enjoyment of fine and delicate scents, tastes, sounds, and works of art. Item responses ranged 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 2) The two HSPS factors of orienting sensitivity and negative 
affect were also measured using the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ)-short form 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007). The ATQ is a self-report scale with 77 items measuring general 
constructs of orienting sensitivity (ATQ-OS), negative affect (ATQ NA), effortful control (ATQ 
EC), and extraversion/surgency (ATQ ES). Item responses ranged from 1 (extremely untrue) to 7 
(extremely true) and “not applicable”. 
The Big Five Inventory (BFI) assessed personality. This 44-item self-report questionnaire 
measures the Big Five dimensions of personality: Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; John et al., 1991; 
John et al., 2008; John & Srivastava, 1999). Item responses ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 




Creativity was assessed using three of the most established and validated measures of 
creative processes. The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al., 2005) was 
chosen as an objective self-report measure of creative achievement across 10 domains of 
creativity. The Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale (RIBS; Runco et al., 2000-2001) is a 19-item 
questionnaire designed to measure creative ideation, which is thought to measure a single factor 
and has discriminant validity. Items probe behavioural tendencies and abilities regarding ideas 
and thinking, with many items emphasizing creative, unusual, or imaginative thought (e.g., “I 
have many wild ideas.”). The RIBS responses ranged from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). This study 
was lab-based in order to administer one pencil and paper creativity test: The Abbreviated 
Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA; Goff & Torrance, 2002) consists of 3 timed (3-minute) tests of 
figural and verbal divergent thinking abilities thought to be critical for the creative process 
(Runco, 2014). The ATTA is a gold standard, objective measure of divergent thinking. The 
ATTA thus is the one test that independently verifies creative products/divergent thinking. The 
ATTA was presented in the lab in paper format with a pencil and eraser, not part of the Survey 
Monkey battery.  
The experimental stimuli in the serial response time task (SRTT; Schendan et al., 2003b) 
were identical to those used by Schendan and colleagues (Schendan, et al., 2013), except for 
hardware and software for presentation. Stimuli were presented using a Viglen Windows 7 PC 
with Philips Brilliance LED monitor 221P3LPYES P-line 21.5" widescreen operating at 1920 × 
1080 pixels with a 60hz refresh rate, and were programmed and controlled using Presentation® 
software (Version 18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com). 
Response cues were shown in second order conditional (SOC) sequences of 12 locations. All 




of the 12 possible transition pairs between locations (i.e., 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 2-1, 2-3, etc.). In the 
sequence condition, one SOC sequence was shown repeatedly for implicit (1-2-1-4-2-3-4-1-3-2-
4-3; Curran, 1997) and explicit SRTT (2-3-2-4-1-3-1-4-3-4-2-1; Reber & Squire, 1998); in the 
random condition, new SOC sequences of 12 locations each were presented once, each, across 
the entire experiment.  
Procedure  
Participants sat in a testing room alone. The implicit SRTT and respective explicit 
memory tests always preceded the explicit SRTT and respective explicit memory tests. 
Implicit serial response time task. Before the first run, naïve participants were given 
instructions on how to perform the task. Participants were told they will see 4 boxes on the 
screen, and press corresponding buttons as they light up. Participants were told the 4 boxes refer 
to each of the locations of the 4 response buttons and to push the relevant button as soon as the 
box lights up, as fast and accurately as possible. Participants were also told to relax their eyes on 
fixation crosses whenever they appeared. Participants were first given a practice run with one 
new SOC sequence of 12 locations. Participants were not informed about any repeating 
sequence. For the experiment, in each of the 4 runs, Sequence and Random blocks alternated. 
Each sequence block began at a random location in the sequence to ensure implicit learning, 
whilst avoiding the need for distractor tasks (Schendan et al., 2003b). The 12-location sequences 
repeated 4 times in each of the 3 Sequence blocks per run for a total of 144 trials per run. 
Random blocks had two lengths: (1) two short 24 trial random blocks (r) consisting of 2 novel 
12-location sequences each and separated by Sequence blocks, and (2) two long 48 trial random 
blocks (R) consisting of 4 novel 12-location sequences each, starting or ending each run in order 




counterbalancing purposes, the position of long Random blocks varied between 3 types of block 
ordering. In block order A, long Random blocks preceded all Sequence blocks (i.e., R-R-S-r-S-r-
S), in block order B, a single long Random sequence preceded all sequences, and a single long 
Random sequence followed all sequences (i.e., R-S-r-S-r-S-R), and in block order C, both long 
Random blocks followed all sequences (i.e., S-r-S-r-S-R-R). Half of participants were presented 
with runs in order of ABBC, and the other half were presented with runs in order of BBBB. 
Fixation rests (3750ms) preceded some Random blocks. At the end of each run, participants were 
given a 10 second rest period. At the end of the rest period a countdown timer was presented, 
counting down from 3 (to 1) to indicate the start of the next run. 
Explicit serial response time task. Before the first run, participants were instructed to 
perform the SRTT again. This time, participants were told to try and see chunks in a new 
repeating sequence and to use chunking to help them memorize the sequence. The first exposure 
to the explicit sequence was in three four-location chunks, given in the training phase before the 
first Sequence block. The run of the explicit SRTT consisted of 6 Sequence and 6 Random 
blocks in this order: 3 consecutive presentations of long Random blocks, followed by 6 
consecutive presentations of 48 trial Sequence blocks with a rest in-between, followed by 3 
consecutive presentations of long Random blocks (i.e., R-R-R-S-S-S-rest-S-S-S-R-R-R). Prior to 
each block, instructions were given. For Random blocks, participants were told that the 
following sequence was a button task with random locations. For the Sequence blocks, 
participants were told to memorize the repeating sequence in 3 chunks of 4 locations. After each 
Sequence block, participants performed the free generation test; they were then asked to report 
the repeating sequence by looking at the boxes, and pressing the buttons in the order of the 




Explicit memory tests. For implicit SRTT, all explicit tests were given after all implicit 
SRTT runs were complete. For explicit SRTT, each Sequence block was followed by a free 
generation test, and, after the entire explicit SRTT was complete, participants did awareness and 
full recognition tasks, but not other explicit tests due to time. Tests which vary in sensitivity to 
conscious awareness are described in the order of presentation. 
Awareness. Immediately following implicit and explicit memory tasks, participants 
pressed a key to respond (1) Yes, (2) Probably, (3) Unlikely, (4) No to four questions: “In the 
task you just performed, did you notice that (a) the boxes lit up at random locations the entire 
time; (b) some boxes lit up more often than other boxes; (c) the task was easier at times and 
harder at other times; (d) there was a repeating pattern of locations some of the time?”. Note, 
awareness is assumed in explicit tasks and thus no analyses are conducted on explicit awareness, 
but see Table 6.9 for descriptive statistics. 
Free generation. Participants were informed that there was a repeating pattern in the 
SRTT, and to try and report the repeating sequence of locations. Following a 3750ms fixation 
point, participants were presented with empty response locations. They pressed buttons in the 
order of the repeating locations until “STOP” appeared onscreen. To complete the task, 
participants had 30 seconds for implicit SRTT and 20 seconds for explicit SRTT from the 
beginning; note, less time is needed when learning is explicit. For explicit SRTT, free generation 
followed each and every Sequence block. 
Cued generation. Similar to the free generation, but each time participants pressed a key 
to generate the repeating implicit sequence, the corresponding square lit up on screen until the 




in the order of the repeating locations until “STOP” appeared onscreen, which only appeared 
after 96 button presses.  
Triplet generation. Participants performed the SRTT on three locations, where half of the 
triplet sequences were in the repeating sequence, and half were novel sequences formed from 
two 12-item SOC sequences, none of which overlapped with the implicit sequence. After each 
triplet, participants were asked to rate how similar the sequence was to the repeating sequence on 
a scale of 1 (“certain I have seen this sequence before”) to 6 (“certain I have not seen this 
sequence before”). 
Full recognition. Participants performed the SRTT with the entire implicit or explicit 
sequence, and four novel 12-item sequences. After each sequence, participants were asked to 
report how similar the sequence was to the repeating sequence on a scale of 10 (“exactly the 
same”) to 0 (“completely different”). 
Analysis 
Median RTs with maximum cut-off of 1250ms (the total trial time) were calculated for 
each Sequence and Random blocks by run (Schendan et al., 2003b; Schendan et al., 2013). The 
two short Random blocks were analyzed together as one, as though they were one long Random 
block. Implicit and explicit performance data were analyzed separately as individual tasks. 
Analysis of higher-order associative learning between 3 or more consecutive locations 
was conducted, where RTs for each pair of consecutive locations, or transition pairs, were 
compared between Sequence and Random conditions. For each transition pair, the median RT 
for the second location for each transition pair was determined, for Sequence and Random 
blocks, separately. The median RT was then averaged across blocks in each run, separately. 




mean RT from the Random mean RT, in each run. Note. A significant positive RT difference for 
one transition pair demonstrates higher-order associative learning among three consecutive 
locations, and for two or more transition pairs demonstrates higher-order associative learning 
amongst four or more locations (Schendan et al., 2003b). 
For explicit memory tests common across task (i.e., free generation and full recognition) 
an omnibus ANOVA was performed to compare differences in conscious awareness between 
implicit and explicit SRTT tasks. Following this, performance on each explicit memory test was 
analyzed for the implicit and explicit SRTT task, separately. Note, for comparison of free 
generation between the implicit and explicit SRTT, mean performance was calculated across the 
six runs of free generation in the explicit SRTT condition.  
Sensitivity may be a taxon consisting of HSPs (i.e., those high on HSPS) and non-HSPs, 
thus Aron and Aron (2013) suggest dichotomizing the sample with high-low break points 
somewhere between 15% for HSPs and 85% for non-HSPs, up to 30% for HSPs and 70% for 
non-HSPs. In this study a 30% HSP 70% non-HSP split was chosen. Between-groups factors of 
sensitivity were used to explore differences in SRTT performance between HSP (n=24) and non-
HSP groups (n=55). 
Group differences were explored using mixed ANOVA and t-test comparisons where 
appropriate using between-groups factors of ATQ-OS measures. See Appendix F for all analysis 
using the HSPS (Aron & Aron, 1997). For the ATQ-OS, the HSP groups (M=.76, 95% CI 
[.74,.79]) had significantly higher scores, t(78)=9.46, p<.001, than non-HSPs (M=.52, 95% CI 
[.48,.55]). The same analysis was also performed for between-groups factors of creativity for 




creativity measures are scaled between 0 and 1, see Chapter 2 for scaling. Max scores used for 
scaling CAQ are 94, and 83 for the ATTA in this chapter only. 
Results 
Implicit SRTT performance and sensitivity 
A mixed ANOVA was run using within-groups factors of Run, Condition, and Block and 
between-groups factors of Sensitivity (HSP, non HSP). See Table 6.1 for the summary of results 
from the mixed ANOVA for ATQ-OS. No between-groups or interaction effects were found for 
the ATQ-OS groups (ps>.05). 
Explicit SRTT performance and sensitivity 
 A mixed ANOVA was run using within-groups factors of Block and Condition and 
between-groups factors of Sensitivity (HSP, non HSP) group. Table 6.2 shows the output of the 
mixed ANOVA. No between-groups or interaction effects were found for the ATQ-OS groups 
(ps>.05). 
Implicit SRTT: higher-order associative learning and sensitivity 
 Sensitivity group differences in higher-order association learning for RTs was analyzed 
with a mixed measures ANOVA using within-groups factors of Run (Run 1 to Run 4) and 
Transition Pair (12 pairs) and between-groups factors of Sensitivity (HSP, non HSP). Table 6.3 
shows no significant effects were observed (ps>.05). 
Explicit Memory Tests: Awareness 
Implicit SRTT: awareness and sensitivity. An independent samples t-test was run to 
compare question ratings between sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. No between-groups 





Explicit Memory Tests: Free Generation 
Free generation omnibus task comparison and sensitivity. Separate omnibus mixed 
ANOVA were performed to analyze group differences in performance on free generation across 
implicit and explicit SRTT task for a) maximum sequences generated, b) number of triplets 
generated, and c) ratio of triplets to keypresses between sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. The 
mixed ANOVA used within-groups factor of task (implicit, explicit) and between-groups variable 
of Sensitivity group. Table 6.4 shows the ANOVA revealed no 2-way, or between-groups main 
effects for ATQ-OS groups (ps>.05). 
Implicit SRTT: free generation and sensitivity. An independent samples t-test was run 
to compare maximum sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to 
keypresses between sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. No between-groups differences were 
found for the ATQ-OS (ps>.413) suggesting ATQ-OS groups do not differ in how they freely 
generate sequences, or recall triplet versus sequence inconsistent keypresses, following exposure 
to implicit sequences. 
 Explicit SRTT: free generation and sensitivity. Group differences in maximum 
sequences generated, number of sequence consistent triplets generated, and triplet ratios in free 
generation were analyzed separately with a mixed ANOVA using within-groups factor of Block 
(1 to 6) and between-groups factor of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. See Table 6.5 for 
mixed ANOVA results.  
Explicit Memory Tests: Cued Generation 
Implicit SRTT: cued generation and sensitivity. An independent samples t-test was run 
to compare maximum sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to 




difference was found for maximum sequence generated, t(77)=2.31, p=.024, where HSP groups 
(M=6.92, 95% CI [6.22,7.65]) showed longer mean maximum sequences generated in cued recall 
compared with non-HSP groups (M=6.02, 95% CI [5.64,6.42]). No between-groups effects were 
found for triplets generated, or ratio of triplets to keypresses for the ATQ-OS (ps>.55).  
Explicit Memory Tests: Triplet Recognition 
Implicit SRTT: triplet recognition and sensitivity. Ratings for Sequence and Random 
triplets were analyzed with a mixed ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Random 
[New], Sequence [Old]) and between-groups factors of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP). No between-
groups effects were significant (ps>.102). Further, no sequence×sensitivity interactions emerged 
for any sensitivity measures (ps>.349).  
A comparison of new versus old triplet recognition on median RTs was performed using 
a mixed ANOVA using within-groups factors of Condition (Random, Sequence) and Location 
(1,2,3), and between-groups factor of Sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. See Table 6.6 for 
results of the mixed ANOVA. 
A 3-way interaction was observed for the full ATQ-OS (p=.04). Simple effects were used 
to determine whether RTs for each condition differed at Location 3. Paired samples t-tests 
showed that non-HSPs were faster to respond in old (M=372ms, 95% CI[356,388]) versus new 
(M=400ms, 95% CI[386,414]) conditions, t(49)=4.51, p<.001, whereas HSPs show little 
difference in Location 3 for old (M=403ms, 95% CI[378,432]) versus new (M=402ms, 95% 
CI[379,426]) conditions (p=.9). Further, the difference between conditions was significantly 




Overall, HSPs show less evidence than non-HSPs of implicit learning or motor fluency in 
higher-order associations measured with the triplets, but neither group shows evidence of motor 
fluency contamination of ratings (Appendix F). 
Explicit Memory Tests: Full Recognition 
Full recognition omnibus task comparison and sensitivity. An omnibus mixed 
measures ANOVA was used to analyze group differences in recognition ratings of the full 
sequence between implicit and explicit tasks using within-group factors of task (implicit, explicit) 
and sequence (target, random), for between groups factors of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP), 
separately. Table 6.7 shows the ANOVA revealed no 2-way, or between-groups main effects for 
ATQ-OS groups (ps>.05). 
 Implicit SRTT: full recognition and sensitivity. Ratings for target sequences and mean 
ratings of the four Random sequences were compared across sensitivity groups with a mixed 
ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Target, Random) and between-groups factors 
of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP). No between-groups effects (ps>.19) of sequence×sensitivity 
interactions (ps>.21) were found for ATQ-OS measures.  
 Explicit SRTT: full recognition and sensitivity. Ratings for target sequences and mean 
ratings of the four Random sequences were compared across sensitivity groups with a mixed 
ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Target, Random) and between-groups factors 
of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP). No between-groups effects were found for ATQ-OS groups 




Exploratory Regression: Explicit Memory of Implicit Sequences as a Predictor of 
Creativity 
 Using hierarchical multiple regression we test the prediction that orienting sensitivity, 
and length of maximum sequence generated in cued generation tasks following implicit SRTT 
can account for unique variance in creativity scores. 
Hierarchical multiple regression. In the hierarchical multiple regression, Model 1 
regressed maximum sequence score (from cued generation task following implicit SRTT) onto 
creativity scores. Model 2 added a sensitivity measure to Model 1. Model 3 added BFI-E and 
BFI-N variables to account for NA Adding NA measures to this hierarchical model allows the 
examination of sensitivity effects with and without NA controlled. Model 4 added BFI-O, a 
strong correlate of ATQ-OS (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), to examine whether IOR and sensitivity 
effects are redundant in the presence of BFI-O.  
In no cases did maximum sequence scores account for unique variance in any of the 
creativity measures (ps>.36). As Models 2, 3 and 4 are of no interest unless Model 1 accounts for 
unique variance they are not reported. 
Discussion 
Overall, analysis in Appendix F shows this diverse group of young to middle-aged people 
showed similar patterns of sequence-specific, higher-order associative, implicit and explicit 
learning and evidence of explicit awareness found in prior work using these tasks (Curran, 1997; 
Reber & Squire, 1998; Schendan et al., 2003a; Schendan et al., 2013). New findings reported in 





Overall, performance on implicit and explicit SRTT did not differ significantly between 
orienting sensitivity groups. However some group differences emerged in the explicit memory 
tasks following the implicit SRTT. Following implicit SRTT learning, explicit memory tasks 
were performed to measure awareness and explicit memory for implicit task sequences. 
Importantly, following implicit SRTT tasks, HSPs demonstrated more knowledge about the 
repeating sequence than non-HSPs. Specifically, the maximum sequence generated on the cued 
generation task of explicit knowledge was higher for HSPs than non-HSPs by the end of implicit 
SRTT learning. Thus, HSPs demonstrate more awareness and explicit knowledge of implicitly 
learned sequences than non-HSPs. 
Interestingly, HSPs show less evidence than non-HSPs of implicit learning or motor-
fluency in higher-order associations measured with the triplets. This finding is consistent with 
the conceptualization of sensitivity as a tendency towards the “pause and check” strategy (Aron 
& Aron, 1997). Indeed, HSPs have been shown to be slower, but no less accurate that non-HSPs 
in visual search tasks (Jagiellowicz et al., 2010). No support found for the 3rd hypothesis, that 
implicit learning and memory performance related to higher sensitivity will predict creativity. 
Overall, these findings for the implicit SRTT are particularly important because they provide key 
confirmation that sensitivity is associated with the ability to become more consciously aware of 
information automatically under implicit conditions, supporting the first and second hypotheses. 
Altogether, this consistent with conceptualizations of the sensitive individual as being more 
consciously aware of subtleties that others may not notice (Aron et al., 2012; Evans & Rothbart, 
2007, 2008). Notably, implicit learning and memory tends to remain unaffected by neurological 
issues, whereas explicit learning and memory differs with many neurological changes. For 




1957) affect explicit learning but leave implicit learning unaffected or relatively spared. In 
contrast, implicit learning tends to be affected mainly by neurological issues affecting dopamine 
systems in the basal ganglia, such as Parkinson’s disease (Schendan, et al., 2013). Given the 
association between implicit learning, dopamine, and the basal ganglia, sensitivity effects on 
conscious sequence knowledge following implicit learning suggests the dopamine system 
implicated in sensitivity could underlie these effects. This is consistent with the evidence that 
dopamine changes underlie changes in implicit and explicit learning and memory with aging and 
Parkinson’s disease (Schendan et al., 2013), as suggested above. For an alternative interpretation 
of the findings that take into account a greater range of sensitivity measures and analysis, please 
see Appendix F. 
Conclusions 
Overall, this study shows that sensitivity is associated with a greater ability to 
incidentally acquire and exploit information during the implicit learning task, consistent with 
conceptualizations of the sensitive individual as being more consciously aware resulting from 
more sensitive exogenous attention systems (Aron et al., 2012; Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008). 
However, explicit memory performance following implicit sequence learning does not predict 












Mixed ANOVA using within-groups factors of Run, Condition and Block with between-groups 
factors of Sensitivity for implicit SRTT performance 
 ATQ-OS 
  F ηp
2 
Main effects     
Sensitivity 0 0 
2-way interactions     
Sensitivity×Run .61 .008 
Sensitivity×Condition .69 .009 
Sensitivity×Block .88 .011 
3-way interactions     
Sensitivity×Run×Condition .56 .007 
Sensitivity×Run×Block 1.33 .017 
Sensitivity×Condition×Block 0 0 
4-way interactions     
Sensitivity×Run×Condition×Block 1.32 .017 




Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-groups 
factors of run and condition with between-groups factors of sensitivity for explicit SRTT 
performance 
 ATQ-OS 
  F ηp
2 
Main effects     
Sensitivity 1.77 .03 
2-way interactions     
Sensitivity×Condition 1.96 .033 
Sensitivity×Block 1.07 .018 











Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-groups 
factors of Run and Transition Pair with between-groups factors of sensitivity for implicit SRTT 
  ATQ-OS 
   F ηp
2 
Main effects      
Sensitivity  .71 .009 
2-way interactions      
Sensitivity×Run  .59 .008 
Sensitivity×Pair  .83 .011 
3-way interactions      
Sensitivity×Run×Pair  1.18 .015 




Summary of separate omnibus mixed ANOVA for free generation, including maximum sequences 
generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to keypresses for between-groups 
factor of sensitivity 
  ATQ-OS 
    F ηp² 
Maximum sequence 
Main effects .02 0 
Interaction 0 0 
Number of triplets 
Main effects .06 .001 
Interaction 1.87 .024 
Triplet ratio  
Main effects .35 .004 
Interaction .02 0 










Summary of separate mixed ANOVA for explicit SRTT free generation, including maximum 
sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to keypresses for 
between-groups factor of sensitivity 
    ATQ-OS 
    F ηp² 
Maximum sequence 
Main effect .01 0 
Interaction 1.59 .02 
Number of triplets 
Main effect .79 .01 
Interaction 1.72 .022 
Triplet ratio 
Main effect .1 .001 
Interaction 1.18 .015 





Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing group effects and interactions for within-groups 
factors of Condition and Location and between-groups variables of sensitivity for implicit SRTT 
triplet recognition response times 
 ATQ-OS 
  F ηp² 
Main effects   
Sensitivity .83 .012 
Two way interactions   
Sensitivity×Condition 1.93 .028 
Sensitivity×Location (Loc) .74 .011 
Three way interactions   
Sensitivity×Condition×Loc 3.29* .046 










Summary output of mixed ANOVA of full recognition ratings for factors of Task and Sequence 
and between-groups factor of sensitivity 
 ATQ-OS 
  F ηp² 
Main effects   
Sensitivity .08 .001 
Two-way interactions   
Sensitivity×Task .47 .006 
Sensitivity×Sequence .65 .008 
Three-way interactions   
Sensitivity×Task×Sequence .01 0 















































Latent Inhibition in the Sensitive Creator 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter we employ an instrumental learning-to-criterion measure of latent 
inhibition (LI) using a within-subjects design (Evans et al., 2007; Granger et al., 2016) to 
examine how individual differences in LI may be one explanatory mechanism underlying higher 
creative potential and achievement in the sensitive, open creator (see Chapter 2). Latent 
inhibition was measured using a) response times for correct trials conditions, and b) number of 
correct predictive trials. 
No sensitivity group differences in LI response times (RT) or number of correct 
predictive responses (CPR) were found. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis provides no 
evidence that LI (RT and CPR) can account for unique variance in creativity measures used, nor 
did the LI measures create redundancy of sensitivity and openness coefficients accounting for 
unique variance in creativity scores, providing no support for the hypothesis that LI is an 




































In the previous chapters, we show that higher sensitivity is associated with higher 
creative potential and achievement (Chapter 2), and as a construct separate from openness to 
experience personality (Chapter 3) has some basis in unconscious cognitive processes, including 
automatic attention (Chapters 4 & 5), and learning with conscious awareness and retrieval of 
memory (Chapter 6). Unconscious cognitive processes are critical for the creative process (Finke 
et al., 1992; Schooler & Melcher, 1995; Wallas, 1926) and are implicated in theories of creative 
cognition, including the cognitive disinhibition hypothesis which explains that original, useful 
and surprising ideas are more probable when normal inhibitory mechanisms that limit novel 
associations break down (Eysenck, 1995; Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999). 
Latent inhibition (LI) describes a phenomenon grounded in automatic attention and memory 
retrieval mechanisms wherein casually familiar stimuli (i.e., stimuli experienced without 
consequence) enter into new associations more slowly than novel stimuli. When latent inhibition 
breaks down, attention, learning and memory improve for previously irrelevant stimuli (Lubow 
& Gewirtz, 1995; Lubow & Kaplan, 2005), and when something deemed irrelevant turns out to 
be highly relevant, surprising, insightful ideas can emerge (Schmajuk et al., 2009; Simonton, 
2012b). The aim of this study is to examine LI as an explanatory mechanism underlying higher 
creative potential and achievement in the sensitive, open creator (see Chapter 2). 
Latent Inhibition and Attention 
LI in humans is most commonly measured using instrumental learning-to-criterion tasks, 
with response time and number of trials to reach learning criterion as the dependent variable 
(Evans et al., 2007; Lubow, 1997; Lubow & Gewirtz, 1995). The procedure to obtain LI involves 




presented without consequence. During the test phase, an association between that stimulus and a 
new event or target must be learned. When comparing associative learning of the pre-exposed 
stimulus (PE) to learning in a non pre-exposed (NPE) control condition that did not receive 
stimulus pre-exposure, reduced learning in the PE versus NPE condition is observed (Braunstein-
Bercovitz & Lubow, 1998b; Lubow & Gewirtz, 1995). Attentional-associative models (for a 
review, see Lubow, 1989) explain that LI results from a stimulus-specific decline in attention as 
a function of repeated, inconsequential exposure during the pre-exposure stage. That is, LI can 
only occur under conditions of diminished voluntary, controlled attention in the pre-exposure 
stage but with sufficient cognitive resources available for automatic/involuntary attentional 
processing (Braunstein-Bercovitz & Lubow, 1998a, 1998b). In the test stage, learned 
associations with the pre-exposed stimulus only occur when conditioned attention decrements 
are overcome. Critically, any attention manipulations or individual differences, such as 
personality trait or neuropathology, that restore or maintain the attention to the pre-exposed 
stimulus reduce the magnitude of LI (Lubow, 2005b). 
As LI is presumed to be modulated by attentional processes (Lubow, 1989), LI tasks have 
been used to study disorders characterized by attentional deficits, such as attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (Lubow & Josman, 1993) and schizophrenia (Baruch, Hemsley, & Gray, 
1988). One of the most salient features of schizophrenia is the inability to ignore, or screen out, 
irrelevant information (Braff, 1993). Consistent with this, Baruch et al. (1988) report that acute 
schizophrenia is associated with diminished latent inhibition due to overattention towards 
irrelevant stimuli in the pre-exposure stage. The dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia states 
that schizophrenia is related to excessive dopamine-related neuronal activity (Meltzer & Stahl, 




differences in LI to dopamine variation. For example, dopamine agonists (i.e., increased 
available dopamine) abolish latent inhibition in the rat (Solomon et al., 1981), whereas dopamine 
antagonists normalize LI in acute schizophrenia patients under treatment with anti-psychotic 
medication (Baruch et al., 1988; Dunn, Atwater, & Kilts, 1993) and create super-LI effects in 
rodents (Solomon et al., 1981). LI and its mediation by the dopaminergic system may be one 
mechanism linking sensitivity, openness and creativity. 
Latent Inhibition, Personality and Creativity 
Disorders of attention and dopamine variation underlie individual differences in LI. 
However, dopamine variation is also related to creativity (Jauk et al., 2015; Takeuchi et al., 
2010), and both sensitivity and openness are associated with variations in DRD4 dopaminergic 
‘plasticity’ genes which play a role in attention (Deyoung, 2013; Deyoung et al., 2011; Jauk et 
al., 2015; Pluess, 2015a, 2017). Lower LI is associated with higher openness to experience 
(Peterson & Carson, 2000), the Big-Five personality trait with the strongest association higher 
creativity (Feist, 2010; Kaufman et al., 2016; Runco, 2014; Sawyer, 2012), and higher creative 
achievement, especially in highly intelligent people, suggesting creative people are more open to 
environmental stimuli (Carson et al., 2003; Chirila & Feldman, 2012; Keri, 2011). Low LI is 
proposed to be a form of cognitive disinhibition that enables awareness of more information for 
creative association (Carson, 2011). According to the cognitive disinhibition hypothesis of 
creativity (Eysenck, 1995; Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999), highly creative 
people have lower cognitive inhibition due to frontal lobe de-activation, with greater 
disinhibition in the right hemisphere. This theory is consistent with evidence implicating anti-
correlated attention networks for internally and externally directed cognition (Dixon et al., 2014) 




volume (Jauk et al., 2015), density (Fink et al., 2014) and function (Fink & Benedek, 2014) of 
areas of the DMN with divergent thinking. Also, variation in ideational originality on divergent 
thinking tasks (e.g., ATTA) is related to structural variation and activity in the DMN and the 
basal ganglia dopaminergic system (Andreasen, 2005; Jauk et al., 2015; Takeuchi et al., 2011; 
Takeuchi et al., 2010). 
Latent inhibition and creativity. The attentional-associative model of classical 
conditioning can explain how low LI enhances creativity (Schmajuk et al., 2009) and suggests 
neural mechanisms for linking LI and creativity with sensitivity, openness, dopamine, and the 
DMN. In the model, an increase in dopaminergic activity enhances effects of novelty on 
attention, thereby increasing attention and reducing LI. Low LI is thus associated with increased 
attention to previously-experienced irrelevant stimuli (i.e., as if they are more novel), and this 
manifests as a lower attentional gating threshold for sensory stimulation (Schmajuk et al., 2009). 
Consequently, with low LI, learning and memory improves, as well as creativity processes that 
involve these novelty, attention, and memory mechanisms, such as the remote associates task and 
divergent thinking (Schmajuk et al., 2009). LI is due to processes within a "default automatic 
processing mode" that stands in contrast to a controlled top-down mode of processing (Lubow & 
Gewirtz, 1995). Consistent with this, neurophysiology (i.e., a P50) suggest that stronger, very 
early automatic attentional capture by an external stimulus (“sensory gating”), which is thought 
to be related to low LI, is associated with higher creativity (Zabelina et al., 2015; Zabelina, 
Saporta, et al., 2016). Early sensory gating and later automatic attention involve different 
processes (Wan, Crawford, & Boutros, 2007), although both may be part of the default automatic 
processing mode associated with LI. For example, low LI associated with low, early automatic 




associated with later automatic attention (e.g., exogenous orienting in the DMN) would further 
reduce selection and filtering. Altogether, this ensures that more stimuli reach awareness. While 
an attentional-associative model of LI and creativity (Schmajuk et al., 2009) fits an emotion-
attention temperament framework (Evans & Rothbart, 2007) most readily, the environmental 
sensitivity framework (Pluess, 2015a) can also accommodate a link with LI because 
neurosensitivity can affect attention, learning and memory systems (e.g., see Chapter 6). 
Latent inhibition and sensitivity. While there are no known direct links between LI and 
sensitive temperament, evidence is suggestive. The sensitive temperament is characterized by a 
behavioural profile that suggests low LI, as people high in sensory-processing sensitivity (SPS) 
seem to have a nonconscious tendency to attend irrelevant stimuli, having trouble ignoring or 
filtering them out (Eby, 2015; Rizzo-Sierra et al., 2011). Early evidence suggests that creativity 
is associated with higher sensitivity, which was defined as less ability to learn to habituate to 
repeated sensory stimulation, and this is associated with a higher orienting response (OR; 
Martindale et al., 1996). Higher OR means greater automatic attention to irrelevant stimulation 
(and greater novelty detection), as in low LI (Schmajuk et al., 2009). This pattern suggests that 
high sensitivity is related to low LI.  
Aims 
The aim of this study is to examine how individual differences in LI may be one 
explanatory mechanism underlying higher creative potential and achievement in the sensitive, 
open creator (see Chapter 2). In this study we employ an instrumental learning-to-criterion 
measure of LI using a within-subjects design (Evans et al., 2007; Granger et al., 2016). Between-
subjects designs are most common in human LI studies, in which participants are split into 




subjects designs provide power to detect effects using fewer participants, and eliminate the need 
for matching groups based on important demographics (Gray, Snowden, Peoples, Hemsley, & 
Gray, 2003). The within-subjects design used in this study is sensitive to individual differences 
and has previously shown that high scores on the schizotypy personality dimension are 
associated with low LI (Evans et al., 2007; Granger et al., 2016; cf. Gray et al., 2003), consistent 
with the continuum approach wherein schizotypy personality may index psychosis-proneness in 
the general population (Claridge, 1994), which is linked to low LI (Baruch et al., 1988; Lubow & 
Gewirtz, 1995). This suggests the within-subjects LI task design can detect group differences in 
LI between sensitivity and creativity groups from the general population. 
 In this within-subjects LI task, the PE stage exposes participants to a PE stimulus letter 
amongst filler letters without consequence. In the test stage, participants see PE and novel NPE 
cues preceding target letters appearing on screen, and must either respond to, or predict, the 
target onset with a key press. Participants attempt to learn to associate the cues with the target 
letters in order to predict the target as early as possible. Learning associations between cues and 
targets will decrease response time, and increase correct predictive responses to targets. Correct 
predictive responses are defined as anticipatory responses recorded during PE or NPE stimuli 
presentations which precede target onset, demonstrating a learned association, rather than a 
simple response to an event (Granger et al., 2016). As a manipulation check (see Appendix G), 
we expect to observe LI effects where PE-target associations are learned more slowly than NPE-
target associations, resulting in slower RTs and lower correct predictive responses for PE versus 
NPE cue-target pairs. Intelligence is not usually considered in human LI experiments or literature 




Progressive Matrices test (Arthur Jr & Day, 1994) because attention deficits associated with LI 
can instil a creative advantage in the presence of high IQ (Carson et al., 2003).  
Hypothesis 
Creative achievement is associated with low LI (Carson et al., 2003; Chirila & Feldman, 
2012; Keri, 2011; Schmajuk et al., 2009), and behavioural profiles of the sensitive temperament 
suggest low LI (Eby, 2015; Rizzo-Sierra et al., 2011). The overall hypothesis is that LI will be 
lower in high sensitive groups relative to low sensitive groups. This predicts group differences in 
response times and number of correct predictive responses between PE and NPE conditions (i.e., 
different LI effects between groups). Specifically, in the test phase i) high sensitive groups (who 
have lower LI) should be faster to learn associations with the PE stimuli than low sensitive 
groups (who have stronger LI). Consequently, a) differences in response times and b) correct 
predictive responses between PE versus NPE conditions (i.e., the LI effects) should be smaller 
for high versus low sensitive groups. 
Regarding the relationship between intelligence, LI and creativity (Carson et al., 2003), 
between sensitivity amd creativity (Chapter 2), and considering that higher intelligence may even 
infer an advantage in the presence of attention deficits associated with psychosis-proneness 
(Carson et al., 2003), we expect that ii) high sensitivity and high intelligence will be associated 
with the lower LI effects.  
Considering sensitivity as a continuous variable, if LI effects represent a shared 
underlying mechanism between sensitivity, creativity and openness to experience, iii) we expect 
that inclusion of those variables together in the hierarchical multiple regression models will 






A sample of 80 participants were recruited for the study (55 female, 25 male, aged between 
18-46 years, M=22.29, SD=5.88). Participants were rewarded with course credit or paid £8 per hour 
pro-rata. This study was approved by Human Ethics Committee in the Faculty of Science and 
Environment at University of Plymouth. Participants gave informed consent before the study and 
were debriefed after completing the study.  
Apparatus and Materials  
A computerized battery was developed on Survey Monkey to assess sensitivity, Big-Five 
personality and creativity and administered in the lab. Each questionnaire was presented on a 
separate page within the software. For each item, the participant checked the blank in front of 
any item corresponding to the response that best applied to them. 
Sensitivity was measured using two questionnaires. 1) The Highly Sensitive Person scale 
(HSPS) from Aron and Aron (1997) is a 27-item, modality general, self-report scale measuring 
sensory processing sensitivity using items asking about tendencies to startle easily, become 
easily overwhelmed by sensory inputs but also awareness of subtleties in the environment, and 
enjoyment of fine and delicate scents, tastes, sounds, and works of art. Item responses ranged 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). 2) The two HSPS factors of orienting sensitivity and negative 
affect were also measured using the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ)-short form 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007). The ATQ is a self-report scale with 77 items measuring general 
constructs of orienting sensitivity (ATQ-OS), negative affect (ATQ NA), effortful control (ATQ 
EC), and extraversion/surgency (ATQ ES). Item responses ranged from 1 (extremely untrue) to 7 




The Big Five Inventory (BFI) assessed personality. This 44-item self-report questionnaire 
measures the Big Five dimensions of personality: Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998; John et al., 1991; 
John et al., 2008; John & Srivastava, 1999). Item responses ranged from 1 (disagree strongly) to 
5 (agree strongly). 
Creativity was assessed using three of the most established and validated measures of 
creative processes. The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al., 2005) was 
chosen as an objective self-report measure of creative achievement across 10 domains of 
creativity. The Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale (RIBS; Runco et al., 2000-2001) is a 19-item 
questionnaire designed to measure creative ideation, which is thought to measure a single factor 
and has discriminant validity. Items probe behavioural tendencies and abilities regarding ideas 
and thinking, with many items emphasizing creative, unusual, or imaginative thought (e.g., “I 
have many wild ideas.”). The RIBS responses ranged from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). This study 
was lab-based in order to administer one pencil and paper creativity test: The Abbreviated 
Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA; Goff & Torrance, 2002) consists of 3 timed (3-minute) tests of 
figural and verbal divergent thinking abilities thought to be critical for the creative process 
(Runco, 2014). The ATTA is a gold standard, objective measure of divergent thinking. The 
ATTA thus is the one test that independently verifies creative products/divergent thinking. The 
ATTA was presented in the lab in paper format with a pencil and eraser, not part of the Survey 
Monkey battery.  
A measure of higher order cognitive ability (g or analytical ‘fluid’ intelligence) was 
assessed using the 12-item short-form of the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices Test. The 




substantially shorter mean administration time of 15 minutes versus 35-45 minutes of the long 
form version (Arthur Jr & Day, 1994). The task consists of 12 matrix or design problems 
arranged in ascending order of difficulty. Participants were administered pencils, erasers, and 
multiple choice response sheets corresponding to the 12-item test presented as a booklet. After 
brief demonstration of how to perform the test using 2 practice items from the Ravens Advanced 
Progressive Matrices Test, participants were informed they have 15 minutes to complete the task, 
timed by the experimenter using a stopwatch. After 15 minutes, participants were asked to put 
their pencil down and stop working, and the experimenter collected the response sheets and test 
booklets. Ravens scores for each participant were calculated by summing the number of 
problems correctly solved, the same as that for the long-form (Arthur Jr & Day, 1994). 
The experimental stimuli were presented on a Viglen Windows 7 PC with Philips 
Brilliance LED monitor 221P3LPYES P-line 21.5" widescreen operating at 1920 × 1080 pixels 
with a 60hz refresh rate, and were programmed and presented using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). 
Stimuli were white capital letters in Arial font (7mm x 5mm; h × w) presented on a grey 
background. The pre-exposed and non pre-exposed letter stimuli were “S” and “H”, respectively, 
but counterbalanced across participants so that equal numbers of participants saw “S” as the pre-
exposed stimuli and “H” as the non pre-exposed stimuli, and vice versa for the other half of 
participants. For all participants, the letter “X” was the target stimulus, and letters “D”, “M”, “T” 





Figure 7.1. Experiment design and example of a pre-exposed stimuli predicting target letter ‘X’ 
in the test stage of the latent inhibition task (Evans et al., 2007; Granger et al., 2016). For pre-
exposure stage, letters in parenthesis reflect stimuli frequency. For test stage, letters in 
parenthesis reflect number of times stimuli predicts target letter ‘X’, where numbers in 
parenthesis for filler trials reflect probability of predicting target letter ‘X’. Note, learning stimuli 
always precede target stimuli in the test stage. 
Procedure  
The latent inhibition task consists of two stages, a pre-exposure stage and a test stage. In 




instructions informed participants that they would be presented with letters, one after the other, 
and their task was to read the letter out loud to themselves. When the participants had read and 
understood the instructions, they were told to push the space bar to begin. In the pre-exposure 
stage, each participant was presented with a random sequence of letters in which the inter-mixed 
pre-exposed stimulus (i.e., S or H) appeared 20 times and four filler letters (D, M, T, V) 
appeared 15 times each. Each letter was presented for 1000ms with a 50ms inter-stimulus 
interval with 80 trials taking approximately 2 minutes to complete. The non pre-exposed and 
target letter stimuli were not presented during the pre-exposure stage.  
The test stage followed the pre-exposure stage. When the pre-exposure stage was 
complete, the participants were given the following instructions for the test phase, taken 
verbatim from Granger et al. (2016): 
 
“In this task, I want you to watch the sequence of letters appearing on 
the screen. Your task is to try and predict when a letter ‘X’ is going to 
appear. If you think you know when the ‘X’ will appear then you can 
press the space bar early in the sequence, that is before the ‘X’ appears 
on screen. Alternatively, if you are unable to do this please press the 
spacebar as quickly as possible when you see the letter ‘X.’ There may 
be more than one rule that predicts the ‘X.’ Please try to be as accurate 
as you can, but do not worry about making the occasional error. If you 





In the test stage, each participant was presented with a random sequence of letters in 
which the inter-mixed pre-exposed and non pre-exposed predictive stimuli appeared 20 times 
each. The target letter followed every presentation of the pre-exposed and non pre-exposed 
predictive stimuli (100% predictive probability). Filler letters appeared 64 times each and, within 
those presentations, the target appeared 5 times following each of the filler stimuli (7.82% 
predictive probability). Thus due to the much higher probability of the pre-exposed and non pre-
exposed predictive stimuli relative to the filler stimuli, learning of the association with the target 
should occur much more strongly for the predictive than the filler stimuli. The extent to which 
learning is less for the pre-exposed relative to non-pre-exposed predictive stimuli is the measure 
of latent inhibition of learning. Each letter was presented for 1000ms with a 50ms inter-stimulus 
interval. The presentation of 356 total trials took approximately 7 minutes to complete. 
Analysis  
Errors of omission (miss) and errors of commission (false alarm) across all trials were 
used to determine participant engagement with the task, because excessive errors of omission 
and commission suggest poor engagement in the task (Evans et al., 2007). Median or mean 
absolute deviation was used to detect outliers and reject participants with outstanding errors of 
omission and commission based on the assumption they were not engaging with the task (cf. 
Evans et al., 2007).  
Latent inhibition was measured using a) response times for correct trials conditions, and b) 
number of correct predictive trials, both for PE and NPE conditions only. Note, correct predictive 
trials were categorized as predictive on the condition that the response preceded target onset during 
presentation of predictive stimuli or during the 50ms pre-target interval. Within-groups task factors 




block (10 trial blocks), wherein each trial block measure is the mean response times over 2 
consecutive trials, with no trials overlapping between blocks (see Granger et al., 2016). A between-
groups factor of pre-exposure stimuli (Order) was included in the main analysis as a stimulus 
counter-balance factor. In this study, participants were either exposed to “S” or “H” as the pre-
exposed stimuli, thus an Order factor determines whether “S” or “H” as the pre-exposed stimulus 
affects latent inhibition. Another between-groups factor included the median-split Ravens short-
form (Arthur Jr & Day, 1994) intelligence scores (high, low), used to examine whether general 
cognitive ability interacts with latent inhibition. Note, only effects relating to the manipulation of 
exposure condition are reported.  
The HSPS may be a taxon consisting of HSPs (i.e., those high on HSPS) and non-HSPs, 
thus Aron and Aron (2013) suggest dichotomizing the sample with high-low break points 
somewhere between 15% for HSPs and 85% for non-HSPs, up to 30% for HSPs and 70% for 
non-HSPs. In this study a 30% HSP 70% non-HSP split was chosen. Between-groups factors of 
sensitivity were used to explore differences in LI performance between HSP (n=22) and non-
HSP groups (n=51). 
Sensitivity group differences were explored using mixed ANOVA and t-test comparisons 
using between-groups factors of ATQ-OS. For the ATQ-OS, the HSP groups (M=.76, 95% CI 
[.73,.78]) had higher scores than non-HSPs (M=.51, 95% CI [.48,.54]). See Appendix G for 
HSPS and CAQ, RIBS, ATTA and Ravens group splits. Note, all personality, temperament, and 
creativity measures are scaled between 0 and 1, see Chapter 2 for scaling. Max scores used for 
scaling in this study are CAQ are 94, and 83 for the ATTA in this study only. 
For sensitivity measures considered as continuous variables and analyzed with regression 




response times across trials and subtracting mean response times of non pre-exposed (NPE) from 
the pre-exposed (PE) condition (PE minus NPE). For latent inhibition correct predictive responses 
(LI CPR), a variable for total correct predictive responses was calculated for each condition and 
subtracted (NPE minus PE). Positive values for LI RT and LI CPR indicate latent inhibition was 
present, whereas zero or negative scores indicate an absence of latent inhibition (Evans et al., 2007). 
Missing Data 
Only 2 participants included in the analysis had a missing data in the control condition, each 
missing a single trial. Therefore, in order to minimize loss of data during the analysis, missing data 
was replaced using the group mean RT for those trials with missing data. 
Results 
Task Accuracy and Participant Exclusion 
Overall, 39 participants made errors of omission (miss) at least once across 60 target 
presentations, ranging between 0 and 14 omissions (M=1.1, SD=2.05). 77 participants made errors 
of commission (false alarm) across all trials ranging between 0 and 37 commissions (M=7.93, 
SD=7.46). Using the median absolute deviation method of outlier detection, 5 participants were 
detected as outliers with errors of commission >=24. For errors of omission, more than 50% of 
error values were zero and thus median absolute deviation was not applicable. Using the mean 
absolute deviation method of outlier detection, 2 participants were detected as outliers with errors 
of omission >=9. Therefore, 7 participants were rejected (n=5 via errors of commission & n=2 via 
errors of omission), leaving n=73 participants for further analysis. See Appendix G for analysis 
collapsed across groups. 
Individual Differences in Latent Inhibition using Dichotomous Measures 




separately for sensitivity groups defined using ATQ-OS. To analyze individual differences in LI 
response times, a mixed ANOVA used within-groups factors of test condition (pre-exposed [PE], 
non pre-exposed [NPE]) and trial (trial block 1:10) and between-groups factors of Ravens group 
(high, low) and Sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP). To analyze individual differences in latent inhibition 
using numbers of correct predictive responses, a mixed ANOVA used within-groups factors of test 
condition (PE, NPE) and between-groups factor of Ravens group (high, low) and Sensitivity (HSP, 
non-HSP). See Appendix G for analysis with the HSPS and with all creativity measures. 
Latent Inhibition and Sensitivity 
Response times. Sensitivity group differences in latent inhibition were not observed for 
ATQ-OS (ps>.17). 
Correct predictive responses. The mixed ANOVA did not reveal any significant between-
groups effects (ps>.16), 2-way (ps>.23) or 3-way (ps>.1) interactions for the sensitivity measure. 
Latent Inhibition and Continuous Individual Differences Measures 
Dichotomous splits used for sensitivity measures reduce statistical power to detect effects 
(MacCallum et al., 2002). To assess LI effects based on continuous sensitivity measures with 
greater power, single variables for LI response times (RT; PE minus NPE) and LI correct 
predictive response (CPR; NPE minus PE) were calculated using mean scores for each condition 
collapsed across trials.  
 Latent inhibition, intelligence and sensitivity as predictors of creativity. The 
hypothesis (iii) asks whether latent inhibition is one underlying mechanism of the sensitive, open 
creator. A hierarchical regression model will demonstrate whether sensitivity and latent inhibition 
can account for unique variance in creativity, measured using the CAQ, RIBS, and ATTA. In the 




and ATTA variables, separately. Model 2 added Ravens short-form scores in order to assess 
whether LI predicts creativity independent of intelligence (Carson et al., 2003). Model 3 adds 
ATQ-OS as a sensitivity measure. Model 4 added BFI-E and BFI-N variables to account for NA. 
Adding NA to this hierarchical model allows the examination of sensitivity effects with and 
without NA controlled. Model 5 added BFI-O, a strong correlate of ATQ-OS (Evans & Rothbart, 
2007), to examine whether latent inhibition and sensitivity coefficients are redundant in the 
presence of BFI-O.  
Assumptions of ordinary least squares regression were checked. Note, the minimum 
number of participants required for multiple regression is N>= 50+m, where m is the number of 
predictors. Regression equations with 6 or more predictor variables should aim for a minimum of 
N=10m (VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). In this study, N=73 and regression models use 6 
predictor variables, thus sample size requirements for multiple regression are satisfied. 
Scatterplots indicate linearity between variables. Distributions were inspected using P-P plots and 
histograms revealed that LI RT and LI CPR are positively skewed. Although no assumptions are 
made regarding independent variables in regression models, it is useful to find whether influential 
cases or outliers exist. Standardised residuals >3 were found for a five cases over creativity 
measures (n=2, n=1 and n=2 for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, respectively), although Mahalonobis 
distance values<15 indicate little influence with low leverage indicated by values<3[k + 1]/n 
suggesting the outlier cases do not substantially influence the model parameters (Field, 2013). 
Homoscedasticity cannot be assumed for CAQ or ATTA, as variance is not evenly dispersed. 
Violation of this assumption may limit the generalisability of the findings beyond the sample. 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 show the results of the hierarchical multiple regressions. In no 




LI CPR, Model 1 was not significant across CAQ, RIBS or ATTA measures, and did not account 
for unique variance together with Ravens short-form measures in Model 2, or with ATQ-OS 
variables in Model 3, or with Big-Five Neuroticism, Extraversion (Model 4) and Openness 
(Model 5) controlled. Note, Ravens scores accounts for significant unique CAQ variance in 
Models 2, 3, and 4 but not with openness to experience controlled in Model 5. 
Discussion 
In this study, a latent inhibition effect was found (see Appendix G) where responses were 
slower and less predictive in PE versus NPE conditions, although order effects were also found for 
response times, suggesting that the manipulation did not work when “S” was the pre-exposed 
stimulus. Further, intelligence measured with the Ravens short-form measure (Arthur Jr & Day, 
1994) did not interact with the LI effects, or correlate with LI variables, suggesting LI in this within-
subjects task is not directly influenced by general intellectual ability. 
The purpose of the study was to understand how individual differences in sensitivity 
manifest in measures of latent inhibition. We tested the hypothesis that sensitivity relates to LI RT 
and LI CPR, treating sensitivity as dichotomous and continuous variables with respective ANOVA 
and regression analysis. Considering the sensitivity as dichotomous, no sensitivity group 
differences in LI response times or number of correct predictive responses were found, providing 
no support for the hypothesis that high sensitivity would be associated with low latent inhibition. 
Thus, ANOVA using dichomtous orienting sensitivity measures provide no evidence that higher 
sensitivity is associated with low LI.  
Considering sensitivity as a continuous variable with greater power to detect effects 
(MacCallum et al., 2002), hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used test the hypothesis 




account for unique variance in models predicting creativity, but in the presence of sensitivity and 
openness measures is made redundant. No effects relating to LI were found. In particular, LI RT 
or LI CPR did not account for unique variance in any creativity measures, nor did LI measures 
create redundancy of sensitivity and openness coefficients accounting for unique variance in 
creativity scores (see Chapter 2 for relationship between sensitivity and creativity, including data 
from this study). Overall, findings provide no evidence that LI is a common mechanism underlying 
sensitivity, openness, and creativity. 
Conclusions 
 The key findings from this within-subjects LI task are that a) LI is normal across high and 
low orienting sensitivity groups, when sensitivity is considered as a dichotomous variable, and b) 
LI does not appear to be a unifying mechanism in the relationship between sensitivity, openness 
and creativity. 
One explanation for the lack of evidence for low LI in sensitivity includes the possibility 
that within-subjects designs of the LI task lack sensitivity to detect individual differences in LI. 
Consistent with this, Gray et al. (2003) show that within-subjects LI tasks are insensitive to LI 
effects between high and low schizotypy personality groups which are observed with between-
groups LI tasks, wherein the magnitude of effects are larger. In addition, the lack of task sensitivity 
could be explained by order effects, as LI effects were only observed in half of the participants pre-
exposed to “H” stimuli, thus larger group differences would be diminished through averaging 
across all participants, including those pre-exposed to “S” stimuli (see Appendix G). Finally, lack 
of group differences in the direction predicted could also be explained by inadequate sample sizes 
per group (ns<30) in the ANOVA analysis (cf. Carson et al., 2003) and overall sample size (N<250) 




in the sensitive, open creator cannot be rejected in this study using either a) a within-subjects task, 



























Hierarchical multiple regression with LI response times, intelligence, sensitivity and personality 
predicting creativity for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA 
 ATQ-OS 
 CAQ RIBS ATTA 
Model 1    
LI RT 0 0 0 
Model 2    
LI RT 0 0 0 
Ravens .217* .019 .114 
Model 3    
LI RT 0 0 0 
Ravens .185* -.03 .104 
Sensitivity .386*** .588*** .116 
Model 4    
LI RT 0 0 0 
Ravens .193** -.04 .107 
Sensitivity .381** .512*** .092 
BFI-E -.096 .159* -.027 
BFI-N 0 .175* .074 
Model 5    
LI RT 0 0 0 
Ravens .118 -.073 .106 
Sensitivity -.035 .33* .086 
BFI-E -.097 .158* -.027 
BFI-N .042 .177** .074 
BFI-O .487** .214 .008 
Model fit (R2)    
Model 1 .005 -.01 -.014 
Model 2 .058* -.024 .002 
Model 3 .177* .343*** .008 
Model 4 .174 .401* .001 
Model 5 .248*** .413 -.014 
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01,*** p<.001; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; LI RT=Latent inhibition response times (mean PE 
– mean NPE); ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; BFI-N=neuroticism factor of the Big Five Inventory; BFI-
E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-O=openness to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory; R²=adjusted R² for change 







Hierarchical multiple regression with LI correct predictive response, intelligence, sensitivity and 
personality predicting creativity for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA 
 ATQ-OS 
 CAQ RIBS ATTA 
Model 1    
LI CPR .005 -.001 0 
Model 2    
LI CPR .005 -.001 0 
Ravens .224* .019 .114 
Model 3    
LI CPR .004 -.002 0 
Ravens .191* -.031 .104 
Sensitivity .389*** .592*** .116 
Model 4    
LI CPR .005 -.002 0 
Ravens .199* -.042 .107 
Sensitivity .383*** .515*** .093 
BFI-E -.091 .164* -.026 
BFI-N .041 .173* .074 
Model 5    
LI CPR .004 -.003 0 
Ravens .122 -.078 .106 
Sensitivity -.032 .321*** .086 
BFI-E -.093 .162* -.026 
BFI-N .045 .175** .074 
BFI-O .486** .227 .008 
Model fit (R2)    
Model 1 -.001 -.013 -.014 
Model 2 .056* -.027 .002 
Model 3 .177*** .346*** .008 
Model 4 .174 .405* .001 
Model 5 .247** .42 -.015 
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01,*** p<.001; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; LI CPR=Latent inhibition correct predictive 
responses (NPE-PE); ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; BFI-N=neuroticism factor of the Big Five Inventory; 
BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-O=openness to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory; R²=adjusted R² for 




























































In this thesis, we established relationships between temperament, personality, creative 
potential and achievement using state-of-the-art subjective and objective measures. We focused 
specifically on orienting sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2007) also captured by environmental 
sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997; Pluess, 2015a) and sensory-processing sensitivity frameworks 
(Aron & Aron, 1997). Orienting sensitivity is the positive-affect-related sensitivity dimension of 
the emotion-attention temperament model most important for creativity (see Chapter 1 and 2). 
Orienting sensitivity can be measured using the Adult Temperament Questionnaire (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2007, 2008) or the Highly Sensitive Person Scale (Aron & Aron, 1997; Smolewska et 
al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015). Cognitive implications of trait sensitivity are suggested 
through mechanisms of sensory-processing sensitivity (SPS; Aron & Aron, 1997), 
neurosensitivity (Pluess, 2015a) and automatic attention orienting processes (Evans & Rothbart, 
2007), thus we aim to establish objective measures of those cognitive processes, and how they 
explain the relationships between temperament, personality and creativity. Findings relating to 
sensitivity and creativity are interpreted in light of a new sensitivity framework explaining the 
sensitive, open creator, which aligns with the cognitive disinhibition and hemispheric asymmetry 
hypothesis of creativity (Eysenck, 1995; Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999), and 
models of the creative process (Lubart, 2001; Wallas, 1926). 
Establishing Links between Sensitivity and Creativity 
 In Chapter 2, findings strongly link orienting sensitivity (OS), openness and diverse 
creative processes. We found that OS and openness are highly correlated traits that have 
independent roles in creative ideation and achievement but interactive roles in divergent thinking 




OS. Some argue that sensitivity is subsumed under openness (Shiner et al., 2012b; Shiner & 
DeYoung, 2013a), suggesting that any relationship between sensitivity and creativity is 
explained by openness. Factor analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that OS and openness are highly 
correlated, but distinct factors with discriminant validity (see also Aron & Aron, 1997; Evans & 
Rothbart, 2007) consistent with theoretical accounts describing OS as the biological substrate of 
openness (Evans & Rothbart, 2007) and the proposition that OS is a dimension of openness 
(Shiner et al., 2012b; Shiner & DeYoung, 2013a). However, factor analysis cannot provide 
clarity regarding hierarchical relationships between constructs, thus we cannot conclude that OS 
is a higher-order openness dimension. Further, in this thesis our conclusions regarding the 
relationship between OS and openness, and the incremental predictive validity of OS over 
openness when accounting for variance in creativity measures, are limited because short-form 
versions of the openness scale were used. However, if openness is to subsume OS, then short-
form measures of openness require more OS questions to capture sensitivity more completely. 
Nevertheless, we show sensitivity is a broad, higher-order personality dimension with 
implications beyond the single trait of openness. For example, the factor analysis shows evidence 
of an NA component in the sensitivity construct, consistent with previous reports (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2008; Smolewska et al., 2006; Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015) and environmental 
sensitivity frameworks (Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron et al., 2005; Pluess, 2015a; Pluess & 
Boniwell, 2015b)  wherein manifestations of sensitivity change depending on experience; people 
who are disproportionately susceptible to positive or negative life events may have different 
outcomes in the relative strengths of positive-affect-related OS and negative-affect-related (NA) 
dimensions of sensitivity, respectively. The HSPS captures multiple outcomes of the sensitive 




of the OS dimension in regards to vantage sensitivity, and the ratio of OS to NA items on the 
HSPS, future work may want to consider the benefits of increasing OS items on the HSPS scale 
to capture OS more completely. Nevertheless, the sensitivity frameworks described in this 
project capture a missing link with personality development by defining core constitutional 
mechanisms which “grow” personality through social and environmental interaction, and shape 
cognition. 
Sensitivity, Cognition and Creativity 
 The conceptualisations of sensory-processing sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997), 
neurosensitivity (Pluess, 2015a) and orienting attention sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2007) 
suggest a neuro-cognitive basis of this higher-order trait. Thus, we hypothesized that sensitivity 
will have broad implications for perception, attention, learning and memory. Indeed, these 
cognitive mechanisms are suggested in the highly sensitive person, who experiences greater 
awareness of internal and external events (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), such that subtleties are 
noted and processed more deeply, driven by either stronger emotional reactions (Aron et al., 
2012), or neurosensitivity (Pluess, 2015a), which may facilitate learning and memory.  
In Chapter 4 we showed that OS is characterized by individual differences in change 
detection and sensitivity of the alerting and executive attention networks. HSPs have a harder 
time filtering out (inhibiting) distracting information (i.e., more sensitive to irrelevant 
information) when attention is alert and diffused. As alerting networks support visual orienting 
and other attention processes (Posner & Petersen, 1990) and share common brain anatomy with 
exogenous attention networks, including the temporal-parietal junction (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002; Fan et al., 2005), this evidence is consistent with OS defined as sensitive exogenous 




therefore cannot fully account for sensitive exogenous orienting mechanisms that may be related 
to ATQ-OS measures. Thus, Chapter 5 examines individual differences in both endogenous and 
exogenous attention, and whether those cognitive processes can explain the relationship between 
sensitivity and creativity. 
Key findings in Chapter 5 demonstrate that ATQ-OS was associated with exogenous 
task-related inhibition-of-return (IOR) effects, consistent with the definition of OS as exogenous 
attention. However, no sensitivity effects were specific to orienting processes per se. Further, as 
no links were made between IOR and creativity, this suggests that exogenous IOR mechanisms 
do not explain the relationship between sensitivity and creativity.  
The findings across Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 suggest that sensitivity relates to attention 
processes more generally, including alerting mechanisms associated with defocused attention 
and disinhibited states (Callejas et al., 2004; Posner, 1994), rather than the orienting processes 
themselves. The observations of defocused, disinhibited states in higher sensitivity and higher 
creative ideation are consistent with accounts suggesting that creative inspirations emerge in 
states of lower cognitive inhibition due to frontal lobe de-activation, with greater disinhibition in 
the right hemisphere (Eysenck, 1995; Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999).  High 
sensitive groups show differences in alerting efficiency associated with right lateralised attention 
networks important for global processing (Fan et al., 2005; Ivry & Robertson, 1998), and show 
greater (disinhibited) activity in those networks during change detection tasks (Jagiellowicz et 
al., 2011). Defocused and  disinhibited global processing styles observed in highly sensitive 
people may enhance creativity by facilitating access to remotely associated content in conceptual 
memory (for a review, see Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Mendelsohn, 1976) which may be 




1995), and divergent thinking (Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Friedman et al., 2003; Friedman & 
Förster, 2001), which is essential for creative ideation (Runco et al., 2000-2001).  
 In Chapter 6 we move beyond the implications of sensitivity on attention to investigate 
the possibility that neurosensitivity may have implications for conscious and unconscious 
cognitive processes associated with learning and memory. Findings show that higher sensitivity 
is associated with greater ability to incidentally acquire and exploit covariations in the 
environment, and greater awareness of unconscious memories.  Higher awareness of 
unconscious memories observed in higher sensitivity is consistent with  greater awareness in the 
sensitive personality (Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron et al., 2012; Evans & Rothbart, 2007) and states 
of cognitive disinhibition that facilitate creative ideation through greater awareness of 
unconsciously generated associations (Carson, 2011; Martindale, 1999).  
 Latent inhibition (LI) is a mechanism which inhibits irrelevant information from 
consciousness in order to help prioritize information relevant to survival, and to protect limited 
attention resources from information overload (Lubow, 2005a; Lubow & Gewirtz, 1995). Based 
on evidence that higher creative achievement and intelligence (Carson et al., 2003; Chirila & 
Feldman, 2012; Keri, 2011; Schmajuk et al., 2009), and higher openness (Peterson & Carson, 2000) 
are associated with low LI, and behavioural profiles of the sensitive temperament suggest low LI 
(Eby, 2015; Martindale et al., 1996; Rizzo-Sierra et al., 2011), the overall hypothesis was that  LI 
will be lower in high than low sensitive groups. We found no support for the hypothesis that high 
sensitivity would be associated with low latent inhibition, and no evidence that LI is a unifying 






A New Sensitivity Framework for the Sensitive, Open Creator 
 In order to understand the implications that sensitivity may have for cognition and 
creativity, it is important to integrate existing knowledge of sensitivity into a single framework 
that can be used to explain the findings from this project.  
A synthesis of existing sensitivity frameworks. Each of the major sensitivity 
frameworks reviewed in Chapter 1 (Aron & Aron, 1997; Evans & Rothbart, 2007; Pluess, 2015a) 
and others not reviewed that include sensitivity dimensions, including the Regulatory Theory of 
Temperament (Strelau & Zawadzki, 1993) and the Functional Ensemble of Temperament 
framework (Trofimova & Robbins, 2016), share a core definition of sensitivity as reactivity to 
environmental stimuli (for a review, see Bridges & Schendan, 2018). In these theories, reactivity 
thresholds are defined by the interaction of the magnitude of both trait sensitivity and 
environmental stimuli with the emotional-motivational systems, which trigger appropriate, 
adaptive behaviours (i.e., approach or avoid) depending on the valence of the affective response 
to the environment (Moore & Depue, 2016). Overstimulation, often experienced by highly 
sensitive people (Aron & Aron, 1997) resulting in part from neuronal disinhibition (Homberg et 
al., 2016), can lead to positive or negative-affect-related life outcomes, depending on the 
developmental context (Pluess, 2015a; Trofimova, 2018). It is the perceived capacity of an 
organism that determines the affective valence associated with overstimulation, and whether to 
explore, or withdraw (Trofimova, 2018). If the needs of an organism outweigh capacity, then 
negative affect is experienced, however if capacity is sufficient, then positive affect is 
experienced. This is particularly important in how an organism responds to novelty, a core 
component of creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 2012), because novelty presents potential for 




by high sensitives may signal lack of capacity to handle situations, resulting in behavioural 
inhibition and withdrawal (Aron & Aron, 1997). However, this tendency is mediated by 
developmental experiences, since positive, enriching environments develop tendencies towards 
positive-affect, openness and resilience (Pluess, 2015b), which are important for creativity 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). The capacity to cope with overstimulation may have important 
implications for creative cognition, since capacity determines whether the upregulation of 
alerting and orienting attention systems (i.e., higher orienting sensitivity) are used for a) coping 
with negative affect, or b) challenging existing capacities that enable further sensation (or 
information) seeking (Bridges & Schendan, 2018; Trofimova, 2018), which itself is part of the 
creative process (Wallas, 1926).  
The Sensitive, Open Creator (SOC) model. Based on the literature review in Chapter 1, 
the findings of this project, and the integration of sensitivity frameworks from the previous section, 
a new model of the sensitive creator emerges, abbreviated to the SOC model. As noted above, and 
in Chapter 1, the mechanisms underlying sensitivity are the same in either positive or negative-
affect-related sensitivity (i.e., disinhibition, attention networks), but how those mechanisms are 
expressed is determined by the developmental context. Thus, the sensitivity × environment 
interaction determines the sensitive, open creator. 
SOC. Developmental environments interacting with sensitivity mechanisms shape the 
outcome of the sensitive temperament. Positive, enriching environments interact with attention 
mechanisms (i.e., orienting sensitivity) to promote resilience to overstimulation experienced with 
novelty, and develop a Big-5 personality profile with high openness, and normal to low 
neuroticism. This profile is most strongly related to vantage sensitivity (Pluess, 2015b) and most 




2007). Conversely, trauma and adversity during childhood decrease the capacity to cope and thus 
decrease resilience to novelty, and develop a Big-5 personality profile with high neuroticism and 
introversion. This profile is most strongly related to the negative-affect-related sensitivity and most 
adequately captured with the HSPS or ATQ-NA component.   
It is vantage sensitivity that offers the greatest potential for creativity, because vantage 
sensitivity enables greater tolerances for disinhibited thought, exploration, curiosity and openness 
towards novelty that are important for creativity (e.g., Chapter 2). The SOC model is consistent 
with the cognitive disinhibition and hemispheric asymmetry hypotheses of creativity (Kaufman, 
Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999) which posit a strong role of disinhibition and right-
hemisphere exogenous attention processes in the creative process. Further, one of the paradoxical 
characteristics of the creative person is the openness to experience life, but with the resilience so 
as not to suffer (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). The resilience and openness of vantage sensitivity offers 
a greater range of stimulation and information extraction that that play an important role in the 
creative process (Lubart, 2001; Wallas, 1926).  
Empirical support for the Sensitive, Open Creator model. The new SOC framework 
developed in this chapter assumes identical sensitivity mechanisms across sensitivity subtypes, but 
differential expression of those mechanisms depending on the developmental context. Using the 
evidence accumulated from this project, the validity of the new SOC framework can be verified. 
We present new evidence that creativity is a vantage sensitivity associated with positive-
affect-related dimensions of OS, distinct from, but interactive with, the Big-Five openness trait, 
and has consequences for cognition that may facilitate creativity. This general summary of evidence 
provides support for the SOC model overall. However, the SOC model suggests that upregulation 




people with vantage sensitivity should display different orienting than those with high negative-
affect-related sensitivity. Interestingly, we find no evidence that sensitivity is characterized by 
differences in orienting attention mechanisms, as would be expected considering definitions of OS 
and evidence linking higher sensitivity to greater activation of orienting brain networks in change 
detection tasks (Jagiellowicz et al., 2011). Instead, positive-affect-related sensitivity is 
characterized by attention states related to global, defocused and disinhibited processing styles that 
predict creativity (Chapter 4). Further, high orienting sensitivity is characterized by stronger 
inhibition-of-return, an exogenous attention process, however no evidence was found to suggest 
exogenous IOR mechanisms associated with orienting sensitivity are implicated in higher creativity 
by any creativity measure used in this study. 
Chapter 6 provides some evidence that sensitivity has positive implications for unconscious 
learning and memory processes implicated in the sensitive, open creator, where the ease of memory 
retrieval of implicit sequences observed in high sensitivity may be grounded in cognitive 
disinhibition and sensitive exogenous orienting mechanisms explained in the SOC model. This is 
feasible because low threshold memories could be more easily accessed in consciousness through 
mechanisms of disinhibition and exogenous orienting, as in the attention to memory model (Cabeza 
et al., 2011). Sensitivity of attention, learning and memory processes and greater awareness during 
disinhibited states are beneficial for the creative process, because novel associations developed 
during preparation and incubation stages may only emerge as creative insights with a level of 
sensitivity and awareness that is receptive to those unconsciously generated ideas (Wallas, 1926). 
Chapter 7 provides no evidence that low latent inhibition is characteristic of the sensitive, open 
creator. As low latent inhibition is proposed to be a form of cognitive disinhibition that enables 




the idea that cognitive disinhibition may be one mechanism defining the sensitive, open creator 
defined in the SOC model. However, the within-subjects design weaknesses in Chapter 7 means 
that further work is required.  
In summary, this thesis proposes a new framework showing the sensitive, open creator 
emerging as a result of positive enriching environments that promote resilience to novelty 
(Bridges & Schendan, 2018). The SOC model assumes that underlying sensitivity mechanisms 
(e.g., disinhibition, sensitive exogenous orienting) are shared across subtypes of sensitivity, but 
are expressed differently depending on their interaction with the developmental context. This 
framework and supporting evidence is consistent with existing theories that explain individual 
differences in creativity originate from cognitive disinhibition and right hemisphere mechanisms 
(Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999). 
Future Directions 
 This thesis provides a broad analysis of the cognitive implications of sensitivity, and how 
they relate to diverse creative processes, although more work is required. Finding an LI effect 
with sensitivity groups was important to understand whether dopamine variation provides an 
explanatory mechanism underlying sensitivity, openness, creativity and DMN function. The 
failure to reject the null hypothesis may be the result of choosing an LI task using within-subjects 
design (see Chapter 7). Thus, future work can address these problems by considering the use of 
between-subjects LI designs for exploring LI in the sensitive creator.  
This project focuses on the impact of positive-affect-related sensitivity on creativity, as 
these vantage sensitivity benefits are not observed in negative-affect-related sensitivity. Thus, an 
interesting question emerges whether interventions in high negative-affect-related sensitivity can 




individuals with traumatic backgrounds achieve more positive life outcomes and realise their 
creative potential. This would provide greater understanding how deterministic environmental 
interactions are on the outcomes of sensitivity, and whether neurosensitivity creates conditions of 
greater dynamism in the brain, such that, under favourable conditions, disproportionate 
susceptibility results in greater recovery following trauma, and ultimately the reformation of 
cognition and personality.  
Finally, future work should consider the nature of sensitivity based on the theory and 
empirical findings presented in this thesis as a motivation for updating current measures of 
environmental sensitivity. We show the HSPS is multidimensional, consistent with previous work 
(Evans & Rothbart, 2007; Smolewska et al., 2006), and recent literature identifying multiple 
factors of sensory-processing sensitivity that the HSPS was not designed to capture (Aron et al., 
2012). The different dimensions of sensitivity have different outcomes for creative cognition, but 
scales differ in how those sub-dimensions are measured. We suggest that current sensitivity 
measures are updated to provide a balanced ratio of  NA and OS sensitivity dimension, whilst 
also taking into consideration the nature of sensitivity in relation the Big-Five personality traits, 
especially openness. Until new measures are created, we recommend the use of long-form 
personality measures when employing measures of sensitivity in order to observe pure sensitivity 
effects beyond what is observed with personality measures, whilst also providing the opportunity 
to consider how sensitivity may interact with personality, as observed in the sensitive, open 
creator (see Chapter 2). These suggestions could help future work address the limitations of this 
study regarding the use of short-form measures in making solid conclusions regarding the 
relationship between temperament, personality and creativity. Without evidence that sensitivity 




measures, then measures of temperament, including the HSPS and ATQ-OS, may struggle to find 
their relevance in a personality-oriented literature. 
Concluding Remarks 
Western society tends to favour “tough warriors and kings” in families, social groups, and 
the workplace, such that sensitivity is perceived as flaw, and is thus penalized (Aron, 1999). In this 
thesis, we demonstrate the uniqueness of the sensitive person should be valued, and nurtured 
throughout child development and adulthood, because through positive, enriching environments, 
vantage sensitivities emerge that are beneficial for the self, and for the cultural advancement of 





































































Theories and Perspectives on Creativity 
Operational definitions of creativity are necessary for experimental work. Definitions of 
“creativity” are both ambiguous, and elusive with an abundance of definitions in the past 
literature offering little consistency regarding what creativity actually means (Plucker et al., 
2004; Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Simonton, 2012a). However, the general consensus, or “standard 
definition” defines creativity as something demanding both originality and effectiveness (Runco 
& Jaeger, 2012; cf. Simonton, 2016). Originality is essential for something to be novel, whereas 
effectiveness determines the usefulness of an idea or product. Neither term alone is sufficient for 
creativity to emerge. For example, original ideas can stem from psychopathology, or 
randomness, but may lack value. On the other hand, effective or useful ideas lacking originality 
are not new, and so already exist. The relationship between the two terms has not been 
thoroughly investigated, however evidence suggests that novelty may be considered as more 
important than usefulness (Diedrich, Benedek, Jauk, & Neubauer, 2015). Others argue the 
standard definition conflates originality with “surprise” (i.e., nonobvious), as something can be 
novel and effective, but not surprising (Simonton, 2012b). The three-criterion definition of 
creativity is a modified version of the criteria used by the United States Patent Office to 
determine whether an invention can be patent protected, wherein an invention must be new, 
useful and nonobvious (surprising) to be accepted (see https://www.uspto.gov/help/patent-help). 
In the three-criterion definition of creativity (Simonton, 2012b), originality, value and surprise 
are scaled variables (valued between 0 to 1) which are multiplicative, rather than additive, 




one way for an idea to be maximally creative, and multiple ways in which an idea can lack 
creativity.  
The standard definition of creativity is a core component of many theories of creativity, 
for example, those exploring how novelty and effectiveness emerges as a function of product, 
place, process and person (for a review of the Four P's of creativity, see Kozbelt, Beghetto, & 
Runco, 2010). Creativity theories can take an objective approach by looking at works or products 
regarded as creative, the environments, or places, in which creativity may flourish, or may seek 
to understand the subjective experience of the individual by exploring the creative process or 
person. Cognitive theories of creativity place emphasis on the creative process and person and 
the idea that normative human cognition forms the basis of creative capacity (Smith et al., 1995). 
Such theories can focus on universal cognitive capacities (e.g., attention, memory) to explain the 
creative process, or how those processes relate to creative potential (Kozbelt et al., 2010). 
Creative cognition approaches (e.g., Finke et al., 1992; Smith et al., 1995) recognize individual 
differences and a continuity between products or ideas that emerge at different levels of creative 
magnitude, arguing that cognitive processes involved in uncommon “Big-C” creative 
achievements of eminent Genius creators, whose influential works stand the test of time, are not 
fundamentally different to those involved in the subjective, everyday “little-c” creativity 
normally distributed throughout the general population (for sub-divisions of little-c, see Kaufman 
& Beghetto, 2009).  
To address the aims of this thesis, we take an individual differences and creative 
cognition approach in order to understand how temperament, personality, and cognition relate to 
creativity at various magnitudes. The three-criterion definition of creativity is adopted because 




differences in cognition (Peterson & Carson, 2000; Simonton, 2012b). Nested within the three-
criteria definition is the widely accepted standard definition of creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 
2012), which is useful because this allows cross-comparison across the greatest number of 
studies, and also because this operationalization allows for objective measures of novelty and 
effectiveness, using scoring and ratings, and holistic approaches using judges to evaluate the 
perceived creativity of a given product or idea (Diedrich et al., 2015). One problem emerging 
with the standard definition of creativity is that socio-cultural influences are not explicitly 
defined. Confluence or “systems” approaches (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Plucker et al., 2004; 
Sternberg & Lubart, 1991, 1999) explain creativity very broadly as “the interaction among 
aptitude, process, and environment by which an individual or group produces a perceptible 
product that is both novel and useful as defined within a social context.” (Plucker et al., 2004, p. 
90). No “creative trait” exists, and one is not creative unless their work is judged as important by 
an appropriate field of expertise. Confluence theories acknowledge the standard definition of 
creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 2012), but go further with the additional role of social context, thus 
explaining why works of great artists of the past (e.g., van Gogh, J. S. Bach) were not considered 
as creative until years later; contemporaries in the field did not judge their work as important at 
the time. This helps to dispel debilitating myths of creativity that people are born 
creative/uncreative but provides the means by which aptitude (e.g., skill-set in a domain) and 
environment as dynamic characteristics allow for individual differences acquired through 
experience (Plucker et al., 2004). Further, the social context criterion suggests that creativity is 
relative, and thus creative magnitude exists on a continuum (cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), i.e., a 
child’s drawing can be considered as creative relative to the context of their home environment, 




definition of creativity, and the context for exploring individual differences in the creative 
process and person at various magnitudes of creativity. However, the qualitative nature of many 
aspects of confluence models (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1996) make it difficult to test hypothesis 
unambiguously, and the multiple, diverse levels of systems models create problems grounding 
experimentation in particular methodologies (Kozbelt et al., 2010), thus the three-criterion 
definition with nested standard definition is preferred in this thesis. 
Creativity: Concepts and Measurement 
 Different conceptualizations of creativity tend to be associated with different 
measurements. One important distinction to make is that between creative potential and creative 
achievement, as the two concepts may not actually be related (Runco, 2014). Creative potential 
is a normally distributed, person-oriented little-c creativity and refers to an ability to produce 
new and useful ideas, whereas creative achievement is a positively skewed, product-oriented 
dimension referring to tangible big-C achievements, such as awards, patents, or publications 
(Carson et al., 2005; Jauk et al., 2013; Runco, 2014). In this project, we investigate how 
individual differences in temperament, personality and cognition relate to both creative potential 
and achievement, considered as two measures on a single continuum of creative magnitude.  
Psychometric approaches characterize individual differences associated with creative 
potential and creative achievement and have been useful in providing researchers with valid 
creativity measurement tools, in particular those with predictive validity and discriminant 
validity. Discriminant validity is of particular importance, as it indicates whether measures of 
creativity are distinct from other constructs, such as intelligence/IQ, thus warranting its own field 




The term ‘intelligence’ can have several meanings. Intelligence can be something 
measured by intelligence quotient (IQ) tests, can be the entire domain of human cognitive ability, 
or observable behaviours or performances (Barron & Harrington, 1981). Many once believed 
that creative talents can be accounted for by high levels of intelligence, but the conceptualization 
that intelligence and creativity are the same has been considered both inadequate and detrimental 
to our understanding of creativity (Guilford, 1950). In the early 20th century, psychometric 
measures showing weak positive correlations between intelligence and creativity suggested the 
two constructs were not identical (for reviews, see Barron & Harrington, 1981; Batey & 
Furnham, 2006). Indeed, recent meta-analyses (Kim, 2005, 2008) indicate that the mean 
correlation coefficient between creativity test scores (including ideation and creative 
achievement) and intelligence are negligible (r <=.174). However, the relationship may be more 
complex than a linear correlation. Threshold theories of intelligence (Guilford, 1967) suggests a 
curvi-linear relationship between IQ and creativity, where the correlation between the two is 
moderately positive, but only up to a certain level of intellectual ability, when IQ<120 (cf. Kim, 
2005; Runco & Albert, 1985, 1986). However, recent reviews conclude little or no support 
overall for threshold theories (Sawyer, 2010). An alternative explanation involves fractionating 
intelligence into separate factors, because a single IQ general ability score may be too coarse to 
represent multiple intelligences inherent in domain-specific abilities and achievements (Gardner, 
2011b; Hampshire, Highfield, Parkin, & Owen, 2012). Indeed, longitudinal studies of 
intellectually talented individuals show that variable intellectual configurations of spatial, 
mathematical, and verbal ability partially determine creative outcomes (Kell, Lubinski, Benbow, 
& Steiger, 2013). When combined, three cognitive measures of mathematical, verbal and spatial 




correlations between IQ and creative ideation and achievement (Kim, 2005, 2008). However, 
spatial abilities, required for spatial judgement and mental imagery (Gardner, 2011b), 
incrementally predict 7.6% of variance in creative achievements over verbal and mathematical 
abilities, which themselves account for 10.8% variance together (Kell et al., 2013). This evidence 
is consistent with the idea that general indicators of intelligence are not adequately capturing the 
individual variations in multiple cognitive abilities which have unique relations with relevant 
domain-specific creative potential and/or achievements.  
Measurement of Creative Potential 
Creative potential can be observed by measuring divergent thinking (DT) abilities. It was 
Guilford (1950) who linked divergent production (i.e., thinking) to creative potential. DT has 
been defined as the ability to give a diversity of responses to open-ended problems and, through 
ideation, this often leads to originality, a central feature of creativity (Runco & Acar, 2012). In 
the Structure of Intellect theory (Guilford, 1967), divergent thinking was defined as a major 
operation of the human intellect and something distinct from convergent thinking. Convergent 
thinking typically leads to a conventional, correct response to a clearly defined question and is 
more often associated with intelligence (Gardner, 2011a). Although seemingly distinct, divergent 
and convergent thinking are thought to exist on a single divergence-convergence continuum 
(Eysenck, 1993; Runco, 2014), in which both styles of thinking are important for creativity 
(Cropley, 2006). Indicators of divergent thinking measure cognitive abilities such as fluency, 
flexibility, originality and elaboration, and whilst not considered the same as creative thinking, 
can be seen as an indicator of creative potential (Runco, 2014).  
Divergent thinking tasks generally have adequate reliability (Runco & Acar, 2012), 




over-inflated due to high correlations with the fluency factor. Fluency contaminates originality in 
verbal DT tasks (Hocevar, 1979b), but originality is reliable in figural DT tasks at certain levels 
of achievement (Runco & Albert, 1985). To counteract this problem, alternative scoring methods 
which control for the effect of fluency on originality are used (e.g., Benedek et al., 2013).  
The discriminant validity of DT tasks is questionable. For example, Wallach and Kogan 
(1965) show the relation between DT and intelligence depends on the task instructions given. 
That is, under test-like conditions, the discriminant validity is affected by low correlations 
between IQ and DT, but under game-like conditions there is no correlation. A re-analysis of 
Wallach and Kogan’s (1965) data suggests that, whilst fluency is strongly related to originality, it 
also has a significantly modest positive relation with IQ (Silvia, 2008). The discriminant validity 
of DT measures is further complicated by the divergence-convergence continuum which 
suggests overlap between the two processes of divergent and convergent thinking (Runco & 
Acar, 2012).  
Regarding convergent validity, DT tasks are positively correlated with various indexes of 
creative ability (for reviews, see Barron & Harrington, 1981; Batey & Furnham, 2006), including 
measures of real world creative achievements (r = .47) across several domains (Carson et al., 
2005), although a recent meta-analysis by Kim (2008) suggest the correlation is weak (r = .216). 
Scores in DT tasks have also been shown to be three times better than intelligence measures at 
predicting creative achievements (Plucker, 1999). However, the predictive validity of DT tasks is 
unstable and influenced by testing conditions (e.g., game-like vs. test-like, timed vs. untimed, 
instructions to “be creative” vs. generic instructions) and may also be susceptible to training 




While this seems to cast doubt on the validity of DT tasks as measures of creative 
potential, the use of creative achievements as criterion measures of divergent thinking have been 
criticised. Runco et al. (2000-2001) argue that DT is a measure of ideation and the potential for 
problem solving, rather than past creative achievements. As such, DT tests are improperly 
validated when past creative accomplishments are used as the criterion measure, which may 
explain the moderate or low predictive validity found in studies of divergent thinking (Kim, 
2008). The evidence of discriminant, convergent and predictive validity presented is therefore 
adequate considering DT tasks are not considered as synonymous with creativity, but rather as 
indicators of ideation and creative potential (Runco & Acar, 2012).  
The Runco Ideational Behavioural Scale (RIBS; (Runco et al., 2000-2001) was designed 
to address the need for a more appropriate criterion measure when looking at the predictive 
validity of divergent thinking/creative ideation. The RIBS is based on the notion that ideas are 
products of original, divergent and creative thinking. The scale is a self-report measure of overt 
behaviours that clearly reflect an individual’s use, appreciation and skill with ideation. The RIBS 
shows good reliability (Cronbach’s α > .9) and discriminant validity with estimates of 
intellectual ability and other self-report measures of creative thinking. The short form RIBS-S 
has good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .84) and correlates highly with long form RIBS-V (r = .94). 
In addition, RIBS-V offers no incremental predictive validity over RIBS-S, which itself shows 
concurrent validity with measures of creative activities and achievement, accounting for 22% 
variance in scores. RIBS is positively correlated with openness to experience (Batey et al., 2010; 
Von Stumm et al., 2011), the Big-Five trait with the strongest relationship with creativity (Feist, 
2010; Kaufman et al., 2016; Runco, 2014; Sawyer, 2012) and shows weak positive correlations 




correlations between DT and RIBS are consistent with the ambiguous construct validity of the 
RIBS (Runco et al., 2000-2001), which suggests creative potential may be more adequately 
captured with both objective divergent thinking tasks and subjective, self-report measures of 
creative ideation. 
Together, DT tasks and self-report creative ideation can be used to measure creative 
potential, the little-c creativity differing only in magnitude to Big-C creativity (Finke et al., 1992; 
Smith et al., 1995). As both measures capture little-c creativity, they are useful indicators of 
everyday creative ideation, problem-solving and insight which is normally distributed throughout 
the population (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009) making any findings highly generalizable. Whilst 
DT tasks and creative ideation are not synonymous with creativity (Runco, 2014), they will help 
fulfil the aims of this thesis by providing insights into specific cognitive processes responsible 
for any magnitude of creative achievement (Finke et al., 1992; Smith et al., 1995) which may 
differ across temperament and personality traits. 
Measurement of Creative Achievement 
The best predictor of creative behavior may be past creative behavior (Colangelo et al., 
1992). For example, greater engagement in everyday creative activities (e.g., wrote a poem, 
designed a piece of music, made a present) predicts real world creative achievement (Jauk et al., 
2014b). Self-report measures of creative achievement can focus on creative behavior, 
achievement and self-perception (for reviews, see Plucker & Makel, 2010; Silvia et al., 2012). 
The Creative Achievements Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson et al., 2005) is a recent self-report 
measure that captures creative achievements across 10 domains, focusing on observable but 
uncommon big-C creative accomplishments. The CAQ has adequate reliability and validity; the 




scores strongly positively correlated with ratings of creative products (r = .59); convergent 
validity is demonstrated through moderate positive correlations with divergent thinking tests (r = 
.47) and openness to experience (r = .33), a personality trait associated with higher creativity 
(Carson et al., 2005). The CAQ also covaries well with other measures of self-reported creative 
behavior, achievement and self-perception (Silvia et al., 2012). CAQ has discriminant validity 
but shows weak positive correlations with IQ (Carson et al., 2005; Keri, 2011). The focus on 
capturing big-C creativity means that CAQ scores are severely skewed with most scores piling 
up at the lower end of the scale and relatively few scores indicating significant creative 
achievements. CAQ scores also tend to be over-dispersed with variances larger than the mean 
resulting from excessive zero scores. The nature of CAQ distributions mean that researchers 
should pay attention to the assumptions of common statistical analysis techniques, and use robust 
methods or data transformations where appropriate (Silvia et al., 2012). 
The Creative Behaviour Inventory (Hocevar, 1979a) also measures big-C creative 
accomplishments and was recently revised to capture little-c accomplishments, although the 
revision lacks domain specificity (Silvia et al., 2012). Other self-report measures are available to 
assess everyday little-c creativity, including the Revised Creative Domain Questionnaire (CDQ-
R; (Kaufman, Waterstreet, et al., 2010). The CDQ-R is a reliable measure of the subjective belief 
people have about their own level of creativity across four domains which combined have 
moderate positive correlations with openness to experience (r = .43). It is recommended that in 
order to gain accurate measurement of big-C and little-c creative achievements, as many 





Neurobiological Theories of Creative Cognition 
Neurobiological theories of creativity aim to explain how the brain achieves creative 
cognition and what biological and neurogenetic factors are involved. Colin Martindale’s work 
builds on early theories of creativity including primary process cognition (Kris, 1952), 
associative hierarchies (Mednick, 1962), and defocused attention (Mendelsohn, 1976), which 
themselves are thought to be cognitive “building blocks” in the overall creative process 
(Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010; Martindale, 1999). Martindale (1999) theorized that creative 
inspirations are the result of a combined mental state in which attention is defocused, thought is 
associative and a large number of mental representations are simultaneously activated, occuring 
together in a state of cognitive disinhibition with comparatively more right than left hemisphere 
activation. Specifically, highly creative people have lower cognitive inhibition due to frontal lobe 
de-activation, with greater disinhibition in the right hemisphere, but only when engaged in the 
creative process. Martindale (1999) thus integrates the cognitive disinhibition and hemispheric 
asymmetry hypotheses of creativity under one theory.  
The cognitive disinhibition and hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis are major theories of 
creativity and Martindale’s (1999) insights (see also Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010) are 
consistent with evidence linking anti-correlated active and default mode brain networks 
(Buckner et al., 2008) responsible for internally and externally directed cognitions (Dixon et al., 
2014) with the creative process. For example, studies link cognitive disinhibition (Takeuchi et 
al., 2011), increased grey matter volume (Jauk et al., 2015), density (Fink et al., 2013) and 
function (Fink et al., 2012) of areas of the DMN with divergent thinking. Also, variation in 
ideational originality on divergent thinking tasks, such as the Abbreviated Torrance Test for 




DMN and the basal ganglia dopaminergic system (Andreasen, 2005; Jauk et al., 2015; Takeuchi 
et al., 2011; Takeuchi et al., 2010). Kris (1952) presciently argued that ability to switch between 
internally and externally directed cognition, or to “regress in the service of the ego”, was a 
defining characteristic of highly creative individuals (Martindale, 1999). Indeed, neuroimaging 
studies have also shown that creative thought processes, including spontaneous mind wandering, 
benefit from the dynamic interaction of the DMN with frontoparietal control and dorsal 
attention/salience networks (Beaty et al., 2015; Beaty, Benedek, et al., 2016; Fox et al., 2015) 
which are also involved with internally and externally directed cognition (Dixon et al., 2014).  
The default mode network includes the strongly right lateralized ventral exogenous 
orienting attention network which aligns attention either with incoming bottom-up processing of 
sensory stimulation (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Posner & Rothbart, 2007) or explicit memory 
(Binder & Desai, 2011; Buckner et al., 2008), as described in the attention to memory model 
(Cabeza et al., 2011; Daselaar et al., 2013). Attention to memory provides a mechanism for the 
detection and orientation towards internally generated novelty. Consistent with the hemispheric 
asymmetry hypothesis of creativity, the ventral network includes a temporal parietal junction 
(TPJ) component that is strongly right lateralized and implicated in global hierarchical pattern 
perception, and orienting attention to global versus local levels of processing (Ivry & Robertson, 
1998). The hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis of creativity capitalizes on the idea that the right 
hemisphere is dominant for global processing, whereas the left hemisphere is dominant for local 
processing (Ivry & Robertson, 1998). Global processing has a role in holistic, diffuse, insight and 
integrative creative processes, whereas local processing has a role in analytical creative 
processes (Kaufman, Kornilov, et al., 2010). Creativity may benefit from a global processing 




content in conceptual memory (for a review, see Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Mendelsohn, 
1976) which may be useful during global problem restructuring and creative insight processes 
(Schooler & Melcher, 1995), cognitive flexibility (Nijstad et al., 2010) and divergent thinking 
(Förster & Dannenberg, 2010; Friedman et al., 2003; Friedman & Förster, 2001). 
Building on Martindale’s integration, Kaufman, Kornilov, et al. (2010) suggests that 
cognitive disinhibition and hemispheric asymmetry reflect two separate stages of creative 
cognition. Cognitive disinhibition facilitates internally directed thought processes, such as day-
dreaming, fantasy and ideation, and the exogenous attention network monitors, detects and 
signals the mind to orient towards novelty. Martindale’s work is of particular interest because of 
the role of that cortical arousal plays in creative cognition. In a series of experiments, Martindale 
found that highly creative people were over-sensitive and more physiologically reactive than 
people low in creativity (for a review, see Martindale, 1999). Sensitivity is considered as an 
enduring higher-order personality or temperament trait anecdotally linked to higher creativity 
(Aron & Aron, 1997) and may reflect individual differences in universal cognitive functions of 
attention (Evans & Rothbart, 2007), and cognition more generally through the mechanism of 
sensory-processing sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997), or neurosensitivity (Pluess, 2015a). The 
relationship between creativity and cognitive processes that should reflect sensitive neural 
processing have not been investigated prior to this project, thus we address these major gaps in 
understanding individual differences in creativity by focusing on sensitivity and its cognitive 
implications, providing a possible neurocognitive basis for creativity 
Temperament, Personality and Creativity 
Openness to experience is the factor among the Big-Five personality dimensions that has 




Sawyer, 2012). Openness to experience is a universal dimension of personality characterized as 
"the breadth, depth, and permeability of consciousness, and in the recurrent need to enlarge and 
examine experience" (McCrae & Costa, 1997, p. 826), the tendency to be imaginative, curious, 
perceptive, creative, artistic, thoughtful and intellectual, all subsumed under the overarching 
explanation of cognitive exploration (Deyoung et al., 2011). Openness is commonly referred to 
as Openness/Intellect, although openness and intellect labels capture core but distinct elements of 
the trait, referring to engagement with perceptual and abstract information, respectively 
(Deyoung et al., 2011). The inclusion of intelligence within the Openness/Intellect factor is 
controversial, as is the suggestion that creativity is synonymous with Openness/Intellect 
(Deyoung, 2013; Johnson, 1994). Indeed, self-reports and ratings of openness are weakly 
positively correlated with divergent thinking (McCrae, 1987; Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, & 
O’Connor, 2009), and moderately positively so with real world creative achievements (Carson et 
al., 2005; Hirsh & Peterson, 2008; Silvia, Kaufman, Reiter-Palmon, & Wigert, 2011; Silvia et al., 
2009), although the correlations are not strong enough to support the inclusion of creativity into 
the more general Openness/Intellect factor as discriminant validity is suggested (rs<.85;  Kline, 
2015). Openness, however, may interact with a range of other creative characteristics, including 
autonomy, unconventionality and sensitivity (Runco, 2014); notably, sensitivity is defined in this 
thesis as sensory-processing sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997), or neurosensitivity (Pluess, 
2015a), an environmental sensitivity framework explaining the basis for individual differences in 
the responsiveness to environmental factors. 
The neurotransmitter dopamine is thought to play a key role in the biological substrate of 
both Openness/Intellect (DeYoung et al., 2002, 2005) and Extraversion (Depue & Collins, 1999). 




with prefrontal dopaminergic function predict Openness/Intellect, and DRD4 also predicts 
Extraversion (Deyoung et al., 2011). Extraversion is a behavioural manifestation of exploratory, 
approach behaviours and reward seeking and is considered distinct from the more cerebral 
cognitive exploration of Openness/Intellect. However, the commonalities can be explained by 
the influence of dopamine forming a biological substrate for both openness and extraversion 
(Deyoung et al., 2011; DeYoung et al., 2002, 2005). These traits, and other Big-Five traits 
converge to form higher-order meta-traits of “plasticity” and “stability”, provide a missing link 
with personality development by defining core constitutional mechanisms which “grow” 
personality through social and environmental interaction (DeYoung et al., 2002, 2005; Digman, 
1997; see also Evans & Rothbart, 2009; Rothbart, 2007). The higher-order trait of plasticity is 
loaded with extraversion and openness traits related to dopamine variation. The higher-order trait 
of stability is loaded with neuroticism (reversed), conscientiousness, agreeableness and has a 
basis in the serotonergic system related to emotional government and motivation regulation, and 
controlled, organized behavior needed for achieving various goals (DeYoung et al., 2006). 
Plasticity and stability are related to, but have opposing effects (pos/neg relationship, 
respectively), on measures of divergent thinking (Silvia et al., 2008) and creative achievement 
(Silvia et al., 2009). 
The personality approach to creativity looks for stable characteristics (i.e., traits) 
associated with creativity. Personality approaches cannot aim to explain creativity in terms of a 
single trait because creativity exists in a constellation of traits interacting with cognitive and 
environmental factors that may facilitate creativity (Runco, 2014). The personality of the creative 
person is complex, and paradoxical. For example, creative people may have higher levels of 




introversion to work, the ability to engage in imagination/fantasy but keep ideas rooted in reality, 
and an openness and sensitivity to experience consciousness but a resilience so as not to suffer 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). A quantitative meta-analysis shows the most creative individuals are 
more likely to be higher in openness, introversion, impulsivity, and display higher sensitivity to 
internal affective states compared with less creative people, but this differs between artists and 
scientists (Feist, 1998); see also Batey and Furnham (2006). 
In spite of the evidence, the existence of a relationship between creativity and personality 
traits remains controversial (Necka & Hlawacz, 2013; Sawyer, 2012), and the scarce links 
between personality and creativity may relate to something not explicitly captured by 
psychometric personality assessments; the notion of temperament (Necka & Hlawacz, 2013). It 
is widely believed that temperaments are the foundations of global personality traits (Aron et al., 
2012; Davis, Panksepp, & Normansell, 2003; McCrae et al., 2000). Temperament refers to ones 
“real nature” (Necka & Hlawacz, 2013), the early emerging basic dispositions in activity, 
affectivity, attention and self-regulation that are product of a complex interaction of genetic, 
biological and environmental factors which influence the development of personality (Goldsmith 
et al., 1987; Rothbart et al., 2000; Shiner et al., 2012b; Zentner & Bates, 2008). However, there 
is some debate regarding the distinction between personality and temperament. Some argue that 
temperament and personality are different ways of describing the same trait separated only by the 
age of manifestation, with temperament relating to childhood and personality relating to 
adulthood. In this view, individual differences in temperament are subsumed under the Big-Five 
traits (Shiner et al., 2012b; Shiner & DeYoung, 2013a). An alternative view is that temperament 
and personality remain separable in that personality includes specific cognitions, beliefs and 




attention), which may influence, but do not include, specific cognitions themselves (Evans & 
Rothbart, 2007). Temperament has received little attention in creativity literature and is not 
explicitly included in recent influential reviews and books (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; 
Kaufman & Sternberg, 2010; Sawyer, 2012) and models of the creative personality (Feist, 2010), 
though it is indirectly included by acknowledging genetic and epigenetic influences on creativity 
and has recently been identified as a major critical gap in creativity research (Feist, 2010; Necka 
& Hlawacz, 2013; Runco, 2014). In this project, the terms “temperament” and “higher-order 







































































































Non-Parametric Spearman’s Rho (rs) correlations between creativity, personality and higher-order factors (N=288) 
 
  Creativity     Higher-order factors                Big-Five     







ATQ-OS ATQ-NA ATQ-EC ATQ-ES BFI-O BFI-C BFI-E BFI-A 
Creativity                  
CAQ -                 
RIBS_S .343*** -                
ATTA .153** .279*** -               
Higher-order factors                 
HSPS .247*** .300*** .083 -              
HSP-OS .410*** .489*** .201*** .673*** -             
HSP-NA .153** .186** .019 .956*** .463*** -            
HSP-OS .459*** .555*** .236*** .553*** .897*** .347*** -           
HSP-EOE .093 .171** -.007 .882*** .487*** .906*** .292*** -          
HSP-LST .185** .187*** .072 .892*** .477*** .895*** .380*** .693*** -         
ATQ-OS .442*** .561*** .201*** .351*** .584*** .215*** .664*** .166** .227*** -        
ATQ-NA .072 .095 .031 .704*** .324*** .751*** .175** .708*** .671*** .166** -       
ATQ-EC -.112 -.177** .105 -.297*** -.203*** -.295*** -.159** -.295*** -.238*** -.170** -.284*** -      
ATQ-ES .100 .064 -.075 -.402*** -.130* -.444*** -.042 -.332*** -.457*** .004 -.479*** .036 -     
Big-Five                 
BFI-O .456*** .530*** .253*** .231*** .533*** .093 .620*** .023 .146* .603*** -.012 -.080 .008 -    
BFI-C -.109 -.117* .084 -.064 -.122* -.045 -.103 -.016 -.066 -.129* -.067 .639*** .065 -.144* -   
BFI-E .123* .103 .046 -.386*** -.178** -.420*** -.012 -.420*** -.378*** .008 -.404*** .122* .573*** .110 .129* -  
BFI-A .010 -.058 -.158** -.100 .021 -.131* -.004 -.021 -.149* .008 -.157** .118* .254*** -.020 .241*** .090 - 
BFI-N .086 .113 .083 .675*** .365*** .689*** .219*** .716*** .559*** .200*** .703*** -.250*** -.417*** .020 -.134* -.460*** -.131* 
Note. 2-tailed significance: * p< 0.05 level, ** p < .01, *** p <.001. CAQ = Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS = Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA = Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults; HSPS = Highly-
Sensitive Person Scale (full); HSP-OS = orienting-sensitivity factor of the HSPS; HSP-NA = negative-affect factor of the HSPS; HSP-OS = orienting/ aesthetic sensitivity factor of the HSPS; HSP-EOE = ease of excitation 
factor of the HSPS; HSP-LST = low sensory threshold factor of the HSPS; ATQ-OS = orienting-sensitivity factor of the ATQ; ATQ-NA = negative-affect factor of the ATQ; ATQ-EC = effortful-control factor of the ATQ; 
ATQ-ES = extraversion/surgency factor of the ATQ; BFI-O = openness factor of the Big-Five Inventory (BFI); BFI-C = conscientiousness factor of the BFI; BFI-E = extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-A = agreeableness factor 






















































































Individual Differences in CDT Performance 
HSPS, HSPS sub factors and CDT reaction time correlations. The HSPS weakly 
positively correlates with location and size RTs. HSP-NA weakly positively correlates with 
location RTs, and size RTs (p=.051). HSP-EOE has a weak positive correlation with overall, 
location and size RTs. HSP-LST has a weak positive correlation with location RTs (p=.052). 
HSP-OS or HSP-AES does not correlate with any CDT RTs, thus only NA factors of the 
HSPS correlate with the CDT RT performance. Note, the correlation between HSPS (N,E) 
residuals and location or size RTs was not significant, suggesting the HSPS correlations with 
location and size RTs are specific to NA. 
Big-Five personality and CDT reaction time correlations. BFI-E (introversion 
inverted) weakly negatively correlates with location RTs. BFI-N weakly positively correlates 
with location and size RTs. No other correlations with personality variables emerged. 
Dichotomous samples in HSPS. Using one-way ANOVA, we explored group 
differences in CDT performance by HSPS, as well as HSPS (E, N) residuals. Note, no effects 
for accuracy were observed and thus not reported further. 
ANOVA comparison of CDT condition across HSPS groups. Group differences 
expected with location RTs based on correlation data (see Table 4.2) were not found 
(p=.101). However, the ANOVA revealed a significant group difference in size RTs between 
HSPS groups, F(1,95)=4.22, p=.043, where HSPs (M=13623ms, 95% CI [11990, 15256]) 
were slower when detecting size changes than non-HSP groups (M=11677ms, 95% CI 
[10645, 12709]). However, the group difference becomes non-significant when negative 
affect (BFI-E and BFI-N) is partialled out of HSPS scores, F(1,95)=1.01, p=.317. Additional 
effects were found when negative affect was partialled out of HSPS scores. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant group difference in colour RTs between HSPS (E, N) residual groups, 




(M=23301ms, 95% CI [18558, 28044]) were slower when detecting colour changes than 
non-HSP groups (M=18420ms, 95% CI [16402, 20439]). 
Minor versus major group comparison. A mixed ANOVA compared HSPS group 
differences in the detection of minor versus major changes, using within-groups factor of 
difference (major RTs, minor RTs) and between-groups factor of group (HSPs, non-HSPs). 
No between-groups effects were found for HSPS groups (p=.361), and difference RTs did 
not interact with HSPS groups (p=.917). For the HSPS (E, N) residual groups, the ANOVA 
revealed a marginally significant difference × group interaction, F(1,95)=3.44, p=.067, 
ηp
2=.035, where HSP groups (M=23301ms, 95% CI [18558, 28044]) show slower RTs than 
non-HSP groups (M=18420ms, 95% CI [16402, 20439]) for minor, t(95)=2.26, p=.026, but 
not major RTs (p>.05). A significant between-groups effect was found, F(1,95)=6.31, 
p=.014, ηp
2=.062, where HSP groups were slower (M=16668ms, 95% CI [14774, 18562]) 
than non-HPSs (M=13804ms, 95% CI [12567, 15042]) overall. 
Dichotomous samples in ATQ-OS.  The same dichotomy used for the HSPS was 
applied to the ATQ-OS. The high sensitive (HSP) ATQ-OS groups consisted of n=29 
participants and the low-sensitive (non-HSP) ATQ-OS groups consisted of n=68 participants. 
The HSP group (M=5.37, 95% CI [5.26, 5.49]) have significantly higher ratings on the ATQ-
OS, t(95)=10.82, p<.001, than non-HSP groups (M=4.18, 95% CI [4.05, 4.31]). Using a one-
way ANOVA, we explored group differences in CDT performance by ATQ-OS, as well as 
ATQ-OS (E, N) residuals. However, no group differences were found by condition (colour, 
size, presence, location) for ATQ-OS or ATQ-OS (E, N) groups. A mixed ANOVA 
compared HSP groups differences in performance detecting minor versus major changes, 
using within-groups factor of difference (major RTs, minor RTs) and between-groups factor 
of ATQ-OS group (HSPs, non-HSPs). However, no between-groups effects (ps>.407) or 





Hierarchical multiple regression: Sensitivity, personality and change detection as 
predictors of creative ideation. 
HSPS. The hierarchical multiple regression models 1-4 were repeated using HSPS in 
place of ATQ-OS. Model 1 accounting for 5.2% variance shows that minor versus major RTs 
account for unique variance in RIBS scores. Model 2 accounts for 4.8 % variance and does 
not provide a better fit for the data (p=.424). In Model 2, HSPS does not account for unique 
variance and minor versus major RT performance remains significant. Model 3 accounts for 
5.8% but does not give a significantly better fit for the data (p=.234), and neither BFI-N, BFI-
E or HSPS account for unique variance, nor do they reduce the capacity of minor versus 
major RTs to account for unique variance. Model 4 accounts for 26.7% and gives a 
significantly better fit for the data. In Model 4, only BFI-O accounts for unique variance in 
RIBS scores. The interpretation of the main results does not change depending on whether 
HSPS is treated as dichotomous, see Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. The final regression equation 
for Model 4: Ŷ(RIBS)=.593 + .121(minor vs. major RT) + .043(HSPS) + .127(BFI-N) + 
.158(BFI-E) + .487(BFI-O). 
Summary of Individual Differences in CDT Performance 
The HSPS does not exhibit this pattern of correlations as the ATQ-OS. The HSPS and 
NA-related factors of the HSPS, ATQ (NA and ES inverted introversion), and personality 
(i.e., BFI-N and BFI-E inverted) all positively correlate with location and size RTs suggesting 
an NA factor relates to performance in those CDT conditions, which show no association 
with creativity. 
When HSPS is treated as dichotomous variable, group differences reflect the 
correlations found with size RT (see Table 4.2) with HSPs performing more slowly than non-




differences in size RT disappear, further suggesting this correlation and group difference 
relates to NA. Additional findings emerged when controlling NA in HSPS scores, showing 
HSPs to have slower colour RTs than non-HSPs. This finding may reflect orienting sensitivity 
(OS) factors within the HSPS (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008; Smolewska et al., 2006). 
However, when ATQ-OS is treated as dichotomous or when NA is controlled, no group 
differences emerge, probably because dichotomous splits reduce power to detect effects 























Mean, standard deviation (SD) and lower (LCI) and upper (UCI) 95% confidence intervals 
for creativity, temperament, personality variables (N=97) 
  Mean SD LCI UCI 
Creativity     
CAQ 8.32 6.62 7.08 9.66 
RIBS 2.85 .53 2.75 2.96 
ATTA 68.09 8.62 66.2 69.79 
Temperament    
HSPS 4.21 .76 4.06 4.36 
HSPS-OS 4.43 .81 4.28 4.59 
HSPS-NA 4.15 .97 3.96 4.34 
HSPS-AES 4.37 .84 4.21 4.53 
HSPS-EOE 4.67 .9 4.5 4.85 
HSPS-LST 3.27 1.16 3.05 3.51 
ATQ-OS 4.53 .74 4.39 4.68 
ATQ-EC 3.98 .75 3.83 4.14 
ATQ-NA 4.2 .69 4.07 4.34 
ATQ-ES 4.67 .83 4.51 4.83 
Personality     
BFI-O 3.16 .57 3.05 3.28 
BFI-C 3.46 .68 3.33 3.6 
BFI-E 3.22 .78 3.07 3.38 
BFI-A 3.81 .66 3.68 3.94 
BFI-N 3.36 .8 3.21 3.52 
Note: CAQ=Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA=Abbreviated Torrance Test for 
Adults; HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); HSP-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the HSPS; HSP-NA=negative affect 
factor of the HSPS; HSP-AES=aesthetic sensitivity factor of the HSPS; HSP-EOE=ease of excitation factor of the HSPS; HSP-
LST=low sensory threshold factor of the HSPS; ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; ATQ-EC=effortful contol factor 
of the ATQ; ATQ-NA=negative affect factor of the ATQ; ATQ-ES=extraversion/surgncy factor of the ATQ; BFI-O=openness to 
experience factor of the Big Five Inventory (BFI); BFI-C=conscientiousness factor of the BFI; BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; 












Spearman’s correlations for creativity, temperament and personality measures and the reaction time and error rates for the CDT task 
  Reaction Times         Error Rates         
  Overall Location Presence Color Size Mi-Ma Overall Location Presence Color Size Mi-Ma 
Creativity                         
CAQ .057 -.005 -.106 .135 .019 .154 -.024 .009 -.017 -.003 .018 .028 
RIBS .114 .036 -.109 .204* .091 .211* -.007 -.06 .04 .031 -.018 .044 
ATTA .105 .015 .156 .061 .074 .042 -.076 -.196 -.088 -.041 -.089 -.005 
Temperament                         
HSPS .185 .241* .132 .021 .221* -.043 -.084 -.058 -.159 -.159 .069 -.149 
HSPS (E, N) .122 .049 .089 .094 .088 .053 -.117 -.04 -.157 -.117 -.001 -.087 
HSP OS .055 .06 -.091 .051 .109 .055 -.14 -.165 -.086 -.136 -.039 -.099 
HSP NA .168 .285** .145 -.004 .199 -.074 -.056 -.019 -.161 -.136 .081 -.134 
HSP EOE .233* .266** .149 .044 .273** -.022 -.065 -.05 -.151 -.154 .061 -.161 
HSP AES .075 .018 -.025 .08 .121 .072 -.106 -.144 -.062 -.102 -.002 -.059 
HSP LST .021 .198 .005 -.04 .001 -.067 -.081 -.013 -.158 -.119 .044 -.104 
ATQ OS .111 .009 -.125 .202* .003 .215* -.086 -.088 -.116 -.049 -.101 -.012 
ATQ OS (E, N) .087 -.025 -.128 .194 -.03 .211* -.076 -.071 -.105 -.026 -.114 .011 
ATQ EC -.19 -.126 -.181 -.119 -.074 -.071 .149 .157 .041 .176 .104 .168 
ATQ NA -.02 .281** .027 -.143 .001 -.155 .034 .081 -.042 -.008 .08 -.029 
ATQ ES -.01 -.266** .023 .088 -.018 .107 -.008 -.048 .073 .033 -.052 .046 
Personality                         
BFI O -.012 -.098 -.193 .1 -.045 .158 -.132 -.008 -.002 -.144 -.032 -.146 
BFI C -.126 -.109 -.171 -.03 -.053 .005 .121 .136 -.068 .178 .06 .191 
BFI E -.015 -.221* .043 .124 -.115 .148 .024 -.027 .077 .113 -.021 .132 
BFI A -.087 -.104 -.165 -.064 .005 -.025 -.059 .031 -.04 -.037 -.107 -.053 
BFI N .135 .241* .044 -.012 .239* -.034 -.056 -.065 -.095 -.142 .083 -.143 
Note. * p< 0.05 level, ** p<.01 (2-tailed). Note: CAQ=Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA=Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults; 
HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); HSPS (E, N)=HSPS with BFI extraversion and neuroticism partialled out; HSP OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the HSPS; HSP NA=negative 
affect factor of the HSPS; HSP AES=aesthetic sensitivity factor of the HSPS; HSP EOE=ease of excitation factor of the HSPS; HSP LST=low sensory threshold factor of the HSPS; ATQ-
OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; ATQ OS (E, N)=ATQ OS with BFI extraversion and neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-EC=effortful contol factor of the ATQ; ATQ-NA=negative 
affect factor of the ATQ; ATQ-ES=extraversion/surgncy factor of the ATQ; BFI O=openness to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory (BFI); BFI C=conscientiousness factor of the BFI; 
BFI E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI A=agreeableness factor of the BFI; BFI N=neuroticism factor of the Big Five




Hierarchical multiple regression – Continuous sensitivity,personality and change detection as 
predictors of creative ideation 
  RIBS             
  ATQ-OS   HSPS 
    Beta SE t   Beta SE t 
Model 1         
Mi-Ma RT  .248 0 2.5*  .248 0 2.5* 
Model 2         
Mi-Ma RT  .159 0 1.68  .248 0 2.49* 
Sensitivity  .386 .068 4.08***  .08 .069 .8 
Model 3         
Mi-Ma RT  .121 0 1.249  .209 0 2.04* 
Sensitivity  .407 .069 4.246***  .218 .099 1.52 
BFI-N  .045 .081 .369  -.026 .1 -.17 
BFI-E  .181 .083 1.476  .205 .093 1.49 
Model 4         
Mi-Ma RT  .077 0 .862  .121 0 1.32 
Sensitivity  .258 .068 2.739**  .043 .09 .33 
BFI-N  .111 .074 .989  .127 .091 .93 
BFI-E  .168 .076 1.491  .158 .082 1.3 
BFI-O   .402 .087 4.321***   .487 .087 5.23*** 
Model fit  F df R²  F df R² 
Model 1  6.23* 1,95 .052  6.23* 1,95 .052 
Model 2  16.66*** 1,94 .186  .65 1,94 .048 
Model 3  1.37 2,92 .192  1.47 2,92 .058 
Model 4  18.67*** 1,91 .322  27.33*** 1,91 .267 
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01,*** p<.001; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; Mi-Ma RT=Major – Minor 
RT; ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); BFI-
N=neuroticism factor of the Big Five Inventory; BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-O=openness to 
















Hierarchical Multiple Regression – Dichotomous sensitivity, personality and change detection as 
predictors of creative ideation 
  RIBS             
  ATQ-OS   HSPS 
    Beta SE t   Beta SE t 
Model 1         
Mi-Ma RT  .248 0 2.5*  .248 0 2.5* 
Model 2         
Mi-Ma RT  .207 0 2.26*  .248 0 2.48* 
Sensitivity  .402 .105 4.4***  .053 .115 .53 
Model 3         
Mi-Ma RT  .174 0 1.85*  .215 0 2.09* 
Sensitivity  .413 .106 4.49***  .104 .134 .9 
BFI-N  .068 .079 .57  .059 .09 .43 
BFI-E  .176 .082 1.45  .177 .093 1.29 
Model 4         
Mi-Ma RT  .114 0 1.29  .121 0 1.32 
Sensitivity  .258 .107 2.78**  .021 .118 .2 
BFI-N  .124 .074 1.12  .144 .08 1.2 
BFI-E  .164 .076 1.46  .153 .081 1.27 
BFI-O   .388 .088 4.1***   .492 .085 5.4*** 
Model fit  F df R²  F df R² 
Model 1  6.23* 1,95 .052  6.23* 1,95 .052 
Model 2  19.34*** 1,94 .205  .28 1,94 .044 
Model 3  1.16 2,92 .208  .89 2,92 .042 
Model 4  16.78*** 1,91 .324  29.17*** 1,91 .267 
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01,*** p<.001; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; Mi-Ma RT=Major – Minor 
RT; ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); BFI-
N=neuroticism factor of the Big Five Inventory; BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-O=openness to 
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The Attention Network Task: Overall Performance 
Table 4.1 shows the mean reaction times (RT) and error rates (ER) with standard deviations 
for flanker conditions across cue types. To replicate Fan et al. (2002) we carried out a 4 (cue 
condition: no cue, centre cue, double cue, spatial/direction cue) × 3 (flanker type: neutral, 
congruent, incongruent) factor cue × flanker ANOVA using RT and ER data. Note, spatial and 
direction cues are synonymous terms used to describe endogenously cued targets. Sphericity was 
not assumed for any factors or interactions so Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied.  
Table D4.1 
Mean and standard deviations in parenthesis for reaction times (msec) and error rates (%) for cue 
(columns) and flanker (row) types 
 Cue Type   
 None Centre Double Direction Overall 
Reaction times      
Congruent 584 (81) 539 (78) 537 (75) 500 (72) 540 (77) 
Incongruent 656 (87) 643 (90) 629 (88) 567 (85) 624 (88) 
Neutral 571 (75) 535 (78) 530 (72) 493 (71) 532 (74) 
Overall 604 (81) 572 (82) 565 (78) 520 (76) 565 (79) 
Error rates       
Congruent 0.45 (.14) 0.92 (.24) 0.58 (.17) 0.59 (.25) .63 (.2) 
Incongruent 3.16 (.47) 5.94 (.88) 5.15 (.84) 2.13 (.40) 4.1 (.65) 
Neutral 1.03 (.20) 1.03 (.22) 0.58 (.14) 0.37 (.14) .75 (.18) 
Overall 1.55 (.27) 2.63 (.45) 2.10 (.38) 1.03 (.26) 1.83 (.34) 
           
The ANOVA revealed significant main effects of cue and flanker conditions, as well as 









Repeated measures ANOVA looking at main effects and interactions for cue and flanker 
conditions for reaction times and error rates  
    F df ηp.
2 
Reaction times    
Cue  392.43*** 3,258 .803 
Flanker  693.19*** 2,151 .878 
Cue × Flanker 21.51*** 5,454 .183 
Error rates    
Cue  15.86*** 3,242 .142 
Flanker  48.46*** 1,104 .335 
Cue × Flanker 9.14*** 3,321 .087 
Note. *** p<.001. F=ANOVA F-ratio; df=degrees of freedom; ηp.2=partial eta squared 
 
For visualization of main effects for cue and flanker, see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 for 
RTs and ERs, respectively. For visualization of the interaction, see Figure 4.3 (main text) for both 
RTs and ERs. Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction examined main effects for RT and 
ER between conditions for each factor. Simple contrasts were used to explore the nature of the 
interactions, where “no cue" and neutral flanker conditions were selected as baseline categories 
for cue and flanker factors, respectively. 
Main effects for reaction times. Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed 
that all mean RTs across cue conditions were significantly different from each other (ps<.01) 
and from baseline no cue conditions (ps<.001). The largest differences in mean RTs is found 
between the spatial orienting (M=520ms, 95% CI [505, 535]) and no cue condition (M=604ms, 
95% CI [588,619]) and the smallest mean difference is found between centre (M=572ms, 95% CI 
[556, 588]) and double (M=565ms, 95% CI [550, 581]) alerting cues, see Figure 4.1. 
All mean RTs across flanker conditions were significantly different from each other 
(ps<.001) and from baseline neutral flanker conditions (ps<.001). The largest differences in RTs 
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is found between incongruent (M=624ms, 95% CI [607, 641]) and neutral (M=532ms, 95% CI 
[517, 546]) flankers and the smallest difference is found between congruent (M=540ms, 95% CI 
[525, 555]) and neutral (M=532ms, 95% CI [517, 546]) flankers, see Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure D4.1. Mean RTs with 95% confidence intervals for a) cue conditions and b) flanker 
conditions. 
Main effects for error rates. Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that 
mean ER across cue conditions were significantly different between centre cues and spatial cues 
(p<.001), and double cues and spatial cues (p<.001). All conditions were significantly different 
from baseline no cue conditions (ps<.05). The largest difference in ER was observed between 
centre (M=2.63%, 95% CI [1.95, 3.31]) and direction cues (M=1.03%, 95% CI [.65, 1.41]) and 
the smallest difference is observed between centre (M=2.63%, 95% CI [1.95, 3.31]) and double 
alerting cues (M=2.1%, 95% CI [1.47, 2.74]), see Figure 4.2. 
Mean ER across flanker conditions were significantly different between incongruent and 
congruent flankers, and incongruent and neutral flankers (ps<.001), but not between congruent 
and neutral flankers (p=.931). The largest differences in ER was found between incongruent 
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(M=4.1%, 95% CI [3.03, 5.17]) and congruent flankers (M=.63%, 95% CI [.38, .89]), and the 
smallest difference was found between congruent and neutral flankers (M=.75, 95% CI [.51, 
1.0]), see Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure D4.2. Mean error rate (%) with 95% confidence intervals for a) cue conditions and b) 
flanker conditions. 
Cue × flanker interactions for reaction times. The cue × flanker interaction was 
significant (see Table 4.2). Simple contrasts revealed that effects of centre cue (vs. no cue) on 
targets with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers are significant, F(1,96)=21.67, p<.001, ηp.
2=.184. 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5 (main text) show the RT differences between targets with neutral and 
incongruent flankers are larger for centre (108msec) versus no cue (85msec) conditions. This 
effect shows that alerting centre cues modulate the incongruency effect. Specifically, when 
alerting centre cues precede a target with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers, RTs increase 
compared with no cue conditions, replicating Fan et al. (2002). The effects of centre cue (vs. no 
cue) on targets surrounded by congruent (vs. neutral) flankers was significant, F(1,96)=9.04, 
p=.003, ηp.
2=.086. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5 (main text) show the RT differences between targets 
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with neutral and congruent flankers are larger for no cue (13ms) versus centre (4ms) conditions. 
Thus, alerting centre cues are associated with faster RTs for targets with congruent (vs. neutral) 
flankers, compared with no cue conditions. This effect was not reported by Fan et al. (2002). 
The effects of double cue (vs. no cue) on targets with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers 
was significant, F(1,96)=14.49, p<.001, ηp.
2=.131. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5 (main text) show the 
RT differences between targets with neutral and incongruent flankers are larger for double (99ms) 
versus no cue (85ms) conditions. This effect shows that alerting double cues modulate the 
incongruency effect. Specifically, when alerting double cues precede a target with incongruent 
(vs. neutral) flankers, RTs increase compared with no cue conditions, replicating Fan et al. 
(2002). The effects of double cue (vs. no cue) on congruent (vs. neutral) flankers was not 
significant, F(1,96)=3.13, p=.08. 
 The effects of direction cue (vs. no cue) on targets with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers 
was significant, F(1,96)=4.79, p=.031, ηp.
2=.047. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5 (main text) show the 
RT differences between targets with neutral and incongruent flankers are larger for no cue (85ms) 
versus direction cue conditions (74ms). This effect shows that direction cues modulate the 
incongruency effect. Specifically, when direction cues precede a target with incongruent (vs. 
neutral) flankers, RTs decrease compared with no cue conditions. This effect was not reported by 
Fan et al. (2002). The effects of direction cue (vs. no cue) on congruent (vs. neutral) flankers was 
not significant, F(1,96)=3.28, p=.073. 
For completeness, we also used contrasts to explore differences between alerting and 
spatial orienting conditions. The effects of direction cues compared to centre cues, 
F(1,96)=64.42, p <.001, ηp.
2=.401, and double cues, F(1,96)=40.31, p <.001, ηp.
2=.296, on 
targets RTs with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers were significant. When alerting cues precede a 
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target with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers, RTs increase compared with direction cue 
conditions. The RT effects of direction cue (vs. centre or double cue) on congruent (vs. neutral) 
flankers were not significant (ps>.469). 
Cue × flanker interactions for error rates. The cue × flanker interaction was significant 
(see Table 4.2). Simple contrasts revealed that the effects of centre cue (vs. no cue) on targets 
with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers was significant, F(1,96)=11.87, p<.001, ηp.
2=.110. Table 
4.1 and Figure 4.5 (main text) show ER differences between targets with neutral and incongruent 
flankers are larger for centre (4.91%) versus no cue (2.13%) conditions. This effect shows that 
alerting centre cues modulate the incongruency effect. Specifically, when alerting centre cues 
precede a target with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers, ERs increase compared with no cue 
conditions. The effects of centre cue (vs. no cue) on targets surrounded by congruent (vs. neutral) 
flankers was not significant (p=.247).  
The effects of double cue (vs. no cue) on targets with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers 
was significant, F(1,96)=11.58, p<.001, ηp.
2=.108. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5 (main text) show the 
error rate differences between targets with neutral and incongruent flankers are larger for double 
(4.57%) versus no cue (2.13%) conditions. This effect shows that alerting double cues modulate 
the incongruency effect. Specifically, when alerting double cues precede a target with 
incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers, ERs increase compared with no cue conditions. The effects of 
double cue (vs. no cue) on congruent (vs. neutral) flankers was significant, F(1,96)=4.04, p=.047, 
ηp.
2=.04. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5 (main text) show the error rate differences between targets with 
neutral and congruent flankers are larger for no cue (.58%) vs double (0%) conditions. This small 
effect is found because alerting double cues show no change in ER between targets with 
congruent and neutral flankers, whereas no cue conditions show higher errors in neutral (vs. 
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congruent) flanker conditions. 
The effects of direction cue (vs. no cue) on targets with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers 
was not significant (p=.457). The effects of direction cue (vs. no cue) on congruent (vs. neutral) 
flankers was significant, F(1,96)=6.41, p=.013, ηp.
2=.063. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5 (main text)  
show the error rate differences between targets with neutral and congruent flankers are larger for 
no cue (.58%) versus direction (-.22%) conditions. This effect is found because ER for no cue and 
direction cue conditions are not different for congruent flankers, whereas no cue conditions show 
higher errors in neutral flanker conditions compared with direction cues. 
For completeness, we also used contrasts to explore differences between alerting and 
spatial orienting conditions. The effects of direction versus centre cue, F(1,96)=15.82, p <.001, 
ηp.
2=.142, and double cues, F(1,96)=17.99, p <.001, ηp.
2=.158, on targets errors with incongruent 
(vs. neutral) flankers were significant. When alerting cues precede a target with incongruent (vs. 
neutral) flankers, ERs increase compared with direction cue conditions. The effects of direction 
cue (vs. centre or double cue) on congruent (vs. neutral) flankers were not significant (ps>.303). 
Summary of ANOVA for reaction times and error rates. Overall, we see main effects 
of both cue and flanker for both RT and error rate data. Targets preceded by cues with spatial 
information have the fastest RTs and lowest ER, whereas targets preceded by warning cues with 
no spatial information (and no cue conditions in RT data only) have the slowest RTs and highest 
ER. Also, targets with incongruent flankers have the slowest RTs and highest ER overall. These 
findings replicate the main effects of cue and flanker for RTs and the main effects of flanker for 
ER found in Fan et al. (2002). However, we additionally report main effects for cues, as well as a 
cue × flanker interaction with ER data. Also, we additionally report that targets with congruent 
flankers are processed more quickly than targets with neutral flankers, although we do not 
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replicate the finding that congruent conditions have lower ER than neutral conditions. For errors, 
the main effect of flanker is common across ANT studies, including Fan et al. (2002), however 
only 60% of datasets may show main effects of cue (MacLeod et al., 2010). 
The interaction effects between cue and flanker type show both centre and double alerting 
cues modulate the incongruency effect for RTs and ERs. Specifically, when alerting cues precede 
targets with incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers, RTs and ERs increase compared with no cue and 
direction cue conditions. The RT findings provide a replication, however the error rate interaction 
was not previously reported by Fan et al. (2002). Indeed, only 60% of ANT studies may show the 
cue × flanker interaction with error data (MacLeod et al., 2010). Further, the incongruency effect 
is significantly weaker for double versus centre cues, t(96)=2.13, p=.036, for RTs, however this 
effect is not significant for ERs (p=.691), suggesting warning cue differences only affect speed 
and not accuracy of target decisions. However, centre and double cues differ in how they interact 
with congruent (vs. neutral) flankers in ER, although the effect is small. Double cues, but not 
centre cues, have lower ER in neutral conditions compared with no cue conditions, and this 
difference disappears in the congruent condition. The differences found between alerting cue 
types suggest that they should be analyzed separately, rather than collapsed into one alerting 
factor, as reported previously by Fan et al. (2002). We also found that direction cues modulate the 
RT incongruency effect. Specifically, when direction cues precede a target with incongruent (vs. 
neutral) flankers, RTs decrease compared with no cue conditions. This effect was not found with 
ER. However, direction cues give lower ER than no cue conditions for neutral (vs. congruent) 
flankers. This suggests that spatial versus no cue facilitates the efficiency but not the accuracy of 
conflict resolution. 




Figure D4.3. Visualization of the cue × flanker interaction for mean a) reaction times and b) error 
rates. Error bars show with 95% confidence intervals.  
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Alerting, Orienting and Conflict Overall Correlations 
Table 4.3 shows the mean, standard deviation (SD) and correlation coefficients for the 
alerting, orienting and conflict variables.  
Table D4.3 
Mean, standard deviation (SD) and Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients for alerting, orienting, 
conflict (executive function) variables for RT (msec) and error rates (%) 
 Mean SD Alerting Orienting Conflict 
Reaction times     
Alerting 38 26 - 
  
Orienting 52 25 .072 - 
 
Conflict 84 30 .082 .113 - 
Overall 565 75 .062 .219* .291* 
Error rates   
  
Alerting -.55 2.31 - 
  
Orienting 1.6 2.62 -.01 - 
 
Conflict 3.46 4.81 -.238* .411*** - 
Overall 1.83 2.3 -.167 .553*** .819*** 
Note. *p<.05,** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
Fan et al. (2002) report that alerting RTs have a mean effect of 47msec and SD of 18msec, 
orienting RTs have a mean effect of 51msec and SD of 21msec, and conflict RTs have a mean 
effect of 84msec and SD of 25msec, and reported no correlations between alerting, orienting and 
conflict variables, although conflict correlated with overall mean RTs (r=.46). The means and SD 
in Table 4.3 are very close to those reported by Fan et al. (2002) and no correlations between 
alerting, orienting or conflict variables were significant (ps>.05), although orienting and conflict 
variables weakly positively correlate with overall mean RTs. This replicates Fan et al. (2002), and 
whilst the orienting correlation with overall RT is significant in this study, it is approximately the 
same strength correlation as that reported by Fan et al. (2002).  
Alerting, orienting and conflict variables for ER are usually omitted from studies the ANT 
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literature, although both RTs and ER should be considered in speeded choice tasks, such as the 
ANT (MacLeod et al., 2010). Conflict errors are significantly weakly negatively correlated with 
alerting errors, and moderately positively correlated with orienting variables, similar correlations 
to those reported by MacLeod et al. (2010). The negative correlation between alerting and conflict 
errors results from the negative effects of alerting (no cue vs. double cue), which increase the 
number of negative signed differences, corresponding to greater differences between congruity 
conditions, i.e., an enhanced incongruity effect for alerting conditions, as demonstrated in the 
ANOVA results and Figure 4.5. The positive correlation between orienting and conflict errors does 
suggests an effect of spatial cue, but is that of the centre alerting cue, whereby the distance between 
centre and spatial cues increase due to poorer performance in the centre versus spatial condition, 
which correlates positively with greater incongruity effects.  
Conflict and orienting also show strong and moderate positive correlations, respectively, 
with overall ER. Note, overall errors significantly weakly negatively correlated with overall RTs 
(r=.301, p<.01) where higher errors are associated with faster reaction times, suggesting a speed-
accuracy trade-off overall, but not specific to any one condition, although negative correlations 
between alerting and conflict RTs and ER have been reported elsewhere (e.g., MacLeod et al., 
2010). 
Individual Differences in ANT Performance by Condition 
Mixed ANOVA for ANT performance using dichotomous HSPS. The Mixed ANOVA 
with RT data revealed no significant between-groups effects (ps>.139), 3-way (ps>.283), or 2-
way (ps>.250) interactions for HSPS or HSPS (E, N) residual groups (see Table 4.4). 
  
 




Mixed ANOVA output showing between-group effects for HSPS (and HSPS (E, N) residuals) and 
group interactions with cue and flanker conditions for reaction times (RT) and error rates  
 
 RT  Error rates 
F df ηp.2 F df ηp.2 
HSPS       
Group .07 1,95 .001 0 1,95 0 
Group × Cue 1.38 3,256 .014 3.04* 3,341 .031 
Group × Flanker .52 2,149 .005 .179 1,103 .002 
Group × Cue × Flanker .84 5,447 .009 3.23* 3,323 .034 
HSPS (E, N) residuals       
Group 2.22 1,95 .023 .04 1,95 0 
Group × Cue .05 3,255 .001 .81 3,239 .008 
Group × Flanker .02 2,150 0 .13 1,103 0 
Group × Cue × Flanker 1.26 5,446 .013 .47 3,319 .005 
 
Note. * p<.05. F=ANOVA F-ratio; df=degrees of freedom; ηp.2=partial eta squared 
 
 The mixed ANOVA with error rate data revealed a significant cue × flanker × HSPS 
group interaction (see Table 4.4). Simple contrasts suggested that the 3-way interaction is the 
result of an effect of accuracy for incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers for centre cues (vs. no cue) 
where HSPs (M=4.86%, 95% CI [2.0, 8.0]) have higher ER than non-HSP (M=1.88%, 95% CI 
[2.2, 3.62]) groups, though the effect of group was not significant, F(1,95)=2.93, p=.09, ηp.
2=.03. 
However, the interactions disappear with HSPS (E, N) residuals groups (see Table 4.4). 
Mixed ANOVA for ANT performance using dichotomous CAQ. The mixed ANOVA 
using RT data did not reveal any significant between-groups effects (p=.214) or significant 3-
way (p>.943) or 2-way interactions (ps>.105). A separate mixed ANOVA using ER data did not 
reveal any significant between-groups effects (p=.421) or significant 3-way (p>.87) or 2-way 
interactions (ps>.85). 
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Mixed ANOVA for ANT performance using dichotomous RIBS. The mixed ANOVA 
using RT data did not reveal any significant between-groups effects (p=.617) or significant 3-
way (p>.287) or 2-way interactions (ps>.229). A separate mixed ANOVA using ER data 
revealed a between-groups effect approaching significance, F(1,95)=3.53, p=.063, ηp.
2=.036, 
where high RIBS groups (M=2.25%, 95% CI[1.61, 2.9]) have higher ER than low RIBS groups 
(M=1.39%, 95% CI[.74, 2.04]). No significant 3-way effects were found (p>.309), and the group 
× cue interaction was not significant (p=.409). However a group × flanker effect approached 
significance, F(1,95)=3.66, p=.055, ηp.
2=.037. Simple contrasts show high RIBS groups have 
significantly greater ER for incongruent (vs. neutral) flankers compared with low RIBS groups, 
F(1,95)=4.54, p=.036, ηp.
2=.046, but not in ERs for congruent (vs. neutral) flankers (p=.141).  
Mixed ANOVA for ANT performance using dichotomous ATTA. The mixed 
ANOVA using RT data did not reveal any significant between-groups effects (p=.315) or 
significant 3-way (p>.36) or 2-way interactions (ps>.23). A separate mixed ANOVA using ER 
data did not reveal any significant between-groups effects (p=.635) or significant 3-way 
(ps>.773) or 2-way interactions (ps>.345). 
Individual Differences in ANT Alerting, Orienting and Conflict Efficiency 
Creativity, temperament and personality correlations with ANT. Correlations 
between creativity, temperament, personality and ANT performance across alerting, orienting, 
and conflict variables were analyzed, including HSPS (E, N) and ATQ-OS (E, N) residuals. See 








Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficients between creativity, temperament, and personality 
measures and the alerting, orienting, conflict (executive function) variables for RT (msec) and 
error rates (%)  
  Reaction Times     Error Rates     
  Alerting Orienting Conflict Overall Alerting Orienting Conflict Overall 
Creativity                 
CAQ -.142 .103 .139 .061 .018 -.033 .049 .05 
RIBS -.053 .009 -.041 -.082 .018 .087 .061 .112 
ATTA -.066 .028 .15 -.145 -.057 .022 .059 .123 
Temperament                 
HSPS -.077 .054 -.108 .071 .121 -.017 -.113 -.210* 
HSPS (E, N) -.118 -.056 -.114 -.023 .125 -.037 -.039 -.113 
HSPS_OS -.157 .021 -.034 -.106 -.049 -.033 .002 -.035 
HSPS_NA -.001 .086 -.11 .131 .152 -.043 -.132 -.221* 
HSPS_EOE .032 .085 -.128 .13 .185 -.064 -.137 -.205* 
HSPS_AES -.219* -.004 -.106 -.181 .004 .025 .039 -.021 
HSPS_LST -.072 .104 .029 .152 .084 -.088 -.211* -.269** 
ATQ_OS -.174 .041 .045 -.135 -.222* .075 .104 .133 
ATQ-OS (E, N) -.184 .035 .056 -.149 -.236* .069 .109 .15 
ATQ_EC .002 -.08 .116 -.001 .016 -.009 -.003 .056 
ATQ_NA .049 .077 -.051 .141 .05 -.106 -.14 -.230* 
ATQ_ES -.079 -.003 .032 -.195 -.037 .072 .112 .261** 
Personality                 
B5_O -.129 .001 .118 -.145 -.019 -.04 -.061 -.036 
B5_C .055 -.042 .086 -.008 .136 .001 .073 .1 
B5_E .023 -.042 .072 -.046 -.067 .03 .114 .182 
B5_A .043 .074 -.112 -.048 .017 -.071 -.128 -.095 
B5_N .068 .196 -.057 .094 .018 .015 -.119 -.198 
Note. * p< 0.05 level, ** p<.01 (2-tailed). Note: CAQ=Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour 
Scale; ATTA=Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults; HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); HSPS (E, N)=full HSPS with 
BFI extraversion and neuroticism partialled out; HSP OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the HSPS; HSP NA=negative affect factor 
of the HSPS; HSP AES=aesthetic sensitivity factor of the HSPS; HSP EOE=ease of excitation factor of the HSPS; HSP LST=low 
sensory threshold factor of the HSPS; ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; ATQ OS (E, N)=ATQ OS with BFI 
extraversion and neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-EC=effortful contol factor of the ATQ; ATQ-NA=negative affect factor of the 
ATQ; ATQ-ES=extraversion/surgncy factor of the ATQ ; BFI O=openness to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory (BFI); 
BFI C=conscientiousness factor of the BFI; BFI E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI A=agreeableness factor of the BFI; BFI 
N=neuroticism factor of the Big Five Inventory. 
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The Spearman’s correlation analysis revealed no significant correlations between 
personality or creativity measures for alerting, orienting, conflict or overall variables for either 
RT or ER. HSPS and negative affect related factors, including ATQ-NA and ATQ-ES 
(introversion inverted), show a significant weak negative correlation with overall ER. This 
correlation between HSPS and overall errors becomes non-significant with the HSPS (E, N) 
residual variable, suggesting this effect relates more strongly to negative affect. HSP LST 
significantly weakly negatively correlates with conflict errors, suggesting congruity effects are 
smaller with lower sensory thresholds. HSP AES is significantly weakly negatively correlated 
with alerting RTs, and ATQ-OS shows a similar non-significant trend (p=.088). ATQ-OS is 
significantly weakly negatively correlated with alerting errors. Together with the RT effects, this 
suggests that higher ATQ-OS is associated with slower RTs and greater ER for double versus no 
cue alerting conditions. Interestingly, ATQ effortful control variable did not correlate with 
conflict reaction times or error rates. 
Individual differences in alerting and orienting by congruity. 
Creativity. No significant between-groups or interaction effects were found for RTs or 












Mixed ANOVA output showing between-group effects for creativity (CAQ, RIBS and ATTA) and 
group interactions with cue (centre – none, double – none, centre-direction) and flanker 
(congruent, incongruent) factors for reaction times (RTs) and error rates 
  RTs Error rates 
  F df ηp.2 F df ηp.2 
CAQ       
Group .51 1,95 .005 0 1,95 0 
Group × Cue .03 1,136 0 .17 1,133 .002 
Group × Flanker 0 1,95 0 0 1,95 0 
Group × Cue × Flanker .04 2,147 0 .12 1,132 .001 
RIBS       
Group .09 1,95 .001 2.78 1,95 .028 
Group × Cue .04 1,136 0 1.54 1,134 .016 
Group × Flanker .64 1,95 .007 .82 1,95 .009 
Group × Cue × Flanker .81 2,146 .008 .15 1,132 .002 
ATTA       
Group .11 1,95 .001 .69 1,95 .007 
Group × Cue .07 1,136 .001 .28 1,133 .003 
Group × Flanker .53 1,95 .006 .08 1,95 .001 
Group × Cue × Flanker .24 1,148 .003 .14 1,131 .001 
Note. * p<.05,** p<.01. F=ANOVA F-ratio; df=degrees of freedom; ηp.2=partial eta squared. 
 
HSPS.  No significant between-groups effects (ps>.56) and no significant 3-way (ps>.29) 
or 2-way (ps>.41) interactions were found with RT data for any HSPS or HSPS (E, N) residuals 











Mixed ANOVA output showing between-group effects for HSPS, including HSPS (E, N) residuals, 
and group interactions with cue (centre – none, double – none, centre-direction) and flanker 
(congruent, incongruent) factors for reaction times (RTs) and error rates 
  RTs Error rates 
  F df ηp.2 F df ηp.2 
HSPS       
Group .22 1,95 .002 1.59 1,95 .017 
Group × Cue 2.82 1,137 .029 6.97** 1,136 .068 
Group × Flanker .78 1,95 .008 1.25 1,95 .013 
Group × Cue × Flanker .32 2,147 .003 6.75** 1,128 .066 
HSPS (E, N) residuals       
Group .32 1,95 .003 .47 1,95 .005 
Group × Cue .03 1,136 0 .74 1,133 .008 
Group × Flanker 1.12 1,95 .012 .21 1,95 .002 
Group × Cue × Flanker .97 2,148 .01 .58 1,132 .006 
Note. * p<.05. F=ANOVA F-ratio; df=degrees of freedom; ηp.2=partial eta squared. 
 The mixed ANOVA with ER data revealed a significant HSPS group × cue × flanker 
interaction and HSPS group × cue interaction, see Table 4.7. Figure 4.4 shows the 3-way 
interaction is the result of group differences in congruity effects across cues types. Non-HSP 
groups have higher ER for incongruent versus congruent targets following centre cues, 
t(67)=1.91, p=.061, double cues, t(67)=2.52, p=.014, and spatial cues, t(67)=2.8, p<.01. HSP 
groups have significantly higher ER for incongruent versus congruent targets following centre 
cues, t(28)=2.41, p=.023, and spatial cues, t(28)=3.07, p< .01, but not following double cues 
(p=.546). However, the interaction is the result of greater spatial congruity effects for HSP groups 
versus non-HSP group, t(95)=2.47, p=.017, which shows that HSPs have more errors for 
incongruent versus congruent targets following centre versus orienting cues (see Figure 4.4), 
although Levene’s test for equality of variance was violated (p<.001), thus when equal variances 
between HSP groups are not assumed the effect approaches significance (p=.059). The congruity 
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effect for double or centre cues does not differ between HSP groups (ps >.159). However, the 3-
way and 2-way interactions disappear when controlling for negative affect using HSPS (E, N) 
residual groups as a between-groups factor in the ANOVA. 
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Sensitivity and ANT as Predictors of Creativity 
Hierarchical multiple regression. 
HSPS. For the HSPS, Model 1 accounting for 5.1% variance shows that congruity 
accounts for unique variance in RIBS scores. Model 2 accounts for 4.3% variance and does not 
provide a better fit for the data (p=.668). In Model 2, HSPS does not account for unique variance 
in RIBS scores, and the addition of HSPS in Model 2 does not affect the significance of the 
congruity coefficient to account for unique RIBS variance. Model 3 accounts for 8.7% and the 
model fit is approaches significance (p=.058). In Model 3, BFI-N is not significant, although 
BFI-E accounts for unique variance in RIBS but does not reduce the effects of congruity. Note, in 
the dichotomous sample, the BFI-E coefficient approaches significance (p =.051). Model 4 
accounts for 29.2% and gives a significantly better fit for the data. In Model 4, only congruity and 
BFI-O account for unique variance in RIBS scores, although BFI-E approaches significance in 
continuous (p=.067) and dichotomous samples (p=.081). The final regression equation for Model 
4: Ŷ(RIBS)=.362 + .195(congruity) + .068(HSPS) + .15(BFI-N) + .216(BFI-E) + .479(BFI-O). 













Hierarchical multiple regression: Sensitivity (dichotomous), personality and congruity 
(incongruent – neutral flankers collapsed across alerting cue conditions) as predictors of 
creative ideation 
  RIBS             
  ATQ-OS   HSPS 
    Beta SE t   Beta SE t 
Model 1         
Congruity  .247 .007 2.49* 
 .247 .007 2.49* 
Model 2  
       
Congruity  .135 .007 1.39 
 .245 .007 2.45* 
Sensitivity  .384 .111 3.97*** 
 .043 .115 .43 
Model 3  
       
Congruity  .142 .007 1.48 
 .252 .007 2.54* 
Sensitivity  .39 .111 4.05*** 
 .103 .132 .9 
BFI-N  .112 .08 .94  .118 .089 .88 
BFI-E  .238 .081 2* 
 .261 .089 1.98 
Model 4  
       
Congruity  .138 .007 1.57 
 .191 .006 2.19* 
Sensitivity  .222 .11 2.31* 
 .017 .116 .17 
BFI-N  .16 .073 1.45  .017 .116 .17 
 BFI-E  .207 .074 1.89 
 .203 .078 1.77 
BFI-O   .406 .087 4.37***  .49 .083 5.52*** 
Model fit  F df R²  F df R² 
Model 1  6.18* 1,95 .051  6.18* 1,95 .051 
Model 2  15.76*** 1,94 .179  .19 1,94 .043 
Model 3  2.1 2,92 .198  1.99 2,92 .063 
Model 4  19.1*** 1,91 .329  30.49*** 1,91 .29 
Note. * p<.05,*** p<.001. RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATQ-OS=orienting 
sensitivity factor of the ATQ; HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); BFI-N=neuroticism 
factor of the Big Five Inventory; BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-O=openness to 
























































































First, we evaluated whether this fully within-subjects design replicated results of Funes et 
al. (2007), which manipulated cue type (task) using a between-subjects design. The interactions of 
main interest are those which may demonstrate dissociations of effects between endogenous and 
exogenous cue types. See Table 5.1 for descriptive statistics for each condition, across task type. 
Response Time (RT) Performance 
RT results replicated Funes et al. (2007), except with the endogenous task. ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of SOA, F(1,64)=199.42, p<.001, ηp.
2=.757, where participants responded 
faster to targets following 850ms (M=429ms, 95% CI[421, 438]) versus 100ms SOA (M=448ms, 
95% CI[438, 457]). A main effect of cue validity, F(1,64)=9.78, p<.01, ηp.
2=.133, shows that 
participants responded faster to valid (M=437ms, 95% CI[428, 446]) versus invalid targets 
(M=440ms, 95% CI[431, 449]). A main effect of congruity, F(1,64)=386.36, p<.001, ηp.
2=.858, 
shows that participants responded faster to congruent (M=415ms, 95% CI[406, 424]) versus 
incongruent targets (M=462ms, 95% CI[453, 471]). No main effect of cue type / task was found (p 
= .143). 




Figure E5.1. Mean reaction times (RTs) for valid and invalid conditions as a function of stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA), for the endogenous cue task (left) and the exogenous cue task (right). 
3-way interactions reported by Funes et al. (2007) were also found. The SOA×Validity×Cue 
type/Task interaction was significant, F(1,64)=5.9, p=.018, ηp.
2=.084, indicating SOA and cue 
validity modulated differently by exogenous versus endogenous cues (see Figure 5.1), and the 
Validity×Congruity×Cue type/Task interaction was significant, F(1,64)=32.51, p<.001, ηp.
2=.337, 
indicating cue validity and spatial congruity effects modulated differently by exogenous versus 
endogenous cues. 
However, unlike Funes et al. (2007), the SOA×Validity×Congruity interaction was also 
significant, F(1,64)=5.05, p=.028, ηp.
2=.073, and a 4-way SOA×Validity×Congruity×Cue 
type/Task  interaction approached significance, F(1,64)=3.85, p = .054, ηp.
2=.057. Results show 
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the spatial Stroop effects change depending on the Cue type/Task, SOA and Validity, visualized in 
Figure 5.2. In this 4-way interaction, for short 100ms SOA, the spatial congruency effect for valid 
versus invalid conditions was larger for exogenous (M=25ms, 95% CI[19, 30]) versus endogenous 
(M=0ms, 95% CI[-6, 6]) conditions, t(64)=5.3, p<.001. For long 850ms SOA, the spatial 
congruency effect for valid versus invalid conditions was larger for exogenous (M=12ms, 95% 
CI[6, 18]) versus endogenous (M=-1ms, 95% CI[-6, 5]) conditions, t(64)=3.18, p<.01. The 
difference in spatial congruency effects across tasks for valid versus invalid conditions and 100ms 
versus 850ms SOA approaches significance, t(64)=1.96, p=.054. 
Two separate planned 2-way ANOVAs with factors of SOA and Cueing Validity collapsed 
across Congruity conditions were conducted to examine interactions with cueing task further, as in 
Funes et al. (2007). 
 




Figure E5.2. Spatial Stroop effect (incongruent target RT–congruent target RT, in ms) across task 
type (endogenous cues vs. exogenous cues), SOA (100 vs. 850ms) and cue validity (valid vs. 
invalid cues). 
Exogenous RT for SOA×Validity. The 2-way ANOVAs with factors of SOA and Cue 
Validity for exogenous RTs revealed a significant main effect of SOA, F(1, 64)=71.29,  p<.001, 
ηp.
2=.527, where RTs were significantly faster for long (M=429, 95% CI[419, 438]) versus short 
(M=442ms, 95% CI[433, 452]) SOAs. A significant main effect of Validity was found, F(1, 
64)=10.05,  p<.01, ηp.
2=.136, where RTs were significantly faster for valid (M=433, 95% CI[424, 
443]) versus invalid (M=438, 95% CI[428, 447]) cues. However, a significant SOA×Validity 
interaction was observed, F(1, 64)=15.53,  p<.001, ηp.
2=.195, see Figure 5.1. Simple effects 
analysis revealed that RTs were significantly faster for valid (M=438ms, 95% CI[429, 447]) versus 
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invalid (M=447ms, 95% CI[437, 457]) conditions at short SOAs, t(64)=5.54, p<.001,  but no 
significant validity effect was observed for long SOAs (p=.6).  
Endogenous RT for SOA×Validity. The 2-way ANOVAs with factors of SOA and Cueing 
Validity for endogenous RTs revealed a significant main effect of SOA, F(1, 64)=136.63, p<.001, 
ηp.
2=.681, where RTs were significantly faster for long (M=430ms, 95% CI[420, 436]) versus short 
(M=453ms, 95% CI[442, 464]) SOAs, see Figure 5.1. No main effect of Validity (p=.22) or 
SOA×Validity interaction (p=.69) was found. 
Two separate 3-way planned ANOVAs for each cueing task were conducted to examine 
interactions with Cue type/Task further, as in Funes et al. (2007), and given that the 4-way 
interaction approached significance. 
Exogenous RT for SOA×Validity×Congruity. A repeated-measures ANOVA using 
within-subjects factors of SOA (100ms, 850ms), validity (valid, invalid), and spatial congruity 
(congruent, incongruent) was conducted for the exogenous task, see Table 5.2 for ANOVA 
summary.  
Unlike Funes et al. (2007), results showed main effects. ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
SOA where participants responded faster to targets following 850ms (M=429ms, 95% CI[419, 
438]) versus 100ms SOA (M=442ms, 95% CI[433, 452]); a main effect of validity where 
participants responded faster to valid (M=433ms, 95% CI[424, 443]) versus invalid (M=438ms, 
95% CI[428, 447]) target locations; a main effect of congruity where participants responded faster 
to congruent (M=415ms, 95% CI[405, 425]) versus incongruent (M=456ms, 95% CI[447, 466]) 
targets.  
Unlike Funes et al. (2007), the Validity and Congruity interaction was not significant, but, 
like Funes et al. (2007), the ANOVA revealed a significant Validity×Congruity×SOA   interaction, 
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which replicates their finding that cue validity reduces spatial congruity effects for the exogenous 
task, and the effect of cue validity on spatial congruity is larger at the 100 ms than 850 ms SOA. 
The spatial congruency effects change depending on cue validity and SOA. At 100ms SOA, the 
spatial congruency effect is smaller for valid (M=25ms, 95% CI[20, 30]) versus invalid (M=50ms, 
95% CI[44, 55]) conditions, t(64)=9.24, p<.001. At 850ms SOA, the spatial congruency effect is 
smaller for valid (M=40ms, 95% CI[34, 45]) versus invalid (M=52ms, 95% CI[46, 58]) conditions, 
t(64)=3.76, p<.001. The significant interaction was found because the difference in spatial 
congruency effects between valid and invalid cues is significantly greater for 100ms (M=25ms, 
95% CI[19, 30]) versus 850ms (M=12ms, 95% CI[5, 18]) SOA, t(1,64)=3.18, p <.01. 
Endogenous RT for SOA×Validity×Congruity. Unlike Funes et al. (2007), ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of SOA where participants responded faster to targets following 850ms 
(M=430ms, 95% CI[420, 439]) versus 100ms SOA (M=453ms, 95% CI[442, 464]), and a main 
effect of congruity where participants responded faster to congruent (M=415ms, 95% CI[405, 425]) 
versus incongruent (M=467ms, 95% CI[457, 478]) targets. No 3-way or 2-way interactions were 
found in the endogenous condition (ps>.05), see Table 5.2. Thus unlike Funes et al. (2007), cueing 
validity and congruity interaction was not significant. 
Order effects for endogenous and exogenous task RT performance. The 
Task×SOA×Validity×Congruity ANOVA was repeated using between-subjects counterbalance 
factors of cue color (whether participants learn to associate green or red with left or right locations) 
and task order (whether the endogenous or exogenous task was completed first or second) to 
examine whether those factors explain why validity effects were observed in the exogenous, but 
not endogenous task. Note, cue color is only relevant for the endogenous task. The 
task×validity×task order interaction was significant, F(1,61)=11.63, p=.001, ηp.
2=.16. Two 
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separate 3-way ANOVAs were conducted for both endogenous and exogenous tasks to examine 
the task order interaction further.  
Exogenous order effects. The ANOVA revealed a significant between-groups effect of task 
order, F(1,61)=6.31, p=.015, ηp.
2=.094, where overall response times were faster for groups taking 
the exogenous task first (M=424ms, 95% CI[411,437]) versus those taking the exogenous task 
second (M=447ms, 95% CI[434,460]). The main effect of validity was significant in the presence 
of the counterbalance factors (p=.002), and the task order×cue validity interaction was also 
significant, F(1,61)=6.99, p=.01, ηp.
2=.103. For the group taking the exogenous task second, the 
validity effect was significant, t(32)=3.79, p<.001, where invalid locations (M=450ms, 95% 
CI[437,463]) have slower response times than valid locations (M=443ms, 95% CI[430, 456]). No 
significant validity effect was observed for the group taking the exogenous task first (p>.63). 
Endogenous order effects. The ANOVA revealed a significant between-groups effect of 
task order, F(1,61)=4.91, p=.031, ηp.
2=.074, where overall response times were faster for groups 
taking the endogenous task second (M=431ms, 95% CI[417, 444]) versus those taking the 
endogenous task first (M=452ms, 95% CI[438,466]). The main effect of validity was not significant 
in the presence of the counterbalance factors (p=.21), however the task order×cue validity 
interaction approached significance, F(1,61)=3.76, p=.057, ηp.
2=.058. For the group taking the 
endogenous task first, the validity effect approaches significance, t(31)=1.94, p=.055, where invalid 
locations (M=454ms, 95% CI[440, 468]) are have slower response times than valid locations 
(M=450ms, 95% CI[437, 464]). No validity effect was observed for the group taking the 
endogenous task second (p>.57). No significant between-groups effects (ps>.072) or interactions 
were found with cue color (ps>.22). 
The analysis revealed that the effect of order on validity effects differs by task, where the 
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typical validity patterns (i.e., slower RTs for invalid vs. valid locations) observed by Funes et al. 
(2007) are observed in endogenous tasks, but only when presented first. Exogenous validity effects 
are present regardless of task order, but when order effects are considered, the validity effects are 
only present when exogenous tasks are presented second, contrary to endogenous validity order 
effects. The analysis suggests that order effects may influence whether validity effects are observed 
in endogenous tasks, possibly relating to effects of fatigue on learning cue-target probabilities. 
However, the task order effect is small, does not reach conventional levels of significance for 
endogenous tasks (i.e., p<.05), and has no significant effect with other interactions between SOA, 
validity and congruity for either task (ps>.12).  
 Thus, exogenous task replicates the finding that cue validity affects spatial congruity, and 
this interaction varies further with SOA, but no evidence that cue validity affects spatial congruity 
was found for endogenous task. Order effects may influence whether validity effect are observed 
in the endogenous task, but this does not interact with SOA, congruity, or both. Nonetheless, the 
endogenous task showed numerically the opposite cue validity effect at the 850 ms SOA (Figure 
5.2), and the results do clearly dissociate spatial congruity effects between exogenous and 
endogenous cueing type tasks. As only the exogenous task replicated, group analyses of RTs and 
corresponding conclusions focus on the exogenous task, though endogenous results will be 
reported. 
Error Rate Performance 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of SOA, F(1,64)=8.4, p<.01, ηp.
2=.116, where 
participants responded with fewer errors to targets following 100ms (M=3.43%, 95% CI[2.82, 
4.05]) versus 850ms SOA (M=4.15%, 95% CI[3.31, 4.98]); a main effect of validity, 
F(1,64)=12.16, p<.001, ηp.
2=.16, where participants responded with fewer errors to valid 
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(M=3.47%, 95% CI[2.81, 4.13]) versus invalid targets (M=4.11%, CI[3.34, 4.87]); a main effect of 
congruity, F(1,64)=90.61, p<.001, ηp.
2=.586, where participants responded with fewer errors to 
congruent (M=1.27%, 95% CI[1.0, 1.54]) versus incongruent targets (M=6.31%, 95% CI[5.11, 
7.51]). No main effect of cue type was found (p = .462). 
A four-way Task×SOA×Validity×Congruity interaction did not reach significance (p = 
.267) for error rates. However, a Task×Validity×Congruity interaction was observed, 
F(1,64)=18.06, p<.001, ηp.
2=.22, and is visualized in Figure 5.3, which shows the effect of validity 
differs by congruity across tasks. Two separate ANOVAs were conducted to examine this 
interaction further, see Table 5.2 for ANOVA summary. Note, results are reported collapsed across 
the SOA factor, thus SOA effects and interactions are not reported. 
 Exogenous error rates. For the exogenous condition, ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of validity where participants responded with fewer errors to valid (M=2.86%, 95% CI[2.2, 
3.53]) versus invalid targets (M=4.46%,95% CI[3.58, 5.35]) and a significant main effect of 
congruity where participants responded with fewer errors to congruent (M=1.15%, 95% CI[.84, 
1.47]) versus incongruent targets (M=6.18%, 95% CI[4.88, 7.48]). 
For the exogenous task, ANOVA revealed a significant Validity×Congruity interaction. A 
paired samples t-test revealed that the difference in exogenous error rates between valid (M=4.78%, 
95% CI[3.65, 5.91]) versus invalid conditions (M=7.58%, 95% CI[5.97, 9.19]) for incongruent 
conditions is larger than the difference in error rates between valid (M=.95%, 95% CI[.61, 1.29]) 
versus invalid conditions (M=1.35%, 95% CI[.96, 1.74]) for congruent conditions, t(1,64)=4.41, 
p<.001.  
Endogenous error rates. For the endogenous condition, ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of congruity where participants responded with fewer errors to congruent (M=1.39%, 
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95% CI[1.04, 1.74]) versus incongruent targets (M=6.43%, 95% CI[5.07, 7.8]).  
The Validity×Congruity interaction was not found in the endogenous condition (p=.1) as 
the difference in spatial congruency effects between valid and invalid conditions was not significant 
(M=-.8%, 95% CI[-1.75, .16]), p = .1. The Task×Validity×Congruity interaction was found because 
the spatial congruency effects across validity conditions were significantly larger for the exogenous 
versus endogenous condition, t(64)=4.25, p<.001. 
 
Figure E5.3. Error rates across task (endogenous vs. exogenous), cue validity (valid vs. invalid) 
and target congruity (congruent vs. incongruent). 
Interim Summary  
 To replicate Funes et al. (2007), we hypothesized that if spatial Stroop effects should 
differ across cue type, this should constitute a dissociation between exogenous and endogenous 
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orienting and serve as evidence against a unitary view of attention (e.g., Jonides, 1981). 
Specifically, in the spatial Stroop paradigm, exogenous cues should reduce spatial Stroop 
interference, such that spatial congruency effects are smaller on valid versus invalid trials, 
whereas endogenous cues should either a) fail to reduce, or b) increase spatial congruency effects 
for valid versus invalid trials. Different SOAs are used in the spatial Stroop paradigm to observe 
maximal effects typically found for exogenous and endogenous cues at short (100ms) and long 
(850ms) SOA, respectively (Funes et al., 2007; Jonides, 1981; Posner & Cohen, 1984). In this 
study, using the same spatial Stroop paradigm, we report similar, and additional findings, which 
support Funes et al. (2007) hypotheses. Note, all replications reported in this study are partial 
replications, considering only 2 SOA (100ms, 850ms) were used in this study versus 4 SOA 
(100ms, 350ms, 600ms, 850ms) used by Funes et al. (2007).  
 We replicate main effects of SOA, Validity and Congruity for reaction times and error 
rates reported by Funes et al. (2007), wherein participants responded faster, but with more errors, 
to targets following 850ms versus 100ms SOAs, and faster, but with fewer errors, to targets 
following valid versus invalid cues, and to congruent versus incongruent targets. We additionally 
report a Task×SOA×Validity×Congruity interaction which approached significance, resulting 
from differences in spatial congruency effects across tasks for valid versus invalid conditions 
which differ across 100ms versus 850ms SOA. This was not reported by Funes et al. (2007), 
albeit within the 4-way interaction we replicate the Task×Validity×Congruity interaction with 
reaction time data that was reported by Funes et al. (2007). However, the nature of the 
interactions reported in this study are different to those reported previously. Funes et al. (2007) 
report that, in the Task×Validity×Congruity interaction, exogenous and endogenous cue-types 
have opposing spatial congruency effects on reaction times, such that for exogenous cue types, 
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the spatial congruency effects are smaller for valid versus invalid conditions, but vice versa with 
endogenous cues. In our study, spatial congruency effects between valid and invalid conditions 
are only present in the exogenous condition (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2). We additionally 
report Task×Validity×Congruity interaction for error rates not reported by Funes et al. (2007). In 
this study, the interaction was observed where the difference in spatial congruency effects 
between valid versus invalid conditions are larger for exogenous versus endogenous tasks (see 
Figure 5.2), and follow-up ANOVAs revealed that the Validity×Congruity interaction for error 
rates was only significant in the exogenous, not endogenous conditions. However, the effect 
trends towards those reported for reaction times by Funes et al. (2007), wherein opposite effects 
are observed across tasks for valid versus invalid conditions.  
 Funes et al. (2007) also report a Task×SOA×Validity and, separately, an 
SOA×Validity×Congruity interaction with reaction times for exogenous, but not endogenous 
tasks, both of which are found in this study and explained under the SOA×Validity×Congruity 
interaction for reaction times in the exogenous task (Table 5.2). We found that spatial congruency 
effects on reaction times are faster for valid versus invalid cues across SOA, but this difference 
greater for 100ms versus 850ms SOA. Further, this interaction was only significant for 
exogenous, but not endogenous tasks (Table 5.2) and thus demonstrates inhibition-of-return, 
wherein reaction times in exogenous tasks for valid conditions show a negative facilitation effect 
at long versus short SOA (Jonides, 1981; Posner & Cohen, 1984). This effect is consistent with 
results reported by Funes et al. (2007), who report a significant positive facilitation effect for 
valid versus invalid cues at 100ms SOA, but not later SOAs in the exogenous task. 
 Overall, with reaction times and error rates, spatial congruency effects were faster for 
valid versus invalid conditions for exogenous conditions only, however for reaction times the 
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difference in spatial congruency effects between valid versus invalid cues was significantly 
greater for 100ms versus 850ms SOA, demonstrating both positive facilitation at short SOAs, and 
inhibition-of-return at long SOAs. Thus, our study provides further support for the hypothesis 
(see Funes et al., 2007) that, in the spatial Stroop paradigm, exogenous cues should reduce spatial 
Stroop interference, such that spatial congruency effects are smaller on valid versus invalid trials, 
whereas endogenous cues should either a) fail to reduce, or b) increase spatial congruency effects. 
This evidence constitutes a dissociation between exogenous and endogenous orienting and 
evidence against a unitary view of attention (e.g., Jonides, 1981). The reaction time and error rate 
data show exactly this pattern of results, but specifically where endogenous cues fail to reduce 
spatial congruency effect for valid versus invalid conditions. 
Individual differences. The HSPS may be a taxon consisting of HSP’s (i.e., those high on HSPS) 
and non-HSP’s, therefore Aron and Aron (2013) suggest dichotomizing the sample. As the 
sample majority consists of Psychology majors who may include a larger percentage of HSPs 
than the typical 20%, the break point was chosen to be 30% (high) HSP’s and 70% (low) non-
HSP’s (Aron & Aron, 2013). For the HSPS, the HSP group (n=20, M = 5.02, 95% CI[4.84, 5.2]) 
have significantly higher ratings on the HSPS, t(63)=10.87, p<.001, than non-HSP groups (n=45, 
M = 3.63, 95% CI[3.48, 3.77]). 
As many HSPS items have negative affect involved (Aron & Aron, 2013), and introversion and 
neuroticism correlate with the HSPS (Aron & Aron, 1997), additional sensitivity scores for both 
HSPS and ATQ-OS were calculated with BFI-E (introversion inverted) and BFI-N 
(neuroticism/negative affect) partialled-out to create new variables capturing SPS more precisely 
henceforth referred to as HSPS (E, N) residuals and ATQ-OS (E, N) residuals. 
 






Dichotomous samples in HSPS measures. A 4-way mixed ANOVA was used to explore within-
subjects factors SOA (100ms, 850ms), Validity (valid, invalid cue), and congruity (congruent, 
incongruent target) and between subjects factors of HSP group (HSP, non-HSP) for exogenous 
and endogenous task reaction times and error rates. Two separate ANOVAs were performed in 
order to look at HSPS and HSPS (E,N) residuals group differences. The ANOVAs were 
performed separately for exogenous and endogenous tasks, because the hypotheses regarding 
sensitivity relate specifically to automatic exogenous attention. See Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 for a 
summary of mixed ANOVA results for HSPS groups, respectively, and see Table 5.3 for 
descriptive statistics of sensitivity measures.  
HSPS Mixed ANOVA for Reaction Times and Error Rates across Task 
Mixed ANOVA with endogenous task reaction times for HSPS. No between-groups 
effects were observed for HSPS, or HSPS (E,N) residuals groups (ps>.05). An 
SOA×Validity×Congruity×HSPS group interaction was observed for endogenous task RTs 
(Table 5.4). Figure 5.4 shows that the interaction is the result of HSPS group differences in 
spatial congruency across SOA for invalid versus valid conditions. An independent samples t-
test revealed that for 100ms versus 850ms SOA and invalid versus valid conditions, HSP groups 
(M=14ms, 95% CI[-3, 32]) show larger spatial congruency effects than non-HSP groups (M=-
8ms, 95% CI[-17, 1]), t(63)=2.42, p=.019. However, this interaction is not significant when 
controlling for negative affect using HSPS (E,N) residuals (p = .11). Interestingly, both HSPs 
and non-HSPs show similar endogenous spatial Stroop patterns reported by Funes et al. (2007), 
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i.e., greater spatial congruency effects for valid versus invalid conditions, but the effects are 
observed at different SOAs for each group. HSPs show the pattern at 100ms and non-HSPs show 
the pattern at 850ms SOA, although simple contrasts reveal that validity effects on spatial 
congruency at those SOA are not significant for either group (ps>.257). This suggests that 
endogenous orienting is easier for HSPs at short SOAs but for non-HSPs at long SOAs. 
Alternatively, non-HSPs have better endogenous attention because the non-HSP pattern 
resembles the expected endogenous pattern more because increasing the SOA should increase 
the validity effect on spatial congruency, which it does in the non-HSPs. Nonetheless, this result 
suggests that endogenous attention differs between HSP and non-HSP groups (full HSPS). 
Further, the group pattern indicates that one reason endogenous spatial Stroop patterns (i.e., 
greater spatial congruency effects for valid versus invalid conditions, observed with greater 
magnitude for 850ms versus 100ms) was not found in this study could be related to individual 
differences related to sensitivity with negative affect, such that opposing HSPS group differences 
in SOA and validity effects on spatial congruency tend to cancel each other out across the entire 
sample.  




Figure E5.4. The SOA (100ms, 850ms) × Validity (Valid, Invalid) × Congruity × HSPS (HSP, 
Non-HSP) Group interaction for endogenous task reaction times. Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals for each HSPS group by condition. 
Mixed ANOVA with exogenous task reaction times for HSPS. No between-group 
effects or interactions were found for exogenous task RTs, see Table 5.4, or when controlling for 
negative affect using HSPS (E,N) residuals groups (ps>.159). 
Mixed ANOVA with endogenous task error rates for HSPS. No between-groups 
effects of interactions were observed with error rates for the HSPS groups (Table 5.4). However, 
an SOA×HSPS (E,N) residual group was observed, F(1,63) = 4.89, p = .031, ηp.
2 = .072. For 
non-HSP groups, error rates were significantly lower for 100ms (M=3.61%, 95% CI[2.67, 4.64]) 
versus 850ms SOA (M=5.04%, 95% CI[3.97, 6.17]), t(44)=3.12, p =.003, whereas for HSP 
groups, error rates are higher for 100ms (M=3.11%, CI [2.14, 4.20]) versus 850ms SOA 
(M=2.86%, CI [2.01, 3.86]), but this difference is not significant (p =.61). Independent samples 
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t-test revealed that the SOA effect is larger for the non-HSP versus HSP group, t(63)=2.21, 
p=.031. These error results provide evidence for interpreting the RT result on this task, with both 
suggesting that endogenous orienting was more effective / easier at the 100 ms SOA for HSPs 
but at the 850 ms SOA for non-HSPs (with the caveat that RTs were full HSPS but errors were 
HSPS residuals). 
Mixed ANOVA with exogenous task error rates for HSPS. No between-groups effects 
or interactions were observed with error rates for the HSPS groups (Table 5.4). However, an 
SOA×Congruity×HSPS (E,N) residuals group interaction was found, F(1,63) = 4.14, p = .046, 
ηp.
2 = .062. Figure 5.5 shows the interaction is the result of HSPS group differences in error rates 
between SOA conditions for incongruent versus congruent targets. Both groups show no effect 
of SOA on error rates for congruent targets (ps >.27). However, for incongruent targets, non-
HSP groups have significantly higher error rates following 850ms (M=7.6%, 95% CI[5.62, 
9.84]) versus 100ms SOA (M=5.73%, 95% CI[4.44, 7.14]), t(44)=3.02, p=.016, whereas HSP 
groups show numerically lower error rates following 850ms (M=4.96%, 95% CI[3.21, 6.96]) 
versus 100ms SOA (M=5.22%, 95% CI[3.53, 7.14]), but this difference is not significant 
(p=.69). Accordingly, for non-HSPs, the effect of SOA was larger for incongruent versus 
congruent conditions, t(44)=3.02, p<.01, but not for HSP groups (p=.715), and an independent 
samples t-test revealed the SOA effects (100ms – 850ms) across congruity conditions is 
significantly larger for non-HSP versus HSP groups, t(63)=2.04, p=.046. In summary, only non-
HSPs make more errors for incongruent targets at long 850 ms SOA. Overall, these results show 
that only non-HSPs show an overall increase in errors for incongruent targets at long 850 relative 
to short 100 ms SOA; HSPs show comparable errors across SOA and congruity conditions, 
suggesting HSP have a greater ability to maintain accuracy regardless of SOA and cue-target 
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congruity, and the null RT group effects indicate that this does not reflect speed-accuracy trade-
off. 
Sensitivity with negative affect affects endogenous orienting. For the HSPS, a significant 
SOA×Validity×Congruity×HSPS group interaction was observed for endogenous task reaction 
times, wherein larger spatial congruency effects for 100ms versus 850ms SOA, and invalid versus 
valid conditions, were observed for HSP groups versus non-HSP groups. Figure 5.4 shows that the 
spatial congruency effects are in opposite directions for HSP versus non-HSP groups, which 
explains the nature of the differences found. This result suggests that HSPs display greater costs 
when disengaging attention from endogenously cued locations at long versus short SOA. This was 
not predicted in the hypothesis that (iiia) for the HSPS, HSPs versus non-HSPs would be associated 
with greater costs when disengaging from invalid peripheral cues at short SOA for exogenous tasks, 
as found with strong BIS (Poy et al., 2004). However, the 4-way interaction for the endogenous 
task reaction times are not significant when negative affect is controlled using HSPS (E,N) 
residuals groups, suggesting the interaction effects relate to negative affect, rather than sensitivity. 
Further, this interaction was not observed with the ATQ-OS, a positive-affect-related measure 
(Sobocko & Zelenski, 2015), further supporting the conclusion that negative affect can explain the 
4-way interaction found with the HSPS for endogenous task reaction times. However, controlling 
for negative affect revealed an SOA×HSPS (E,N) residuals interaction for endogenous task error 
rates, wherein the effect of SOA on errors is larger for non-HSP versus HSP groups, as non-HSPs 
show greater accuracy for 100ms versus 850ms. This difference in errors across SOA is in the 
opposite direction for HSP groups, but is not significant Overall, these results suggest that 
endogenous orienting was more effective / easier at the 100 ms SOA for HSPs but at the 850 ms 
SOA for non-HSPs. 




Figure E5.5. The SOA × Congruity × HSPS (E,N) residuals group interaction for error rates in 
the exogenous task. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.  
Sensitivity and inhibition-of-return. 
For the HSPS (E,N) residuals group, the inhibition-of-return effects were not observed. However, 
a significant SOA×Congruity×HSPS (E,N) residuals group interaction was observed for 
exogenous task error rates. In this interaction, non-HSP groups show higher error rates for 
incongruent targets following 850ms versus 100ms SOA, whereas HSP groups show non-
significant effects in the opposite direction. Neither groups show effects of SOA on error rates for 
congruent targets, therefore the interaction is the result of greater differences in SOA effects for 
incongruent targets for non-HSP versus HSP groups. This finding suggests that HSPs versus non-
HSPs are less affected by the attention and perception associated with SOA typically observed in 
inhibition-of-return with validity conditions.  
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Creativity and Spatial Stroop Performance 
  Dichotomous samples in CAQ, RIBS and ATTA creativity measures. A 4-way mixed 
ANOVA was used to explore within-subjects factors SOA (100ms, 850ms), validity (valid, 
invalid cue), and congruity (congruent, incongruent target) and between-subjects factors of 
creativity group (high, low) for exogenous and endogenous task reaction times and error rates. 
Two separate ANOVAs were performed for each creativity measure, (CAQ, RIBS, ATTA) for 
exogenous and endogenous tasks, because the hypotheses regarding sensitivity and creativity 
relate more specifically to automatic exogenous attention. See Table 5.5, Table 5.6, and Table 5.7 
for a summary of mixed ANOVA results for CAQ, RIBS, and ATTA groups, respectively, and 
see Table 5.3 for descriptive statistics of creativity measures. Note, no exogenous or endogenous 
task effects were found for RIBS and thus are not reported further, but see Table 5.6. 
CAQ spatial Stroop performance. No between-groups effects or interactions were found 
for endogenous reaction times, or exogenous reaction times and error rates (see Table 5.5). 
However, an SOA×Congruity×CAQ group interaction approached significance (p=.055) for 
endogenous task error rates. Figure 5.8 shows the interaction is the result of group differences in 
error rates across SOA conditions for incongruent versus congruent targets. A paired samples t-test 
revealed that neither high nor low CAQ groups show SOA effects for congruent conditions 
(ps>.603). However, high CAQ groups show significantly larger errors for 850ms (M=8.82%, 95% 
CI[6.51, 11.2]) versus 100ms SOA (M=5.82%, 95% CI[4.17, 7.79]) for incongruent trials, 
t(31)=2.91, p<.01. Low CAQ groups show larger errors for 850ms (M=6%, 95% CI[4.33, 7.97]) 
versus 100ms SOA (M=5.14%, 95% CI[3.34, 7.29]) for incongruent trials, but this difference is 
not significant (p=.23). For high CAQ groups, the effect of SOA on error rates is larger for 
incongruent versus congruent conditions, t(31)=3.16, p<.01, but not for low CAQ groups, p=.23. 
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An independent samples t-test revealed that the SOA effects on incongruent versus congruent 
targets are larger for high versus low CAQ groups, t(63)=1.96, p=.055.  
  
Figure E5.8. The SOA × Congruity × CAQ group interaction for error rates in the endogenous 
task. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.  
ATTA spatial Stroop performance. No between-groups effects or interactions were 
found for endogenous reaction times (see Table 5.7). No between-groups effects were found for 
exogenous reaction times, however a SOA×Validity×ATTA group interaction approached 
significance (p=.053). Figure 5.9 shows the interaction is the result of group differences in 
exogenous reaction times across SOA and validity conditions. For valid conditions, the high 
ATTA group reaction times are significantly slower for 100ms (M=434ms, 95% CI[422, 447]) 
versus 850ms (M=422ms, 95% CI[412, 433]) SOA, t(29)=4.43, p<.001, and the low ATTA 
group reaction times are significantly slower for 100ms (M=441ms, 95% CI[429, 454]) versus 
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850ms (M=435ms, 95% CI[423,449]) SOA, t(34)=2.35, p=.024. For invalid conditions, the high 
ATTA group reaction times are significantly slower for 100ms (M=441ms, 95% CI[429, 454]) 
versus 850ms (M=424ms, 95% CI[414, 435]) SOA, t(29)=4.75, p<.001, and the low ATTA 
group reaction times are significantly slower for 100ms (M=452ms, 95% CI[440, 467]) versus 
850ms (M=431ms, 95% CI[418, 445]) SOA , t(34)=6.8, p<.001. For high ATTA groups, the 
effect of SOA does not change across validity conditions (p=.17), however for low ATTA 
groups, the effect of SOA is larger for invalid versus valid conditions, t(34)=4, p<.001, and an 
independent samples t-test revealed the SOA effect on validity is marginally larger for low 
versus high ATTA groups, t(63)=1.97, p=.053. 
For ATTA groups, between-groups effects were found for in both endogenous and 
exogenous task error rates. For the endogenous task, higher error rates are found in low 
(M=4.61%, 95% CI[3.54, 5.67]) versus high (M=3.11%, 95% CI[1.95, 4.26])  ATTA groups 
(p=.061). For the exogenous task, higher error rates are found in low (M=4.38%, 95% CI[3.4, 
5.35]) versus high (M=2.84%, 95% CI[1.78, 3.89]) ATTA groups (p=.036). 




Figure E5.9. The SOA × Validity × ATTA group interaction for error rates in the exogenous 
task. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.  
Interim Summary: Creativity and Spatial Stroop Performance 
 Evidence supports the hypothesis that (iv) spatial Stroop performance will differ across 
creativity measures, providing further evidence that different processes are implicated in 
different measures of creative achievement (CAQ), ideation (RIBS) and divergent thinking 
(ATTA; see Chapter 2 for analysis of relationship between CAQ, RIBS & ATTA). CAQ groups 
were associated with differences in spatial conflict resolution at different SOAs for endogenous 
tasks only, wherein high creative achievers show less ability to resolve spatial conflict at long 
versus short SOAs in endogenous tasks. ATTA groups were associated with differences in 
exogenous task reaction times, wherein SOA modulated response times across validity 
conditions uniquely for each group. Specifically, high ATTA groups show no effects of SOA 
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across validity conditions, but SOA effects were larger between invalid versus valid conditions 
for low ATTA groups (Figure 5.9). Thus, low versus high ATTA are slower to disengage from 
invalid cued locations at short SOAs, suggesting high ATTA display greater cognitive flexibility 
for disengaging attention from exogenously cued locations. This is consistent with evidence 
linking higher ATTA scores with higher levels of flexible cognitive control (Zabelina & 
Robinson, 2010). Further, high ATTA groups were overall more accurate for endogenous and 
exogenous tasks. No significant effects were found for RIBS. 
 Whether there are shared underlying mechanisms between spatial Stroop effects for 
sensitive (HSP) and creative (high) groups is not clear, as the spatial Stroop effects found do not 
strongly overlap within or between sensitivity and creativity measures. For exogenous tasks 
errors, ATQ-OS is associated with greater facilitation and/or inhibition-of-return with spatial 
congruency effects, but the HSPS measure, with negative affect controlled, is associated with 
group differences how SOA modulates resolution of spatial conflict for exogenous tasks, and 
accuracy more generally for endogenous tasks, although the interactions are the result of null 
findings for the HSP groups. Creativity measures also perform differently across task. SOA 
modulates spatial conflict resolution differently across CAQ groups for endogenous tasks, but 
modulates response time between validity conditions across ATTA groups in the exogenous task, 
and, additionally, accuracy more generally over endogenous and exogenous tasks. 
 We found no evidence to support the hypothesis that (iiib) ATQ-OS HSPs versus non-
HSPs would have greater ability to disengage voluntary cued attention from invalid target 
locations at long SOA, thus we found no justification for the hypothesis (vi) that this performance 
would predict creative achievement and divergent thinking. However, the hypothesis that (ii) 
ATQ-OS HSPs versus non-HSPs would be associated with greater IOR was supported. Thus, one 
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question emerges whether inhibition-of-return accounts for unique variance in creativity 
measures, and whether that variance is shared, or independent from ATQ-OS variance, thus 
demonstrating whether exogenous attention mechanisms partially explain the relationship 
























Mean reaction times (RT) and error rates (ER; %) with standard deviations (SD) for validity, 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), and congruity for exogenous and endogenous cue types 
      Exogenous Endogenous 
      Valid Invalid Valid Invalid 
  SOA Congruity Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
RT 
100 
Congruent 425 38 422 45 426 42 428 48 
Incongruent 450 39 472 43 477 45 479 50 
850 
Congruent 409 42 402 42 402 39 404 41 
Incongruent 449 39 454 37 456 43 457 46 
ER 
100 
Congruent 1.13 1.86 1.35 1.92 1.5 1.9 1.37 2.06 
Incongruent 4.42 4.29 6.73 5.85 5.73 6.15 5.22 6.62 
850 
Congruent 0.77 1.55 1.35 1.87 1.21 1.68 1.48 2.59 




Summary of separate repeated-measures ANOVA by task for endogenous and exogenous tasks 
using factors of SOA, Validity and Congruity for reaction time, and without SOA factor for error 
rate performance 
 Reaction times Error rates 
 Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous 
  F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 
Main effects         
SOA 136.63*** .681 71.29*** .527 --- --- --- --- 
Validity 1.52 .023 10.05** .136 1.95 .03 37.97*** .372 
Congruity 304.05*** .826 390.74*** .859 71.13*** .526 72.22*** .53 
Interactions         
SOA×Validity .16 .002 15.53*** .195 --- --- --- --- 
SOA×Congruity 1.09 .017 15.81*** .198 --- --- --- --- 
Validity×Congruity .08 .001 68.16*** .516 2.75 .041 19.43*** .233 
SOA×Validity×Congruity .05 .001 10.12** .137 --- --- --- --- 
Note, *p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001; degrees of freedom = 1,64.     
 




Mean, standard deviation (SD), and lower (LCI) and upper (UCI) 95% confidence intervals for 
creativity, temperament and personality variables (n=65) 
  Mean SD LCI UCI 
Creativity     
CAQ 7.78 8.87 5.85 9.97 
RIBS 2.93 .56 2.81 3.06 
ATTA 65.63 10.00 62.95 67.95 
Temperament    
HSPS 4.06 .81 3.86 4.25 
ATQ_OS 4.67 .81 4.5 4.85 
ATQ_EC 3.94 .81 3.74 4.13 
ATQ_NA 4.21 .73 4.04 4.39 
ATQ_ES 4.64 .64 4.48 4.8 
Personality     
B5_O 3.15 .56 3 3.29 
B5_C 3.39 .64 3.23 3.55 
B5_E 3.14 .81 2.95 3.32 
B5_A 3.87 .56 3.73 4 
B5_N 3.09 .89 2.89 3.29 
Note: CAQ = Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS = Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA = Abbreviated Torrance Test for 
Adults; HSPS = Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); ATQ-OS = orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; ATQ-EC = effortful contol 
factor of the ATQ; ATQ-NA = negative affect factor of the ATQ; ATQ-ES = extraversion/surgncy factor of the ATQ; BFI-O = openness 
to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory (BFI); BFI-C = conscientiousness factor of the BFI; BFI-E = extraversion factor of the BFI; 














Summary of separate mixed ANOVA for endogenous and exogenous tasks using within-groups 
factors of SOA, Validity and Congruity, and between-groups factors of HSPS group, for reaction 
time and error rate performance 
Table E5.5 
Summary of separate mixed ANOVA for endogenous and exogenous tasks using within-groups 
factors of SOA, Validity and Congruity, and between-groups factors of CAQ group, for reaction 
time and error rate performance 
 Reaction times Error rates 
 Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous 
  F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 
Main effects         
CAQ .06 .001 1.14 .018 2.26 .035 1.24 .019 
Interactions         
CAQ×SOA 1.89 .029 1.1 .017 1.69 .026 .63 .01 
CAQ×Validity .45 .007 .21 .003 .06 .001 .38 .006 
CAQ×Congruity 2.61 .04 .17 .003 .87 .014 .87 .014 
CAQ×SOA×Validity .16 .003 1.09 .017 .58 .009 1.6 .025 
CAQ×SOA×Congruity 2.5 .038 .36 .006 3.83 .057 .02 0 
CAQ×Validity×Congruity 2.26 .035 3.34 .05 1 .016 .72 .011 
CAQ×SOA×Validity×Congruity .32 .005 .02 0 .13 .002 1.59 .025 
      
 Reaction times Error rates 
 Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous 
  F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 
Main effects         
HSPS .35 .006 .25 .004 .28 .004 1.39 .022 
Interactions         
HSPS×SOA 2.83 .043 .2 .003 .88 .014 .02 0 
HSPS×Validity .67 .011 0 0 .64 .01 .22 .004 
HSPS×Congruity 1.93 .03 1.61 .025 .31 .005 .89 .014 
HSPS×SOA×Validity 1.12 .017 .37 .006 .01 0 .05 .001 
HSPS×SOA×Congruity 1.47 .023 2.44 .037 .19 .003 .45 .007 
HSPS×Validity×Congruity .98 .001 .71 .011 1.98 .03 .44 .007 
HSPS×SOA×Validity×Congruity 5.84* .085 .1 .001 .03 0 .14 .002 
Note, *p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001; degrees of freedom = 1,64.      
 





Summary of separate mixed ANOVA for endogenous and exogenous tasks using within-groups 
factors of SOA, Validity and Congruity, and between-groups factors of RIBS group, for reaction 
time and error rate performance 
 Reaction times Error rates 
 Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous 
  F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 
Main effects         
RIBS 1.4 .022 .37 .006 .79 .012 1.04 .016 
Interactions         
RIBS×SOA .2 .003 .07 .001 .92 .014 .01 0 
RIBS×Validity .9 .014 .25 .004 .04 .001 2.69 .041 
RIBS×Congruity .79 .012 .9 .014 .03 .001 .19 .003 
RIBS×SOA×Validity .43 .007 .18 .003 .78 .012 2.48 .038 
RIBS×SOA×Congruity 1.29 .02 1.94 .03 .25 .004 0 0 
RIBS×Validity×Congruity .23 .004 1.29 .02 .2 .003 .8 .013 
RIBS×SOA×Validity×Congruity 1.09 .017 .1 .002 1.6 .025 3.21 .048 















Summary of separate mixed ANOVA for endogenous and exogenous tasks using within-groups 
factors of SOA, Validity and Congruity, and between-groups factors of ATTA group, for reaction 
time and error rate performance 
 Reaction times Error rates 
 Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous 
  F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 F ηp.2 
Main effects         
ATTA 1.21 .019 1.07 .017 3.65 .055 4.58* .068 
Interactions         
ATTA×SOA .03 .001 .04 .001 .07 .001 0 0 
ATTA×Validity .02 0 .14 .002 2.14 .03 .77 .012 
ATTA×Congruity .09 .001 0 0 2.52 .038 2.21 .034 
ATTA×SOA×Validity 2.96 .045 3.89 .058 0 0 .81 .013 
ATTA×SOA×Congruity 1.11 .017 0 0 .94 .015 .79 .012 
ATTA×Validity×Congruity .42 .007 3.16 .048 .85 .013 .15 .002 
ATTA×SOA×Validity×Congruity .06 .001 2.08 .032 .13 .002 .63 .01 
Note, *p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001; degrees of freedom = 1,63.  
 
Table E5.8 
Spearman’s Rho correlations between inhibition-of-return variables for exdogenous and 
exogenous reaction times and error rates (rows) and creativity, temperament, and personality 
variables (columns)  
  Creativity Temperament Personality 























.085 .246* .09 .108 .131 .027 .053 -.026 -.086 
Endogenous -.08
9 










-.199 -.013 -.101 -.12 -.132 -.086 .059 .177 .053 
Note, *p<.05,**p<.01, n = 65. Note: CAQ = Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS = Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; 
ATTA = Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults; HSPS = Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); ATQ-OS = orienting sensitivity 
factor of the ATQ; BF-O = openness to experience factor of the Big Five Inventory (BFI); BF-C = conscientiousness factor of the 
BFI; BF-E = extraversion factor of the BFI; BF-A = agreeableness factor of the BFI; BF-N = neuroticism factor of the BFI. 
 
 
























































As (a) many HSPS items have negative affect involved (Aron & Aron, 2013), (b) 
introversion and neuroticism correlate with the HSPS (Aron & Aron, 1997), and (c) higher 
introversion and neuroticism are associated with greater learning without awareness (Deo & 
Singh, 1973), additional sensitivity scores for both HSPS and ATQ-OS were calculated with 
BFI-E (introversion inverted) and BFI-N (neuroticism/negative affect) partialled-out to create 
new variables capturing SPS more precisely, henceforth referred to as HSPS (E,N) residuals and 
ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals.  
Group differences were explored using mixed ANOVA and t-test comparisons where 
appropriate using between-groups factors of full HSPS and ATQ-OS measures and HSPS (E,N) 
and ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals variables, separately. Thus, for every analysis undertaken, the full 
HSPS/OS measures, and HSPS/ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals were used in order to examine effects 
of sensitivity with, and without negative affect controlled. For the HSPS, the HSP groups 
(M=.75, 95% CI [.72,.78]) had significantly higher scores, t(78)=10.12, p<.001, than non-HSPs 
(M=.45, 95% CI [.41,.49]). For the ATQ-OS, the HSP groups (M=.76, 95% CI [.74,.79]) had 
significantly higher scores, t(78)=9.46, p<.001, than non-HSPs (M=.52, 95% CI [.48,.55]). The 
same analysis was also performed for between-groups factors of creativity for CAQ, RIBS and 
ATTA, separately. For each creativity measure, two groups were formed from the 79 available 
participants using a median split with the following group sizes: High groups >= CAQ Mdn=.08, 
and low groups < CAQ Mdn giving high (n=39) and low CAQ (n=40) groups; High groups >= 
RIBS Mdn=.5, and low groups < RIBS Mdn giving high (n=42) and low RIBS (n=37) groups. 
High groups >= ATTA Mdn=.86, and low groups < ATTA Mdn giving high (n=41) and low 
ATTA (n=38) groups. ). Note, all personality, temperament, and creativity measures are scaled 
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between 0 and 1, see Chapter 2 for scaling. Max scores used for scaling CAQ are 94, and 83 for 
the ATTA. 
Results 
Overall Implicit SRTT Performance 
A repeated measures ANOVA was run to look at implicit SRTT RT performance across 
within-groups factors of Run (Run 1, Run 2, Run 3, and Run 4), Condition (Random, Sequence) 
and Block (Block 1, Block 2, and Block 3). Mauchleys Test of Sphericity was violated for 
factors of Run and Block, and for interaction terms of Run×Block (ps<.001), thus Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied for those main effects and interactions analysed henceforth. See 
Table 6.1 for ANOVA summary. 
 A Run×Condition×Block interaction was observed for implicit SRTT RTs. Figure 6.1 
shows that RTs for Sequence conditions were faster than RTs for Random conditions, 
demonstrating sequence-specific learning, and this learning varied by Run and Condition.  
 
Figure F6.1. Median RTs plot for Run (4×3 blocks), Condition (Sequence, Random) and Block 
(block 1 to block 12). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Implicit SRTT performance and sensitivity. A mixed ANOVA was run using within-
groups factors of Run, Condition, and Block and between-groups factors of Sensitivity (HSP, 
non HSP). See Table 6.2 for the summary of results from the mixed ANOVA for full sensitivity 
and sensitivity residual group outputs.  
 For the HSPS (E,N) residuals, the Sensitivity×Condition interaction approached 
significance (p=.075), visualized in Figure 6.2. An independent measures t-test revealed that both 
groups responded faster for Sequence versus Random conditions (p<.001). However, the 
difference between conditions was almost significantly larger for HSP (M=27ms, 95% CI 
[20,33]) versus non-HSP (M=19ms, 95% CI [15,23]) groups, t(77)=1.8, p=.075. No other 
between-groups or interaction effects were found for the HSPS or ATQ-OS or for the HSPS 
(E,N) or ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals groups (ps>.05). 
 
Figure F6.2. Sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP)×Condition (Sequence, Random) interaction. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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 Implicit SRTT performance and creativity. A mixed ANOVA was run using within-
groups factors of Run, Condition, and Block and between-groups factors of Creativity (High, 
Low), separately for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA. No significant 4-way (p>.574), 3-way (ps>.173) or 
2-way (ps>.225) interactions or between groups effects (ps>.312) were found for CAQ, RIBS, or 
ATTA measures. 
Overall Explicit SRTT Performance 
RTs were analyzed with a repeated-measures ANOVA using within-groups factors of 
Condition (Random, Sequence) and Block (1 to 6). Due to missing values from participants who 
did not complete the task correctly, 19 participants were excluded from the analysis. See Table 
6.3 for summary of repeated measures ANOVA. 
Table 6.3 shows main effects of Block and Condition and the 2-way Block×Condition 
interaction are significant. Figure 6.3 below shows that the interaction is the result of learning 
effects between conditions differing over runs. Sequence RTs demonstrate sequence learning, 
becoming faster between runs 1 – 3 but stabilizing thereafter, whereas Random RTs remain stable 
and show little change over each run. 




Figure F6.3. Reaction Times (RT) for Condition (Random, Sequence)×Block (1 to 6) interaction. 
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
 Explicit SRTT performance and sensitivity. A mixed ANOVA was run using within-
groups factors of Block and Condition and between-groups factors of Sensitivity (HSP, non HSP) 
group. Table 6.4 shows the output of the mixed ANOVA. For the ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals 
groups, a significant Sensitivity×Block interaction was found (p=.027), indicating the group 
effect varies by Block. To interpret this interaction, planned simple effects analysis were done. 
The group effect was evaluated for each block separately, although no groups differences 
between blocks emerged (ps>.15). To assess the Block effect in each group, Block 1 was 
compared to each of the other blocks. Simple contrasts using Block 1 as the baseline comparison 
revealed that ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals groups significantly differed in performance between 
Block 1 and Block 2, F(1,58)=7.5, p<.01, ηp
2=.115, as shown in Figure 6.4. Non-HSP showed a 
larger decrease in RTs from Blocks 1 to 2 than HSPs, indicating slower early learning in HSPs. 
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No other significant effects were found between ATQ-OS (E,N) groups when comparing blocks 
to baseline Block 1 performance (ps>.05). However, Figure 6.4 shows that by the last 2 blocks, 
HSPs are numerically faster than non-HSPs. Indeed, difference contrasts (comparing two 
consecutive blocks) indicate that group differences approach significance between Block 4 and 5, 
F(1,58)=3.55, p=.065, ηp
2=.058, and between block 5 and 6, F(1,58)=3.25, p=.077, ηp
2=.053. 
These patterns demonstrate that HSPs and non-HSPs have a different style of explicit SRTT 
learning.  
 
Figure F6.4. Reaction times for Block (1 to 6)×ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals group. Grey dashed line 
represents overall mean performance. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
 Explicit SRTT performance and creativity. A mixed ANOVA was run using within-
groups factors of Block and Condition and between-groups factors of Creativity (high, low), for 
CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, separately. Table 6.5 shows the output of the mixed ANOVA. A 
significant ATTA × Block interaction was found and visualized in Figure 6.5. To interpret this 
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interaction, planned simple effects analysis were done. The group effect was evaluated for each 
block separately, and results showed group differences emerged in Block 1, F(1,58)=5.85, 
p=.019, where high ATTA groups (M=372ms, 95% CI[355,390]) were significantly faster than 
low ATTA groups (M=413ms, 95% CI[382,443]). No other groups differences between blocks 
emerged (ps>.45). To assess the Block effect in each group, Block 1 was compared to each of the 
other blocks (with no correction). The Hochberg method of adjustment for family-wise error 
revealed that, in descending order of significance, performance in Blocks 6, 3 and 5 differed 
significantly from Block 1 across ATTA groups (ps<.05). The largest effect was found between 
Block 1 and 6, and the pattern remains the same for Blocks 3 and 5 versus Block 1. For example, 
with low ATTA groups, the RTs in Block 6 (M=333ms, 95% CI[310,357]) versus Block 1 
(M=413ms, 95% CI[389,437]) is a greater decrease than the RTs in Block 6 (M=342ms, 95% 
CI[319,364]) versus Block 1 (M=372ms, 95% CI[349,396]) for high ATTA groups, a difference 
of 50ms, F(1,58)=10.37, p<.01, ηp
2=.152. Difference contrasts (comparing two consecutive 
blocks) revealed no further significant group differences with the Hochberg method of adjustment 
for family-wise error other than those reported in comparison with Block 1. These patterns 
demonstrate that high and low ATTA groups have a different style of explicit SRTT learning.  




Figure F6.5. Reaction times for Run (Run 1 to 6)×ATTA group. Grey dashed line represents 
overall mean performance. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Implicit SRTT: Higher-Order Associative Learning 
Higher-order association learning was analyzed for RTs with a repeated measures 
ANOVA using within-groups factors of Run (Run 1 to Run 4) and Transition Pair (12 pairs). 
Mauchleys Test of Sphericity was violated for Transition Pair, and for interaction terms of 
Run×Transition Pair (ps < .001), thus Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied for those main 
effects and interactions henceforth. See Table 6.6 for the summary of ANOVA results. 
 Results showed that higher-order associative learning did not differ across runs. However, 
learning differed between transitions, where some transitions showed higher learning scores than 
others. For example, transition pair “4-3” (M=-1.16, 95% CI [-5.63, 3.3]) was not significantly 
different from zero, t(78)=.52, p=.606, and transition pair “2-1” (M=-17.77, 95% CI [-13.46, -
22.08]) median RTs were significantly slower for Sequence versus Random conditions, 
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t(78)=8.21, p < .001. However all other transition pairs differed significantly from zero (ps<.001), 
except “4-2” (p=.002. The significant Run×Transition Pair showed that the increase in RT 
differences from higher-order associative learning across runs differed between transition pair. 
See Figure 6.6 for a visualization of the Run×Transition Pair interaction. 
 
Figure F6.6. Median reaction time (ms) difference for Conditions (Random – Sequence) by Run 
(run 1 to run 4) and Transition Pair (12 pairs). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Grey 
horizontal dashed line at y=0 shows no difference between Sequence and Random conditions.  
 Implicit SRTT: higher-order associative learning and sensitivity. Sensitivity group 
differences in higher-order association learning for RTs was analyzed with a mixed measures 
ANOVA using within-groups factors of Run (Run 1 to Run 4) and Transition Pair (12 pairs) and 
between-groups factors of Sensitivity (HSP, non HSP). See Table 6.7 for ANOVA output. 
 A between-groups effect of HSPS (E,N) residuals approached significance (p=.083), 
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where HSPs (M=20ms, 95% CI [14,25]) had more positive transition RTs than non-HSPs 
(M=14ms, 95% CI[11,17]) overall suggesting comparatively greater acquisition of higher-order 
associations overall. No other effects were observed (ps>.05). 
Implicit SRTT: higher-order associative learning and creativity. Creativity groups 
differences in higher-order association learning for RTs were analyzed with a mixed measures 
ANOVA using within-groups factors of Run and Transition Pair and between-groups factors of 
Creativity (high, low), separately for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA. See Table 6.8 for ANOVA output. 
A 3-way Run×Transition Pair×ATTA Group interaction was found (p=.022) where RT 
differences in higher-order associative learning across runs differed between transition pair, and 
this effect differed between high and low ATTA groups (see Figure 6.7 for visualization). A 
between-groups effects for ATTA groups approached significance (p=.094) where high ATTA 
groups (M=13ms, 95% CI [9, 17]) show overall smaller effects of higher-order associative 
learning than low ATTA groups (M=18ms, 95% CI [14, 22]).  
 The 3-way interactions suggest that run effects varied between groups for some transition 
pairs. To interpret the 3-way interaction, for each transition pair, the run×group interaction was 
assessed (run with no correction). The Hochberg method of adjustment for family-wise error 
revealed that only transition points “2-4” (p=.006) and “4-3” (p=.012) were significant in the 
Run×ATTA group interaction. Figure 6.7 suggests that the Run×Group interaction for transition 
pair “2-4” is a result of High ATTA groups showing reduced higher-order associative learning for 
run 3, not evident in the low ATTA group. However, the high ATTA group shows greater higher-
order associative learning than the low ATTA group in run 3 for transition pair “4-3”. Thus the 
pattern of how higher-order associative learning develops across runs for each transition pair 
differs between high and low ATTA, suggesting learning processes differ with ATTA creativity. 




Figure F6.7. Median RT for Run (run 1 to run 4) and Transition Pair (12 pairs) for a) High 
ATTA groups and b) Low ATTA groups. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Grey 
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horizontal dashed line at y=0 represents no differences between Sequence and Random 
conditions. 
Explicit SRTT Higher-Order Associative Learning 
Higher-order associative learning in the explicit condition was analyzed by collapsing 
RTs across runs to look at overall higher-order learning for transition pairs. Analysis of Block (1 
to 6)×Transition pair (12 pairs) was not performed as only 26 participants had complete data for 
each transition across each Block, and thus individual difference analyses were not performed 
due to inadequate group sizes. The Hochberg method of adjustment for family-wise error 
revealed that transition pairs differed according to higher-order learning. For example, transition 
pair “1-2”, t(69)=.891, p=.376, and transition pair “4-3”, t(69)=1.88, p=.064, were not 
significantly different from zero. The remaining transition pairs were significantly different from 
zero (ps<.001). See Figure 6.8 for visualization of higher-order associative learning. 
 
Figure F6.8. Median RT for Transition Pair (12 pairs) in explicit SRTT. Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals. Grey horizontal dashed line at y=0 represents no difference between 
Sequence and Random conditions. 
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Explicit Memory Tests: Awareness 
Implicit SRTT: awareness. Table 6.9 shows ratings participants reports to (Q1) the 
boxes lit up at random locations the entire time; (Q2) some boxes lit up more often than other 
boxes; (Q3) the task was easier at times and harder at other times; (Q4) there was a repeating 
pattern of locations some of the time. The frequency values suggest that at least 9 participants 
report the locations were not always random (Q1), and at least 35 participants report that there 
was a repeating pattern of locations some of the time (Q4), suggesting awareness. 
Implicit SRTT: awareness and sensitivity. An independent samples t-test was run to 
compare question ratings between sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. No between-groups 
differences in awareness ratings were observed between HSPS or ATQ-OS groups (ps>.128) or 
ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals groups (ps>.351). However, a significant group difference, t(77)=2.3, 
p=.024, was observed between HSPS (E,N) groups for Q4, where HSPs (M=1.71, 95% CI 
[1.36,2.1]) showed lower mean ratings than non-HSPs (M=2.35, 95% CI [2,2.7]), suggesting that 
HSPs versus non-HSPs were more likely to think there was a repeating pattern some of the time 
(Q4) and thus suggesting greater awareness in HSPs versus non-HSPs groups.  
Implicit SRTT: awareness and creativity. An independent samples t-test was run to 
compare question ratings between Creativity groups (high, low) for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, 
separately. No between groups differences were observed between CAQ (ps>.340) or ATTA 
groups (ps>.144). However, RIBS groups showed significantly different responses, t(77)=2.19, 
p=.032, to Q1 where the high RIBS group (M=2.26, 95% CI [1.98,2.56]) have higher mean 
ratings for Q1 than the low RIBS group (M=1.78, 95% CI [1.49,2.11]), demonstrating that the 
high RIBS group rate sequences as less random than the low RIBS group, suggesting more 
awareness of sequence structure in the high versus low RIBS groups. No other differences in 
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ratings were found for RIBS groups (ps>.467). 
Explicit Memory Tests: Free Generation 
Free generation omnibus task comparison for implicit and explicit SRTT. A within-
groups ANOVA was performed to analyze performance on free generation across implicit and 
explicit SRTT tasks for a) maximum sequences generated, b) number of triplets generated, and c) 
ratio of triplets to keypresses. Table 6.10 shows the summary ANOVA output and Figure 6.9 
shows the overall performance for each measure of free generation for both implicit and explicit 
SRTT tasks. For each measure of free generation, recall in the explicit task was significantly 
greater than in the implicit task (ps<.001). 
 
Figure F6.9. The significant within-groups main effects for implicit and explicit SRTT free 
generation tasks for a) maximum sequence generated, b) number of triplets generated and c) 
triplet ratios with error bars showing 95% confidence intervals. 
Free generation omnibus task comparison and sensitivity. Separate omnibus mixed 
ANOVA were performed to analyze group differences in performance on free generation across 
implicit and explicit SRTT task for a) maximum sequences generated, b) number of triplets 
generated, and c) ratio of triplets to keypresses between sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. 
Results relating to group main effects and interactions are reported, but see Table 6.10 for overall 
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within-groups effects. The mixed ANOVA used within-groups factor of task (implicit, explicit) 
and between-groups variable of Sensitivity group. Table 6.11 shows the ANOVA revealed no 2-
way, or between-groups main effects for full HSPS and ATQ-OS or HSPS (E,N) and ATQ-OS 
(E,N) residuals. 
Free generation omnibus task comparison and creativity. Separate omnibus mixed 
ANOVA were performed to analyze group differences in performance on free generation across 
implicit and explicit SRTT task for a) maximum sequences generated, b) number of triplets 
generated, and c) ratio of triplets to keypresses between creativity groups (high, low) for CAQ, 
RIBS and ATTA, separately. Each mixed ANOVA used within-groups factor of task (implicit, 
explicit) and between-groups variable of Creativity group. See Table 6.12 for the mixed ANOVA 
output. 
 Table 6.12 shows a significant task×group interaction was observed for both maximum 
sequence generated and triplet ratios for the ATTA measure, visualized in Figure 6.10. Both high 
and low ATTA groups generate longer sequences for explicit versus implicit tasks (ps<.001), 
however the differences in maximum sequences generated for explicit versus implicit tasks is 
significantly larger for low (M=4.51, 95% CI [3.53,5.5]) versus high (M=2.84, 95% CI 
[1.84,3.85]) ATTA groups, t(77)=2.28, p=.025. Figure 6.10b below shows the interaction 
between triplet ratios by task and ATTA group. Both high and low ATTA groups generate higher 
triplet ratios for explicit versus implicit tasks (ps<.001), but the differences in triplet ratios for 
explicit versus implicit tasks is significantly larger for low (M=.316, 95% CI [.24,.395]) versus 
high (M=.175, 95% CI [.094,.253]) ATTA groups, t(77)=2.28, p=.025. Together, the findings 
show that high versus low ATTA groups generate shorter sequences and lower triplet ratios 
during explicit versus implicit tasks. No 2-way or between-groups effects for CAQ or RIBS were 





Figure F6.10. The significant two-way interaction of learning (implicit, explicit) and ATTA 
group (low, high) for free generation following the SRTT tasks for a) maximum sequence 
generated and b) triplet ratios. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Implicit SRTT: free generation and sensitivity. An independent samples t-test was run 
to compare maximum sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to 
keypresses between sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. No between-groups differences were 
found for the full HSPS (ps>.589) or ATQ-OS (ps>.413), or ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals groups 
(ps>487). For HSPS (E,N) residuals, a group difference in maximum sequences generated was 
significant, t(77)=2.29, p=.025, where HSP groups (M=5.04, 95% CI [4.53,5.58]) show longer 
mean maximum sequences generated in free recall compared with non-HSP groups (M=4.2, 95% 
CI [3.8,4.6]). Also, a significant group difference was found for triplet ratio, t(77)=2.54, p=.013, 
where HSP groups (M=.41, 95% CI [.344,.475]) show higher triplet ratios in free generation 
compared with non-HSP groups (M=.307, 95% CI [.266,.348]). No between-groups effects were 
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found for number of triplet reported (p>.632) for HSPS (E,N) residuals. See Figure 6.11 for 
visualization. 
 
Figure F6.11. Free generation mean a) maximum length of sequences generated, b) number of 
sequence consistent triplets generated, and c) triplet ratios following the implicit task for HSP and 
non-HSP groups as defined by HSPS (E,N) residuals. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
interval. 
Overall, when negative affect is partialled out, HSP versus non-HSP groups of the HSPS, 
but not the ATQ-OS, freely generate longer sequences, and show greater accuracy in regards to 
triplets recalled versus sequence inconsistent keypresses, following exposure to implicit 
sequences. 
 Implicit SRTT: free generation and creativity. An independent samples t-test was run 
to compare maximum sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to 
keypresses between Creativity (high, low) groups, for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, separately. No 
effects were found (ps>.235). 
Explicit SRTT: free generation. Figure 6.12 below shows the outcome of the free 
generation runs (blocks) within the explicit SRTT task, showing a) maximum number of 
sequences generated, b) number of consistent triplets generated, and c) triplet ratios, for each run, 
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and with overall mean represented by dashed line. Overall, Figure 6.12 shows a sharp increase in 
recall in free generation within the first 3 runs, with learning and recall leveling out in the 
remaining runs. 
 
Figure F6.12. Free generation mean a) maximum length of sequences generated, b) number of 
sequence consistent triplets generated, and c) triplet ratios for each Block in the explicit task. 
Dashed silver line represents overall mean across Block. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
interval.  
 Explicit SRTT: free generation and sensitivity. Group differences in maximum 
sequences generated, number of sequence consistent triplets generated, and triplet ratios in free 
generation were analyzed separately with a mixed ANOVA using within-groups factor of Block 
(1 to 6) and between-groups factor of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. See Table 6.13 for 
mixed ANOVA results. For maximum generated sequences, a 2-way Block×Group interaction 
was found for HSPS (E,N) residuals groups (p=.01). Simple effects analysis comparing HSPS 
(E,N) residuals group performance across each block did not reveal any significant group 
differences (ps>.24). Figure 6.13 and simple contrasts using Block 1 as a baseline comparison 
reveal that HSPS (E,N) residual group differences are significant in Block 5 (p=.024) and 
marginal in Block 6 (p=.058), showing that explicit memory improves significantly more with 
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learning after 5 blocks of trials for HSPs than non-HSPs. No other significant main effects or 
interactions were found (ps>.05).  
 
Figure F6.13. The Block×HSPS (E,N) residuals group interaction for maximally generated 
sequences in the free generation task following each explicit SRTT block. Error bars represent 
95% confidence interval. 
 Explicit SRTT: free generation and creativity. Creativity group differences in 
maximum sequences generated, number of consistent triplets generated, and triplet ratios in free 
generation were analyzed separately with a mixed ANOVA using within-groups factor of Block 
(1 to 6) and between-groups factor of Creativity (high, low) for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, 
separately. See Table 6.14 for ANOVA output. 
For maximum generated sequences, a group difference approached significance, 
F(1,77)=3.57 p=.063, ηp²=.044, for ATTA groups where high ATTA groups (M=7.46, 95% CI 
[6.49, 8.44]) have shorter maximum length of sequences generated than low ATTA groups 
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(M=8.8, 95% CI [7.78, 9.81]). For triplets ratios, a group difference approached significance, 
F(1,77)=3.68 p=.059, ηp²=.046, for ATTA groups where high ATTA groups (M=.53, 95% CI 
[.46, .61]) have lower triplet ratios than low ATTA groups (M=.63, 95% CI [.56, .71]). Overall, 
the findings show that high versus low ATTA groups freely generate shorter sequences, and 
display less accuracy in regards to triplets recalled versus sequence inconsistent keypresses, 
following exposure to explicit sequences. No other effects were found (ps>.05). 
Explicit Memory Tests: Cued Generation 
Implicit SRTT: cued generation. Table 6.15 shows summary statistics for a) maximum 
number of sequences generated, b) number of consistent triplets generated, and c) triplet ratios 
taken from the cued generation task following the implicit SRTT.  
Implicit SRTT: cued generation and sensitivity. An independent samples t-test was run 
to compare maximum sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to 
keypresses between sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. No effects were found for the full HSPS 
(ps>.361), or HSPS (E,N) residuals groups (ps>.113). For full ATQ-OS, a significant group 
difference was found for maximum sequence generated, t(77)=2.31, p=.024, where HSP groups 
(M=6.92, 95% CI [6.22,7.65]) showed longer mean maximum sequences generated in cued recall 
compared with non-HSP groups (M=6.02, 95% CI [5.64,6.42]). However, this group difference 
disappears when negative affect is partialled out (p>.179). No between-groups effects were found 
for triplets generated, or ratio of triplets to keypresses for the full ATQ-OS (ps>.55), or ATQ-OS 
(E,N) residuals (ps>.95).  
Overall, HSPS scores do not differ according to maximum sequences generated number of 
triplets generated, or triplet ratios. Group differences in maximum sequences generated emerge 
between ATQ-OS groups, but these group differences disappear when negative affect is partialled 
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out, suggesting these effects relate to negative affect. 
Implicit SRTT: cued generation and creativity. An independent samples t-test was run 
to compare maximum sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to 
keypresses between Creativity (high, low) groups, for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, separately. No 
effects were found (ps>.133). 
Explicit Memory Tests: Triplet Recognition 
Implicit SRTT: triplet recognition. In triplet recognition, ratings closer to 1 indicate 
higher certainty the sequence was seen before, and ratings closer to 6 indicate higher certainty 
that the sequence was not seen before. Ratings for Sequence (Old) triplets (M=2.47, 95% CI 
[2.35, 2.61]) were significantly lower, t(78)=5.72, p<.001, than ratings for Random (New) 
triplets (M=2.81, 95% CI [2.67, 2.95]), showing that participants rated old triplets as more 
similar than new triplets to the repeating sequences. Figure 6.14 below shows the area under 
curve as .57 (95% CI [.55, .59]) and a linear discriminant analysis showed that cases from the 
two conditions (i.e., new and old) could be classified with 59.5% accuracy (one-out cross-
validation). Whilst the t-test analysis suggests that old triplets are more familiar than new triplets 
thus suggesting explicit knowledge of the repeating sequence, the ROC analysis suggests that 
participants fail to explicitly discriminate old and new triplets because classification accuracy of 
old versus new triplets is just above chance level (Tape, 2006).  




Figure F6.14. Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) and area under curve for triplet 
recognition ratings.  
In triplet recognition, certainty ratings of triplets may be influenced by implicit memory 
or motor fluency (Schendan et al., 2003b; Shanks & Johnstone, 1999). According to Shanks and 
Johnstone (1999), motor fluency cannot be considered the same as implicit learning because 
motor fluency is consciously experienced and may be associated with explicit sequence 
knowledge. Motor fluency would be suggested with faster RTs for old versus new sequences at 
Location 3, and as motor fluency suggests either explicit sequence knowledge (Shanks & 
Johnstone, 1999), or feelings of sequence familiarity (Schendan et al., 2003b), then faster RTs 
for old versus new sequences at Location 3 should be related to higher recognition ratings for old 
versus new sequences (i.e., positively correlated). Triplet RTs were thus analysed with the goal 
to examine whether ratings were contaminated with motor fluency. 
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Performance for triplets was analyzed between conditions by comparing median RTs for 
the three locations in a repeated measures ANOVA using within-groups factors of Condition 
(New, Old) and Location (Location 1, Location 2, Location 3). 9 participants were excluded in 
the triplet generation RT analysis due to not responding with key presses during sequence 
presentation. See Table 6.16 for the ANOVA summary output. The ANOVA revealed effects of 
condition where median RTs for new conditions (M=411ms, 95% CI [400,423]) were slower than 
median RTs for old conditions (M=403ms, 95% CI [392,414]). The main effect of location is due 
to location 1 conditions (M=439ms, 95% CI [426,451]) having slower median RTs than both 
location 2 (M=392ms, 95% CI [382, 403]) and location 3 (M=391ms, CI [379,402]) (ps<.001), 
but no difference was found between location 2 and location 3 (p=1). Simple contrasts show the 
Condition×Location interaction was the result of a greater condition effect for Location 3 versus 
Location 1, F(1,69)=7.02, p=.01, ηp²=.092, and Location 2, F(1,69)=6.29, p=.014, ηp²=.084. As 
SOC sequences are equated for bi-item frequency, higher-order learning effects with SOC are 
only observed between 3 or more locations (Curran, 1997; Reed & Johnson, 1994; Schendan et 
al., 2003b). Put another way, SOCs refer to the fact that at least two prior locations are needed to 
predict the next location in the sequence (Shanks & Johnstone, 1999). Thus higher-order 
associative learning is only observed in Location 3. Indeed, simple effects analysis of median 
RTs were significantly faster for old than new triplets for Location 3, t(69)=3.75, p<.001, but not 
other locations (ps>.276), as shown in Figure 6.15. This raises the possibility that implicit 
memory or motor fluency could influence explicit ratings of sequence triplet recognition. To 
check for motor fluency influence on ratings, a Spearman’s correlation was performed to examine 
the relationship between new – old difference RTs for Location 3 and new – old difference 
ratings. The analysis revealed no significant relationship between the two variables, rs(69)=.056, 
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p=.64, thus showing that motor fluency does not influence ratings. 
 
Figure F6.15. Triplet recognition median RT for Condition (Random, Sequence) by Location 
(Location 1 to Location 3). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Implicit SRTT: triplet recognition and sensitivity. Ratings for Sequence and Random 
triplets were analysed with a mixed ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Random 
[New], Sequence [Old]) and between-groups factors of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP). For the 
HSPS, a between-groups effect approached significance, F(1,69)=3.83, p=.054, ηp²=053, where 
HSPs (M=2.45, 95% CI[2.21, 2.68]) gave lower ratings overall than non-HSPs (M=2.72, 95% 
CI[2.57,2.87]), although this effect is not significant when negative affect is controlled (p>.3), 
and no other between-groups effects were significant (ps>.102). Further, no sequence×sensitivity 
interactions emerged for any sensitivity measures (ps>.349).  
A comparison of new versus old triplet recognition on median RTs was performed using 
a mixed ANOVA using within-groups factors of Condition (Random, Sequence) and Location 
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(1,2,3), and between-groups factor of Sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP) groups. See Table 6.17 for 
results of the mixed ANOVA. 
A 3-way interaction was observed for the full ATQ-OS (p=.04). Simple effects were used 
to determine whether RTs for each condition differed at Location 3. Paired samples t-tests 
showed that non-HSPs were faster to respond in old (M=372ms, 95% CI[356,388]) versus new 
(M=400ms, 95% CI[386,414]) conditions, t(49)=4.51, p<.001, whereas HSPs show little 
difference in Location 3 for old (M=403ms, 95% CI[378,432]) versus new (M=402ms, 95% 
CI[379,426]) conditions (p=.9). Further, the difference between conditions was significantly 
larger for non-HSPs versus HSPs, t(68)=2.6, p=.011. 
No between-groups (ps>.489) or interaction effects (ps>.350) were observed for the full 
HSPS, but, with negative affect partialled out, a 3-way interaction (see Figure 6.16) emerged with 
HSPS (E,N) residuals (p=.01) similar in nature to the ATQ-OS 3-way interaction. Simple effects 
were used to determine whether RTs for each condition differed at Location 3. Paired samples t-
tests revealed that non-HSPs were faster to respond in old (M=373ms, 95% CI[358,389]) versus 
new (M=399ms, 95% CI[385,413]) conditions, t(49)=4.29, p<.001, whereas HSPs show almost 
no difference in Location 3 for old (M=400ms, 95% CI[371,430]) versus new (M=403ms, 95% 
CI[383,423]) conditions (p=.73). Further, the difference between conditions was significantly 
larger for non-HSPs versus HSPs, t(68)=2.02, p=.047. This raises the possibility that implicit 
memory or motor fluency could influence explicit ratings of sequence triplet recognition in non-
HSPs, but not HSPs. To check for the influence of motor fluency on ratings, data were split by 
HSPS (E,N) residuals group and a Spearman’s correlation was performed for each group to 
examine the relationship between new – old difference RTs for Location 3 and new – old 
difference ratings. The analysis revealed no significant linear relationship between the two 
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variables for HSPs, rs(19)=.001, p=1, or for non-HSPs, rs(48)=.095, p=.51, showing that motor 
fluency does not influence ratings for either HSPS (E,N) residuals group. 
Overall, the effects show that HSPs on the HSPS rate all triplets as more familiar than 
non-HSPs, or, put another way, non-HSPs rate all triplets as more novel than HSPs, although 
effects disappear when negative affect is partialled out. Further, HSPs show less evidence than 
non-HSPs of implicit learning or motor fluency in higher-order associations measured with the 
triplets, but neither group shows evidence of motor fluency contamination of ratings. 
  
Figure F6.16. Triplet recognition median RT for Condition (Random, Sequence) by Location 
(Location 1 to Location 3) for a) HSPs and b) non-HSPs for HSPS (E,N) residuals. Error bars 
show 95% confidence intervals.  
 Implicit SRTT: triplet recognition and creativity. Ratings for Sequence and Random 
triplets were analysed with a mixed ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Random 
[new], Sequence [old]) and between-groups factors of creativity (high, low).No between-groups 
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effects (ps>.29) or sequence×creativity interactions (ps>38) were found for the CAQ, RIBS or 
ATTA. 
A comparison of Random versus Sequence triplet recognition was performed using a 
mixed ANOVA using within-groups factors of Condition (Random, Sequence) and Location 
(1,2,3), and between-groups factor of Creativity (high, low) for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, 
separately. For each creativity measure, no 3-way (p=.110) or 2-way interactions (ps>.189) or 
between-groups effects (p=.103) were found.  
Explicit Memory Tests: Full Recognition 
Full recognition omnibus task comparison for implicit and explicit SRTT. An 
omnibus repeated-measures ANOVA was used to analyze recognition ratings of the full sequence 
between implicit and explicit tasks using factors of task (implicit, explicit) and sequence (target, 
random). Note, higher ratings indicate awareness of the repeating sequence. Table 6.18 shows the 
summary results of the ANOVA. 
Table 6.18 shows that main effects of task were not significant (p>.05), but the main 
effect of Sequence was significant, where overall Target sequences (M=7.01, 95% CI[6.57,7.44]) 
had higher ratings overall (where higher ratings indicate greater recognition of sequences) than 
Random sequences (M=5.04, 95% CI[4.75,5.32]). The significant Task×Sequence interaction, 
visualized in Figure 6.17 shows that the difference between Target and Random ratings changes 
depending on the task. Targets sequences were given higher recognition ratings in explicit versus 
implicit tasks, t(78)=3.65, p<.001, and Random sequences were given lower recognition ratings 
in explicit versus implicit tasks, t(78)=4.15, p<.001, giving a larger mean difference in 
recognition ratings (M=2.46, 95% CI [1.44,3.47]) for the explicit versus implicit tasks, t(78)=4.8, 
p<.001. These effects show that explicit knowledge of the repeated sequence was more 
 Chapter 1: Literature Review 
333 
 
consciously available following the explicit versus implicit task. However, target sequences 
produced significantly higher recognition ratings than random sequences for explicit and implicit 
tasks (ps<.01), meaning the repeated versus random sequence was more consciously available 
following both explicit and implicit task, where the effect of sequence was larger for explicit 
tasks (p<.001).  
 
 
Figure F6.17. The Task (implicit, explicit)×Sequence (Target, Random) interaction for full 
sequence recognition ratings. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.  
Full recognition omnibus task comparison and sensitivity. An omnibus mixed 
measures ANOVA was used to analyze group differences in recognition ratings of the full 
sequence between implicit and explicit tasks using within-group factors of task (implicit, explicit) 
and sequence (target, random), for between groups factors of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP), 
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separately. Table 6.19 shows the ANOVA results, revealing a significant between-groups effect 
for the HSPS groups, where HSP (M=6.43, 95% CI [5.97,6.9]) groups gave higher recognition 
ratings overall than non-HSPs (M=5.84, CI [5.54,6.15]). This effect remains significant when 
negative affect is controlled in HSPS (E,N) residuals groups. However, this between-groups 
effect suggests no distinction in recognition for sequence versus random patterns, or across tasks. 
HSPs rate all 12-location sequences as more familiar than non-HSPs, or, put another way, non-
HSPs rate all sequences as more novel than HSPs. 
 Full recognition omnibus task comparison and creativity. An omnibus mixed 
measures ANOVA was used to analyze creativity group differences in recognition ratings of the 
full sequence between implicit and explicit tasks using within-group factors of task (implicit, 
explicit) and sequence (target, random), and between-groups factors of creativity (high, low) for 
CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, separately. No between-groups effects (ps>.198), three-way (ps>.176) 
or two-way (ps>.198) interactions were observed for CAQ, RIBS, or ATTA. 
 Implicit SRTT: full recognition and sensitivity. Ratings for target sequences and mean 
ratings of the four Random sequences were compared across sensitivity groups with a mixed 
ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Target, Random) and between-groups factors 
of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP). No between-groups effects (ps>.19) of sequence×sensitivity 
interactions (ps>.21) were found for any sensitivity measure.  
Implicit SRTT: full recognition and creativity. Ratings for target sequences and mean 
ratings of the four Random sequences were compared across sensitivity groups with a mixed 
ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Target, Random) and between-groups factors 
of creativity (high, low). No between-groups effects (ps>.58) of sequence×creativity interactions 
(ps>.66) were found the CAQ, RIBS or ATTA. 
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 Explicit SRTT: full recognition and sensitivity. Ratings for target sequences and mean 
ratings of the four Random sequences were compared across sensitivity groups with a mixed 
ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Target, Random) and between-groups factors 
of sensitivity (HSP, non-HSP). A between-groups effect approached significance for HSPS 
groups, F(1,77)=3.8, p=.055, ηp²=.047, where HSPs (M=6.47, 95% CI[6.03,7.37]) gave higher 
ratings overall than non-HSPs (M=5.91, 95% CI[5.47,6.35]). This effect is similar when negative 
affect is controlled in HSPS (E,N) residuals groups (p=.077). No between-groups effects were 
found for any ATQ-OS grops (ps>.5). No significant sequence×sensitivity interactions were 
found for any sensitivity measures (ps>.14). Overall, HSPs rate all 12-location sequences from 
the explicit task as more familiar than non-HSPs, or, put another way, non-HSPs rate all 
sequences from the explicit task as more novel than HSPs.  
 Explicit SRTT: full recognition and creativity. Ratings for target sequences and mean 
ratings of the four Random sequences were compared across sensitivity groups with a mixed 
ANOVA using within-subjects factors of sequence (Target, Random) and between-groups factors 
of creativity (high, low). No between-groups effects (ps>.19) of sequence×creativity interactions 
(ps>.11) were found the CAQ, RIBS or ATTA. 
Discussion 
Overall, this diverse group of young to middle-aged people showed similar patterns of 
sequence-specific, higher-order associative, implicit and explicit learning and evidence of 
explicit awareness found in prior work using these tasks (Curran, 1997; Reber & Squire, 1998; 
Schendan et al., 2003a; Schendan et al., 2013). New findings reported in this study have revealed 
how implicit and explicit learning and memory relate to concepts of sensitivity and creativity.  
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Using the implicit SRTT, learning during the task shows different patterns of individual 
differences for sensitive versus creative people. Regarding sensitivity, findings demonstrate that 
highly sensitive people have a greater ability than less sensitive people to become more 
consciously aware of subtle higher-order, structured information during implicit learning. 
Relative to non-HSPs, while HSPs show marginally better implicit learning on the task, they 
develop more explicit awareness of a repeating pattern and more explicit knowledge about the 
exact sequence in this pattern. For implicit SRTT performance, trends show that HSPs relative to 
non-HSPs defined using the HSPS tend to show greater implicit learning (i.e., faster RTs for 
sequence versus random) when negative affect is controlled. This supports the first hypothesis, 
that HSPs versus non-HSPs should have greater ability to incidentally extract and exploit 
information during the implicit learning task due to the links between sensitivity and automatic 
information-gathering attention systems (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). Further support for the first 
hypothesis is the difference in transition RTs between HSPs versus non-HSPs, as defined with 
the HSPS when negative affect is controlled, suggesting that HSPs were more able to 
incidentally acquire and exploit higher-order associations in repeating sequences.  
Regarding creativity, implicit learning processes differ between high and low creativity 
groups, as defined using the ATTA. Higher-order associative learning across runs differs 
between ATTA groups, as high versus low ATTA groups show lower and higher associative 
learning for the respective final two transition pairs between runs. No other evidence was found 
that implicit sequence learning varies with sensitivity and creativity 
Following implicit and explicit SRTT learning, explicit memory tasks were performed to 
measure awareness and explicit memory for implicit and explicit task sequences. Importantly, 
regarding sensitivity, following both implicit and explicit SRTT tasks, HSPs demonstrated more 
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knowledge about the repeating sequence than non-HSPs. Specifically, the maximum sequence 
generated on the free generation task of explicit knowledge was higher for HSPs than non-HSPs 
by the end of both implicit and explicit SRTT learning. This finding for the implicit SRTT is 
particularly important because it provides key confirmation that sensitivity is associated with the 
ability to become more consciously aware of information automatically under implicit 
conditions, supporting the first and second hypotheses. Finding a similar pattern following 
explicit learning indicates that this same ability also supports greater memory under explicit 
learning conditions for high versus low sensitive people.  
Following the implicit SRTT, as predicted by the first and second hypotheses, HSPs 
compared to non-HSPs develop more conscious knowledge about the sequence (i.e., awareness 
of structure, greater accuracy when reporting triplets, and longer sequences) during implicit 
learning. HSPs, compared to non-HSPs defined by HSPS with negative affect controlled, were 
more likely to think there was a repeating pattern some of the time (Q4), suggesting awareness of 
a structured, repeating pattern of locations. On free generation, HSPs also freely generate longer 
sequences and show better free recall of triplets from the repeating sequence than non-HSPs. 
Further, on the triplet recognition task, recognition ratings revealed that HSPs tend to rate all 
triplet sequences (repeated and random) as more familiar overall than non-HSPs, but not when 
negative affect is controlled. Full sequence recognition shows that HSPs tend to rate all 12-
location sequences (repeated and random) as more familiar overall than non-HSPs when negative 
affect is controlled. Put another way, non-HSPs rate all triplet and full sequences as more novel 
than HSPs. The ratings on the triplet and full recognition tasks suggest a bias toward feeling 
information is familiar in HSPs, compared to non-HSPs. However, this bias did not enable HSPs 
to recognize the sequence better than non-HSPs.  
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 Overall, as the result of implicit SRTT learning, HSPs developed larger amounts of 
consciously available knowledge about the repeating sequence than non-HSPs, providing support 
for the second hypothesis, that higher sensitivity is associated with greater awareness of implicit 
knowledge. Altogether, this consistent with conceptualizations of the sensitive individual as 
being more consciously aware of subtleties that others may not notice (Aron et al., 2012; Evans 
& Rothbart, 2007, 2008).  
Intriguingly, group differences in implicit and explicit SRTT RTs, higher-order 
associative learning, sequence awareness, triplet recognition, and explicit recall of implicit and 
explicit sequences only emerge when negative affect is controlled. These findings suggest that 
the better HSP performance disappears when negative affect is present, presumably because 
negative affect affects MTL function, which impairs learning and memory and thus cancels out 
the advantage of sensitivity. This provides support for the hypothesis that negative-affect-related 
sensitivity may impact negatively on hippocampal memory functions and associated learning and 
memory performance.  
Altogether, these findings provide strong evidence that high sensitive temperament is 
related to a greater ability to acquire and exploit implicit information and bring this information 
to conscious awareness, but mainly when negative affect is controlled. Notably, implicit learning 
and memory tends to remain unaffected by neurological issues, whereas explicit learning and 
memory differs with many neurological changes. For example, aging (Schendan, et al., 2013), or 
mediotemporal lobe damage (Scoville & Milner, 1957) affect explicit learning but leave implicit 
learning unaffected or relatively spared. In contrast, implicit learning tends to be affected mainly 
by neurological issues affecting dopamine systems in the basal ganglia, such as Parkinson’s 
disease (Schendan, et al., 2013). Given the association between implicit learning, dopamine, and 
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the basal ganglia, sensitivity effects on implicit learning and conscious sequence knowledge 
suggests the dopamine system implicated in sensitivity could underlie these effects. This is 
consistent with the evidence that dopamine changes underlie changes in implicit and explicit 
learning and memory with aging and Parkinson’s disease (Schendan et al., 2013), as suggested 
above. However, learning effects are not specific to implicit memory. On the explicit SRTT, 
HSPs versus non-HSPs show improved performance on the second versus first block (for ATQ-
OS), with longer freely recalled sequences in the final two blocks of the explicit SRTT (for 
HSPS), but only when negative affect is controlled. This shows that HSPs versus non-HSPs are 
better able to consciously improve performance and recall consciously acquired information 
during explicit SRTT tasks.  
Regarding creativity, like HSPS groups, high creative ideation (RIBS) groups found the 
locations less random than low RIBS groups in the implicit SRTT, suggesting awareness of a 
repeating pattern of locations. This is consistent with the positive relationship between sensitivity 
and creative ideation (see Chapter 2), suggesting both are associated with higher ability to 
become aware of structured patterns during implicit learning, consistent with evidence that both 
constructs are grounded in attention mechanisms (see Chapter 4 & 5). Like sensitivity, creativity 
also benefits explicit SRTT performance, as people high in ATTA creativity respond faster 
overall on the explicit SRTT in the first block. Most of the learning takes place by the end of the 
first block resulting in a sharp drop in RT for the sequence relative to random locations by the 
second block. Learning the sequence is most effortful in the first block, as indicated by RTs 
being instead slower to sequence than random locations in the first block only. Altogether, this 
pattern indicates that people with high ATTA creativity need to exert less effort to learn the 
sequence than those with low ATTA. This could reflect higher working memory functions in the 
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frontal lobe, which enable chunking and other working memory functions that contribute to 
explicit SRTT learning (Bo, Borza, & Seidler, 2009; Graybiel, 1998). However, higher ATTA 
and divergent thinking scores are more commonly associated with less efficient working memory 
and executive functions (Fugate, Zentall, & Gentry, 2013; Takeuchi et al., 2011), and lower 
working memory is associated with difficulty blocking out, or inhibiting, distracting information 
(Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001) and difficulty focusing in selective attention tasks (Engle, 
Kane, & Tuholski, 1999). This is consistent with our findings that explicit memory for high 
versus low ATTA groups is less efficient following explicit versus implicit tasks, and during 
explicit SRTT tasks, suggesting high ATTA groups are less able to block out competing items 
during sequence recall. One intriguing possibility is that explicit learning is better for people 
with high versus low ATTA creativity because more creative people have higher ability to make 
loose associations, which could reflect better relational memory in the MTL system thereby 
enabling higher-order associations to be made more readily. 
Conclusions 
Overall, this study shows that sensitivity is associated with a greater ability to 
incidentally acquire and exploit information during the implicit learning task, and both 
sensitivity and creative ideation are associated with higher ability to develop more awareness and 
conscious knowledge about that information, consistent with conceptualizations of the sensitive 
individual as being more consciously aware resulting from more sensitive exogenous attention 
systems (Aron et al., 2012; Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2008). However, highly sensitive people are 
more able to consciously improve performance and recall consciously acquired information 
during explicit SRTT tasks. As learning and memory effects were found across tasks, this 
suggests that HSP groups differ in how automatic and obligatory associative learning systems are 
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recruited in the MTL during explicit and implicit learning, consistent with relational accounts of 
memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Schendan et al., 2003b), although conclusions regarding 
group differences in associative learning across implicit and explicit tasks are limited due to lack 
of data in the explicit condition probably resulting from boredom and fatigue. Further, evidence 
suggests that negative-affect-related sensitivity may be detrimental for learning and memory. 
Findings also suggest that differences associated with higher divergent thinking, such as working 





















Summary output of repeated measures ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-
groups factors of Run, Condition and Block for implicit SRTT performance 
  F df ηp
2 
Main effects      
Run 5.81** 3,234 .069 
Condition 129.82*** 1,78 .624 
Block 2 2,156 .025 
2-way interactions      
Run×Condition 0.04 3,234 0 
Run×Block 4.2** 6,468 .051 
Condition×Block 4.95** 2,156 .06 
3-way interactions      
Run×Condition×Block 9.31*** 6,468 .107 
Note. **p<.01, ***p<.001. ηp²=partial eta squared effect size; df=degrees of freedom. 
 
Table F6.2 
Mixed ANOVA using within-groups factors of Run, Condition and Block with between-groups 
factors of Sensitivity for implicit SRTT performance 
 HSPS ATQ-OS HSPS (E,N) ATQ-O(E,N) 





Main effects                 
Sensitivity .74 .009 0 0 .61 .008 0 0 
2-way interactions                 
Sensitivity×Run .17 .002 .61 .008 1.03 .013 .34 .004 
Sensitivity×Condition .01 0 .69 .009 3.25 .04 .01 0 
Sensitivity×Block 1.34 .017 .88 .011 1.48 .019 .5 .006 
3-way interactions                
Sensitivity×Run×Condition .57 .007 .56 .007 .35 .005 .39 .005 
Sensitivity×Run×Block .46 .006 1.33 .017 1.43 .018 2.02 .026 
Sensitivity×Condition×Block 1.72 .022 0 0 .01 0 .29 .004 
4-way interactions                 
Sensitivity×Run×Condition×Block .64 .008 1.32 .017 .84 .011 .57 .007 
Note. HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale; ATQ-OS=Orienting sensitivity of the adult temperament questionnaire 
(ATQ); HSPS(E,N)=HSPS with Big-Five Extraversion and Big-Five Neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-
OS(E,N)=ATQ-OS with Big-Five Extraversion and Big-Five Neuroticism partialled out; ηp²=partial eta squared 
effect size. 




Summary output of repeated measures ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-
groups factors of Run and Condition for explicit SRTT performance 
  F df ηp
2 
Main effects      
Run 25.58*** 1,59 .302 
Condition 55.39*** 5,295 .484 
2-way interactions      
Run×Condition 32.49*** 5,295 .355 
Note. ***p<.001. ηp²=partial eta squared effect size; df=degrees of freedom. 
Table F6.4 
Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-groups 
factors of run and condition with between-groups factors of sensitivity for explicit SRTT 
performance 
 HSPS ATQ-OS HSPS(E,N) ATQ-OS(E,N) 





Main effects                 
Sensitivity .32 .005 1.77 .03 .01 0 0 0 
2-way interactions                 
Sensitivity×Condition .97 .016 1.96 .033 .07 .001 .04 .001 
Sensitivity×Block .37 .006 1.07 .018 .99 .017 2.97* .049 
3-way interactions                
Sensitivity×Condition×Block 
 
.93 .016 .47 .008 1.12 .019 .77 .013 
Note.*p<.05. HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale; ATQ-OS=Orienting sensitivity of the adult temperament 
questionnaire (ATQ); HSPS(E,N)=HSPS with Big-Five Extraversion and Big-Five Neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-











Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-groups 
factors of Run and Condition with between-groups factors of creativity for explicit SRTT 
performance 
 CAQ RIBS ATTA 




Main effects       
Creativity 1.85 .031 .14 .002 .41 .007 
2-way interactions       
Creativity×Condition .55 .009 .59 .01 1.37 .023 
Creativity×Run .46 .008 .77 .013 3.53* .057 
3-way interactions       
Creativity×Condition×Run .28 .005 .65 .011 1.19 .02 
Note. *p=.01.CAQ=Creative Achievements Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behavioural Scale; 




Summary output of repeated measures ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-
groups factors of Run and Transition Pair for implicit SRTT  
  F df ηp
2 
Main effects      
Run 1.21 3,234 .015 
Transition Pair 39.28*** 11,858 .335 
2-way interactions      
Run×Transition Pair 6.62*** 33,2574 .078 










Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-groups 
factors of Run and Transition Pair with between-groups factors of sensitivity for implicit SRTT 
 HSPS ATQ-OS HSPS (E,N) ATQ-O(E,N) 





Main effects                 
Sensitivity .03 0 .71 .009 3.08 .038 .01 0 
2-way interactions                 
Sensitivity×Run .3 .004 .59 .008 .62 .008 .21 .003 
Sensitivity×Pair 1.45 .018 .83 .011 1.12 .014 1.16 .015 
3-way interactions                
Sensitivity×Run×Pair .89 .011 1.18 .015 .81 .01 1.22 .016 
Note. HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale; ATQ-OS=Orienting sensitivity of the adult temperament questionnaire 
(ATQ); HSPS(E,N)=HSPS with Big-Five Extraversion and Big-Five Neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-




Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-groups 
factors of Run and Transition Pair with between-groups factors of creativity for implicit SRTT 
 CAQ RIBS ATTA 




Main effects       
Creativity .24 .003 .04 .001 2.88 .036 
2-way interactions       
Creativity×Run 1 .013 .79 .01 1.22 .016 
Creativity×Pair .73 .009 .59 .008 1.58 .02 
3-way interactions       
Creativity×Run×Pair .54 .007 1.14 .015 1.78* .023 
Note. *p < .05. CAQ=Creative Achievements Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behavioural Scale; 














Frequency of rating by question with mean (M), standard deviation (SD), and lower (LCI) and 
upper (UCI) 95% confidence intervals for questions 1-4 measuring awareness of sequences for 
both implicit and explicit tasks 
  Response     
Task Question Yes Probably Unlikely No M SD LCI UCI 
Implicit 
Q1 28 29 13 9 2.04 .99 1.82 2.26 
Q2 19 22 5 33 2.66 1.25 2.38 2.94 
Q3 42 12 8 17 2 1.23 1.72 2.28 
Q4 35 18 5 21 2.15 1.25 1.87 2.43 
Explicit 
Q1 15 26 14 24 2.59 1.12 2.35 2.84 
Q2 27 27 11 14 2.15 1.09 1.91 2.39 
Q3 39 12 7 21 2.13 1.29 1.86 2.41 
Q4 46 18 4 11 1.75 1.07 1.52 1.99 
 
Table F6.10 
Summary ANOVA output for repeated measures ANOVA comparing free generation performance 
across implicit and explicit SRTT tasks 
  F ηp² 
Maximum sequence 96.14*** .552 
Number of triplets 26.79*** .256 
Triplet ratio 68.89*** .469 











Summary of separate omnibus mixed ANOVA for free generation, including maximum sequences 
generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to keypresses for between-groups 
factor of sensitivity 
  HSPS ATQ-OS HSPS(E,N) ATQ-OS(E,N) 
    F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Maximum sequence 
Main effects .01 0 .02 0 .54 .007 .9 .012 
Interaction .06 .001 0 0 1.54 .02 1.54 .02 
Number of triplets 
Main effects .07 .001 .06 .001 .39 .005 .66 .008 
Interaction .12 .002 1.87 .024 .85 .011 .02 0 
Triplet ratio  
Main effects .01 0 .35 .004 1.7 .022 .13 .002 
Interaction .1 .001 .02 0 2.67 .034 1.89 .024 
Note. HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale; ATQ-OS=Orienting sensitivity of the adult temperament questionnaire 
(ATQ); HSPS(E,N)=HSPS with Big-Five Extraversion and Big-Five Neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-




Summary of separate omnibus mixed ANOVA for free generation, including maximum sequences 
generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to keypresses for creativity (high, 
low) groups for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA 
  CAQ RIBS ATTA 
    F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Maximum sequence 
Main effects .08 .001 1.53 .019 1.44 .018 
Interaction .18 .002 .32 .004 5.2* .063 
Number of triplets 
Main effects .37 .005 .79 .01 1.04 .013 
Interaction .46 .006 .02 0 2.2 .028 
Triplet ratio  
Main effects .66 .009 1.69 .021 .73 .009 
Interaction .3 .004 0 0 6.21* .075 
Note. *p < .05. CAQ=Creative Achievements Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behavioural Scale; 








Summary of separate mixed ANOVA for explicit SRTT free generation, including maximum 
sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to keypresses for 
between-groups factor of sensitivity 
    HSPS ATQ-OS HSPS(E,N) ATQ-OS(E,N) 
    F ηp²² F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Maximum sequence 
Main effect .04 0 .01 0 .04 .001 1.46 .019 
Interaction 1.59 .02 1.59 .02 3.63* .045 1.36 .017 
Number of triplets 
Main effect 0 0 .79 .01 .82 .011 .38 .005 
Interaction 1.16 .015 1.72 .022 .94 .012 .47 .006 
Triplet ratio 
Main effect .06 .001 .1 .001 0 0 .98 .013 
Interaction 1.67 .021 1.18 .015 2.3 .029 .52 .007 
Note. *p<.05. HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale; ATQ-OS=Orienting sensitivity of the adult temperament 
questionnaire (ATQ); HSPS(E,N)=HSPS with Big-Five Extraversion and Big-Five Neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-






Summary of separate mixed ANOVA for explicit SRTT free generation, including maximum 
sequences generated, number of triplets generated, and ratio of triplets to keypresses for 
between-groups factor of creativity 
  CAQ RIBS ATTA 
    F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Maximum sequence 
Main effects .15 .002 1.04 .013 3.57 .044 
Interaction .23 .003 1.57 .02 .92 .012 
Number of triplets 
Main effects .59 .008 .44 .006 2.17 .027 
Interaction .23 .003 .29 .004 .98 .013 
Triplet ratio  
Main effects .06 .001 .82 .01 3.68 .046 
Interaction .69 .009 .95 .012 .6 .008 
Note. CAQ=Creative Achievements Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behavioural Scale; ATTA=Abbreviated 








Mean, standard deviation, lower (LCI) and upper (UCI) 95% confidence intervals and min/max 
values for maximum length of correct sequences reported, number of triplets reported and ratio 
of triplets to keypresses in the cued generation task for the implicit SRTT 
 M SD LCI UCI Min Max 
Maximum sequence 
generated 
6.29 1.63 5.95 6.66 3 10 
Triplets generated 35.42 7.71 33.75 37.09 21 54 
Triplet ratio .38 .08 .36 .4 .22 .57 
 
Table F6.16 
Summary output of repeated measures ANOVA showing main effects and interactions for within-
groups factors of Condition and Location for implicit SRTT triplet recognition response times 
  F df ηp
2 
Main effects      
Condition 9.48** 1,69 .121 
Location 75.95*** 2,138 .524 
2-way interactions      
Condition×Location 3.58* 2,138 .049 














Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing group effects and interactions for within-groups 
factors of Condition and Location and between-groups variables of sensitivity for implicit SRTT 
triplet recognition response times 
 HSPS ATQ-OS HSPS(E,N) ATQ-OS(E,N) 
  F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Main effects         
Sensitivity .49 .007 .83 .012 .7 .01 .42 .006 
Two way interactions         
Sensitivity×Condition .05 .001 1.93 .028 .43 .006 .41 .006 
Sensitivity×Location (Loc) .08 .001 .74 .011 .89 .013 1.29 .019 
Three way interactions         
Sensitivity×Condition×Loc 1.06 .015 3.29* .046 4.64* .064 2.72 .038 
Note. *p<.05. HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale; ATQ-OS=Orienting sensitivity of the adult temperament 
questionnaire (ATQ); HSPS(E,N)=HSPS with Big-Five Extraversion and Big-Five Neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-




Summary output of repeated measures omnibus ANOVA for comparison of full recognition 
ratings for factors of Task and Sequence 
  F ηp² 
Task 1.43 .018 
Sequence 57.7*** .425 
Task×Sequence 23.08*** .228 












Summary output of mixed ANOVA of full recognition ratings for factors of Task and Sequence 
and between-groups factor of sensitivity 
 HSPS ATQ-OS HSPS(E,N) ATQ-OS(E,N) 
  F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Main effects         
Sensitivity 4.44* .055 .08 .001 4.21* .052 .78 .01 
Two-way interactions         
Sensitivity×Task .75 .01 .47 .006 .45 .006 .01 0 
Sensitivity×Sequence .01 0 .65 .008 .07 .001 .08 .001 
Three-way interactions         
Sensitivity×Task×Sequence 1.92 .024 .01 0 .01 0 .23 .003 
Note. *p<.05. HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale; ATQ-OS=Orienting sensitivity of the adult temperament 
questionnaire (ATQ); HSPS(E,N)=HSPS with Big-Five Extraversion and Big-Five Neuroticism partialled out; ATQ-








































































Sensitivity and creativity group differences were explored using mixed ANOVA and t-
test comparisons using between-groups factors of full HSPS and ATQ-OS measures and HSPS 
(E,N) and ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals variables, separately. Thus, for every analysis undertaken, 
the full HSPS/ATQ-OS measures, and HSPS/ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals were used in order to 
examine effects of sensitivity with, and without negative affect controlled. For the HSPS, the 
HSP groups (M=.74, 95% CI [.71,.78]) had higher scores than non-HSPs (M=.44, 95% CI 
[.40,.48]). For the ATQ-OS, the HSP groups (M=.76, 95% CI [.73,.78]) had higher scores than 
non-HSPs (M=.51, 95% CI [.48,.54]). The same analysis was also performed for between-groups 
factors of creativity for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA, separately. For each creativity measure, two 
groups were formed from the 73 available participants using a median split with the following 
group sizes: High groups >= CAQ Mdn=.07, and low groups<CAQ Mdn giving high (n=39) and 
low CAQ (n=34) groups; High groups >= RIBS Mdn=.49, and low groups<RIBS Mdn giving 
high (n=41) and low RIBS (n=32) groups. High groups >= ATTA Mdn=.86, and low 
groups<ATTA Mdn giving high (n=38) and low ATTA (n=35) groups. For the Ravens short-
form measure scaled between 0 and 1 using maximum possible score of 12 (participant 
score/12), two groups were formed from the 73 available participants using a median split with 
the following group sizes: High groups > Ravens Mdn=.58, and low groups <= Ravens Mdn 
giving high (n=35) and low Ravens groups (n=38). Note, all personality, temperament, and 
creativity measures are scaled between 0 and 1, see Chapter 2 for scaling. Max scores used for 
scaling in this study are CAQ are 94, and 83 for the ATTA in this study only.  
 




Task Accuracy and Participant Exclusion 
Overall, 39 participants made errors of omission (miss) at least once across 60 target 
presentations, ranging between 0 and 14 omissions (M=1.1, SD=2.05). 77 participants made errors 
of commission (false alarm) across all trials ranging between 0 and 37 commissions (M=7.93, 
SD=7.46). Using the median absolute deviation method of outlier detection, 5 participants were 
detected as outliers with errors of commission >=24. For errors of omission, more than 50% of 
error values were zero and thus median absolute deviation was not applicable. Using the mean 
absolute deviation method of outlier detection, 2 participants were detected as outliers with errors 
of omission >=9. Therefore, 7 participants were rejected (n=5 via errors of commission & n=2 via 
errors of omission), leaving n=73 participants for further analysis. 
Latent Inhibition 
Response times. Figure 7.1 below shows response times for targets following pre-exposed, 
non pre-exposed and filler stimuli.  




Figure G7.1. Response times across conditions for each 2-trial block where 1000ms marks target 
onset. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
A mixed ANOVA was performed on mean RT data using within-groups factors of 
Condition (pre-exposed [PE], non pre-exposed [NPE]) and Trial (10 consecutive trial blocks, 1:10), 
and between-groups factor of pre-exposure (Order) condition (“S” or “H”) and Ravens group (high, 
low). The results of the ANOVA are summarized in Table 7.1. Results demonstrated the latent 
inhibition effect, as the main effect of exposure condition was significant, where mean RTs in the 
PE condition (M=1305ms, 95% CI[1250,1359]) were slower (p=.04) than mean RTs in the NPE 
condition (M=1261ms, 95% CI[1201,1321]). A main effect of trial was also found showing that 
learning increased over time (see Figure 7.1). No between-group effects of Order were observed, 
however an Order×Condition interaction was found (p=.015), wherein Condition effects differed 
depending on the stimuli. Specifically, Condition effects were only observed for “H” stimuli, 
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wherein mean RTs in the PE condition (M=1348ms, 95% CI [1278,1408]) were significantly 
slower than mean RTs in the NPE condition (M=1254ms, 95% CI[1180,1326]), t(34)=3.08, p<.01. 
No differences in condition were observed for “S” stimuli (p=.83). Finally, no main effects or 
interactions were observed with Ravens groups (ps>.238). Although the Condition×Trial 
interaction was not observed (p=.174), the difference between PE and NPE stimuli was larger in 
the last block than first block (see Figure 7.1). To test for this, the slope for PE and NPE conditions 
was calculated for each participant using the line of best fit method. The within-subjects ANOVA 
revealed that the mean slope for the NPE condition (M=-25ms, 95% CI[-15,-35]) was significantly 
steeper, F(1,72)=6.41, p=.014, ηp.²=.082, than the mean slope for PE condition (M=-14ms, 95% 
CI[-6, 22]), demonstrating a stronger LI effect in PE versus NPE conditions. Overall, these results 
demonstrate that pre-exposure adversely affects subsequent associative learning as slower response 
times were observed for PE versus NPE stimuli. Whilst this LI effect was generalized across trial 
blocks, the analysis of slopes suggested the learning was stronger over time for NPE versus PE 
conditions thus demonstrating LI, however the overall LI effect was stimulus-specific. 
Accuracy. Latent inhibition was assessed using the number of correct predictive responses 
(CPR) for trials in pre-exposed and non pre-exposed stimuli in a mixed measures ANOVA using 
within-groups factors of test condition (pre-exposed [PE], non pre-exposed [NPE]) and between-
groups factor of pre-exposure (Order) condition (“S” or “H”) and Ravens group (high, low). 
ANOVA results are summarized in Table 7.2. Results demonstrated latent inhibition, as a main 
effect of test condition was significant (p=.022), wherein PE stimuli (M=3.53, 95% CI[2.33,4.7]) 
produced fewer correct predictive responses than NPE stimuli (M=4.64, 95% CI[3.27,6.01]) out of 
the 20 target presentations in each condition. No main effects or interactions were observed with 
Order (ps>.132) or Ravens group (ps>.297). Overall, these results demonstrate that pre-exposure 
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adversely affects associative learning, as demonstrated by fewer correct predictive responses for 
PE versus NPE stimuli. In summary, both response time and accuracy demonstrated latent 
inhibition. 
Latent Inhibition and Sensitivity 
Response times. Sensitivity group differences in latent inhibition were not observed for 
ATQ-OS, or when negative affect was partialled out in ATQ-OS (E,N) residuals (ps>.17). For 
HSPS (E,N) residuals, a Condition×Trial×Sensitivity×Ravens interaction approached significance, 
F(7,496)=1.81, p=.081, ηp²=.026. Figure 7.2 shows that the 4-way interaction reflects larger LI 
effects as learning progresses in the HSP low Ravens group compared with all other groups, 
whereas the non-HSP low Ravens group shows the least LI effects. Note, the HSPS (E,N) residuals 
group sizes for HSP (n=13) versus non-HPS (n=22) when Ravens scores are high, and HSP (n=9) 
versus non-HSP (n=29) when Ravens scores are low. The small HSP low Raven’s group may 
explain why results did not reach significance. 




Figure G7.2. Condition×Trial×Sensitivity×Ravens interaction for HSPS (E,N) residuals groups. a) 
and b) are HSPs in low and high Ravens groups, c) and d) are non-HSPs in low and high Ravens 
groups, respectively. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Latent Inhibition and Creativity 
Response times. The mixed ANOVA results are presented in Table 7.3. No effects were 
found for RIBS or ATTA measures (ps>.05). For the CAQ, the Condition×Creativity×Ravens 
interaction was significant (p=.027). Figure 7.3 shows the core LI effect collapsed across trial 
blocks. LI is greater for high versus low CAQ groups when Ravens scores are low as mean response 
times are slightly faster for PE versus NPE in low Ravens and low CAQ groups, whereas LI is 
greater for low versus high CAQ groups when Ravens scores are high. Thus LI is low in groups 
high in both CAQ and Ravens or low in both. However, the Condition×Trial×Creativity×Ravens 
interaction was also significant, visualized in Figure 7.4, which shows how LI effects change across 
trials depending on level of creative achievement and intelligence. The LI effect increases across 
trials in groups with high CAQ and low Ravens and groups with low CAQ and high Ravens. Thus 
LI learning is low in groups high in both CAQ and Ravens or low in both. Note, the group sizes for 
high (n=24) versus low (n=11) creative achievement when Ravens scores are high, and high (n=15) 
versus low (n=23) creative achievement when Ravens scores are low. 
To interpret the 3-way Condition×Creativity×Ravens interaction, planned contrasts were 
performed by splitting data by Ravens groups in a Condition×Creativity mixed ANOVA using 
CAQ group as a between-groups factor. The mixed ANOVA revealed that the 
Condition×Creativity interaction approached significance for low Ravens groups, F(1,36)=3.94, 
p=.055, ηp.²=.099, but was not significant for high Ravens groups (p=.224). For low Ravens 
groups, the overall LI RT effects (PE minus NPE condition RTs) are marginally greater in the high 
(M=94ms, 95% CI[2,195]) versus low (M=-25ms, 95% CI[-96,41]) CAQ groups, t(36)=1.99, 
p=.055. For high Ravens, the overall LI effects are lower for high (M=38ms, 95% CI[-11, 87]) 
versus low (M=117ms, 95% CI[-17, 269]) CAQ groups, but not significantly so (p=.224). Note, 
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positive values for LI RTs indicate latent inhibition was present, whereas zero or negative scores 
indicate an absence of latent inhibition (Evans et al., 2007). Thus our analysis shows that CAQ 
group differences in LI are only observed in low Ravens groups, and within low Ravens groups, 
LI is lower in low versus high CAQ groups, however there is a trend towards lower LI in high CAQ 
high Ravens groups. 
To interpret the 4-way Condition×Trial×Creativity×Ravens interaction, planned contrasts 
were performed by splitting data by Ravens groups. To interpret the condition×trial 
block×creativity interaction, each trial block (vs. baseline trial block 1) within the interaction was 
assessed (with no correction). For high Ravens groups, the mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 
3-way interaction, F(6,191)=2.15, p=.052, ηp.²=.061. For low Ravens groups, the interaction was 
not significant (p=.13). The Hochberg method of adjustment for family-wise error revealed that for 
high Ravens groups, the LI effect was significantly different between CAQ groups for trial blocks 
9, 5, 6, and 10, in descending order of significance (ps<.01). Figure 7.4 shows that in high Ravens 
groups, low versus high CAQ groups show stronger LI with a greater decrease in reaction times in 
trial blocks 9, 5, 6, and 10 (vs. trial block 1) for NPE versus PE conditions.  
Overall, when response time performance by condition is collapsed across trials, CAQ 
group differences in LI are only observed in low Ravens groups, and within low Ravens groups, 
LI is lower in low versus high CAQ groups, although when Ravens scores are high, response times 
trend towards lower LI in high versus low CAQ groups. However, further analysis by trial block 
suggests that LI RT effects are observable between high versus low CAQ groups when Ravens is 
high. Specifically, when Ravens scores are high, lower LI is observed in high versus low CAQ 
groups over 4 trial blocks, thus suggesting that high versus low CAQ groups have lower LI and 
stronger LI, when Ravens scores are high and low, respectively. 




Figure G7.3. Condition×Creativity×Ravens (IQ) interaction with mean response times for the 
CAQ. PE and NPE are pre-exposure and non pre-exposure conditions, respectively. Error bars 
show 95% confidence intervals. 




Figure G7.4. Condition×Trial×Creativity×Ravens interaction for CAQ groups. a) and b) are low 
and high Ravens groups with high CAQ scores, c) and d) are low and high Ravens groups with 
high CAQ scores. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Correct predictive responses. The mixed ANOVA did not reveal any effects for RIBS or 
ATTA (ps>.05). For the CAQ, a significant Condition×Creativity×Ravens interaction was found 
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(p=.016). Figure 7.5 shows the LI CPR effect where CAQ group differences in LI CPR emerge 
across Ravens group. Specifically, when Ravens scores are low, LI is stronger in high versus low 
CAQ groups. Conversely, when Ravens scores are high, LI is lower in high versus low CAQ 
groups.  
To interpret the 3-way Condition×Creativity×Ravens interaction, planned contrasts were 
performed by splitting data by Ravens groups in a Condition×Creativity mixed ANOVA using 
CAQ group as a between-groups factor. For low Ravens groups, LI CPR effects (NPE minus PE 
condition CPRs) across conditions are significantly different across CAQ groups, F(1,36)=5.32, 
p=.027, ηp.²=.129, whereas for high Ravens groups, no significant Condition×CAQ interaction 
emerges (p=.214). When Ravens scores are low, high CAQ groups have stronger mean LI CPR 
effects (M=2.73, 95% CI[.6,5.25]) than low CAQ groups (M=-.22, 95% CI[.84,-1.29]), t(36)=2.31, 
p=.027. When Ravens scores are high, high CAQ groups trend towards lower mean LI CPR effects 
(M=.71, 95% CI[-.32,1.87]) than low CAQ groups (M=2.55, 95% CI[-.2,5.8]), p=.214. Note, 
positive values for LI CPR indicate latent inhibition was present, whereas zero or negative scores 
indicate an absence of latent inhibition (Evans et al., 2007). 
Overall, these results show that LI CPR effects are stronger in high versus low creative 
achievement when intelligence is low, but high versus low CAQ groups trend towards lower LI 
CPR effects when intelligence is high. 




Figure G7.5. Condition×Creativity×Ravens interaction with total trials (n=20) minus correct 
predictive responses (CPR) for the CAQ groups. PE and NPE are pre-exposure and non pre-
exposure conditions, respectively. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.  
(Alternative) Discussion 
In this study, a latent inhibition effect was found where responses were slower and less 
predictive in PE versus NPE conditions, although order effects were also found for response times, 
suggesting that the manipulation did not work when “S” was the pre-exposed stimulus. Further, 
intelligence measured with the Ravens short-form measure (Arthur Jr & Day, 1994) did not interact 
with the LI effects, or correlate with LI variables, suggesting LI in this within-subjects task is not 
directly influenced by general intellectual ability. 
The purpose of the study was to understand how individual differences in sensitivity and 
creativity manifest in measures of latent inhibition. We tested the hypothesis that sensitivity and 
creativity relate to LI RT and LI CPR, treating creativity and sensitivity as dichotomous and 
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continuous variables with respective ANOVA and regression analysis. Considering the sensitivity 
and creativity variables as dichotomous, no sensitivity or creativity group differences in LI response 
times or number of correct predictive responses were found, providing no support for the 
hypothesis that high sensitivity or high creativity would be associated with low latent inhibition. 
However, some effects emerge when intelligence is considered as an interactive term.  
No evidence was found that higher sensitivity is associated with low LI. With Ravens short-
form scores as a between-groups factor in the mixed ANOVA, larger LI RT effects as learning 
progresses are observed in HSPS (E,N) HSP groups with low Ravens scores versus all other groups, 
suggesting LI is stronger in HSP groups with lower intelligence and negative affect controlled, 
although this group difference did not reach conventional levels of significance (i.e., p<.05).  
Regarding creativity, previous findings suggest that creative achievement is associated with 
low LI, especially when intelligence is high (Carson et al., 2003). Thus, we expected to find that 
ii) high creativity and high intelligence will be associated with the lowest LI effects for both LI 
response times and correct predictive responses. Consistent with the hypothesis and previous 
findings (Carson et al., 2003), Figure 7.3, 7.5 and Figure 7.5 shows that LI is reduced in high versus 
low creative achievement when intelligence is high. Whilst low LI CPR effects in high creative, 
high intelligence groups is a non-significant trend, convincing evidence of low LI in high creative 
achievement and high intelligence groups emerges when LI RT effects are analysed by trial block. 
Specifically, we find that low LI is observed across several mid to late trial blocks in high versus 
low creative achievers, but only when intelligence is high. Conversely, LI (RT and CPR) is stronger 
in high versus low creative achievers with low Ravens scores. These results imply that participants 
high in creative achievement have both lower LI and stronger LI, when Ravens scores are high and 
low, respectively. On the other hand, low LI is also apparent in people with both low intelligence 
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and low creative achievement. 
Considering sensitivity and creativity as continuous variables with greater power to detect 
effects (MacCallum et al., 2002), correlation analysis was used to explore relationships between 
sensitivity, personality and creativity with LI RT and LI CPR variables. Overall, sensitivity, 
personality and creativity show non-significant weak positive correlations with LI measures, and 
sensitivity and creative achievement show the highest correlations. Recall that positive values for 
LI RT and LI CPR (PE minus NPE for RT; NPE minus PE for CPR) indicate latent inhibition was 
present, whereas zero or negative scores indicate an absence of latent inhibition (Evans et al., 2007). 
Lack of significant correlations between sensitivity, creativity and LI measures could suggest that 
LI was attenuated, or not present, providing some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that LI 
effects should not, or correlate negatively with creativity and sensitivity measures. However, the 
correlations are positive in direction across all variables, and lack of significance of this relationship 
could relate to sample size, as stable correlation estimates require a sample size approaching 250 
(Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013) versus N=73 used in this study. Thus, correlations provide no 
support for the hypothesis that higher sensitivity, openness and creativity are characterized by low 
LI. Notably, some effects in the dichotomous group analysis went in the opposite direction (e.g., 
in low intelligence, high sensitivity and creative achievement are associated with higher LI), and 
LI tends to be lower in groups high or low in both dimensions (i.e., high IQ and CAQ or low IQ 
and CAQ). Previous research using high IQ groups (Carson et al., 2003) would have captured only 
the former (LI is lower when CAQ is high in high IQ groups). This finding is most readily 
interpreted within a multiple intelligence framework (Gardner, 2011b), as insofar as IQ and CAQ 
capture different aspects of cognition/intelligence, there appears to be a trade-off such that LI 
occurs when either IQ or CAQ is high but is reduced when IQ and CAQ are both either high or low 
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(i.e., the extremes). 
Further, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used test the hypothesis that latent 
inhibition is one shared underlying mechanism of the sensitive, open creator that can account for 
unique variance in models predicting creativity, but in the presence of sensitivity and openness 
measures is made redundant. Moreover, no effects relating to LI were found. In particular, LI RT 
or LI CPR did not account for unique variance in any creativity measures, nor did LI measures 
create redundancy of sensitivity and openness coefficients accounting for unique variance in 
creativity scores (see Chapter 2 for relationship between sensitivity and creativity, including data 
from this study). Ravens scores accounted for significant unique CAQ variance in the regression 
models, consistent with previous findings (Carson et al., 2003), but Ravens scores were redundant 
in the presence of openness to experience. Overall, findings provide no evidence that LI is a 
common mechanism underlying sensitivity, openness, and creativity. 
Conclusions 
 The key findings from this within-subjects LI task are that a) LI tends to be lower in 
participants high or low in dimensions of creative achievement and intelligence. Moreover, 
whenever either CAQ or intelligence is low, LI is higher for groups high than low on the other 
dimension, suggesting that higher creativity and higher intelligence are qualitatively different 
processes for dealing with novelty effectively. Results also suggest b) LI is stronger in higher 
sensitivity with lower intelligence and negative affect controlled. Further, c) LI does not appear to 
be a unifying mechanism in the relationship between sensitivity, openness and creativity. 
In this study, we present evidence that supports the hypothesis, and replicates prior findings 
(Carson et al., 2003), of low LI in higher creative achievement and higher intelligence. However, 
evidence reported is not consistent with the hypothesis that sensitivity is characterized by low LI, 
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or previous observations of low LI in higher openness personality (Peterson & Carson, 2000). One 
explanation for the lack of evidence for low LI in sensitivity includes the possibility that within-
subjects designs of the LI task lack sensitivity to detect individual differences in LI. For example, 
Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.5 show CAQ group differences in LI effects that differ by Ravens scores 
in the direction predicted, however those group effects were not significant when trial block was 
not considered. Consistent with this, Gray et al. (2003) show that within-subjects LI tasks are 
insensitive to LI effects between high and low schizotypy personality groups which are observed 
with between-groups LI tasks, wherein the magnitude of effects are larger. In addition, the lack of 
task sensitivity could be explained by order effects, as LI effects were only observed in half of the 
participants pre-exposed to “H” stimuli, thus larger group differences would be diminished through 
averaging across all participants, including those pre-exposed to “S” stimuli. Finally, lack of group 
differences in the direction predicted could also be explained by inadequate sample sizes per group 
(ns<30) in the ANOVA analysis (cf. Carson et al., 2003) and overall sample size (N<250) in the 
correlation and regression analysis (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). Thus, the null hypothesis of 
normal LI in the sensitive, open creator cannot be rejected in this study using either a) a within-
subjects task, or b) inadequate sample sizes. 
Nonetheless, significant group differences indicate a more complex picture than previous 
research. LI is higher for groups high than low on the other dimension (e.g., high intelligence and 
low CAQ), whereas LI tends to be lower in groups high or low in both dimensions (i.e., high 
intelligence and CAQ or low intelligence and CAQ). Previous research revealed the former (high 
intelligence and high CAQ), but we additionally report that LI is also lower in groups low on both 
IQ and CAQ. 
 




Summary output of mixed ANOVA on response times showing main effects and interactions for 
within-groups factor of condition and trial, and between-groups factors of pre-exposure 
condition (Order) and Ravens group 
  F df ηp² 
Main effects      
Condition 4.4* 1,69 .06 
Trial 10.42*** 9,621 .131 
Order .43 1,69 .006 
Ravens .54 1,69 .008 
2-way interactions      
Condition×Trial 1.47 9,621 .021 
Condition×Ravens 1.42 1,69 .02 
Condition×Order 6.18* 1,69 .082 
3-way interactions      
Condition×Trial×Ravens .54 9,621 .008 
Condition×Trial×Order 1.06 9,621 .015 
4-way interactions      
Condition×Trial×Ravens×Order .68 9,621 .01 















Summary output of mixed ANOVA on accuracy showing main effects and interactions for within-
groups factor of condition, and between-groups factors of pre-exposure condition (Order) and 
Ravens group 
  F ηp² 
Main effects     
Condition 5.51* .074 
Order .43 .006 
Ravens 1.11 .016 
2-way interactions     
Condition×Ravens .22 .003 
Condition×Order 2.33 .033 
3-way interactions     
Condition×Ravens×Order .68 .01 
Note. * p<.05; ηp²=partial eta squared; degrees of freedom (df1, df2)=(1,69). 
Table G7.3 
Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing response time main effects and interactions for 
within-groups factor of condition and trial, and between-groups factors of Ravens group and 
creativity for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA 
 CAQ RIBS ATTA 
  F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Main effects             
Creativity .66 .009 .65 .009 .88 .013 
2-way interactions          
Condition×Creativity .21 .003 .04 .001 .17 .002 
3-way interactions             
Condition×Creativity×Ravens 5.1* .069 .59 .008 .33 .005 
Condition×Trial×Creativity .84 .012 1.68 .024 .66 .009 
4-way interactions             
Condition×Trial×Creativity×Ravens 2.78** .039 1.44 .02 .61 .009 
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01, Ravens=Ravens Advanved Progressive Matrices short-form; 
CAQ=Creative Achievements Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; 
ATTA=Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults 
 
 




Summary output of mixed ANOVA showing correct response main effects and interactions for 
within-groups factor of condition and trial, and between-groups factors of Ravens group and 
creativity for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA 
  CAQ RIBS ATTA 
  F ηp² F ηp² F ηp² 
Main effects             
Creativity .74 .011 .52 .007 1.4 .02 
2-way interactions            
Condition×Creativity .33 .005 .05 .001 .45 .006 
3-way interactions             
Condition×Creativity×Ravens 6.16* .082 1.59 .023 .01 0 
Note. * p<.05, Ravens=Ravens Advanved Progressive Matrices short-form; CAQ=Creative 
Achievements Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA=Abbreviated 
Torrance Test for Adults 
 
Table G7.5 
Spearman’s correlations between creativity, sensitivity, personality and intelligence variables 
and latent inhibition response times and number of correct predictive responses 
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3 Note: Ravens=Ravens Advanved Progressive Matrices short-form; CAQ=Creative Achievement Questionnaire; RIBS=Runco 
Ideational Behaviour Scale; ATTA=Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults; HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); 
OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; HSPS (E,N)=full HSPS with Big Five Inventory (BFI) extraversion and neuroticism 
partialled out; OS (E,N)=full ATQ-OS with BFI extraversion and neuroticism partialled out; O=openness to experience factor of 
the BFI; C=conscientiousness factor of the BFI; E=extraversion factor of the BFI; A=agreeableness factor of the BFI; 









Hierarchical multiple regression with LI response times, intelligence, sensitivity and personality 
predicting creativity for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA 
 HSPS ATQ-OS 
 CAQ RIBS ATTA CAQ RIBS ATTA 
Model 1       
LI RT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Model 2       
LI RT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ravens .217* .019 .114 .217* .019 .114 
Model 3       
LI RT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ravens .204* -.003 .108 .185* -.03 .104 
Sensitivity .247* .389*** .112 .386*** .588*** .116 
Model 4       
LI RT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ravens .207* -.024 .111 .193** -.04 .107 
Sensitivity .254 .412*** .057 .381** .512*** .092 
BFI-E -.04 .237** 0 -.096 .159* -.027 
BFI-N -.023 .057 .062 0 .175* .074 
Model 5       
LI RT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ravens .118 -.093 .099 .118 -.073 .106 
Sensitivity -.062 .169 .016 -.035 .33* .086 
BFI-E -.104 .187** -.022 -.097 .158* -.027 
BFI-N .068 .126 .074 .042 .177** .074 
BFI-O .491* .377*** .063 .487** .214 .008 
Model fit (R2)       
Model 1 .005 -.01 -.014 .005 -.01 -.014 
Model 2 .058* -.024 .002 .058* -.024 .002 
Model 3 .122* .2*** .014 .177* .343*** .008 
Model 4 .098 .278* -.007 .174 .401* .001 
Model 5 .249*** .388*** -.018 .248*** .413 -.014 
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01,*** p<.001; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; LI RT=Latent inhibition response times (mean PE 
– mean NPE); HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; BFI-N=neuroticism 
factor of the Big Five Inventory; BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-O=openness to experience factor of the Big Five 








Hierarchical multiple regression with LI correct predictive response, intelligence, sensitivity and 
personality predicting creativity for CAQ, RIBS and ATTA 
 HSPS ATQ-OS 
 CAQ RIBS ATTA CAQ RIBS ATTA 
Model 1       
LI CPR .005 -.001 0 .005 -.001 0 
Model 2       
LI CPR .005 -.001 0 .005 -.001 0 
Ravens .224* .019 .114 .224* .019 .114 
Model 3       
LI CPR .005 -.002 0 .004 -.002 0 
Ravens .209* -.003 .108 .191* -.031 .104 
Sensitivity .25* .392*** .112 .389*** .592*** .116 
Model 4       
LI CPR .005 -.003 0 .005 -.002 0 
Ravens .213* -.028 .111 .199* -.042 .107 
Sensitivity .256 .421*** .057 .383*** .515*** .093 
BFI-E -.035 .241** -.013 -.091 .164* -.026 
BFI-N -.02 .05 .061 .041 .173* .074 
Model 5       
LI CPR .004 -.004 0 .004 -.003 0 
Ravens .122 -.098 .099 .122 -.078 .106 
Sensitivity -.06 .175 .016 -.032 .321*** .086 
BFI-E -.099 .191** -.021 -.093 .162* -.026 
BFI-N .07 .12 .073 .045 .175** .074 
BFI-O .49*** .382*** .064 .486** .227 .008 
Model fit (R2)       
Model 1 -.001 -.013 -.014 -.001 -.013 -.014 
Model 2 .056* -.027 .002 .056* -.027 .002 
Model 3 .122* .202*** .014 .177*** .346*** .008 
Model 4 .097 .285** -.007 .174 .405* .001 
Model 5 .248*** .398*** -.018 .247** .42 -.015 
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01,*** p<.001; RIBS=Runco Ideational Behaviour Scale; LI CPR=Latent inhibition correct predictive 
responses (NPE-PE); HSPS=Highly Sensitive Person Scale (full); ATQ-OS=orienting sensitivity factor of the ATQ; BFI-
N=neuroticism factor of the Big Five Inventory; BFI-E=extraversion factor of the BFI; BFI-O=openness to experience factor of 
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